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Reason is the special embodiment in us of the disciplined 
counter-agency which saves the world.
Alfred North Whitehead
Yet what needs doing, could he see his and his world’s true 
need, he could do, no one else so capable of it or so ready for 
it. He could. It’s a free country. But it will take a change of 
consciousness. So phenomenology becomes politics.
Stanley Cavell
To hear that somebody has ‘converted’ immediately brings to mind 
the idea that they have gone through some kind of ‘religious expe-
rience’ whose outcome was a change of faith, that is, a transforma-
tion or reorientation of belief. But from the outset, such a conversion 
also has its place in philosophy, marked initially by the experience 
of wonder that Socrates described as the first and only beginning for 
both philosophy and the philosopher,1 even if today we can recognize 
Nietzsche’s foresight in calling for a philosophy that would begin 
not with wonder but with dread.2 In truth, whether wonder or dread, 
such a beginning is not just an experience but an interruption of one 
way of seeing through which another way of seeing opens up: so it 
amounts to a conversion of the gaze. But such a transformation also 
sounds awfully like the starting point of that particular philosophy 
that is Husserlian phenomenology, which seeks a way into phenomena 
through an interruption of the ordinary that Husserl sometimes calls 
the ‘natural attitude’ – this phenomenology begins with an epokhē. 
Bernard Stiegler begins to philosophize, we would like to argue, 
thanks to just such a conversion of the gaze, and this inauguration 
is followed by two others, the third of which is expressed in the col-
lected texts that compose this volume.
Long before the invention and institution of the university, philos-
ophy was a way of approaching the question of how to live, a way 
that, if it does indeed arise from out of an individual experience of the 
extraordinary (or, rather, of the extraordinariness of the ordinary) that 
we could call ‘existential’, is nevertheless immediately drawn into the 
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collective problem of how to live with others, which is to say in the 
city, the city as a problem, and a problem occurring, always, within 
the specificity and locality of a ‘here and now’: this is its epochal-
ity. If the condition of possibility of the first proto-human gatherings 
was the acquisition of fire that provided so many benefits so long as 
it was carefully tended, and the condition of possibility of sedenta-
rization was the development of agriculture that promised to diminish 
the risks to subsistence so long as the grain and the cattle were care-
fully cultivated (with all the invocations of cosmic beneficence this 
required), the condition of possibility of the political city was, above 
all, the invention of alphabetical writing, which, so long as it was 
widely taught and learned, opened the possibility of a law that was 
public, deliberative and (thanks to its exactitude) interpretative – that 
is, requiring decision. Such an innovation opens, therefore, the pos-
sibility of deciding otherwise, of re-organizing collective existence 
within a particular locality, and thereby ‘spontaneously’ raises the 
question, which is to say the challenge and the problem, of the basis 
(that is, the reasons and motives) on which to do so. Hence: if it is true 
that questions become possible when they become necessary, then the 
necessity that led to the question of philosophy was, above all, that 
imposed by the city in crisis, and in strife – threatened with stasis.
Let us say, then, that the discipline of ‘philosophy’ – assuming that 
something more than nostalgia lies behind our desire to hold onto this 
name for what has mostly become either academic scholasticism or 
publishing fashion, hence without ruling out that something bearing 
this name may indeed have died yesterday or the day before, and yet 
recognizing that it may be in the encounter with its own exposed mor-
tality that it will finally and for the first time have the opportunity 
to become what it promises to be (which may, who knows, require 
some other name than philosophy) – let us say that philosophy always 
involves, in one way or another, taking the measure of ‘today’, that is, 
of the epoch in which it is (almost always) written, so that, making an 
advance upon that epoch, and through the socialization of the ideas 
advanced by the writer and the desires they express, there is hope of 
fruitfully surpassing that epoch, or, in other words, of performatively 
and affirmatively contributing to the necessity of its individuation. 
But this is also to say that, in feeling the necessity of questions that 
may hitherto have remained generally opaque, the philosopher strives 
to make the difference through which this necessity becomes ours, 
and so contribute to the transformation of our shared milieu by mak-
ing possible the adoption of an imagined but possible future, how-
ever improbable.
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If so, what do we make of, say, the epoch of the last ten years? 
Surely the following five milestones, signposts, symptoms and ten-
dencies would be among those requiring delineation and critique:
 ▪ on 26 September 2006, Facebook was made universally 
available, opening what was to become the age no longer 
just of the digital (with the integrated circuit dating from 
1958 and the first CPU from 1971), or of the network (with 
the global opening of the World Wide Web in April 1993) 
but of the ‘social’ digital network, whose effects have thus 
far proven to be, paradoxically, overwhelmingly and liter-
ally anti-social (in spite and because of the relentless rise 
of its ‘popularity’), as well as, in a sense, anti-network, in 
that such networks largely consist in a systematic attempt 
to maintain users within an algorithmically-controlled and 
increasingly image-based ‘feed’, and to diminish interac-
tion with a links-based internet3;
 ▪ on 29 June 2007, Apple launched its first iPhone, opening 
the age of the capacitive multi-touch ‘smartphone’, that 
is, of the ubiquitous, portable and permanently-connected 
input/output screen, which has become the two-way inter-
face through which ‘users’ experience virtually all exter-
nal events and their own (Facebook-mediated) lives, while 
simultaneously relaying the ‘data’ they produce through 
interacting with these touchable screens back to the algo-
rithmic programs of the electronic Leviathan;
 ▪ by the end of 2007, the ‘subprime mortgage crisis’ in the 
United States had become manifest, exposing the corrupt 
character of financialization and the highly speculative 
character of ‘investment’, as well as the irrational reliance 
on automated high-speed trading, leading in September 
2008 to the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the unfold-
ing of a global financial crisis whose causes were largely 
identifiable but proposed solutions for which were non-
systemic and in any case left unimplemented, resulting in 
worldwide economic stagnation (with the notable excep-
tions of Alphabet, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) combined 
with the continued risk of further bubbles and crises (such 
as in Greece);
 ▪ the disastrous foreign policy decisions of the United States 
going back to at least 1990, when George H. W. Bush 
launched Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
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and, after 9/11, to 2003, when George W. Bush launched 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, would continue to unfold their 
ever-proliferating consequences, through the turmoil and 
contradictions of the Facebook-mediated ‘Arab Spring’ 
(beginning in late 2010) and the resulting turmoil and con-
tradictions of the civil uprising in Syria (2011) that would 
lead to an extremely brutal civil war whose calamitous 
character would feed into the creation of the so-called 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (adopting this name in 
April 2013), leading in turn to a long sequence of attacks 
using guns, bombs and vehicles as deadly weapons, includ-
ing, among numerous others, the Charlie Hebdo shooting 
on 7 January 2015, the co-ordinated attacks in Paris on 13 
November 2015 and the Nice attack on 14 July 2016, along 
with all the turmoil and contradictions of the police, mili-
tary and ‘security’ responses to this wave of terrorism;
 ▪ we have seen the rapid development of artificial intelli-
gence technology (spearheaded by Alphabet) and robotic 
technology (exemplified by Amazon’s purchase of Kiva 
Systems in 2012, and subsequent cessation of all new cus-
tomer contracts), leading to many predictions of a com-
ing wave of automation that will lead to widespread job 
destruction no longer limited to manufacturing but instead 
extending to many other areas of employment, contribut-
ing to ‘disruptive’ ‘Uberization’ and potentially threatening 
the Fordist-Keynesian-welfare state compromise that has 
formed the crux of the redistribution process underpinning 
the consumerist, perpetual-growth macro-economic model 
that has reigned since the end of the Second World War.
Overarching all of these developments and tendencies, however, 
are two other challenges whose scale and profundity call out for a 
response, that is, for a theory and a practice capable of taking and 
assuming responsibility:
 ▪ there is the dawning awareness that industrialization in 
the nineteenth century and hyper-industrialization in the 
twentieth century has had numerous deleterious effects 
that are now being felt at the level of the biosphere itself, 
including (but not limited to) the crisis of climate change, 
leading to the proposal that we have entered into a new 
geological epoch, the Anthropocene (whose adoption 
was recommended by the working group dedicated to 
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this question on 29 August 2016), an epoch in which such 
anthropogenic effects would have become the major con-
tributor to geophysical change, or, in other words, an epoch 
coincident with the ‘anthropization’ of the planet and its 
systems, while threatening, in its unsustainability, to lead to 
its eventual de-anthropization;
 ▪ there is, finally, all about us, evidence of a deterioration 
of political faith, belief, trust, hope and will, and a corre-
sponding rise of a desperate, reactionary and xenophobic 
anti-politics all too willing to designate scapegoats and 
appeal at every opportunity to fear and stupidity, culmi-
nating (so far) in the election (on 8 November 2016) of a 
reality-TV huckster to the presidency of the United States of 
America and a growing understanding that a polity of per-
formatively-generated filter bubbles, of ‘audiences’ rather 
than citizens, no longer conforms to the minimum require-
ments of ‘democracy’ understood as a representative system 
in which the power to make collective decisions resides in 
the demos – the so-called Trumpocene being, above all, a 
‘post-democratic’ worldless world in which collective deci-
sion becomes strictly speaking impossible, because truth 
itself, losing its effective actuality, has somehow come to 
seem an irrelevant and obsolescent criterion.
Countless scholarly and popular works have already been written on 
all seven of these profound challenges. These are, once again: (1) the 
rise of social networks; (2) the growth of the ubiquitous interactive 
screen; (3) the global financial crisis as symptomatic of the tendency 
of investment to become increasingly short-term and speculative; (4) 
the proliferation of geopolitical crises, terrorism and related forms of 
individual and collective acting out; (5) automation as a threat to a 
consumerist macro-economic system founded on employment-based 
purchasing power; (6) the Anthropocene as an ‘existential threat’ to 
human existence and the biosphere; and (7) the unfurling of the con-
sequences of industrially-generated populism, including the entrance 
into a so-called ‘post-truth’ age. Some of the books on these topics 
are undoubtedly fine works, indeed important ones. But, in rela-
tion to these challenges, two things are undeniable, and, in truth, 
at some level understood by everyone: on the one hand, these chal-
lenges all tend to combine and synergistically reinforce one another, 
in particular in terms of their destructive characteristics; on the other 
hand, they are all in contradiction with each other, so that a proposed 
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solution to a problem associated with one of these challenges inevita-
bly has the effect of antagonistically diminishing potential solutions 
to other challenges.
Does anyone really believe that it is possible to ‘solve’ the prob-
lems of climate change, habitat destruction and cultural destruction 
without addressing the consumerist basis of the present macro-eco-
nomic system, or vice versa, or without addressing the way in which 
this system depletes the psychic energy required to find the collective 
will, belief, hope and reason to address this planetary challenge? Can 
this consumerism really survive the coming wave of automation that 
threatens to decimate its customer base and undermine the ‘consumer 
confidence’ that is fundamental to its perpetual growth requirements, 
themselves antithetical, once again, to the problems of biospherical 
preservation? How can the collective intelligence and will required to 
address these problems be found, when these are precisely what thou-
sands of the world’s best engineers are working so hard to dismantle 
algorithmically and telecratically, in order to extract every possible 
cent from advertisers in their perpetual quest to hijack attention and 
seize control of behaviour? And, in a world where stupidity and mad-
ness seem to be systemically produced, and where economic despera-
tion continues to force journalism to regress to the cheapest (in all 
senses of the word) forms of sensationalism, what hope is there of pre-
venting the growth not just of terrorism, but of suicidal and homicidal 
behaviours of all kinds, in turn contributing to the rise of far right 
movements, as has been seen throughout the industrial democracies?
In short, all these problems amount to the eschatological questions 
that arise when a system reaches its limits. What do we mean by a 
system? Any system is a bounded (that is, limited) dynamic process 
that always arises from out of certain background conditions (from 
a preindividual milieu), in so doing achieving relative stability. But 
if it is bounded (marked by a boundary), for a system to maintain its 
relative stability (and therefore relative instability – ‘metastability’), 
it must nevertheless be open to exchanges that exceed those bounds, 
and that ‘feed’ the system: it is only through the economy of such 
circulations that it can remain within its limit conditions, whether 
the system is a spiral galaxy, a hurricane, a cell, an organ, an organ-
ism, an ecosystem or a technical infrastructure with its correspond-
ing social and cultural systems. A closed system, cut off from any 
outside, is sure, sooner or later, to collapse. But an open system, too, 
insofar as it is dynamic, is only ever relatively stable, and once certain 
thresholds (limit conditions) are crossed, the system can only trans-
form its character (becoming another system of a different kind) or 
fall apart – dis-integrate. When multiple limits are reached more or 
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less simultaneously, the process through which a system either trans-
forms or destroys itself can only be hastened and intensified (which 
does not mean that it cannot last a long time). It seems entirely justifi-
able to see the unfolding convergence of limits reached by the present 
technical, social and ecological systems as amounting to a systemic 
crisis equivalent to a Category 7 Shitstorm.
What task, then, falls to the philosopher who so measures the char-
acter of an epoch in crisis, other than to critique those limits in their 
synergistic and antagonistic convergence, either to try and illuminate 
the path that turns the system towards the least destructive and most 
beneficial phase-shift imaginable, or, if it is too late for the catastro-
phe to be averted, to provide resources to those who, coming after 
the apocalypse, have no choice but to forge something new from out 
of the ashes (assuming there is someone and not just ashes)? To raise 
such a question risks being accused of purveying unduly pessimistic 
prophecies of doom. Such accusations have for many years, of course, 
been levelled not at philosophers but at climatologists – by so-called 
climate ‘skeptics’ and ‘deniers’. That these deniers are indeed in 
denial, and that scientists are not simply melodramatic purveyors of 
mass hysteria, is a judgment we continue to make based on the con-
tinuing belief we are able to maintain in the ‘objectivity’ of the scien-
tific research that lies behind the modelling of future scenarios.
Climate modelling is an example of a field of knowledge that 
involves analysis of converging limits, but where these are the limits 
that fall within the fields covered by the sciences dedicated to describ-
ing the conditions of geological, meteorological, oceanic and ecologi-
cal systems – systems for which this objectivity remains best practice. 
If we are to understand the character of our epoch, however, we must 
indeed pursue an understanding of the limits of all these physical and 
biophysical systems, but, at the same time, we must also understand 
the converging technical, economic, social, cultural and psychological 
limits of the systems of human existence. Furthermore, the so-called 
Anthropocene, as a proposed geological epoch, is not just a ques-
tion for geological science, but a challenge, even a disruption: if the 
established objective method for epochal division depends on the long 
timescales associated with stratigraphy, the rapidity of anthropized 
change since the advent of the industrial revolution upsets the very 
basis on which such determinations have hitherto been made.
In this situation, a synthesis of various scientifically objective 
fields of research cannot suffice: what is required exceeds the divi-
sion and conflict of the faculties. Why? Because this convergence of 
limits involves the question, the stakes, the conditions, the categories 
and the future of knowledge as such – that is, the faculty of reason 
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as such, or rather, in Whiteheadian rather than Kantian terms, the 
function of reason. What the crisis represented by this convergence 
requires, in other words, is a new critique, if not a hyper-critique: if 
the ‘post-truth’ age is one in which thinking itself is fundamentally 
challenged by the Anthropocene as Gestell taken to its limits, where 
calculation becomes so hegemonic as to threaten the possibility of 
thinking itself, then what this age amounts to is the challenge to think 
at the limits of the thinkable, and to care enough to do so.
The set of thirteen texts of which this book is composed trace a 
path pursued by Bernard Stiegler as he seeks to respond to the criti-
cal imperative arising from the systemic crisis of which these seven 
challenges are symptoms. Some words of introduction to this path 
are advisable, perhaps, because the early reception of the work of 
this French philosopher has too often tended, in the Anglophone 
world, to hastily presume Stiegler to be little more than an unfaith-
ful acolyte of Jacques Derrida, one who, leavening his adoption of a 
deconstructive approach with an added dose of Leroi-Gourhan’s pal-
aeo-archaeology, unduly circumscribes ‘différance’ onto a material, 
positivist and anthropocentric basis that Derrida’s supposedly richer 
account had always already exceeded. But in addition to misjudg-
ing Stiegler’s work, and being too willing to accept that the notion of 
the ‘quasi-transcendental’ is sufficient to secure the foundations and 
future of Derrida’s conceptual innovations, the possibility of such a 
(mis)reading stems from taking its first expression, in the first volume 
of Technics and Time, as an offshoot of Derrida’s work, rather than as 
a genuine confrontation. But by giving consideration to its much ear-
lier provenance, it is possible to see how Stiegler’s philosophy is really 
against, but right up against, Derrida’s work – and also Heidegger’s.
More than one reason could be cited for the deficiencies of this 
(non)reception in the sphere of Anglophone philosophy. Technics 
and Time, 1, for example, resolutely ventured into fields and thinkers 
largely ignored by and uninteresting to this sphere, and did so pre-
cisely because, from the outset, Stiegler was concerned to take the 
measure of his ‘today’, and to exceed it in the direction of the future, 
as he indicated in the second paragraph of the introduction to the first 
part of that volume:
Today, we need to understand the process of technical evolu-
tion given that we are experiencing the deep opacity of con-
temporary technics; we do not immediately understand what 
is being played out in technics, nor what is being profoundly 
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transformed therein, even though we unceasingly have to 
make decisions regarding technics, the consequences of 
which are felt to escape us more and more. […] More pro-
foundly, the question is to know if we can predict and, if 
possible, orient the evolution of technics, that is, of power 
(puissance). What power (pouvoir) do we have over power 
(puissance)?4
But this reference to puissance, mobilized in a description of the 
powerlessness attending what Heidegger called Gestell, itself serves, 
in hindsight, as a clue: for, despite the influence of Simondon’s anti-
Aristotelianism, Stiegler’s thought in fact gets going through a con-
sideration of the relationship of potential and act, and of the passage à 
l’acte that would lead, much later, to the publication of the small work 
that would first describe Stiegler’s first ‘conversion of the gaze’.5
It was not until 2003, then, almost ten years after the publication of 
the first volume of Technics and Time and twenty years after this con-
version took place (but he had already stated in the preface to Technics 
and Time, 1 that the ‘first delineations’ of that work had occurred ten 
years earlier6), that Stiegler first described its general conditions:
My incarceration in Saint Michel Prison, result of a passage 
to the act, will have been the suspension of my acts and the 
interruption of my actions: such is the function of prison. 
But interruption and suspension, which are also the begin-
ning of philosophy (Socrates’ daimon is the one who inter-
rupts), were for myself the occasion of a reflection on what 
the passage to the act is in general – and a recollection of all 
the acts that brought me there.7
Through this suspension and interruption of the world that the young 
Stiegler brought upon himself by acting out, he is led to the question 
of potential and act, and, more specifically, to Aristotle’s account of 
three kinds of souls – the vegetative, the sensitive and the noetic soul 
– and to the way in which, according to Aristotle, the sensitive soul 
is actually sensitive, and the noetic soul actually noetic, only inter-
mittently, perpetually threatened, in other words, by the possibility of 
falling back.
Wherein lies the possibility of the soul’s elevation or regression, 
possibilities between which it consists in a kind of tension (that is, 
the tension of a struggle that he will come to understand as being 
between competing tendencies and counter-tendencies, and that 
equally amounts to the struggle to bind the drives, the struggle to sub-
limate broadly conceived)? What Stiegler learns from Aristotle is that 
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the answer to this question has everything to do with the milieu of 
that soul: whether, as in the case of sight, it is a matter of the diapha-
nous membrane that opens up the possibility of colour and therefore 
of visual perception, or, in the case of the fish, of water. This milieu, 
as what is closest, all-pervasive and most intimate, is what is most 
difficult to apprehend. It is what, in the ordinariness of existence, 
is easiest to forget: this milieu may be that which potentially gives 
rise to questions, but its very transparency is, strangely, what gives 
these questions a paradoxical opacity whose overcoming requires a 
converted gaze.
Stiegler himself practised, in his cell, in the suspension of the world 
made possible and unavoidable by his incarceration, what for him 
became a necessity: a kind of phenomenological laboratory (doing 
so in ignorance of Husserlian philosophy) that amounted to a reflec-
tion on the world-as-milieu as if from outside (like water perceived 
intermittently from ‘above’ by a flying fish). Through this process 
of experimentation, brought about by a suspension and interruption, 
he was brought to ask: what is the intimate, all-too-easily forgotten 
milieu of the noetic soul? Thinking at first that it may have been lan-
guage, he eventually concluded that it is, instead, much older, con-
sisting in that exteriorized milieu in general which is the realm of 
technics as such. And, what is more, to the realization that, in the 
absence of the exterior milieu, his interior milieu (that is, his noetic 
soul, or, spelled otherwise, his psychic apparatus) consisted in noth-
ing but the fabric of anamnesic memories woven and interwoven with 
the hymponesic traces left in and by artefacts (such as books) to which 
he continued to have limited access, forming an artificial memory and 
projective mechanism that would serve only to demonstrate, above 
all, the irreducibility of the exterior.
The noetic soul, the psychic apparatus, is, then, a struggle of ten-
dencies and counter-tendencies playing out within and between the 
interior milieu that it ‘is’ and the exterior milieu without which it 
does not exist. And, since the exterior milieu, the technical milieu, 
cannot form without the noetic activity that made possible its inven-
tion, Stiegler concludes in Technics and Time that the origin of the 
distinction between interior and exterior can only ever be understood 
as a ‘default of origin’. Hence if, as the preface to Technics and Time, 
1 states, the object of that work is ‘technics’, which will lead some 
to conclude that the author’s project to describe the ‘pursuit of life 
by means other than life’ amounts to an anthropocentrism premised 
on the exclusion of non-human tool use, what is really at stake with 
technics is the opening of a new process of conserving the past in the 
present: with the first inscriptions in matter of the gestures of the 
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inscriber, there begins to unfold a history of ‘organized inorganic mat-
ter’ inaugurating an artificial selection process that ultimately tends 
to suspend processes of natural selection. This new retentional pro-
cess, which is in some way the advent of new memory, grants access 
to the possibility of knowledge as such, because it opens up a trans-
generational process collectively conserving, accumulating and hence 
perpetually stabilizing and transforming the lessons of individual 
experience. It is for this reason that the noetic soul, arising after the 
default of origin, is a struggle of tendencies: this soul’s potential for 
elevation depends on the desire to know, requiring the constant under-
taking of practices of care and learning made possible by exteriorized 
memory, but perpetually threatened by the regressive possibilities of 
forgetting, barbarism, and, in general, of succumbing to the inhuman.
With this notion of a default of origin between the exterior and the 
interior, Stiegler will articulate his account (in Technics and Time, 1) 
of technical exteriorization as a ‘third kind of memory’ (in addition to 
genetic memory and nervous memory), that is, of the exterior milieu, 
with his critique and extension (in Technics and Time, 2) of Husserl’s 
account of the relationship between retention and perception, that is, 
of the interior milieu. For Husserl, striving to understand the phenom-
enal constitution of an experience of temporal continuity, the experi-
ence of objects in time (temporal objects such as a melody) cannot, 
strictly speaking, be composed of instants: the ‘instant’ just past must 
somehow be included in ‘present’ perception, and Husserl refers to 
this minimal form of inclusion as ‘primary retention’, just as he refers 
to ‘primary protention’ to refer to the minimal form of imagination 
involved in anticipating the next ‘instant’. But in Technics and Time, 
2, Stiegler undertakes to show that, if the process of primary retention 
cannot retain the whole field of what is perceptually given, then the 
retentional operation amounts to a selection within a field of possibili-
ties, and that this (mostly unconscious) selection must operate accord-
ing to criteria, and that the criteria for this selection must derive from 
the set of past primary retentions that have since become secondary 
retentions (or what we ordinarily refer to as memories), that is, from 
my accumulated ‘experience’.
Where, then, Derrida deconstructs the Husserlian distinction 
between primary and secondary retention as amounting to two 
modifications of non-presence that cannot possibly be kept sepa-
rate, Stiegler radicalizes it: Husserl may dismiss (until he eventually 
rethinks his entire project with ‘The Origin of Geometry’) imagistic 
artefacts such as busts or paintings as insignificant to the question of 
temporal perception on the grounds they make little or no difference 
to his account of primary and secondary retention and protention, but 
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Stiegler shows that, on the contrary, the protentional aspects of these 
‘tertiary retentions’ make it possible to gain a certain amount of con-
trol over the play between them. And they do so in two distinct ways: 
through all the processes of the transmission, stabilization and trans-
formation of information and knowledge that are the intergenerational 
processes of education and culture (what Stiegler calls ‘long circuits 
of transindividuation’); and through all those processes that make use 
of tertiary retention as a way of short-circuiting transindividuation, 
standardizing the retentional process in order to manipulate the pro-
tentional process (that is, processes of desire) and thereby turn con-
sumer behaviour into something calculable.
The history of technical exteriorization amounts, then, to the his-
tory of tertiary retention, where this unfolds as a history of technical 
systems. Again, systems are never stable but only metastable: nev-
ertheless, their systemic tendency, that is, their tendency to form a 
coherent, integrated whole in which all the parts are mutually inter-
dependent, means that all this unfolds as the history of the epochs 
of tertiary retention, beginning with all those prehistoric tools that 
are retentional only in an accidental way (not designed to be memory 
systems), and passing through all those epochs of hypomnesic (that 
is, intentionally retentional) tertiary retention, from cave painting 
to ideographic writing, alphabetical writing, the printing press, the 
gramophone, radio, cinema, television and eventually digital tertiary 
retention. This opens the pathway that Stiegler pursues in Technics 
and Time, 3, where, through a critique and account of Simondon, he 
begins to describe this articulation between technical exterioriza-
tion and tertiary retention in terms of the relationship between the 
history of technical systems and the history of what Simondon calls 
psychic and collective individuation. For, if tertiary retentional inno-
vation opens up the possibility of a succession of epochs, it does so 
only insofar as each of these innovations gives rise to new practices of 
these tertiary retentions, which are always practices of care.
This in turn leads, through a critique of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, to the argument that, if the transcendental schematism (that 
is, the capacity for imaginative projection to synthesize the data of 
intuition with the analysis of the understanding) has a tertiary reten-
tional basis, then what Adorno and Horkheimer called the culture 
industry does not amount to a technological substitute for the sche-
matism (since the latter has always been technological), but rather to 
its industrialization. What is really required, Stiegler argues in that 
volume, is an understanding of the specificity of the cinematic (and 
so televisual) epoch of tertiary retention, and the way it opens up 
new protentional possibilities, vast new forms of the elaboration and 
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control of desire, that set in motion the adoptive processes that are 
consumerist capitalism and the American way of life. Now, all ways 
of life may amount to such adoptive processes (a fact exposed by the 
‘law-making’ of Cleisthenes), but the relative stability of the techni-
cal system (that is, the slow pace of its transformation) meant that the 
Epimethean lag involved in responding to systemic changes did not 
threaten adoption itself. When, however, the technical system begins 
to change so rapidly that the adoptive processes of the social systems 
struggle to keep up, that is, to exceed technological transformations, 
and when the technoscientific industrialization of the imagination 
effected by the culture industry begins to short-circuit the inventive 
capacities of the psychic apparatuses of which society is composed – 
at that point adoption begins to be reduced to, and to regress towards, 
mere adaptation.
The French edition of Technics and Time, 3 was published in October 
2001. One month earlier, however, and obviously after the comple-
tion of that work, Stiegler, along with millions of others, bore wit-
ness, watching ‘live’, to a televised ‘blockbuster’ event in which he 
‘saw signs of a precipitation towards the worst’.8 The spectacular, 
awful events of 11 September 2001, along with the steady rise of the 
National Front, led him to what we can consider a second conversion 
of the gaze, as a result of which he would reorient his work and ‘write 
only in an absolutely direct, visible, legible and primary relation to 
questions of political economy: by politicizing phenomenological 
questions’.9 ‘So phenomenology becomes politics’, as Stanley Cavell 
put it more fifty years ago.10
Through this second conversion, Stiegler was able to crystallize his 
account of the relationship between exteriorization and individuation 
as his proposal for a three-stranded ‘general organology’ describing 
(and practising) the ‘transductive’ relations11 between the psychic and 
somatic organs of psychic individuation, the social organizations of 
collective individuation and the technical organs of technical indi-
viduation. The necessity of these three strands arises from the default 
of origin, that is, from the advent of those beings that we ourselves 
are inasmuch as we are neotenic and perpetually unfinished: in our 
incompletion, we find ourselves bound:
1 to produce artificial organs;
2 to learn to practise these artificial organs;
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3 to institute, for the purposes of such learning and such 
practices, social organizations that articulate the relations 
between the generations, metastabilizing the forms of 
knowledge that are these practices and these cares.
The primary analytical concept emerging from this general organol-
ogy, in this second phase of Stiegler’s work, is, however, grammatiza-
tion, taken up from Sylvain Auroux and greatly extended: while for 
Auroux, grammatization essentially describes the process that was 
necessary for speech to be broken down into the discrete elements 
of alphabetical writing, for Stiegler it refers to the broader analytical 
process by which temporal and perceptual flows of all kinds are ren-
dered discrete and reproducible through being spatialized. Through 
this extension, he is able to push the origin of the grammatization 
process backwards in time to the ‘arche-cinematic’ reproductions of 
Upper Palaeolithic cave painting, and to extend this process forwards, 
not just to the grammatization of visual and auditory perception that 
occurred with radio and cinema, but, prior to that, to the grammatiza-
tion of the manual gestures of the worker or the craftsman that are 
spatialized in being programmed into the machinery of the industrial 
revolution, and finally to what is unfolding right now: the grammati-
zation of ‘everything’ made possible by the inscription of binary code 
into central processing units composed of silicon.
The advantage of conceiving this highly extended process of gram-
matization, divided as it is into successive epochs that each require 
specific analysis, is to make plain the connection between the Socratic 
account (in the Phaedrus) of writing as a pharmakon that both aids 
and harms memory (that is, the ability to think for oneself) and the 
Marxist account (in the Grundrisse) of industrialization, accord-
ing to which:
the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general 
productive forces of the social brain, is thus absorbed into 
capital, as opposed to labour, and hence appears as an attri-
bute of capital, and more specifically of fixed capital, in so 
far as it enters into the production process as a means of pro-
duction proper.12
In the ancient Greece to which Socrates bore witness, as in the indus-
trial revolution to which Marx bore witness, the advent of a particu-
lar form of grammatized tertiary retention (alphabetical writing in 
the one case, the mechanical loom and a thousand other examples of 
industrial machinery in the latter) both facilitates new knowledge and 
threatens existing knowledge. Hence Stiegler elaborates, on the basis 
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of Socrates, Marx and Simondon, what is perhaps his fundamental 
political concept: proletarianization, understood as a process of the 
deprivation of knowledge, and of which Socrates is as such the first 
thinker. In the nineteenth century, it is work-knowledge (knowledge 
of how to make and do) that is proletarianized in the industrial revolu-
tion, and then, in the twentieth century, and especially in its second 
half, it is life-knowledge (knowledge of all the mores and manners 
and ways of living that make up ‘culture’) that comes to be proletari-
anized by the culture industry and marketing (which systematically 
target the formation of the youthful psychic apparatus and its atten-
tional capacities, or, in other words, systematically interfere with 
intergenerational relations and the processes of knowledge-transmis-
sion they facilitate). And now, in the twenty-first century, it is ratio-
nal and conceptual knowledge that finds itself increasingly absorbed 
into an ever more powerful computational apparatus: the successive 
epochs of grammatization have thus ultimately led to the progressive 
extension of the proletarianization described by Socrates and Marx to 
all areas of understanding and finally reason. In short, what Stiegler 
calls general organology, which is the thought and practice of the 
three strands of psychic, collective and technical individuation, con-
ceives technics in general, and tertiary retention in particular, as a 
pharmakon, that is, as requiring both a toxicology and a therapeutics.
One other crucial element in this second, pharmacological phase 
of Stiegler’s work is his attention not just to retention but to proten-
tion, that is, to the way in which the noetic soul is always also making 
an advance on what it perceives, which is to say that it projects its 
objects. This is what Stiegler refers to as arche-cinema: if the montage 
of primary retention (edited on the basis of selection criteria derived 
from accumulated secondary retentions) leads to new secondary 
retentions that may later be ‘recalled’ as images drawn from memory 
(and hence is always in some way a work both of reproduction and 
of imagination), so too protention cannot possibly end with the ‘pri-
mary’ process that ‘anticipates’ the immediately following ‘instant’ of 
a temporal process. On the contrary, anticipations extend outward to 
all manner of (conscious or unconscious) expectations, fears, desires, 
hopes, beliefs, motives, reasons and dreams (dreams whose images 
are realized by the technical beings that are noetic souls), and it is this 
protentional process that the tertiary retentions of marketing or cul-
ture all ultimately aim to control, because it is protention that decides 
behaviour insofar as it is not reduced to the impulses of the drives.
It is the industrialization of protention that, in the end, makes it 
possible not just for the analytical operations of the understanding to 
be proletarianized (that is, automated), but the synthetic faculties of 
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reason. But if Stiegler is thereby able to explain the process by which 
what Foucault called ‘disciplinary societies’ give way to what Deleuze 
called ‘control societies’, and eventually to what Stiegler calls ‘hyper-
control societies’ – by harnessing the production economy to the libid-
inal economy while making the latter serve the interests of the con-
sumerist market – Stiegler’s fundamental diagnosis is that the means 
of doing so ultimately gives rise to uncontrollability: taking control 
of protention means reducing desire to a calculable object, and this is 
a process that can only tend to deplete libidinal energy and hence to 
undermine the libidinal economy, unbind the drives and eventually to 
render the productive economy insolvent. It is in this perilous situa-
tion of generalized proletarianization that all manner of passages to 
the act inevitably proliferate.
This narrative, involving two conversions of the gaze that correspond 
to a technological phase and an organological and pharmacological 
phase of Stiegler’s philosophy, is worth retelling, despite the overly-
concise character of the recapitulation, for at least two reasons: firstly, 
because, as mentioned, the reception of Stiegler’s work by Anglophone 
philosophy has rarely ventured beyond the first three volumes of 
Technics and Time (whereas, conversely, readers coming from ‘media 
studies’ and related fields have tended to take up the more ‘direct, vis-
ible and legible’ works of the second phase, with less recourse to their 
more profound philosophical underpinnings); and, secondly, because 
the lectures and essays collected in this volume are something akin to 
a documentation of Stiegler’s third conversion, corresponding to what 
we are proposing to call his neganthropological phase.
So to recapitulate: what prompts Stiegler’s first conversion is an 
existential crisis making it absolutely necessary for him to reflect 
upon the composition of the interior milieu in the absence (or rather, 
the near absence) of the exterior milieu (that is, in the absence of the 
social world), leading in turn to a reflection on the process of homi-
nization qua exteriorization, and hence on the history of the supple-
ment that Derrida called for without undertaking, and on the noetic 
intermittence of the supplementary beings that we are ourselves. It is 
this intermittent situation that makes our perpetual tendency to rise or 
fall, to progress or regress, a problem that demands an ethics. What 
prompts Stiegler’s second conversion is his sense and observations 
of a collective existential crisis involving the decay of both psychic 
individuation processes and collective individuation processes, lead-
ing to a reflection on the doubly toxic and therapeutic character of 
tertiary retention in relation to desire and knowledge (where these 
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are imbricated by their mutually projective character, projected, 
that is, onto revealing and concealing screens of all kinds, beyond 
the finitude of what exists and towards the infinitude of what does 
not exist yet consists – towards ‘consistences’).13 It is this situation 
of intermittence at the level of collective individuation processes, 
where groups or civilizations may rise or fall, progress or regress, that 
demands a politics.
What prompts Stiegler’s third conversion – which, in addition to 
the texts collected here, plays out across Automatic Society, Volume 1, 
Dans la disruption and the new fourth volume of Technics and Time 
that Stiegler has interjected into his planned sequence – is his recog-
nition that what gets going with the grammatization of work-knowl-
edge is the Anthropocene, giving rise to an imperative to confront an 
‘existential’ crisis occurring not just at the level of psychic and collec-
tive individuation processes, but on the planetary scale, at the level of 
the ecosystems of the biosphere and the globalized techno-economic 
systems of platform capitalism. This in turn demands a reconsidera-
tion of the broadest macro-economic questions and their relationship 
to the speed and power made possible by the digitalized, networked 
and algorithmic technical system. Stiegler enters into this third 
reinscription of his work through a kind of reckoning with anthro-
pology, by tying it back to the question of the fate of Anthropos in 
the Anthropocene, but in no way does this amount to some kind of 
‘anthropocentrism’. For if, as we have just indicated, the imbrication 
of desire and knowledge lies in their shared projective character, pro-
jecting towards what does not exist yet consists (such as, for instance, 
the ideas, which are the consistences of rational conceptualization), 
then this non-existence includes the idea of Anthropos itself, which, 
therefore, like all consistences, has the structure of a promise.
Central to this third conversion is Stiegler’s conclusion that the 
question of différance amounts to the problem of entropy and the 
struggle against it: Derrida maintains that différance names an ‘econ-
omy’ of difference and deferral, but in Of Grammatology he ascribes 
this to the history of life understood as a différantial continuum, as 
it were. Life, as the differentiation of organs and species in order 
to defer the entropic tendency, is indeed, as Schrödinger argued, a 
process that can be understood as negentropic, or anti-entropic (the 
struggle against rather than the reversal). But if, as Derrida argues 
with respect to Phaedrus, anamnesis is always already conditioned by 
hypomnesis (or if, in other words, secondary retention is, for the inter-
mittently noetic beings that we ourselves are, always already condi-
tioned by tertiary retention), then this is to argue that, for such beings, 
what is dead conditions the living, which is to introduce a bifurcation 
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into vital différance that is therefore no longer just vital. For what is 
it that ultimately makes the pharmakon pharmacological (conjointly 
poisonous and curative, requiring both a toxicology and a therapeu-
tics), if not the fact that it doubles up (and doubles down) on vital dif-
férance, that is, the fact that it seizes hold of the inorganic in order 
to intensify and accelerate the struggle of tendency and counter-ten-
dency that is vital individuation qua process (lasting now some four 
billion years) of the unfolding of biological and ecological systems 
struggling to maintain their metastability against the arrow of time 
exposed by the second law of thermodynamics?
The transgenerational persistence of the exteriorized memory to 
which all technics amounts is what opens up the tertiary retentional 
control that makes possible the transgenerational conservation and 
transformation of accumulated experience, and the metastabilization 
of these processes of transindividuation makes possible all that we call 
culture, education and knowledge (as practices of care). But such pro-
cesses of conservation and transformation are forms of deferral and 
difference of another character than those made possible by genetic 
conservation and transformation, later supported by the behavioural 
flexibility made possible by the evolution of cerebral organs (begin-
ning with the first nervous tissue some 500 million years ago) that 
enables the lessons of individual experience to be retained (but where 
those lessons die with the individual). This new différance, beyond 
both genetic and nervous conservation, is what makes it possible for 
our psychic apparatus to be that of a knowing and desiring soul (desir-
ing to know), and this is why Stiegler describes it as being not just 
negentropic, but ‘neganthropic’.
Returning to the concept of entropy itself, it arose not from the pur-
suit of the physical understanding of the universe but from the prob-
lem of optimizing the functioning of the steam engine (minimizing its 
inefficiency). Initially, Sadi Carnot and Rudolf Clausius did not at all 
conceive the entropic forces limiting the extraction of useful energy 
from heat engines as probabilistic, since the atomic theory was yet to 
be confirmed and hence a gas was not understood to be a large collec-
tion of energetic microscopic particles propagating through random 
collisions. But with the concept of the engine as a localized system, 
it was nevertheless possible to move towards a set of equations that 
Boltzmann would later generalize and reconceptualize as statistical, 
and to the notion of entropy as the overwhelming tendency of any 
such localized system. And from this the obvious conclusion was 
drawn: insofar as the entire universe could be conceived as a closed, 
localized system of this kind, it, too, must be subject to these proba-
bilistic tendencies described by the second law of thermodynamics, 
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frequently characterized, more or less well, as the tendency of a sys-
tem to move from states of order to disorder.
In this way, a change occurred in the cosmological understanding 
that had reigned for centuries: a temporally static or cyclical cos-
mos was challenged by the thought of a physical universe that would 
instead be processual, subject to an unavoidable ‘downward trend’, 
as it were. The degree to which this did, indeed, amount to a chal-
lenge is exemplified by the fact that Friedrich Engels felt (in 1869) 
that this notion, drawn from ‘the conversion of the natural forces, for 
instance, heat into mechanical energy’ and postulating that ‘more 
heat must always be converted into other energy than can be obtained 
by converting other energy into heat’, was bound to lead to the ‘very 
absurd theory’ that there must have been a ‘first heating’.14 The lat-
ter, so he thought, implied the existence of a creator being and hence 
contradicted his own, ultimately metaphysical and traditional pref-
erence, as stated in Dialectics of Nature, for a cosmology consisting 
in an ‘eternally repeated succession of worlds in infinite time […] an 
eternal cycle’.15
Conversely but correspondingly, for the pseudo-Nietzschean 
Oswald Spengler, the ‘Calculus of Probabilities’ in which the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics consists, far from implying the necessity 
of an originative deity, means that the ‘idea of the end of the world 
appears, under the veil of formulae that are no longer in their essence 
formulae at all’.16 In short, it implies not the necessity but the twilight 
of the gods:
What the myth of Götterdämmerung signified of old, the 
irreligious form of it, the theory of Entropy, signifies to-
day – world’s end as completion of an inwardly necessary 
evolution.17
Hence, too, Georges Canguilhem would with hindsight take note of 
the deleterious effects of the importation of thermodynamic ideas (in 
combination with the toxic psychosomatic and social effects of indus-
trialization) on the idea of progress.18 And Claude Lévi-Strauss will 
continue in this modern tradition when, in Tristes Tropiques, he notes 
that the ‘world began without man and will end without him’, that in 
the intervening period he has been ‘perhaps the most effective agent 
working towards the disintegration of the original order of things’, 
that he has done nothing other than ‘blithely break down billions 
of structures and reduce them to a state in which they are no longer 
capable of integration’, and that anthropology might therefore more 
instructively be spelled as ‘entropology’.19
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Twelve years prior to Tristes Tropiques, Erwin Schrödinger’s lec-
tures20 on life as a systemic struggle against entropy had opened up 
the possibility of yet again reconceptualizing the significance of 
entropy, even if Schrödinger’s ‘negentropy’, it goes without saying, 
does not in any way imply the possibility of vanquishing entropy, and 
even if the anthropology of ‘synchronic’ ‘structures’ would pay no 
attention to this theoretical advance (a negligence made possible, in 
part, through the suppression of Leroi-Gourhan). And this was fol-
lowed, in 1945, by Alfred Lotka’s account of the significance of 
entropy for an understanding, not just of the anti-entropic struggles of 
biological evolution, but also of hominization, which he characterizes 
as an ‘entirely new path’. Through the rapid accumulation of ‘“arti-
ficial” aids’, including ‘methods of recording’ enabling an ‘unceas-
ing accumulation of knowledge and […] technical skills’, something 
completely original arises, a ‘process that might be termed exosomatic 
evolution’.21
Drawing on both Schrödinger and Lotka, the economist Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen will then propose reinscribing the foundations of 
economics on the basis of the concepts of entropy, negentropy and the 
exosomatic: if biology is the science of the anti-entropic functions of 
the systems of life, economics is the science of the anti-entropic func-
tions of systems that are no longer just biological, because they are 
technical, that is, exosomatic. Through the influence of all this work, 
Stiegler will be led, from 2014 onwards, to speak less frequently of 
the process of exteriorization and increasingly often of exosomatiza-
tion as the process of exosomatic organogenesis (whereas biology is 
concerned with the processes of endosomatic organogenesis). And 
this will ultimately lead him to reconceptualize psychic individua-
tion processes as those of simple exorganisms and collective individ-
uation processes as those of complex exorganisms,22 while the great 
structures of a globalized (that is, anthropized) biosphere, such as 
those of so-called ‘platform capitalism’, amount to ‘planetary-scale 
exorganisms’.
Another historical importation of the concept of entropy will, of 
course, be equally significant: its migration from thermodynamics to 
information theory, where the term ‘entropy’ was borrowed, legend-
arily, not just because of the resemblance of its statistical formulation 
but also because the opacity of the concept would guarantee advan-
tage in any debate.
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Von Neumann told me, ‘You should call it entropy, for two 
reasons. In the first place your uncertainty function has been 
used in statistical mechanics under that name, so it already 
has a name. In the second place, and more important, nobody 
knows what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always 
have the advantage’.23
The irony of such a witticism lies in the fact that this use of the notion 
of entropy, arising from the attempt to optimize the transmission of 
a signal along a wire (to minimize its inefficiency), in fact depends 
on attributing no useful advantage to obscurity (that is, to assume the 
uselessness of interpretation), because the premise underlying this 
theory of information is that the latter can be reduced to a calculable 
signal for which interpretability is trivial, irrelevant or epiphenome-
nal. Or, more pointedly, the conception of this ‘signal’ relies on a dou-
ble denial: both that the ‘material support’ that is the wire or the appa-
ratus in general or the data protocol is constitutive (an abstraction that 
Simondon, too, will accept), and that this materiality is what opens 
the possibility of the infinity of knowledge but also what prevents this 
possibility from ever being realized, which we could describe as the 
fundamental problem of ‘advantage’ as such caused by the fact that 
knowledge is always subject to decay (into dogma and automaticity).
Just as the question of physical entropy is sometimes conceived 
in terms of the question of the degree of ‘useful energy’ that can be 
extracted from a thermodynamic system, the question of entropy in 
information theory is akin to a measure of the degree of ‘useful data’ 
that can be extracted from a communication system. But however 
‘useful’ this way of conceiving information in terms of a calculable 
signal may be, the conception of ‘data’ it entails can only be finite, 
and can only be recognizable insofar as it conforms to a pre-existing 
format. If this fundamental notion of information theory will, in this 
way or that, be extended to form the basis of one or another version of 
cognitivism, producing a strange image of the ‘cognitive faculty’ as 
‘computational’ (the cognitivist ‘model’), through some kind of theo-
retical hybrid (or monstrosity) combining technical utilitarianism and 
pseudo-Kantian neurobiology, and eventually leading to what Stiegler 
calls the ‘ideology of transhumanism’, this calculability of information 
is also what enables this utility to be subsumed into the production 
function of the data economy.24
The way ‘information’ is conceived by information technology, 
information science and information theory has a performative char-
acter: this performativity operates through the way in which ‘utility’, 
‘value’ and ‘advantage’ come to be defined in terms of the calculable 
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degree to which I know something that others do not – information 
‘is’, then, ‘exchange value’ as the basis of capital. Later, this will be 
supplemented by the possibility of gathering massive amounts of data 
and treating it with very powerful probability-based algorithms oper-
ating at extremely high speeds, extracting the greatest possible per-
formatively predictive function from these calculable signals (where 
what is to be predicted is, first of all, what will make users click), but 
through a process that operates, to an extraordinary degree, by depriv-
ing everyone else (and ultimately everyone) of every kind of knowl-
edge and value.
Simondon tried to reconceptualize information beyond the quanti-
tative approaches of information theory and cybernetics, by thinking 
information qualitatively, and as a tension between the signal and the 
receiver, where the production of significance amounts to the resolu-
tion of this tension, as Yuk Hui has shown.25 But Simondon retains 
from information theory the notion that information must be thought 
independently of its supports (that is, its medium, its tertiary reten-
tional basis), making it impossible to understand wherein the possibil-
ity of such a tension lies. What Stiegler shows is that the possibility 
of this tension, of this ‘amplification’ that is the potentially transfor-
mational character of information conceived fundamentally as pro-
cess, derives from the protentional possibility of ‘tensing’ outwards 
towards new meanings and unexpected information, a protentionality 
that arises, precisely, from the tertiary retentional supports that open 
the possibility of the process of transindividuation in general. But, in 
this case, this is to conceive ‘information’ in the light of Derrida’s 
‘writing’: that is, as ultimately a question of the différant traces of a 
process of noetic différance.
The question of ‘neganthropy’, then, is not just a question of the dif-
férance granted by, let’s say, the way that technical thermodynamics 
doubles up on biological thermodynamics: it is also a question of the 
différantial character of infinite knowledge (infinitely long circuits 
of transindividuation) insofar as knowledge is not reducible to the 
informational entropy of the finite calculable signal. The ‘localiza-
tion’ involved in the formation of the negentropic systems of biologi-
cal existence (whether these are the localized systems of the cell, the 
organism, the ecosystem or the biosphere) are expressions of the (bio-
logical) ‘economy’ of vital différance, but the localizations of noetic 
or neganthropic différance are those of the default of origin: ab-origi-
nal and therefore infinite processes of idiomatization of all kinds.
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The fundamental functions required by exorganological systems, 
then, are those of the economy (broadly conceived), through which 
technical organs are interrelated and arranged, and those of educa-
tion (broadly conceived), through which these technical organs are 
arranged with the simple exorganisms that we are ourselves: these 
are the knowledgeable mechanisms by which complex exorganisms 
maintain their coherence and their integration. Hence the functions 
of knowledge and reason are simply not reducible to, or ‘dissoluble 
into’, the ‘information’ that fuels the production function of so-called 
‘algorithmic governmentality’: the latter leads to in-coherence and 
dis-integration and is therefore entropic. What is ultimately at stake in 
the question of the Anthropocene is to open a possible future for what 
governs the economic and educational systems and processes through 
which simple and complex exorganisms are articulated: what Stiegler 
calls ‘cosmological sur-realities’, which are all those consistences 
(formerly thought as transcendences of one kind or another) that form 
the limit conditions of our belief.
To put this another way, if any system involves an economy, this 
is because it involves the circulation, conservation and expenditure 
of energy within the bounded and limited locality of the system. But 
in the bioeconomic circuits of vital différance, this is, as in the steam 
engine, physical energy that is put to work, more or less efficiently 
(more or less negentropically, which is to say, more or less entropi-
cally), in the negentropic struggle to subsist, producing waste and 
requiring constant replenishment. In the circuits of desire that cir-
culate within the libidinal economies of neganthropological dif-
férance, however, this libidinal energy possesses a strange property: 
in the right conditions, to expend energy by doing work (which is not 
opposed here to play, precisely because both are potentially transfor-
mational) can lead that energy to increase. And what causes that ener-
getic increase is the way in which such work has the potential to open 
up prospects of a new future, as Stiegler explained in Technics and 
Time, 3 with respect to cinema:
if the film is good, we come out of it less lazy, even re-invig-
orated, full of emotion and the desire to do something, or 
else infused with a new outlook on things: the cinemato-
graphic machine, taking charge of our boredom, will have 
transformed it into new energy, transubstantiated it, made 
something out of nothing […,] brought back the expectation 
of something, something that must come, that will come, and 
that will come to us from our own life.26
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Our problem, today, is that we seem to be in the midst of living 
through a very bad movie, one of whose beginnings was the world-
wide spectacle of 9/11. It is with thoughts of this kind that Stiegler 
comes to draw upon Whitehead’s The Function of Reason (1929), 
which, fourteen years before Schrödinger, presents an account of the 
cosmological and historical struggle between a ‘downward’ tendency 
and an ‘upward’ counter-tendency. It is through Whitehead’s specula-
tive cosmology that Stiegler can reinscribe the notion of reason, so 
that it can be grasped not just as a faculty in the Kantian sense, but 
as a function: beyond the ecosystemic subsistence characteristic of 
vital différance, reason, according to Whitehead, has the function of 
promoting the ‘art of life’ through ‘the operation of theoretical real-
ization’.27 Whereas animals adapt to their environment, noetic beings 
‘are actively engaged in modifying their environment’ and, in the 
case of the kind of beings that we ourselves are, ‘this active attack on 
the environment is the most prominent fact in his existence’.28
With this thought of ‘realization’ (upon whose ‘oneiric’ and hence 
arche-cinematic quality Stiegler will particularly insist), Whitehead 
describes a function that amounts to the anthropization of the milieu 
that will eventually give rise to the Anthropocene. But when he fur-
ther characterizes this as ‘the urge to transform mere existence into 
the good existence, and to transform the good existence into the better 
existence’,29 or when he states that reason is the ‘organ of novelty, the 
urge beyond’,30 it is clear that this transformational capability of the 
urge towards knowledge involves an infinitude irreducible to calcu-
lable information – the infinitude this entails aims not at subsistence 
or existence but at consistence, at what does not exist yet consists. 
And when Whitehead further characterizes this ‘urge’ as ‘a criticism 
of appetitions’,31 it could not be clearer that the ‘critique’ this involves 
amounts precisely to the binding of the drives by sublimating desire, 
and does so insofar as desire names the infinitization of finite appeti-
tions. Far from being the cognitive faculty by which we understand 
the world, reason, this binding-that-infinitizes, is, as Whitehead puts 
it, ‘the disciplined counter-agency which saves the world’.32
The neganthropological function of reason, in other words, ulti-
mately consists in the possibility of opening bifurcations that would 
be not just probabilistic, but highly improbable. Any singular event, 
whether it be the ‘dawn of life’ (of organic or endosomatic organo-
genesis), or the ‘dawn of man’ (of organological or exosomatic organ-
ogenesis), or ‘saving the world’ (opening a new epoch or, when our 
very capacity for epochality seems threatened by the destruction 
of our temporalizational capacities, a new era), may be analysed in 
terms of probabilities, but such analyses can never measure up to 
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that singularity as such. It is in this sense that the reason required 
to ‘attack’ the convergence of systemic limits exceeds scientific 
objectivity:
To pose questions of science, politics and economics from an 
organological perspective is to posit in the most general way 
possible their indissoluble character, and to bind them trans-
ductively to a method that absolutely excludes pure scien-
tific objectivity – it excludes any objectivity that would not 
be performative, that is, incomplete in Whitehead’s sense, 
for there is concrescence only to the extent that there is this 
incompleteness.33
Concrescence, in other words, is Whitehead’s name for the transduc-
tive, open-ended (and therefore infinite) processes of individuation 
that Stiegler characterizes as organological insofar as they are at once 
psychic, collective and technical. Whitehead’s organ of novelty, the 
‘urge beyond’, the ‘the urge to transform mere existence into the good 
existence, and to transform the good existence into the better exis-
tence’, is thus both an oneiric and a technical organ, which must there-
fore be married with what Leroi-Gourhan himself called the ‘urge to 
conquer space and time’.34 If such concrescence, when it involves the 
noetic existence of the technical form of life, still involves localized 
systems, these noetic concrescences, as processes of idiomatization, 
are, in Stiegler’s terms, themselves localized technicizations, both 
anthropizations and neganthropizations:
In noetic locality, a neganthropic différance is produced by 
exosomatization, which locally differs from and defers [dif-
fère] not just the law of entropy but also the law of anthropy, 
namely, the toxicity of the pharmacological condition, in 
a way that organizes and orders locality, within universal 
becoming but against the current.35
The thoroughly anthropized biosphere that we now refer to as the 
Anthropocene has, since the industrial revolution, become our global 
noetic locality, but only insofar as it has not yet been totally de-
noetized. The Neganthropocene, as Stiegler thinks it, is the challenge 
to find a performative response adequate to all the systemic chal-
lenges arising in the face of contemporary concrescence. If this threat 
of de-noetization implies that this remains a question (as Whitehead 
says) of the urge to knowledge, then the transformation of knowledge 
becomes the value of values on the basis of which we must mas-
sively invest in processes of de-proletarianization and re-noetization. 
Such processes must absolutely not be anti-calculative, but they must 
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resolutely refuse to reduce knowledge to the calculable information 
of algorithmic governmentality, transhumanist ideology and the data 
economy – that is, of platform capitalism.
Truth, neganthropologically reconceived, is the possibility not just 
of metastabilizing and transindividuating forms of knowing but of 
opening new bifurcatory pathways in the process of exosomatiza-
tion. In inviting us, through his work and through the invocation of 
the Neganthropocene, to take up the necessity of this urge beyond, 
Stiegler is reminding us that such a bifurcation is not just a matter 
of sufficient information and understanding, nor even just of the fac-
ulties and functions of knowledge, or a question of desire, technical 
‘solutions’ or will, let alone hope – it is also, and above all, a question 
of care, that is, of improbable courage. What kind of courage? Without 
necessarily being a question of barricades or of seizing and smash-
ing governmental or even corporate levers, it is, nevertheless, a ques-
tion of revolutionary courage, of finding a form of thought and care 
capable of taking the measure (and measuring up to the excessiveness) 
of the revolutionary situation in which, in the twenty-first century, we 
find ourselves: revolutionary, that is, suspensive, interruptive, fateful, 
unavoidable, indeterminate and requiring a conversion of our collec-
tive gaze – because on the brink.
And, in addition to the confrontation with Derrida’s différance, 
this also means finding and having the courage to confront, read, 
reread and reinterpret Heidegger: if the latter did not think entropy or 
negentropy, either in the thermodynamic or the informational sense 
(although he grasped the significance of cybernetics earlier and with 
greater clarity than most), what is also true is that none of the theo-
rists of entropy (or, for that matter, of différance) have confronted the 
depths of the bifurcation that Heidegger tried to name with the word 
tekhnē. It is in this confrontation, and in thinking what this means for 
a ‘history of truth’ confronted with the possibility of ‘post-truth’, that 
we may just find the resources that need to be set to work in order to 
rethink the future of the processes of différantial individuation that 
are the simple and complex exorganological beings that we ourselves 




1 The Anthropocene and Neganthropology
For Dan Ross, to whom I owe so much.
A new critique of anthropology, both philosophical and positive: did 
this not become necessary from the moment in 2004 when we saw 
Claude Lévi-Strauss on television admitting that he is preparing to 
depart a world he no longer loves? If anthropology cannot account 
for this becoming that so disheartens the anthropologist, does it not 
thereby lose its legitimacy, just as has occurred to those philosophies 
that pretend to be unaware of such questions? In other words, what 
becomes of anthropology in the Anthropocene era? My thesis is this: 
it becomes a neganthropology, and it must contribute to the advent of 
the Neganthropocene.
We are noetic beings to the extent that we weave psychic secondary 
retentions on the framework of collective secondary retentions, con-
stituted from psychic and collective preindividual funds: we individu-
ate ourselves by exteriorizing the protentions contained within these 
retentional funds, hidden as ‘potentials’ that are ‘concretized’ and 
‘actualized’ through being transindividuated.
This is an organological perspective inasmuch as arrangements of 
psychic and collective retentions and protentions are made possible 
by tertiary retentions, by artificial retentional organs the specific fea-
tures of which generate protentional possibilities that are different in 
each case, and on the basis of which, in each new retentional epoch, 
transindividuation metastabilizes new attentional forms that consti-
tute horizons of expectations, wills and desires.
This organology is itself a pharmacology to the extent that, gener-
ally speaking, tertiary retention both impedes and allows individua-
tion. A new pharmakon carries new possibilities of psychic and col-
lective individuation, and it thus requires ‘therapeutic’ prescriptions 
– in the form of magic, then religion, then politics – therapeutic pre-
scriptions that constitute practices of care (sacrifice, ritual, worship, 
deliberation and debate), practices configured by the social systems 
within which attentional forms emerge.
This very general perspective, however, is shown in a new light 
with the advent of the so-called Anthropocene era. This term is 
used to refer to the most recent period of geophysical evolution, in 
which the systemic and massively toxic character of contemporary 
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organology comes to light, especially since the advent of organologi-
cal industrialization, that is, since the industrial revolution, which we 
must understand as an organological revolution.
The question that arises here is exceptional and extraordinary in 
every respect – and this extra-ordinariness is overwhelming: how can 
we live under the weight of a common protention that is potentially 
but massively negative on a worldwide scale? The warnings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a thousand 
other current realities bring about expectations and protentions of the 
worst, that is, of collapse – not of this or that lost civilization, as Jared 
Diamond discusses,36 but of humanity itself and in totality.
What is the meaning of belief when, for example, we say that we no 
longer believe it is possible to change a situation in which the ‘human 
factor’ that we now refer to as ‘anthropogenic’ is, if not a cosmic ele-
ment, then at least a geo-logical one, and when we do not believe that 
it is possible to change human behaviour? And what is the relationship 
here between believing, wanting and individuating? What positivity 
can we fashion from this negative belief, that is, this negative proten-
tion? How might we fight against it without making the mistake of 
denying its legitimacy, that is, without denying how serious the situ-
ation really is?
Such negative protention is inherently performative and self-fulfill-
ing. If in general terms belief is a highly performative form of pro-
tention capable of nurturing a will, then non-belief is a negative per-
formativity that brings dejection, stupefaction and neglect (of which 
denial is a specific and cowardly form): it is paralysis. To understand 
the specific question of protention, of belief, of will and of cowardice 
in the Anthropocene epoch, we must turn back to what constitutes 
the protentional possibilities of the noetic soul in general, that is, of 
the technical form of life, constituted by its self-exteriorization, in 
a way that is bound up with the performativity of belief and there-
fore with will.
Noetic protention, in its elementary content [teneur], and according to 
Heidegger, is constituted by an arche-protention, which is that of its 
own end: Dasein is a Sein-zum-Tode. Such an arche-protention of the 
end (in relation to which Heidegger never confronted the questions 
of retentional survival and retentional finitude, and the subsequent 
projection of my protentions beyond the instant of my death) has, for 
hundreds of thousands of years, taken the form of an arche-protention 
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that anticipates the continuation of the reproduction of the human 
species and the continuing pursuit of the human adventure, that is, of 
Dasein. In the Anthropocene that is our ‘Da-sein’, our ex-sistence, 
what had hitherto been clearly, primordially and spontaneously obvi-
ous has been fundamentally disturbed and cracked, if not blocked up 
and covered over – and the result is the destruction of what has consti-
tuted the rational, universal and in this sense transcendental structure 
of what Kant called the kingdom of ends.
If, in Heideggerian existentialism, every protentional prospect 
forming the horizon to come of all Dasein to come is inscribed within 
the originary ordeal of abandonment, this fundamental moment of 
anxiety (Angst) remained, for it, structurally hidden, denied and for-
gotten – just as the knowledge of death is forgotten in and through 
concern (Besorgen), even though it thoroughly orders and controls it. 
Today, however, everydayness in the contemporary Anthropocene is 
constantly invaded by discussions, treated as banal, about the end of 
the human adventure and the dereliction and abandonment to which 
all these protentions are most likely heading – discussions that are all 
generally conducted in the mode of chatter (Gerede). In such a con-
text, the meaning of the word end undergoes radical change.
It is first and foremost as this new epoch of negative protention 
constituting the banality of the Anthropocene, in which this end is 
increasingly perceived as highly probable, that technics challenges us 
and puts us into question today. It confronts us with an unprecedented 
question, and this question is all the more daunting given that, at the 
very time this question arises, we also see the rise of the possibility and 
the temptation of erasing the very possibility of questioning and being 
put into question.
I should mention here that the arguments along these lines that I 
put forward in What Makes Life Worth Living37 in fact depart fun-
damentally from those of Heidegger: if Dasein is constituted by the 
‘possibility of questioning’, if being-there exists only as being-put-
in-question, then it is always organological becoming that puts it into 
question in the process of a doubly epokhal redoubling within which 
the therapeutic care required by the new organological situation trans-
forms this becoming into a future, that is, transforms this entropy 
into negentropy.
The great organological question in the contemporary Anthropocene 
is protention, which simultaneously raises a question and closes off 
this questioning, in the sense that, faced with the radical negativity 
brought about by this situation, and insofar as it concerns each of us 
with respect to our responsibility and our ability to respond to the 
challenge of being put into question, the data economy has established 
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an industrial and automatized production of protentions that amounts 
to guiding them by remote control, or, in other words, it amounts to 
their annihilation.
The combination of the network effect, the self-production of 
traces, user profiling and real-time supercomputing indeed generates 
an industrial short-circuit and a systemic elimination of those proten-
tions that are incalculable, subjecting all will to a form of levelling 
via what Thomas Berns and Antoinette Rouvroy call ‘algorithmic 
governmentality’38 – which is the reorganization of psychopower in 
the era of what Jonathan Crary calls ‘24/7 capitalism’.39
All noetic activity is governed by protention: in the existential ana-
lytic this is called being-towards-death and in psychoanalysis it is 
called libidinal economy. When fiduciary artifices appear, such as 
written forms of quantifiable exchange, capital is constituted as a 
power over protentions, in the first place through this tertiary proten-
tion that is money.40 In the contemporary stage of the Anthropocene, 
it turns out that capital has generated a negative protention that ruins 
every economy – existential, libidinal and capitalist. This negative 
protention is the protention of nihil, of nothing, and it is that comple-
tion of nihilism foreshadowed by Nietzsche at the moment German 
capitalism was imposing itself on Europe.
What is now called the Anthropocene corresponds to industrial 
capitalism, where calculation prevails as criterion of decision-mak-
ing – as such, this constitutes the advent of nihilism. The confusion 
and disarray into which the ‘reflexive’ stage of the Anthropocene era 
has fallen, reflexive because purportedly ‘aware’, is nevertheless an 
historical outcome for which new causal and quasi-causal factors can 
now be identified that have hitherto received little analysis – and this 
is why it is correct to reject ‘geocratic’ understandings of this situa-
tion that short-circuit political analyses of that history which unfolds 
after the beginning of the Anthropocene event.
In addition to this historical and political perspective, however, 
we must add the fact that the Anthropocene event has made patently 
obvious something that philosophy had, in a structural way, been 
denying for centuries: the artefact is the mainspring of hominiza-
tion, its condition and its fate. This can no longer be ignored: what 
Valéry, Husserl and Freud laid out between the two world wars as a 
new age of humanity, that is, as its pharmacological consciousness 
and pharmacological unconscious, has become a common awareness 
and unawareness that is both muddled and unhappy. Such is ill-being 
in the malaise of the Anthropocene today.
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It is, therefore, imperative to completely rethink the noetic fact, 
and to do so in every field of knowledge, whether of living, doing or 
conceptualizing. This imperative presents itself in the contemporary 
Anthropocene as an extremely urgent situation vital to both politics 
and economics, thereby raising a question of practical organology, 
that is, of inventive productions, which I, along with Ars Industrialis 
and the Institut de recherche et d’innovation (IRI), maintain requires 
a total reinvention of the architecture of the World Wide Web – that 
technological apparatus through which the Anthropocene has, since 
1993, entered into a new epoch.
If we are to think the Anthropocene as giving rise to the devaluation 
of all values, then we must think it with Nietzsche: the vital task for 
all noetic knowledge in the Anthropocene is the transvaluation of all 
values, in an age when the noetic soul’s calling itself into question 
occurs as the completion of nihilism. This is the very test and ordeal of 
our age – and it is the very meaning of the Anthropocene as a name 
for the age of capitalism’s globalization. In this test, the noetic soul 
is faced with the imperative of thinking thought inasmuch as it is fun-
damentally a question of protention, and as the arche-protention of its 
being called into question by its organological fate – which constitutes 
it while also ‘destituting’ it without recourse. This is something that 
in fact began long before either the Anthropocene or capitalism, as 
the pharmacological condition of thinking itself, but today there is no 
escape from this ordeal, which is that of nihilism.
What does this destitution of thinking at the very heart of thinking 
mean? It means that I think only insofar as there is, in my thinking, a 
place for what, in that which must still be thought, can and must give 
space for the unthinkable, that is, for becoming. We must think the 
transvaluation of becoming into future by reading Nietzsche, and we 
must read him together with the Marx of 1857, that is, as a thinker of 
capitalism. Marx and Nietzsche must be read together in the service 
of a new critique of political economy, in a world where economics 
has become a key factor, in a way that is localized and yet occurs on a 
scale that is colossal and indeed cosmic. They must be read, therefore, 
in the service of an ecology: such a reading should lead to a process 
of transvaluation, so that the economic values and moral devaloriza-
tions to which nihilism gives rise when it becomes unbridled capital-
ism can be ‘transvaluated’ by a new value of values, which is to say, 
by negentropy.
The theory of entropy – deriving from thermodynamics some 
thirty years after the advent of industrial technology and the 
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beginning of the organological revolution that lies at the origin of the 
Anthropocene, that is, after the steam engine41 – redefines the ques-
tion of value, given that the relation entropy/negentropy is really the 
question of life par excellence. It is with respect to such perspectives 
that we must think, organologically and pharmacologically, what we 
should in fact call the Entropocene and neganthropology.
The contemporary Anthropocene is a test and ordeal of thinking in 
all its forms (as knowledge of how to do, how to live and how to con-
ceptualize), and as such it requires a new critique of Kantian critique, 
especially given that what Kant’s rational cosmology is incapable of 
taking into account is, precisely, the organological question.
If the schematism originally derives from technical exterioriza-
tion and the artefactualization of the world, as I attempted to show 
in the third volume of Technics and Time,42 the subtitle of which was 
The Time of Cinema (and this is what constitutes the a-transcendental 
question of arche-cinema and of arche-cinema as a constant putting 
into question of spirit by itself, that is, by its concretizations and its 
exteriorizations – such is the tragedy of the Aufklärung as described 
by Adorno and Horkheimer), if the schematism originally derives 
from technical exteriorization and the artefactualization of the world, 
as I say, then this affects not just the account of the world, but of the 
cosmos itself.
At the dawn of philosophy, the kosmos is thought as identity and 
equilibrium (in a way that, however, was not the case for Pre-Socratic 
philosophy). In this opposition between equilibrium of ontological 
origin and the disequilibrium of corruptible beings, technics con-
stitutes the organological condition and is related to the sublunary 
as the world of contingency, as ‘that which can be otherwise that it 
is’ (to endekhomenon allōs ekhein). As such, it finds itself excluded 
from thought.
Such a position, however, is no longer tenable in the Anthropocene, 
and as such it constitutes an unprecedented epistemic crisis: the 
advent of the thermodynamic machine, which is the Ereignis of the 
industrial revolution and of its Gestell, and which showed the human 
world to be fundamentally characterized by change and disruption 
[perturbation], inscribes ‘processuality’, the irreversibility of becom-
ing and the instability of equilibrium in which all this consists, at the 
core of physics itself.
The thermodynamic machine, which raises, in physics, the new 
and specific problem of the dissipation of energy, is also an industrial 
technical object that fundamentally disrupts social organizations, 
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with the result that it radically alters ‘the understanding that there-
being has of its being’. This technical object, of which Watt’s flyball 
governor will prove a key element at the centre of the cybernetic con-
ception – this technical object, as essentially combustive, introduces, 
on both the astrophysical plane (which replaces mythological cosmol-
ogy) and on the plane of human ecology, the question of fire and of its 
pharmacology.
The question of fire – that is, of combustion – is thus inscribed in 
the perspectives of both physics and anthropological ecology, at the 
heart of a renewed thought of cosmos qua cosmos: the Anthropocene 
epoch can appear as such only starting from the moment when the 
question of the cosmos is itself grasped as that of combustion, in both 
astrophysics and thermodynamics – but, therefore, also in relation to 
this exceptional pharmakon that is domesticated fire, fire as that arti-
fice par excellence delivered to mortals by Prometheus.
As a physical problem, the techno-logical conquest of fire (which 
is the Ereignis of Gestell) puts anthropogenesis, that is, organologi-
cal organogenesis, at the heart of what Alfred North Whitehead called 
concrescence,43 and does so as the local technicization of the cosmos. 
This may be only a local technicization, but it leads to conceiving the 
cosmos in totality on the basis of this position and on the basis of this 
local opening of the question of fire as that pharmakon of which we 
must take care. And here, the question of the energy (and energeia) 
that fire (which is also light) contains – after the organological and 
epistemological revolution that occurs when Schrödinger rethinks 
thermodynamics – constitutes the matrix of the thought of life and of 
information, and does so as the play of entropy and negentropy.
Establishing the question of entropy and negentropy for human 
beings as the crucial problem of daily human life and of life in gen-
eral, and ultimately of the universe in totality, technics constitutes 
the matrix of all thinking of oikos, of habitat and of law. At the very 
moment when Erwin Schrödinger was giving his lectures in Dublin, 
Georges Canguilhem was arguing that the noetic soul is a technical 
form of life, and that it requires new conditions of fidelity in order to 
overcome the shocks of infidelity caused by what I myself refer to as 
the doubly epokhal redoubling.
The infidelity of the technical milieu: this is what the organologi-
cal and pharmacological beings who are noetic individuals encoun-
ter in the form of epokhal technological shock. This shock and this 
infidelity are essentially what Simondon referred to as ‘shifting 
phase’ [déphasage] in order to describe the dynamic principle of 
individuation.
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We should recall here what Canguilhem posits in principle con-
cerning the more-than-biological meaning of epistēmē: knowledge 
of life is a specific form of life conceived not just as biological but as 
the vital knowledge of milieus, systems and processes of individua-
tion – where knowledge is the future of life. Here, the concrescence 
of the cosmos generates processes of individuation in which entro-
pic and negentropic tendencies play out differently in each case. We 
must relate this organo-logical function of knowledge in the technical 
form of life to Simondon’s account of the knowledge of individuation: 
for Simondon, to know individuation is to individuate, that is, it is 
to already no longer know because it is to undergo a phase shift, to 
become out-of-phase.
Questions of life and negentropy may derive from Darwin and 
Schrödinger, but they must be redefined in relation to the organologi-
cal context, given that:
1 natural selection gives way to artificial selection; and
2 the passage from the organic to the organological displaces 
the play of entropy and negentropy.44
Technics is an accentuation of negentropy, since it brings increased 
differentiation. But it is equally true that technics is an acceleration 
of entropy, not just because it is a process of combustion and of the 
dissipation of energy, but because industrial standardization seems to 
be leading the contemporary Anthropocene to the possibility of the 
destruction of life qua the burgeoning and proliferation of difference 
– a destruction of biodiversity, cultural diversity and the singularity 
of both psychic individuations and collective individuations.
With the concept of process, Whitehead moves beyond seeing natural 
phenomena and cultural phenomena in oppositional terms, and this 
is also the very meaning of the Anthropocene: anthropic activity has 
become a geophysical factor. In Whitehead, cosmology is no longer a 
matter of the order of the spheres, but a processual dynamic of nested 
spirals that materialize regimes of speed. And here, thinking would 
be that infinite speed of the power to rupture, to effect breaks, that 
is, to cause bifurcations by disautomatizing repetitive regularities 
and by changing the rules – power, which is knowledge, and which 
Whitehead also called history.
This power to change the rules, however, also establishes a risk of 
intersystemic conflict (which von Bertalanffy studied in his General 
System Theory45), which inscribes the pharmacological question at 
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the centre of cosmology, and does so as the anthropo-technical, bio-
spherical and local consequence of the initial combustion and its uni-
versal thermodynamic law. This is why Whitehead could write that 
‘the major advances in civilization are processes that all but wreck 
the societies in which they occur’.46 To change the rules is to go faster 
than light insofar as the latter has become, as the speed of digital 
automatons, the horizon of the calculation industry: it is to go infi-
nitely fast – at the speed of desire, that is, of that idealization via which 
neganthropy passes onto the plane of consistences.
This raises the question of those laws of the universe that constitute 
the field of physics, and that form the set of rules of a game we cannot 
change – but that we can localize, that we can play by interpreting it 
in a localized way, that is, by liberating potentials for individuation 
through the artefactual organization of inorganic sidereal play – this 
is what occurs, for instance, with nanophysics, emerging as it does 
from quantum technology.
Above all, technics consists in the organization of inorganic mat-
ter, leading in return to the organological reorganization of cerebral 
organic matter, which in its turn organologically modifies the play of 
the somatic organs, giving rise to a new form of life, that is, a new 
form of negentropy, which is nevertheless also, as technics, an accel-
erator of entropy on every cosmic level – it is this two-sidedness that 
characterizes the pharmakon: toxic means entropic.
An example of a nanotechnological organ is the scanning tun-
nelling microscope, which is itself a computer. This arrangement 
between the cerebral organ and the quantum scale of hyper-matter is 
a stage of concrescence that here also amounts to a process of con-
cretization in the larger Simondonian sense, operating on all cosmic 
planes at once: sidereal, vital and psychosocial, that is, technical. This 
localization is a striking example of anthropotechnical retroaction on 
the play of the biospherical whole, within which it spreads and gener-
alizes by locally generating this extra-ordinary stage of concrescence 
that is the Anthropocene.
While respecting the laws of physics, technics locally trans-forms 
the cosmic order in unpredictable ways. Hence the concretization of 
the technical individual that is the machine, whose functioning is 
not soluble into the laws of physics, tends to form associated techno-
geographical milieus. According to Simondon, this tendency implies 
the need for a mechanology, but I believe it can more fruitfully be 
understood in terms of an organology, given that mechanology does 
not allow us to think either pharmacology or the links between psy-
chic, technical and collective individuation.
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Process, concrescence, disturbances, infidelities of milieus and of 
every metastable equilibrium (that is, metastable disequilibrium) all 
form what, in our age, presents itself to us as what we are causing 
within ourselves, around us and between us. It is what we are causing 
as the projection of a becoming that our organological and pharmaco-
logical condition no longer allows us to succeed in trans-forming into 
a future, that is, as the play between the processes of psychic, techni-
cal and collective (that is, social) individuation, where the latter form 
the three dimensions through which and within which our existence 
always occurs, bound by their mutual organological condition.
With the control of protentions by a capitalism that has become 
structurally entropic, the contemporary Anthropocene seems to con-
demn psychic and collective individuation to being wiped out by a 
technical individuation that has become subject to a self-destructive 
economy, given that it destroys those social milieus without which the 
technical milieu inevitably becomes a negative externality that in turn 
destroys the physical milieus of the biosphere.
The organological approach is constitutively situated in time in the 
sense that its object is becoming, and its question is the transforma-
tion of becoming into future, which means that what is at issue is the 
transformation of entropy into negentropy. It is a practical approach 
whereby becoming, for which there can be no complete theory, no 
ontology, requires inventiveness – it requires an ‘inventivity’ that 
would be the pharmacological and organological counterpart of what 
Whitehead called creativity. Within such an approach, we must begin 
by describing the situation in which we now find ourselves organo-
logically and pharmacologically immersed, and on the basis of which 
we can accede – as Dasein – to the historiality (Geschichtlichkeit) of a 
being-organologically-there that is a being-pharmacologically-there.
But here, historiality is not conceived as in Heidegger, namely, 
ontologically, but as in Simondon, that is, as an ontogenesis, but with 
the corollary that this is understood, contrary to Simondon, as an arte-
factual ontogenesis. According to such an approach, our situation at 
the end of November 2014, aside from the widespread recognition of 
the inherently pharmacological dimension of development, is marked 
by the new and unprecedented questions presented to us by digi-
tal technology.
Digital technology, which completely reconfigures the globalized 
industrial infrastructure, is the unavoidable path we must follow, and 
we cannot escape the question of a pharmacology and a therapeutics 
that places the digital becoming of the world at the very centre of 
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what must be decided, as the organon of this decision and/or of this 
indecision. This is why I, along with Ars Industrialis and IRI, and 
with the Digital Studies Network, have implemented our organologi-
cal project from the perspective of what we call digital studies. Digital 
studies posits in principle that everything begins with exteriorization, 
and in particular with the digits – that is, with the foot and the hand.47
Digital studies refers, firstly, to the study of the materiality and/or 
the corporeality of knowledge, that is, of the incorporation and mate-
rialization of noetic fluxes. Like writing, like the steam engine, the 
programmable loom and machine tools, like analogue devices, like 
all of these, the computer – especially when it becomes what Michel 
Volle calls a ‘ubiquitous programmable automaton’,48 that is, the ter-
minal of a network – is what causes a change in the relationships 
between knowledge and technics or knowledge and technology, and, 
through these relationships, a change in knowledge itself in all its 
forms. In this way, a new organological epoch of knowledge is con-
stituted, amounting to a new epistēmē that calls for specific concepts.
The reticular computer raises anew all those questions first posed 
by Socrates in relation to the question of the pharmakon, multiplying 
them by a factor of four million, which is the difference between, on 
the one hand, the speed of nerve impulses that circulate at 50 metres 
per second along the nerves that are the reticulation of our bodies,49 
and, on the other hand, the speed of information on fibre optic net-
works running along the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean, where infor-
mation circulates via specialized connections serving high frequency 
trading at two hundred million metres per second.50
These questions put back into play the entire relationship between 
technics, knowledge, politics and economics (that is, powers): the 
status of the steam engine, just like that of the computer, is at once 
epistemic, epistemological, political and economic, and we cannot 
approach either of them without considering all these dimensions. In 
fact, the overtaking of the speed of nervous transmission by the speed 
of fibre optics, which is also the overtaking of the speed of reason by 
an understanding that has become automatic, brings the problem of 
proletarianization, which every pharmakon always involves, to that 
ultimate point that is completed nihilism. And, as such, it demands a 
reconsideration of the organological (arche-cinemato-graphic) condi-
tions of the Kantian schematism.
To pose questions of science, politics and economics from an organ-
ological perspective is to posit in the most general way possible their 
indissoluble character, and to bind them transductively to a method 
that absolutely excludes pure scientific objectivity – it excludes any 
objectivity that would not be performative, that is, incomplete in 
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Whitehead’s sense, for there is concrescence only to the extent that 
there is this incompleteness. And it is this incompleteness that also 
constitutes the process of individuation in Simondon, for whom the 
question of the scheme and the category arises from this processual 
perspective.
To in principle posit the incompleteness of the cosmos, and thereby 
inscribe a performative possibility that would exceed any scientific 
objectivity, obviously does not rule out all scientific objectification 
and objectivity. Rather, it means that the cosmic process contains 
something that cannot be objectified, and that the cosmos is not 
reducible to physics as a stable set of laws – in this case because phys-
ics is organological, that is, because it leads to the introduction, into 
the cosmos, of the pharmakon, that is, the incompleteness in which it 
radically consists – and in this sense knowledge of life is a struggle 
not just for life but for existence, wherein to know individuation con-
sists in individuating and therefore in never quite knowing it entirely 
(this thesis is not Whitehead’s but mine).
Scientific objectivity is always related to a particular organologi-
cal state given at that time, and also to a given locality: organology 
has an irreducibly local dimension. This point of view suggests that 
there are indeed grounds on which one could contest the term ‘general 
organology’, as Ricardo Baldissone has done – except and unless one 
gives to words such as genre, generalis and generality a new meaning, 
whereby the word general would mean: transindividuated on the three 
planes of organological becoming.
The singularity of the Anthropocene as an organological epoch lies 
in the fact it has generated the organological question itself, hence in 
the fact it is constituted by its own recognition, a recognition bring-
ing with it something new: its negative protention and the necessity 
of overcoming itself. The question of the Anthropocene is how to exit 
from the Anthropocene qua toxic period in order to enter into a new 
epoch that we are calling the Neganthropocene, as a curative, care-ful 
epoch. In practical terms this means that, on the economic plane, value 
accumulation should be undertaken exclusively with a view to negan-
thropic investments.
The question of the Anthropocene, which, therefore, has the struc-
ture of a promise, emerges at the moment when, on the other hand, 
full and general automation is being set in place as one outcome of 
the industry of reticular digital traces. This reticulation industry must 
be thought as the chance for a new epoch of work, where the epoch 
of employment will be brought to an end, and where this will occur 
through a ‘transvaluation’ of value, wherein, as Marx put it: ‘labour 
time ceases and must cease to be [the] measure [of work or labour], and 
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hence exchange value [must cease to be the measure] of use value’.51 In 
this situation, the value of value becomes neganthropy: what remains 
to be accomplished is thus the passage to the Neganthropocene – and 
in saying this I am continuing a discussion with Maurizio Lazzarato 
that I opened in Automatic Society, Volume 1.
It was Socrates who first posed the question of the trace, of its inte-
riorization and exteriorization. This was the first formulation of the 
pharmacological question: the question of the trace as the threat of 
proletarianization inherent in all knowledge – given that all knowl-
edge is exteriorized. It is on this very basis that we must analyse 
today’s globalized industry of reticulated traces, the organ of which is 
the reticulated computer, operating on the basis of the network effect, 
the self- and auto-generation of traces, and the real time calculation 
applied to these traces on a planetary scale – technologies that pro-
duce what Berns and Rouvroy call ‘algorithmic governmentality’.
The algorithmic governmentality of 24/7 capitalism leads to the 
formation of artificial crowds (in Freud’s sense, commenting on Le 
Bon), this being the origin of ‘crowd sourcing’, that is, of the data 
economy: such is the contemporary reality of the Anthropocene qua 
digital stage of grammatization, leading psychic individuals through-
out the entire world to grammatize their own behaviour by interacting 
with computer systems operating in real time.
These systems produce an automatic performativity that channels, 
diverts and short-circuits individual and collective protentions: by 
outstripping and overtaking the noetic capacities of individuation, 
and doing so precisely insofar as the latter are protentional capacities 
(that is, oneiric capacities); and, at the same time, by short-circuiting 
the collective production of circuits of transindividuation.
This outstripping and overtaking of every form of noesis operates 
via the incitement, by remote control, of protentions, protentions that 
are continuously being redefined and are always already erased by 
new protentions that prove ever more dis-integrated, that is, that show 
themselves to be ‘dividuals’, in Guattari’s sense. This short-circuiting 
of psychic and collective protentions, replaced by automatically gen-
erated protentions, impedes dreaming, wanting, reflecting and decid-
ing, that is, the collective realization of dreams. And these obstruc-
tions are ultimately a systemic impediment to thinking, which then 
constitutes the basis of algorithmic governmentality as the power 
structure of computationally integrated 24/7 capitalism.
The analyses by Jonathan Crary and by Berns and Rouvroy of the 
computationalization of behaviour generated by the digital doubles of 
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user profiling should be combined with Alan Greenspan’s reflections 
on the effects of automating financial transactions, enabling the for-
mation of a system also referred to as the ‘financial industry’, where 
we find both subprime mortgages and speculative technologies such 
as credit default swaps and high frequency trading, all ‘founded’ on 
increasing speed.52
Berns and Rouvroy do not denounce the existence of digital dou-
bles as such. Their conclusion, on the contrary, is that ‘our statistical 
double is too detached from us’.53 This detachment arises because the 
data industry, as the automated production and exploitation of traces, 
disposseses us of the possibility of interpreting our retentions and pro-
tentions – both psychic and collective.
To change this situation, this state of fact, and open up the pos-
sibility for a new state of law, which Antoinette Rouvroy calls for, 
we must invent an organology based on the potentials contained in 
the digital technical system – even though currently this system does 
indeed give every appearance of being a giant technical individual, a 
digital Leviathan that exerts its power over the entire Earth, and does 
so through its ability to continually outstrip and overtake everything 
on behalf of a decadent, uncultivated and self-destructive oligarchy – 
because it is an absolutely venal oligarchy, that is, perfectly nihilistic.
This contemporary Leviathan is global, and it is the result of the 
reticular and interactive traceability of 24/7 capitalism. Most people 
now have a general awareness of this situation, and thus this trace-
ability does not operate ‘behind the back of consciousness’, as Hegel 
said about the phenomenology of spirit (of its epiphany as exterioriza-
tion), but rather by outstripping and overtaking the protentions that 
produce this consciousness, that is, by proposing and substituting pre-
fabricated protentions – and these protentions are prefabricated even 
if they are also ‘individualized’ or ‘personalized’. All this represents 
a radical and unprecedented rupture with Husserl’s description of the 
temporal activity of noetic consciousness.
The latter is composed of primary retentions that consciousness 
selects (without being aware of doing so) at the time the experience 
occurs, selections made on the basis of the secondary retentions this 
consciousness contains. Secondary retentions thereby constitute the 
criteria for these selections. The primary retentions resulting from 
this selection ‘engramme’ individually lived experience, and contrib-
ute to the accumulation of past experience – by in their turn becoming 
secondary retentions. The play between primary and secondary reten-
tions generates protentions that are themselves primary and second-
ary (though Husserl did not make this distinction). Primary proten-
tions are tied to the object of lived experience, so that through habit, 
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reasoning, physiological automatisms, or through the knowledge 
that the perceiving subject accumulates about the object of percep-
tion, such ‘primarily retained’ traits result in ‘primarily protained’ 
traits, that is, expected and anticipated traits – whether consciously 
or otherwise.
These primary and secondary retentions and protentions consti-
tute mnesic traces, which, like the ‘neurones’ in Freud’s Project for 
a Scientific Psychology, are ‘charged’ with and ‘tend’ towards proten-
tions, through circuits and facilitations formed between these mne-
sic traces that Freud called ‘contact barriers’, as potentials for action 
and as expectations that constitute the lived experience of these poten-
tials.54 This play of retentional and protentional mnesic traces is con-
ditioned and overdetermined by the play of those hypomnesic traces 
formed by tertiary retention.
In the case of digital and reticulated tertiary retention, that is, 
arrangements of psychic retentions and protentions via automa-
tisms whose speed approaches that of light, the retentional selec-
tions through which experience occurs as the production of primary 
retentions and protentions are overtaken by prefabricated tertiary 
retentions and protentions that are ‘tailored’ through ‘user profiling’ 
and ‘auto-completion’ technologies, and through all the possibilities 
afforded by real-time processing and its associated network effects – 
and augmented by this performativity.
Given this differential of four million between the speed of nerves 
and that of fibre optics, such considerations call for an organology and 
a pharmacology of speed and will. For it is will in its most basic forms 
that is thereby emptied of all content and overtaken by traceability.
We must elaborate an organology of will, and not just of desire – of 
will [volition] as including every kind of production of motives, of 
which willpower [volonté] qua deliberate and conscious production is 
merely one case among others – which does not mean that we should 
dilute the specificity of each of them, quite the contrary.
We must work towards an organology of will the goal of which 
would be to pose the challenges of the Anthropocene and the 
Neganthropocene by, precisely, rethinking practical questions in rela-
tion to this organology. This is necessary because the hyper-matter in 
which this organological matter consists enables control to be taken of 
the material processes that condition will and willpower, and thereby 
short-circuits them in every dimension, replacing them with automa-
tized protentions.
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When a noetic individual undergoes a temporal experience in which 
he or she selects primary retentions on the basis of his or her second-
ary retentions, this individual at the same time, and in return,55 inter-
prets these secondary retentions inasmuch as they form ensembles.
Such ensembles are charged with protentions arising from previ-
ous experiences. Some of these protentions are transindividuated and 
transformed into rules held in common, that is, into habits and con-
ventions of every kind, metastabilized between the psychic individual 
and the collective individuals associated with these experiences (a 
con-vention being what is con-venient to, suitable for, a plurality of 
individuals: what makes them come together). Some of these proten-
tions, however, remain awaiting transindividuation, that is, they await 
expressions and inscriptions that pursue existing circuits of transindi-
viduation further.
For a psychic individual to interpret, during a present experience, 
the ensembles of secondary retentions that constitute his or her past 
experience is to make actual the protentions that these ensembles con-
tain as potential.56 By short-circuiting the protentional projections of 
psychic and collective noetic individuals, by phagocytically absorb-
ing the milieus associated with them, and by sterilizing the circuits 
of transindividuation that are woven between them through their indi-
vidual and collective experiences, by doing all this, algorithmic gov-
ernmentality annihilates the traumatypical potentials of any proten-
tions that might bear the possibility of neganthropological upheavals. 
Such is computational nihilism in the contemporary Anthropocene.
When noetic experience is fulfilled in actuality and ‘fully’ (in the 
plenitude of actuality that constitutes what Aristotle called entelechy), 
it constitutes a support for the expression of traumatypes that par-
ticipate in the inscription of noetic singularity into circuits of trans-
individuation, circuits through which knowledge is woven as the 
accumulation of previous experience insofar as it is original and yet 
recognized and identified. As such, noetic experience is experience 
that is neganthropically bifurcating.
It is a question, therefore, of how to re-establish a true process of 
transindividuation with digital, reticulated tertiary retentions, and 
to bring about a digital age of psychic and collective individuation. 
The challenge is to generate tertiary retentions with all the polysemic 
and plurivocal thickness of which the hypomnesic trace is capable, 
reflecting the hermeneutic play of the improbable and of the singular-
ity involved in the protentions that are woven between psychic and 
collective retentions.
To do this, we must build and implement systems dedicated to 
the individual and collective interpretation of traces – including by 
Part One: Anthropocene, Entropocene, Neganthropocene 50
using automated systems that enable analytical transformations to be 
optimized, and new materials to be supplied for synthetic activity. 
This is what we are working towards, organologically, with the goal 
of rebuilding the architecture of the World Wide Web, and as a way 
of responding to the call issued by Tim Berners-Lee in London last 
September with his initiative entitled ‘The Web We Want’. As for us, 
what we want is a neganthropic web, and we want it so that we can 
inaugurate the Neganthropocene
2 Escaping the Anthropocene
1 Automation and negentropy
The propositions at the heart of this paper are founded on the conclu-
sions of my recent work entitled Automatic Society, a book concerned 
with the issues of full and general automation that have accompanied 
the advent of the digital age.57 In it I argue that algorithmic automation 
is leading to the decline of wage labour and employment, and hence to 
the imminent disappearance of the Keynesian model of redistributing 
productivity gains, a model that has until now been the basis of the 
macro-economic system’s ability to remain solvent.
After the ‘great transformation’ that Karl Polanyi described in 
1944,58 which gave rise to what we now call the Anthropocene, there 
is now taking place what amounts to an immense transformation, a 
transformation that presents us with an alternative:
 ▪ either we continue being led in the direction of hyper-pro-
letarianization and a generalized form of automatic piloting 
that will engender both structural insolvency and a vertigi-
nous increase in entropy;
 ▪ or we lead ourselves out of the process of generalized prole-
tarianization into which we have been placed by 250 years 
of industrial capitalism – which requires negentropic capa-
bilities to be widely developed on a massive scale, through 
a noetic politics of reticulation that places automatons, auto-
mation systems of every kind, into the service of individual 
and collective capacities for dis-automatization, that is, into 
the service of the production of negentropic bifurcations.
The immensity of the transformation currently underway is due both 
to the speed of its effects and to the fact that these effects operate on 
a global scale. So-called ‘big data’ is a key example of this immense 
transformation, which is leading globalized consumerism to liquidate 
all forms of knowledge (savoir vivre, savoir faire and savoir conceptu-
aliser, knowledge of how to live, do and think).
The Anthropocene is an ‘Entropocene’, that is, a period in which 
entropy is produced on a massive scale, thanks precisely to the fact 
that what has been liquidated and automated is knowledge, so that in 
fact it is no longer knowledge at all, but rather a set of closed systems, 
that is, entropic systems. Knowledge is an open system: it always 
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includes a capacity for dis-automatization that produces negentropy. 
When Chris Anderson announced that the era of ‘big data’, or what 
he calls the ‘data deluge’, would lead to the ‘end of theory’,59 he made 
a serious mistake, given that he ignored the fact that to close an open 
system leads in a systemic way to its disappearance.
Given that it is founded on proletarianization and the destruction 
of knowledge, the model of redistributing productivity gains through 
employment is itself doomed. Another model of redistribution must 
be conceived and implemented if we are to ensure macro-economic 
solvency in the age of digital automation. The criteria for redistribu-
tion that must now be adopted can no longer be founded on the pro-
ductivity of labour. Productivity is today a question of machines, 
and today’s digital machine no longer has any need for either work 
or employment.
Manual work, which produces negentropy and knowledge – which 
Hegel discussed in terms of Knecht – was, in the nineteenth century, 
progressively replaced by proletarianized labour or employment, that 
is, by a proletariat forced to submit to a machinery that was entro-
pic not just because of its consumption of fossil fuels, but because 
of its standardization of operating sequences and the resultant loss 
of knowledge on the side of the employee. This loss of knowledge 
has today become so widespread that it has reached as far as Alan 
Greenspan, as I have shown in Automatic Society, Volume 1, and as he 
himself stated on October 23, 2008.60
The Anthropocene is unsustainable: it is a massive and high-speed 
process of destruction operating on a planetary scale, and its cur-
rent direction must be reversed. The question and challenge of the 
Anthropocene is therefore the ‘Neganthropocene’, that is, to find a 
pathway that will enable us to escape from this impasse of cosmic 
dimensions – which requires the elaboration of a new speculative cos-
mology in the wake of Whitehead.
New criteria, as I said, must be implemented in order to organize 
redistribution in the economy of the Neganthropocene, and these new 
criteria must be founded on the capacity for dis-automatization that it 
is up to us to resuscitate. This necessarily involves a resurrection of 
what Amartya Sen calls capabilities, which he places at the foundation 
of human development – that is, of the individuation of humankind.
2 Knowledge, freedom and agency
Amartya Sen relates ‘capability’ to the development of freedom, 
which he defines as always being both individual and collective: ‘we 
have to see individual freedom as a social commitment’.61 In this 
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way, Sen remains faithful to both Kantian and Socratic perspectives. 
Capability constitutes the basis of economic dynamism and develop-
ment, and it does so as freedom: ‘Expansion of freedom is viewed, in 
this approach, both as the primary end and as the principal means of 
development’.62 Freedom, in Sen’s definition, is therefore a form of 
agency: the power to act.
Sen’s comparative example of the incapacitating effects of con-
sumerism (that is, in his terms, of the indicators of affluence) is well-
known: the black residents of Harlem have a lower life expectancy 
than the people of Bangladesh, and this is precisely a question of 
their ‘agency’.
Freedom, here, is a question of knowledge insofar as it is a capabil-
ity that is always both individual and collective – and this means: indi-
viduated both psychically and collectively. It was on this basis that 
Sen devised the human development index in order to form a contrast 
with the economic growth index.
I would like to extend Sen’s propositions by means of a different 
analysis, one that leads to other questions. In particular, consideration 
must be given to the question of what relations psychic and collective 
individuals can forge with automatons, in order to achieve individual 
and collective bifurcations within an industrial and economic system 
that, in becoming massively automated, tends also to become closed.
The Anthropocene, insofar as it is an ‘Entropocene’, amounts to 
accomplished nihilism: it produces an unsustainable levelling of all 
values that requires a leap into a ‘transvaluation’ capable of giving 
rise to a ‘general economy’ in Georges Bataille’s sense, whose work 
I have elsewhere tried to show involves a reconsideration of libidinal 
economy. The movement I am describing here is no doubt not a trans-
valuation in a strict Nietzschean sense. Rather, it is an invitation to 
reread Nietzsche with respect to questions of disorder and order that 
in the following will be understood in terms of becoming and future.
3 Becoming and future
If there is to be a future [avenir], and not just a becoming [devenir], 
the value of tomorrow will lie in the constitutive negentropy of the 
economy-to-come of the Neganthropocene. For such an economy, the 
practical and functional differentiation between becoming and future 
must form its criteria of evaluation – only in so doing will it be pos-
sible to overcome the systemic entropy in which the Anthropocene 
consists. This economy requires a shift from anthropology to negan-
thropology, where the latter is founded on what I call general organol-
ogy and on a pharmacology: the pharmakon is the artefact and as such 
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the condition of hominization, that is, an organogenesis of artefactual 
organs and organizations, but it always produces both entropy and 
negentropy, and hence it is always also a threat to hominization.
The problem raised by such a perspective on the future is to know 
how to evaluate or measure negentropy. Referred to as negative 
entropy by Erwin Schrödinger and as anti-entropy by Francis Bailly 
and Giuseppe Longo, negentropy is always defined in relation to an 
observer (see the work of Henri Atlan63 and of Edgar Morin64) – that is, 
it is always described in relation to a locality that it as such produces, 
and that it differentiates within a more or less homogeneous space 
(and this is why a neganthropology is always also a geography). What 
appears entropic from one angle is negentropic from another angle.
Knowledge – as savoir faire (that is, knowledge of what to do so 
that I do not myself collapse and am not led into chaos), as savoir 
vivre (that is, knowledge that enriches and individuates the social 
organization in which I live without destroying it), and as conceptual 
knowledge (that is, knowledge the inheritance of which occurs only by 
passing through its transformation, and which is transformed only by 
being revived through a process of what Socrates called anamnesis, a 
process that, in the West, structurally exceeds its locality) – knowl-
edge, in all these forms, is always a way of collectively defining what is 
negentropic in this or that field of human existence.
The inhuman refers to a way of denying the negentropic possibili-
ties of the human, that is, of denying its noetic freedom, and, as a 
result, its agency. What Sen describes as freedom and capability must 
be conceived from this cosmic perspective, and related to Alfred 
North Whitehead’s ‘speculative cosmology’, as constituting a negent-
ropic potentiality – as the potential for openness of a localized system, 
which, for that being we refer to as ‘human’, may always once again 
become closed. Or, in Whitehead’s terms, human beings may always 
relapse, decay into simpler forms, that is, become inhuman.65
This is so only because the anthropological is both hyperentropic 
and negentropic to the second degree: Anthropos is organological, 
that is, pharmacological, or, as Jean-Pierre Vernant put it, constitu-
tively ambiguous.
4 Anthropology as entropology according to  
Lévi-Strauss and beyond
In addition to being fundamentally local, an open, negentropic system 
is characterized by its relative sustainability – or in other words, by its 
finitude. What is negentropic – whether idiom, tool, institution, mar-
ket, desire and so on – is always in the course of its inevitable decay.
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What I call an idiotext (Figure 1), as I attempted to define it in the 
final part of my thesis (which has not yet been published), is an open 
locality taken up within another, greater locality, or within what I 
describe as nested spirals as they co-produce a process of collective 
individuation by psychically individuating themselves. This is not 
without an echo in the questions posed by Edgar Morin in The Nature 
of Nature.66 But Morin, like Atlan, overlooks the essential, namely, the 
organological dimension (that is, the technical and artificial dimen-
sion) of the negentropy characteristic of Anthropos, which means that 
it is also pharmacological, that is, both entropic and negentropic, and 
hence requires continual arbitration – negotiations that are operations 
of knowledge as therapies and therapeutics.
In an idiotext tendencies compose, tendencies that are highly phar-
macological, that is, both entropic and negentropic, and, in this way, 
they constitute a dynamic wherein figures or motives emerge that are 
protentions, that is, differences that separate future from becoming 
and thereby allow this separation to be perpetuated. These are the 
motives and figures through which knowledge is woven as the cir-
cuits of transindividuation that form both within a generation and 
between the generations.
Since the early years of the twenty-first century, at IRCAM, that is, 
as a result of my journey through musicology, I have presented this 
composition of tendencies as what results from negotiation between 
psychosomatic organisms (psychic individuals), artificial organs 
(technical individuals) and social organizations (collective individu-
ations). It is through the complexity of this negotiation that the prin-
ciples of general organology are formalized, as a kind of pharmaco-
logical drama, that is, as the constantly renewed and reposed problem 
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This point of view is the complete opposite of the conclusion 
reached by Claude Lévi-Strauss at the end of Tristes Tropiques, when, 
having recalled that ‘the world began without man and will end with-
out him’, and that man works towards ‘the disintegration of the origi-
nal order of things and precipitates a powerful organization of matter 
towards ever greater inertia, an inertia that one day will be final’,67 
he adds that
From the time when he first began to breathe and eat, up 
to the invention of atomic and thermonuclear devices, 
by way of the discovery of fire – and except when he has 
been engaged in self-reproduction – man has done nothing 
other than blithely break down billions of structures and 
reduce them to a state in which they are no longer capable 
of integration.68
Hence Lévi-Strauss poses with rare radicality the question of becom-
ing without being, that is, of the inevitably ephemeral character of 
the cosmos in totality, as well as of the localities that form therein 
through negentropic processes that are themselves always factors of 
entropic accelerations.
If we were to take this profoundly nihilistic statement by Lévi-
Strauss literally (when, for example, he writes that ‘man has done 
nothing other than blithely break down billions of structures and 
reduce them to a state in which they are no longer capable of integra-
tion’), we would be forced to assume that very little time separates us 
from the ‘end times’. We would be forced to reduce this time to noth-
ing, to annihilate it, and to discount negentropy on the grounds of its 
being ephemeral: we would have to dissolve the future into becoming, 
to assess it as null and void [non avenu], as never coming, that is, as 
having ultimately never happened, the outcome of having no future – 
as becoming without future. And we would be forced to conclude that 
what is ephemeral, because it is ephemeral, is merely nothing.
This is what the anthropologist literally says. I define myself as a 
neganthropologist. And I have two objections to Lévi-Strauss:
 ▪ on the one hand, that the question of reason, understood as 
a quasi-causal power (in the Deleuzian sense) to bifurcate, 
that is, to produce, in the jumble of facts, a necessary order 
forming a law, is always the question of being ‘worthy of 
what happens to us’,69 which is another way of describing 
the function of reason as defined by Whitehead, namely as 
what makes a life a good life, and what makes a good life a 
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better life,70 that is, a struggle against static survival, which 
is nothing other than the entropic tendency of all life;
 ▪ on the other hand, that Lévi-Strauss’s bitter and disillu-
sioned sophistry seriously neglects two points:
1 first, life in general, as ‘negative entropy’, that is, as 
negentropy, is always produced from entropy, and 
invariably leads back there: it is a detour – as was said by 
Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and by Blanchot 
in The Infinite Conversation;
2 second, technical life is an amplified and hyperbolic 
form of negentropy, that is, of an organization that is not 
just organic but organological, but which produces an 
entropy that is equally hyperbolic, and which, like living 
things, returns to it, but does so by accelerating the speed 
of the differentiations and indifferentiations in which this 
detour consists, speed here constituting, then, a locally 
cosmic factor.
This detour in which technical life consists is desire as the power 
to infinitize.
It is misleading to give the impression, as Lévi-Strauss does here, 
that man has an entropic essence and that he destroys some ‘creation’, 
some ‘nature’ that would on the contrary have a negentropic essence 
– alive, profuse and fecund, whether animal or vegetable. Plants and 
animals are indeed organic orderings of highly improbable inert mat-
ter (as is all negentropy), yet all life unfurls and succeeds only by itself 
intensifying entropic processes: plants and animals are themselves 
only an all too temporary and in the end futile detour in becoming.
By consuming and thereby disassociating what Lévi-Strauss calls 
‘structures’, all living things participate in a local increase of entropy 
while at the same time locally producing a negentropic order. What 
Derrida called différance, if we may indeed relate negentropy to this 
concept, is first and foremost a matter of economy and detour. And if it 
is also true that différance is an arrangement of retentions and proten-
tions, as Derrida indicates in Of Grammatology, and if it is true that 
for those beings we call human, that is, technical and noetic beings, 
arrangements of retentions and protentions are trans-formed by ter-
tiary retentions, then we should be able, on the basis of this concept of 
différance, to redefine economy and desire (as configurations of cir-
cuits that form themselves through these detours, as turns and spirals).
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Unlike purely organic beings, those beings called human are organ-
ological, that is, negentropic (and entropic) on two levels: both as liv-
ing beings, that is, organic beings, who through reproduction bring 
about those ‘minor differences’71 that lie at the origin of evolution, 
and hence at the origin of what Schrödinger called negative entropy,72 
and as artificial beings, that is, organological beings, who produce dif-
ferentiations that are no longer those of what we refer to as a spe-
cies but of a ‘kind’, which in this case is humankind – which is what 
Simondon called the process of psychic and collective individuation.
Artifices are always detours, detours that are always more or less 
ephemeral, like the genus of insects named ephemera, neither more 
nor less ‘without why’ than those roses that are much prized in Great 
Britain, and that are themselves essentially artificial.73 But these 
artifices, inasmuch as they give rise to the arts and to works and art-
works of all kinds, as well as to science, can infinitize themselves, 
and can infinitize their recipients beyond themselves, that is, beyond 
their own end, projecting them into an infinite protention of a promise 
always yet to come, which alone is able to pierce the horizon of undif-
ferentiated becoming.
One might offer the retort that my own objection to Lévi-Strauss, 
that organological negentropy is not just organic, and constitutes what 
I thus refer to as Neganthropos, necessarily implies that the organo-
logical is nothing but an accelerator of entropization that precipitates 
the end and from this perspective shortens what is ultimately essen-
tial, namely, the time of this différance. But this would be to precisely 
misunderstand what I am trying to say.
There is no doubt that the question of speed in relation to thermody-
namic physics, as well as biology and zoology, is a crucial issue. But 
the question here is of a politics of speed in which there are opposing 
possibilities, and where it is a matter of knowing in what way, where, 
on what plane and for how long what, in order to define the dynamic 
of human evolution, Leroi-Gourhan called the ‘urge to conquer space 
and time’, increases or reduces entropy.74 The concept of idiotext with 
which I have been working is conceived precisely in order to under-
stand something not just as a question, but rather, as Deleuze said, 
as a problem.
In a situation as exceptional and unsustainable as the Anthropocene, 
only a resolute assumption of the organological condition, that is, an 
adoption of the organological condition, directed towards an increase 
in negentropy, can transform the speed of technological vectors cur-
rently at work – in a world where today the digital reaches speeds 
of two hundred thousand kilometres per second, or two thirds of the 
speed of light, which is some four million times faster than the speed 
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of nerve impulses. Only such a resolute adoption or assumption of 
the organological condition will allow us, in a literal sense, to save 
time, that is, differentiation, insofar as, precisely, a transvaluation 
of the industrial economy can commit us to and engage us with the 
Neganthropocene, and disengage us from the Anthropocene.
If the hyperbolic negentropy in which the organological becom-
ing of the organic consists installs a neganthropology that accelerates 
(entropic and anthropic) becoming, it can nevertheless also transform 
this acceleration into a future that differs and defers this becoming, 
according to the two senses of the verb différer mobilized by Derrida 
in his term différance. Hence a (negentropic and neganthropic) future 
can be established from this infinitizing form of protention that 
is the object of desire as a factor of (psychic, social and technical) 
individuation and integration – failing which, différance will remain 
merely formal.
It is in the light of these questions – effaced by Lévi-Strauss’s triste 
statement, his sad and gloomy words erasing the indeterminacy of the 
future under the probabilistic weight of becoming – that today we 
must reinterpret Spinoza.
5 Noetic intermittence and cosmic potlatch
Organological beings are capable of purposefully organizing the 
negentropic and organo-logical works that we are referring to here 
as neganthropic. Depending on how they undertake this organization 
that is both psychic and social, depending on the way that they do or 
do not take care of the anthropic and neganthropic power in which 
their behaviour consists, they can either indifferently precipitate a 
release of entropy, or, on the contrary, differ and defer it – thereby 
constituting a différance that Simondon called individuation and that 
he thinks as a process, as does Whitehead.75
We ourselves support a neganthropological project conceived as 
care and in this sense as an economy. This economy of care is not sim-
ply a power to anthropologically transform the world (as ‘masters and 
possessors of nature’76). It is a pharmacological knowledge constitut-
ing a neganthropology in the service of the Neganthropocene, in the 
way that Canguilhem conceives the function of biology as the knowl-
edge of life in technical life, and in the way that Whitehead thinks the 
function of reason within a speculative cosmology.
Of course, we must identify and describe the ‘negative externali-
ties’ that the ‘neganthropy’ generated by anthropization propagates in 
‘anthropized’ milieus. But this is not a question of nullifying negan-
thropy. Rather, and on the contrary, it is a matter of passing from 
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anthropization to neganthropization by cultivating a positive phar-
macology no more nor less ephemeral than life that is carried along 
in becoming, as is everything that ‘is’ in the universe. This care is 
the very thing in which this neganthropology consists, and it is what 
Lévi-Strauss always ignored, by ignoring and deliberately censoring 
the thought of Leroi-Gourhan.
This situation stems from the fact that Lévi-Straussian anthro-
pology is founded on the repression of organology (to which Leroi-
Gourhan drew attention), and on ignoring the neganthropological 
question that prevails beyond any anthropology. This repression of the 
organological can be related to the notion of dépense, of expenditure 
as conceived by Georges Bataille:
Every time the meaning of a discussion depends on the fun-
damental value of the word useful – in other words, every 
time the essential question touching on the life of human 
societies is raised, […] it is possible to affirm that the debate 
is necessarily warped and that the fundamental question 
is eluded. In fact […], there is nothing that permits one to 
define what is useful to man.77
At stake here are those ‘so-called unproductive expenditures’78 that 
are always related to sacrifice, that is, to ‘the production of sacred 
things […] constituted by an operation of loss’.79 Every loss sacrifices, 
sacralizes and sanctifies a default of being older than any being (and 
this is how I read Levinas80). In this tenor of primordial default, noetic 
intermittence is constituted, and can project itself speculatively, only 
in and as a cosmic totality conceived neganthropo-logically – that is, 
as the knowledge and power to create bifurcations within entropy.
All noetic bifurcation, that is, quasi-causal bifurcation, derives 
from a cosmic potlatch that indeed destroys very large quantities of 
differences and orders, but it does so by projecting a very great dif-
ference on another plane, constituting another ‘order of magnitude’ 
against the disorder of a kosmos in becoming, a kosmos that, without 
this projection of a yet-to-come from the unknown, would be reduced 
to a universe without singularity.81
Thus expenditure, even though it might be a social function, 
immediately leads to an agonistic and apparently antisocial 
act of separation. The rich man consumes the poor man’s 
losses, creating for him a category of degradation and abjec-
tion that leads to slavery. Now it is evident that, from the 
endlessly transmitted heritage of the sumptuary world, the 
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modern world has received slavery, and has reserved it for 
the proletariat.82
In this proletarianized world, the expenditure of the ‘rich man’ never-
theless becomes sterile:
The expenditures taken on by the capitalists in order to aid 
the proletarians and give them a chance to pull themselves 
up on the social ladder only bear witness to their inability 
(due to exhaustion) to carry out thoroughly a sumptuary pro-
cess. Once the loss of the poor man is accomplished, little by 
little the pleasure of the rich man is emptied and neutralized; 
it gives way to a kind of apathetic indifference.83
At a time when the becoming-automatic of knowledge forms the heart 
of the economy, and does so at the risk of denying itself as knowl-
edge by taking the form of a-theoretical computation, we will take up 
this project once again, from an epistemic and epistemological per-
spective, in a second volume of Automatic Society, to be subtitled The 
Future of Knowledge. There we will show:
 ▪ that the question of the future of knowledge is inseparable 
from that of the future of work;
 ▪ that this question must be translated into an alternative 
industrial politics that gives to France and to Europe their 
place in becoming – and as trans-formations of this becom-
ing into futures.
6 Becoming, future and neganthropology
Our question is the future – of work, of knowledge and of everything 
this entails and generates, that is, everything – insofar as it is not solu-
ble into becoming. That it is not soluble means nothing other than the 
fact that it cannot be dissolved and (re)solved without this dissolution 
being also its disappearance, that is, ours. This possible dissolution 
in fact is what is not possible in law: we do not have the right to just 
accept this and submit to it.
Lévi-Strauss cannot conceive this distinction between, on the one 
hand, that which remains radically undetermined because it is strictly 
and constitutively improbable and remains to come, and, on the other 
hand, that which is most probable, and which is as such statistically 
determinable.
If Lévi-Strauss is obviously not unaware of the many discourses 
emerging from philosophy that affirm the supra-causality of freedom 
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– and therefore of will – in and before nature, he ultimately sees in 
this only an entropic power that accelerates the decay of the world, 
far removed from any differing and deferring that could give rise to 
new difference. In so doing, Lévi-Strauss adopts that nihilistic per-
spective the advent of which was announced by Nietzsche seventy 
years beforehand.
We cannot accept the Lévi-Straussian perspective. We cannot and 
we need not resolve to dissolve ourselves into becoming. We cannot, 
because to do so would consist in no longer promising to our descen-
dants any possible future, a future to come, and we need not because 
Lévi-Strauss’s reasoning is based on what in philosophy since its 
inception has consisted in repressing the neganthropological dimen-
sion of the noetic soul and of what we call ‘human being’, namely, the 
passage from the organic to the organological in which this soul and 
being consists.
Lévi-Strauss proposes to understand anthropology as entropology. 
But he takes no account of the negentropy generated by the techni-
cal form of life as described by Canguilhem, that type that character-
izes the noetic soul – whose very noesis (producing what Lévi-Strauss 
called the ‘works’ of man) is its intermittent fruit.
Any noetic work, as the intermittent fruit of noesis, produces a 
bifurcation and a singular difference in becoming, irreducible to its 
laws (improbable, quasi-causal and in this sense free – as freedom 
of thought, ethical freedom and aesthetic freedom). It would here be 
necessary to read Schelling. But such a noetic work thereby engen-
ders a pharmakon that can turn against its own gesture – and this 
is why the Aufklärung can give rise to its contrary, namely, to what 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas follow Weber in describing as 
rationalization.
Prior to Lévi-Strauss, Valéry, Freud and Husserl all drew atten-
tion to this duplicity of spirit that was for the Greeks of the tragic 
age their Promethean, Epimethean and hermeneutic lot. But, unlike 
Lévi-Strauss, neither the Tragics, nor Valéry, nor Freud, nor Husserl 
denied the neganthropological fecundity of noesis and of its organo-
logical condition.
This denial is equally characteristic of the nihilism suffered by those 
who cannot conceive the nihilism enacted by absolutely computational 
capitalism, that is, by a capitalism that has lost its mind and spirit 
– and has done so thanks not just to its rupture with its religious ori-
gin and the dissolution of belief into fiduciary and calculable trust, 
but to the destruction it has wrought upon all theory through the cor-
relationist ideology founded on the application of supercomputing 
to ‘big data’.
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Capitalism’s loss of spirit leads to the total proletarianization of the 
mind itself. To fight against this state of fact in order to restore a state 
of law is to prescribe, for the digital pharmakon that makes this state 
of fact possible, a new state of law that recognizes this pharmacologi-
cal situation and that prescribes therapies and therapeutics so as to 
form a new age of knowledge.
The discourse of Lévi-Strauss is profoundly nihilistic, literally des-
perate and fundamentally despairing – and as such it is neither lucid 
(enlightening) nor rational. Rationality does not submit to becoming, 
and in this lies the unity of the diverse dimensions of freedom, that 
is, of the improbable as constituting the undetermined horizon of all 
ends worthy of the name, within that ‘kingdom of ends’ that is the 
plane of interpretation of what we refer to as ‘consistences’. The latter 
do not exist, in the sense that, as Whitehead indicates:
Reason is a factor in experience which directs and criticizes 
the urge towards the attainment of an end realized in imagi-
nation but not in fact.84
Reason is an organ, as Whitehead says, and this organ organizes the 
passage from fact to law, that is, the realization of law in facts, law 
being the new, that is, negentropy:
Reason is the organ of emphasis upon novelty. It provides the 
judgment by which realization in idea obtains the emphasis 
by which it passes into realization in purpose, and thence its 
realization in fact.85
Consistences are promises – they are inherently improbable, and it is 
as such that they make desirable a Neganthropos that remains always 
to come,86 that is, improbable.87 This improbability is a spring that 
returns again in the winter of universal decay, the universe localized 
on this inhabited Earth being the site of ‘two main tendencies’:
the slow decay of physical nature [whereby,] with stealthy 
inevitableness, there is degradation of energy [whereas] 
the other tendency is exemplified by the yearly renewal of 
nature in the spring, and by the upward course of biological 
evolution. […] Reason is the self-discipline of the originative 
element in history.88
It is this discipline that is lacking in Lévi-Strauss, and in his 
entropology.
3 Symptomatology of the Month of  
January 2015 in France
When I received this invitation, I enthusiastically accepted the offer 
from Ebrahim Moosa and the University of Notre Dame to participate 
in this encounter here in Rome. And even though I am not a believer 
– at least in the classical sense, by which I mean that I am not what 
is called one of the faithful within the meaning of the Churches – I 
do believe that the question of faith and fidelity is the great problem 
of what I call non-inhuman being, as it continuously confronts what, 
in The Normal and the Pathological, Georges Canguilhem called the 
‘infidelity’89 of the milieu: humankind is characterized by the fact 
that it produces its own milieu, its own living environment, and this 
self-production constantly confronts an infidelity to itself that it struc-
turally secretes throughout the exosomatic organogenesis in which 
the irresistible concretization of its technicity consists.
Canguilhem concludes that ‘the power and temptation to fall sick 
are an essential characteristic of human physiology’.90 Hence we 
might refer in this instance to an organology of temptation.
The reason for my enthusiastic response to your invitation is that, 
for a long time, I have wanted to engage a dialogue with theology, and 
hence with theologians, and because at this very moment, in Paris, I 
have been trying to renew the question of hermeneutics – in the cur-
rent context of reticulated society, the worldwide establishment of 
which began in the spring of 1993 with the introduction of the World 
Wide Web, and which we might say constitutes a specific stage in the 
accomplishment of what Martin Heidegger called Gestell.
Beginning as it did on 30 April 1993, this structural and generalized 
reticulation, which also involved sending a very large fleet of geosta-
tionary satellites into orbit, has, since then, caused something that is 
not quite a revolution, but that has for several years been referred to as 
a disruption (rupture, upheaval, disturbance, interruption), a term cur-
rently utilized by marketing but that originates from physics.
That the current use of this term comes from marketing is no acci-
dent: the disruption provoked by marketing is the very thing that has 
given rise to the systemic infidelity characteristic of consumer capi-
talism and to its consequent immense problems.
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I would like to engage a dialogue not only with theologians but with 
those who care about the spirituality of esprit, Geist, spirit, spiritus 
– and hence also with the anthropologists of mana and hau: I aspire 
to reopen a question of spirit rendered unthinkable by that science 
of the mind calling itself ‘cognitive science’. And it has done so 
thanks to what, according to my own analysis, amounts to a denial 
(Verneinung) and repression (Verdrängung) of the spirit insofar as it 
is always the precarious and metastable unification of a division that 
can never be eliminated – which means that one can lose spirit, lose 
one’s mind, which also means, in French as in English, to become 
mad, to go crazy.
The French translation of Witz as mot d’esprit, the sound of which 
resembles the English wit, allows us to understand how Freud high-
lighted the fundamental relationship that exists between the spirit 
and laughter – and I am working into a forthcoming book a chapter 
that will be called ‘Rire jaune’, ‘Yellow Laugh’, a French phrase that 
means to laugh in such a way as to conceal one’s annoyance, one’s 
pain, one’s embarrassment, one’s sadness, or distress, or disorienta-
tion, sometimes one’s humiliation, and the despair this always causes.
The relationships between spirit, laughter and despair are keystones 
of psychoanalysis inasmuch as I believe it to have been historically 
constituted through the experience of melancholy, which Freud dis-
cussed in Civilization and Its Discontents91 and which I interpret as 
an experience of the pharmakon, an experience that Paul Valéry and 
Edmund Husserl had already identified as a poisonous becoming in 
the life of the spirit – Valéry in ‘La crise de l’esprit’92 and Husserl 
in The Crisis of European Sciences93 – a becoming and a develop-
ment that we are now facing on a global scale, and that we experience 
through the profound changes taking place in the psychic apparatus 
as a result of the technologies of mind and spirit that today serve to 
destroy the spirit.
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud raises questions that I 
believe are prerequisites for any analysis of the contemporary psychic 
and spiritual apparatus insofar as it is, moreover, deprived of spirit 
and threatened with a loss of reason, in a sense that is primordial and 
irreducible, constituted as it is by its pharmacological character, so 
that it can always be de-spiritualized, so to speak – that is, become 
intoxicated, and thereby regress, of which the rire jaune that gripped 
France in January after the killings of 7 January, and the coverage 
of Charlie Hebdo that followed, constitutes a symptom of extraordi-
nary complexity.
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This potential de-spiritualization is the underlying basis of what 
Christianity calls temptation. It is also the tension that runs through 
the bipolarity constituting what Gilbert Simondon calls the psychic 
individual. And it is, as well, what consumer capitalism induces, 
by systematically soliciting the drives at the expense of the libidi-
nal economy as conceived by Freud, for whom it was the guarantee 
maintaining the unity of the psychic apparatus – and, along with 
it, of society.
If the context of this intervention, in which I began by speaking to 
you of belief, faith, fidelity, spirit, laughter, the unconscious, tempta-
tion, the libidinal economy and contemporary capitalism, has much 
to do with what happened in Paris between 7 and 11 January – and 
where I sincerely doubt that this was a genuine moment of public 
debate, which freedom of expression alone makes possible, this being 
also the condition of political life – it nevertheless also concerns, and 
much more broadly, the loss of the feeling of existing that afflicts 
our societies, a feeling that I began to analyse in 2003, in Aimer, 
s’aimer, nous aimer, a book concerned with the events that unfolded 
in 2001 and 2002.94
As for the way that 2015 began in France, it has been dominated 
less by political debate than by reactions and symptoms – in the sense 
of ‘symptomatology’ invoked by Paolo Vignola,95 and this is why I 
have chosen as my title, ‘Symptomatology of the Month of January 
2015 in France’. As such, this response to what some believe we 
should call ‘15 January’ (as in France one refers to ‘May 68’) seems to 
me to amount to a form of stupidity that is perfectly symptomatic of 
the generalized disorientation of minds and spirits characteristic of a 
derelict world.
What I try to think, and which inclines me towards you despite my 
lack of religious and theological culture, lies not only in what can be 
called the spiritual question, but also, inscribing myself in the after-
math of what is called (including in theology) the death of God, in 
the following:
 ▪ I believe with Freud that the father is all the more power-
ful once he is dead, and that it is only in this way that it is 
possible to think – if it is possible – what is often wrongly 
called the ‘return of the religious’ in the context of contem-
porary science and technology, which is to say of contem-
porary capitalism (for in this world these three terms are 
inseparable);
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 ▪ I believe that the question of belief is not soluble into that of 
knowledge (the question of belief being therefore also that 
of faith, and hence of fidelity);
 ▪ I take extremely seriously the Nietzschean statement that, 
describing capitalism as nihilism – since what is involved 
with the levelling of all values is clearly capitalism, which 
also constitutes the horizon of the work of Max Weber – 
proposes that what is required beyond nihilism, and as the 
transvaluation of all values, is a new belief.
What is the relationship between the possibility of this new belief 
and religious belief? And, more particularly, how does this ques-
tion arise in a singular way in the context of what we now call the 
Anthropocene, which is also the context of the encyclical on ecology 
soon to be published by Pope Francis?96
These are the organizing questions for what I will say in what fol-
lows. And here, I wonder how we can imagine, if it is imaginable, that 
there could be Jewish and Muslim theologies of the death of God – as 
there are Christian theologies of the death of God, the death of God 
through his Son being an originally Christian concept, as Christianity 
is the religion of the meaning of the death of Christ, and because, 
after Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche, this mortality of God takes on a new 
meaning, through which this theology explores and interprets the 
death of God.
These questions formed the context for my reflections on the object 
of desire, which led me to propose that God is the name of the object 
of all desires – and I am here only repeating, in a perhaps debatable 
way, what I believe I have understood in Aristotle’s treatises On the 
Soul and Metaphysics, and which I argue is the meaning of the term 
‘ontotheology’.
To accept this statement – ‘God’ refers to the object of all desires – 
is to turn questions of belief, faith and fidelity, which were conceived 
on the basis of religious injunctions and prescriptions, into questions 
of libidinal economy, where libidinal economy obviously refers not 
just to the economy of sexuality, even if it is always also the economy 
of sexuality.
It was on the basis of such considerations that, seven years ago, in a 
dialogue with Jean-Luc Nancy, I took a position that was not exactly 
‘for religion’, but for a dialogue with religion faced with the adver-
sity (and hence with an adversary) constituted by the hegemony of 
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marketing over ways of life.97 In this dialogue – in which I explained 
my decision not to become involved in the project of the journal that 
published this dialogue, the particular issue of which was given the 
title ‘Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas Chrétiens’ (‘Why We Are Not 
Christians’) – I said that, if it is true that in the nineteenth century 
religion and its ecclesiastical institution had, in their institutional 
hegemony, effectively become opponents of thought and philosophy, 
nevertheless the historical task of philosophy today is, on the contrary, 
to rethink the question of desire with religions and to struggle against 
the liquidation of desire by marketing, which subjects scientific 
programs to the liquidation of the life of the spirit – in the sense of 
Valéry, Husserl and Freud – and of the psychic apparatus that we refer 
to, at the origin of ontotheology and with Aristotle, as the noetic soul.
This is also why, more recently, I stated to my Christian and 
non-Christian friends that I planned to start a movement gathering 
together ‘compagnons de route’ of Pope Francis. This French expres-
sion, ‘compagnons de route’, ‘fellow travelers’, refers to those ‘intel-
lectuals’ who, after the Second World War, accompanied the French 
Communist Party without themselves being communists. Today, Pope 
Francis, whom I consider exemplary in his struggle against corrup-
tion – of souls, bodies, institutions, organizations and terrestrial envi-
ronments – needs companions, and it was to further this approach that 
I came here, to Rome, at the invitation of a Muslim, and to address 
to you and to the Pope an invitation to visit France in the coming 
autumn, prior to the conference of the United Nations,98 and to the 
Basilica of Saint-Denis, a place of great importance, if not a mecca, in 
the history of Christianity, and a place where I, along with my friends 
and companions, am attempting to foster a new approach.
Today, the word esprit, Geist, spirit is, then, the subject of a denial 
and a repression, and at the same time of embarrassment and even 
of a malaise, or of discontent – which is obviously in part tied to the 
discontent of civilization and culture referred to by Freud, and where 
‘le mot d’esprit’, ‘Der Witz’, ‘wit’, which introduces laughter into 
the mind, is what also gives rise, behind laughter, to the diabolon of 
the unconscious (which is also what, in dialogue, paves the way for 
Socrates’s daimōn).
I have argued for twelve years that capitalism is destroying the 
spirit. It is not just that the word spirit was used by thinkers who then 
inspired totalitarian practices – Hegel, whose dialectic became the 
dictatorship of the proletariat historically concretized as the Soviet 
Gulag; Heidegger, with his question of Geist in the Rectorate Address 
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(and as was unearthed and exhumed in particular by Derrida), who 
was not only attracted to Nazism, but allowed a fundamental element 
of his thought to bend in that direction. It is not only because this 
word, ‘spirit’, happened to be used by thinkers tied directly or indi-
rectly to what since Hannah Arendt we call ‘totalitarianism’ that the 
word spirit – Geist, esprit – has been repressed.
And it is not only because the Trinitarian spirit lies at the heart of 
Christianity. Without in any way denying the seriousness of this or 
that perspective tying the word spirit to the totalitarian perspective 
on totality, and without wanting to deny what muting it, so to speak, 
gave to the laicization that was enshrined in the secularization of the 
origins of capitalism, I think that what constitutes the fundamental 
principle of the liquidation of the concept of spirit is that the spirit is 
that which returns as the incalculable, and as the ghost of the incalcu-
lable, whereas capitalism, as Max Weber said very early on (not long 
after Nietzsche), is what must eliminate the incalculable – which it 
does even at the risk of eliminating itself.
Among the fields of science, it is cognitive science – but in this case 
I wish to contest its scientific status, that is, its rationality – that exe-
cutes this liquidation of the question of spirit, and that makes this liq-
uidation (in a way that is the complete opposite of my own position) 
the very foundation of science, and hence of the life of what is no 
longer the human spirit (in Hannah Arendt’s sense when she refers to 
the life of the spirit) but the mind, itself thought mechanistically and 
computationally.
How and why is it possible for the mind to dilute and disintegrate 
the spirit – the latter being the guarantor, in noesis, of integrity, which 
in the first place refers to the integrity of truth, alētheia? (And I must 
note, here, without having the time for elaboration, that integrity does 
not mean totality.) This dilution began with the expansion of cyber-
netics during and after the Second World War, in a context of poten-
tial nuclear conflict, firstly with Nazi Germany and then with Soviet 
Communism, ultimately leading to artificial intelligence programs 
and hence to the elaboration of the cognitive sciences paradigm.
This possibility, however, rests more profoundly on a feature of 
what, since the twentieth century, and after Heidegger, we call the 
‘history of metaphysics’ – where Kant represents a turning point. I 
have tried to show, in Technics and Time, 3, that there are paradoxi-
cal and contradictory tensions between the theory and practice of 
Immanuel Kant with respect to the possibility of schematization.99 I 
argue that the schematization that allows the understanding to meet 
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up with intuition presupposes a fourth, techno-logical synthesis of 
the transcendental imagination, which thus goes beyond what Kant 
explains in the ‘Transcendental Deduction of Categories’, and I also 
argue that we must make this question more general by injecting it 
into the heart of psychoanalysis and by showing that this question is 
what cognitive science is incapable of thinking, and what it denies in 
advance, regardless of the reference to the computer as the ‘model’ of 
thinking conceived as calculation.
By distinguishing the drives from the instincts, reserving the term 
‘drive’ for what submits to the différance of a libidinal economy – 
Derrida’s différance with an ‘a’ – the drive being, therefore, unlike 
instinct, capable of changing its object, submitting the drive to a 
deferral of the satisfaction of its goal, which also produces a differ-
entiation, an idiomatization and a diversification of these circuitous 
paths via which the drive constitutes its object of desire according to 
the schema of what Jacques Lacan called das Ding, psychoanalysis 
thereby describes an economy that presupposes the technicization of 
life (but where psychoanalysis does not itself perceive this precondi-
tion of what it describes).
This means not only that the reality principle, of which work is the 
effective reality, is imposed on every form of human life, and con-
stitutes the condition of exosomatic organogenesis, but that it is only 
through the mediation of the transitional object that the psychic indi-
vidual can be inscribed and formed in and through the symbolic.
On the basis of the work of Husserl and Derrida, I have proposed 
the concept of tertiary retention in order to think the transitional 
object that is also and already a pharmakon (as Donald Winnicott 
shows), just as the fetish allowed Freud to think the drive. And I have 
striven to show that the tertiary retention that is the pharmakon, of 
which the transitional object and the fetish are primordial instances, 
plays a crucial role in the possibility of noesis, and especially in the 
apodictic noesis that rationality constitutes in the Western tradition – 
and in relation to which Husserl showed that the pharmakon of alpha-
betical writing is its condition.
The pharmakon is thus the condition of the dual intellective and 
spiritual dimension of what Aristotle called the noetic soul. This 
is thought in Kant as the dual dimension of consciousness formed 
through the understanding and reason in the encounter with intuition, 
that is, the world, desire being the dynamic process of everything 
through which (in the Critique of Judgment) the world exceeds itself – 
that is, infinitizes itself.
The noetic soul is intellective and spiritual, and this is why Greek 
nous is translated into Latin as both spiritus and intellectus. Kant’s 
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critique of reason distinguished the intellect from what he called, not 
spirit but, precisely, reason. He argued that this analytical faculty that 
is the intellect, as the understanding, can unfurl the logical conse-
quences of any analytical, conceptual given, on the basis of ‘pure con-
cepts of understanding’, without anything else having to be added. I 
myself argue that this automatic intellect, which can automatize itself 
in the sense of artefactualizing itself, itself presupposes a primordial 
artefactuality of the schematization – and, through it, of the under-
standing itself, that is, of its concepts and categories – and that it can, 
therefore, function without reason, as, for example, automated artifi-
cial intelligence.
To generalize Freud’s position is to show that desire – and I refer to 
desire in the sense that Diotima speaks of it in Symposium, that is, as 
the condition of logos, of knowledge, of philosophy and of the quest 
for truth – is itself conditioned by its retentional artefactuality, by ter-
tiary retention, for instance by the transitional object, but also by the 
rosary – and this is why Pascal can raise the question of an automatic 
technicity of faith.
It is due to this primordial artefactuality of the spirit – which is origi-
nally divided precisely because the artefact is the pharmakon that 
always makes possible both the infinite exceeding of the world by the 
world, and the imminent possibility of ruining it by turning it into the 
immonde, the vile – that non-inhuman beings can individuate and dif-
ferentiate themselves.
The spirit is always already divided into spirits that nevertheless 
always seek the unity of a ‘spirit’, a Geist, a Spiritus beyond Intellectus 
and beyond Zeitgeist – such as when language idiomatizes and local-
izes itself in diachronic multiplicities, as long as this is not prevented 
by the intermediation of what Sylvain Auroux described as gram-
matization,100 which, today, in reticulated society, is reaching an 
extreme limit that is, indeed, an apocalyptic limit, in the Greek sense 
of this word.
In Disbelief and Discredit, the third volume of which is entitled The 
Lost Spirit of Capitalism, I tried to show how the war of spirits has 
become a war against the spirit – a war led by the mind, which was 
already the issue for Adorno when he described how that reason that 
stems from the Enlightenment has degraded into rationalization.101 I 
have since endeavored to show, in Automatic Society, how this leads to 
a destruction of the social relation.102
A society, whatever it’s form, is above all an apparatus for the pro-
duction of fidelity. Capitalism has transformed the type of fidelity 
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that has structured Western society – founded on that faith proper to 
monotheistic religious belief – into trust, understood as fiduciary cal-
culability. Credit is thus massively inverted into what consequently 
becomes discredit, and a completely new form of mécréance, of mis-
belief and miscreance – rationalization leading to what Max Weber 
described as disenchantment. I argue that rationalization and dis-
enchantment are tied to a process of grammatization that connects 
back to the whole history of the hypomnesic pharmakon that Socrates 
described in Phaedrus.
Grammatization effects this disenchantment as the technology 
of calculation – in particular as financial technology, as Clarisse 
Herrenschmidt shows in Les Trois Écritures.103 It begins to spread 
across society after the Renaissance and becomes more widely gen-
eralized as the capitalist organization of social relations. It is phar-
macological, just like the book, which made possible sophistical 
logography as a means of power, but also formed the milieu for the 
enrichment of profane knowledge.
The alphabetical noetic milieu becomes the apodictic milieu, that 
is, it conforms to the canons of alētheia, and it is constituted through 
the books of geometry, history, geography, literature, law and so on, 
such as for example the Book, that is, sacred writing, all these books 
being what Husserl called ‘objects invested with spirit’.104 It was 
Socrates who opened up the question of the pharmacology of spirit 
that books form – and therefore also the Book, whether the Bible, the 
Gospels or the Koran.
Capitalism arose out of the spiritual conflict that resulted from the 
advent of the printing press, which again divided Christianity in the 
service of a new therapeutics: this was firstly religious, in the form 
of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and then secular, that 
is, ‘political’ and ‘scientific’. This then constitutes the stakes of the 
‘bourgeois’ French revolution, which, in France, preceded by some 
years the industrial revolution that began in England. Hence begins 
the transformation of fidelity into trust and secularization, the full 
accomplishment of which is what Nietzsche called nihilism.
After the printing press there occurred a ‘pharmacological turn’, a 
continuation of grammatization via the reproduction of gestures by 
automatons, leading to machinism. In this turn, what changed was 
the relationship between otium and negotium: this becoming then 
passed through a new socialization of hypomnēmata wherein the lat-
ter eventually led to the formation of a ratio now understood no lon-
ger as reason but as calculation, firstly in the form of those account 
books examined by Weber, and then as the mechanical reproduction 
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of documents leading eventually to computing and ultimately to the 
current digital reticulation.
I argued in Disbelief and Discredit that this transformation is 
reflected in the American motto inscribed on the dollar bill, which, in 
positing that it is ‘In God We Trust’, is no longer quite a statement of 
our belief in God.
This strange evolution (from ‘to believe’ to ‘to trust’) of the verb 
used to designate the relationship of fidelity of noetic creatures to 
their Creator would not be comprehensible were it not for the fact that 
we read it inscribed on paper that constitutes an accounting unit, a 
unit of currency. It is the relation to what stands (and to the One who 
stands) on another plane than creatures, a relation that was consti-
tuted in a relation to the Book, which is therefore affected by what, in 
Nietzsche’s word, thus takes the name of nihilism – Heidegger argu-
ing that, with this name, it is, for Nietzsche, the suprasensible as a 
whole that is in question.
If Nietzsche can say that it is still a long time before the mur-
derers of God will be able to have understood what will have been 
their gesture –
‘I come too early’ […]. This tremendous event is still on 
its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. 
Lightning and thunder need time; the light of the stars needs 
time; deeds need time, even after they are done, in order to 
be seen and heard105
– perhaps we ourselves, who arrive more than 130 years after this 
word of Nietzsche (in The Gay Science, in 1884), are now entering the 
trial of this revelation as such: now perhaps the dark night, and not 
just the shadows that herald it, falls upon us, and does so as this apoc-
alypticism without God that now haunts the entire world, given that 
since 2008 the consumerist model, by collapsing, has made clear that 
it is no longer just the financial objects of logos, constituted by their 
hypomnēmata, which in the twentieth century changed their mean-
ing and social function, but also everyday and familiar objects – and, 
along with them, and since they alone can definitively undermine the 
foundations, das Ding, the Thing.
The Thing is the object of all desires – but it is an object that 
does not exist, if we admit with Lacan that this Thing is an object of 
which there is never any experience. It is a kind of a priori of desire 
that closely resembles Aristotle’s theos. The object of all desires, 
das Ding, taking thus the place of God, opens (like the theos of 
Aristotle) every horizon of expectation, and in this way constitutes 
the arche-protention.
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The capturing of otium and its dissolution into negotium is the 
reality of that industrial modernity that generates technology and 
what some people call technoscience.106 Only now has this been 
fully accomplished, as the ‘information society’ and the ‘knowledge 
industry’ – at the cost of a mutation of the university whereby the 
data sciences replace the humanities, all in the service of innova-
tion conceived as the chronic obsolescence of industrial products, 
and leading to the systemic infidelity that establishes itself as libidi-
nal diseconomy.
The great transformation that allowed the market to be disembedded 
in the form of a total domination of negotium was enabled only by 
placing otium into its service. Science, which fell within the sphere of 
otium, and technics, which fell within negotium – science and tech-
nics thus being opposed just as the nobles who did not work were fun-
damentally separated from the needy – become, with the advent of the 
industrial revolution, confounded. This confusion has been the condi-
tion of possibility of capitalism and of its accomplishment as nihilism.
And yet…
And yet hypomnesis, which is to say mnemotechnics, and, with 
it, technics in general, has always been the condition of anamnesis, 
which is to say, of knowledge as it was conceived by Socrates, that is, 
as the experience of apodictic truth (see Plato’s Meno). It is this that 
Jacques Derrida made clear in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’.107
Is, then, the opposition between science and technics, translated 
socially into the nobility of otium and the ignominy of negotium, 
nothing more than a social construction elaborated by the dominant to 
justify their domination, as was claimed by both bourgeois and then 
socialist revolutionaries? Is it what must be fought against in the ser-
vice of a new revolution that may never come?
I believe otherwise. Otium and negotium constitute the bipolarity 
constitutive of the tension characteristic of the pharmacological situ-
ation resulting from the exosomatic condition in which consists the 
organogenesis of the non-inhuman being. In this situation, a form of 
knowledge, whatever it may be – as savoir faire, savoir vivre or savoir 
conceptuel, knowledge of how to do, live or conceptualize – is con-
stituted by organological artefacture, which in turn constitutes the 
Zeitgeist. It is grammatization that enables the analytical discretiza-
tion on which operations of the understanding are founded, delivering 
to reason the materials for an interpretation of ends such that they rise 
above analysis only on the condition that they break with it, and do so 
as decision, that is, as bifurcation.
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With this last term, I am adopting the vocabulary of systems the-
ory, which seems to me to be necessary in order to think the future 
within the Anthropocene. This is the name by which we refer to 
what is in fact the concrete reality of nihilism. As the levelling of 
all values, the nihilism that is the Anthropocene imposes an entropic 
becoming without a future – where the stakes of ‘spirit’ are the differ-
ence between the future and becoming, between avenir and devenir. 
Becoming is entropic. The future is negentropic. Both human entropy 
and human negentropy are produced by the toxic and curative poten-
tialities of the pharmakon, which stems from exosomatic organogen-
esis. It is towards a constant re-elaboration of this state of fact in the 
service of a state of law that the spirit works to inscribe the difference 
between becoming and future.
This question is being played out today, and it is being carried to an 
extremity that was still inconceivable just a few years ago. So-called 
correlationist models of the automated processing of ‘big data’ make 
real and concrete the possibility of an automatic society that will 
prove to be unlivable – because it is entropic, condemned to a brief 
existence, something that worries Stephen Hawking and the scientists 
who co-signed his recent column about artificial intelligence.108
Such are the stakes of the Anthropocene, and hence of ecology as 
an organology of reason and a pharmacology of spirit, calling for an 
urgent re-evaluation of the hermeneutic question in reticular society 
– a re-evaluation in the service of what I call the Neganthropocene, 
understood from the perspective of a neganthropology.
4 Elements of Neganthropology
The augmentation and enhancement of the human brain – undertaken 
by arranging so-called neurotechnological prosthetic pathways, such 
as cerebral implants, in combination with neurochemical pathways, 
so as to optimize neural performance and conceived in direct relation 
to these additional units – is a new stage in the history of noetic life 
and of the organological augmentation and transformation that has, 
ever since the beginning of hominization, occurred continuously.
As with many human organs, the brain has always organologically 
‘augmented’ and transformed itself: this self-transformation is pre-
cisely what characterizes noetic life inasmuch as it is also and imme-
diately technical life, that is, a form of life that realizes its dreams. 
But, unlike other organs, the brain can be enhanced through internal 
processes of disorganization (that is, defunctionalizations) and reor-
ganization (refunctionalizations) that occur in accordance with exter-
nal organs. These disorganizations and reorganizations correspond 
to what Freud described as defunctionalizations and refunctionaliza-
tions of the sensorimotor system. And we now know that these trans-
formations are based on what Stanislas Dehaene has described as 
neuronal recycling.
What is really new about this organological transformation, this 
endosomatization of the exosomatic – which consists in this addition 
of units, that is, prostheses conceived and fabricated exosomatically 
but endosomatically implanted, just as are those prostheses added to 
the heart or to the ears – lies in the fact that it is now tertiary reten-
tions (that is, technical artefacts, which shape and materialize knowl-
edge, that is, memory and spatialized time), produced in an industrial 
and standardized way, that are beginning to be introduced into the 
organ of primary retentions and secondary retentions that is the brain.
Hence is heralded the arrival and the realization of neuroindustry 
– some of whose issues were anticipated in The Final Cut (2004), as 
Patricia Pisters has shown in her analysis of the film.109 The neuro-
industry opens onto the more general question of the management 
of exosomatization according to the selection criteria of the market, 
where exosomatization is in general terms what characterizes the 
technical form of life that appears with and as hominization.
Transhumanist ‘storytelling’110 is the attempt to legitimate the 
subordination of such a selection to the criteria of the market. This 
necessarily and exclusively computational criteriology, however, is 
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absolutely illegitimate, for reasons that are not ethical but systemic: 
it leads inevitably to an increase of entropy. In other words, a critique 
of the transhumanist project as subordinating exosomatic becoming 
to market criteria, and as radicalizing what we are now calling dis-
ruption, must start from an analysis of the process of exosomatiza-
tion such as that undertaken by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen from the 
point of view of bio-economics,111 which is more relevant today than 
ever before.
No serious reflection on the stakes of transhumanism, of which 
cerebral rearrangement is obviously one highly specific and exem-
plary aspect, and on the pharmacology that all this constitutes, can be 
conducted without investigating organogenesis. Organogenesis char-
acterizes the history of life in general, but, later, with the appearance 
of the technical form of life, that is, of what Aristotle called the noetic 
soul, it becomes above all exosomatic. As such, it raises the question 
of the organo-logical and pharmaco-logical condition of noesis, and 
of the form of life to which it corresponds, but also of the function of 
noesis in life, and, faced with the disruptive transformations currently 
underway, the question of the future of noesis itself.
Noesis is a specific case of the negentropic process that is life in gen-
eral, and it is so inasmuch as it constitutes, in its inseparable relation 
to exosomatization, a neganthropology that is constantly confronting 
the ambiguous character of exosomatic artificial organs, the latter 
being, as pharmaka, organs that make possible both the production of 
new neganthropic forms and a massive increase in the rate of entropy. 
At the moment, it is this second alternative that predominates, specifi-
cally in terms of the threat to biodiversity, but where, today, another 
issue looms equally large, in particular with respect to neurotechnol-
ogy: the question of the threat to noodiversity.
It is firstly by asking how neganthropology has unfolded since the 
beginning of exosomatization, about how it has been able to struggle 
against the ‘entropology’ evoked by Lévi-Strauss at the end of Tristes 
Tropiques,112 and by inquiring about its stages – from the purely epi-
phylogenetic stage that I attempted to describe in Technics and Time, 
1, passing through the primary hypomnesic stage that begins in the 
Upper Palaeolithic, then the various epochs of hypomnesis, up until 
the most recent stage of grammatization referred to as NBIC (nano-
bio-info-cogno) – it is by asking how all this has either allowed or 
prevented neganthropological production (that is, inscription) within 
the entropic becoming of the cosmos, a sequence of bifurcations 
constituting and opening a neganthropological future, that we can 
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rationally and reasonably investigate the stakes, politics and econom-
ics of the neuroindustry.
The question of neuroindustrial reason is also and firstly that of the 
justice of cerebral becoming, and in cerebral becoming – where jus-
tice is never a question of human rights in the degraded sense in which 
this phrase has become entangled in the twentieth century, but, rather, 
the stakes and the challenge of the coherence of reason.
This coherence of reason, moreover, conditions economic rational-
ity, and, therefore, the reason of the new critique of political economy 
required by the highly entropic state installed in the Anthropocene qua 
process of generalized proletarianziation, which has led to the entro-
pic explosion that now threatens biodiversity in general, including the 
human species, but therefore also threatens noodiversity, as the condi-
tion of noesis that is in turn the condition of any neganthropological 
bifurcation.
From other perspectives – linked to the process of full and general-
ized automation that I describe in Automatic Society113 – I have tried 
to show why and how we must now enter into an economy that sys-
tematically and systemically values negentropy, which amounts to the 
prospect of what I call the Neganthropocene, wherein the future lies 
in de-proletarianization as that which is made possible by a contribu-
tory economy.
It is starting from these general reflections that I will make the pre-
liminary assertion that any neuropolitics and neuroindustry must be 
dedicated to maximally enhancing the conditions of rationality inas-
much as they are evidently conditioned to a fundamental degree by a 
widely distributed cerebral organology – that is, inasmuch as they are 
conditioned by the relations between noetic brains and the exosomatic 
systems that support them, therein forming social organizations, 
which govern the relations between psychosomatic organs and arti-
ficial organs – all these transductive supports constituting the objects 
of general organology inasmuch as the latter names an approach to 
transdisciplinary research.
Behind such questions, there of course lies an astonishing renova-
tion of the political question as such, in relation to which:
1 we must intensify the neganthropological potentials of each 
noetic individual so as to enrich noodiversity;
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2 we must cultivate this noodiversity through social diver-
sity, that is, a sociodiversity that takes care of its noetic 
heritage – its languages, archives, works, knowledge and 
noetic exteriorities in general;
3 we must therefore struggle against the extreme violence 
within which the massively entropic becoming provoked by 
the Anthropocene – that is, by generalized proletarianiza-
tion – encloses us, and which, in the short term, can only 
explode, unless there is a resolute bifurcation in the direc-
tion of the Neganthropocene, these being the real stakes 
involved in what Heidegger referred to as the Kehre, Gestell 
and Ereignis.
All these analyses, which I am introducing here in view of a global 
geopolitical alternative to transhumanist marketing, build upon 
the work of Maryanne Wolf, as well as on the questions that I have 
addressed to Jean-Pierre Changeux about his book, Neuronal Man,114 
in my preface to the French edition of Proust and the Squid,115 and 
upon my critique of Allen Buchanan’s theory of the augmented 
human in Better than Human,116 which I presented almost four years 
ago at Berkeley.117
In what follows, and without going back over the substance of that 
lecture, which will be taken up again in La Société automatique 2. 
L’avenir du savoir, I would like to recall the central thesis of Maryanne 
Wolf’s work and the questions I posed to Changeux on the basis of her 
conclusions.
What is quite sure is that a new process of psychic and collective indi-
viduation (in the sense given to this expression by Gilbert Simondon) 
will be constituted through this new stage of exosomatization, char-
acterized as it is by a second endosomatization.
This amounts to the industrial production of new forms of technical 
life, organological and pharmacological forms whose unprecedented 
character resides in the fact that they are bio-computational and there-
fore secondarily endosomatized – a standardized endosomatization 
that can replace the noetic interiorization of exteriorized knowledge 
with tertiary retentions. All exosomatic organology is composed of 
tertiary retentions, which are thereby able to form what archaeolo-
gists call material cultures.
It is a question of knowing if, behind this process or these processes 
of psychic and collective individuation, as they have arisen through 
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the successive and parallel eras and epochs of humanity – diversely 
localized and temporalized through the noetic process of what Derrida 
called différance, and as the ‘history of the supplement’ – it is strictly 
speaking a new regime of individuation that is appearing, or merely 
one or more new processes of psychic and collective individuation.
If the former were to prove the case, if the new processes of psy-
chic and collective individuation made possible by neuroindustry do 
contain the seeds of a new regime of individuation, then, by concret-
izing itself as a mega-bifurcation above and beyond the bifurcations 
through which new processes of psychic and collective individua-
tion become possible, this would add a fourth possibility to the three 
regimes of individuation described by Simondon: the physical indi-
viduation of entropic becoming, embodied in the crystal; the vital 
individuation of the living operating through negentropic organogen-
esis; and the psychic and social individuation that occurs in anthropo-
logical exosomatization.
If that were the case, and it probably is the case, this would raise the 
question of the wide diversity of arrangements that can be imagined 
and that constitute diverse new types of noo-organisms, and of mega-
noo-organsisms, which might take on a wide variety of forms, from 
the digital anthill I described in 2004 in Symbolic Misery118 (three 
years before the appearance of the digital network that would concret-
ize this hypothesis119) to new types of aggregations, more organically 
and organologically integrated (of which technological monsters in 
the style of The Terminator (1984) are the ‘cyborgian’ hypotheses), 
proliferating meta-noo-organisms of limited size: one can imag-
ine anything.
Such imagination must be the result of a noetic dream, that is, a 
dream that is realizable according to the conditions of sufficient 
rationality, but also according to relations of force that are political, 
economic and ecological, thanks to which it may always turn into a 
nightmare, which we understand now more clearly than ever before.
This must be imagined, precisely so that the new stage of exosoma-
tization, leading to a second, industrial endosomatization, may also 
lead to the diverse proliferation of new territorialized forms, diversi-
fications not just linguistic, religious, architectural, culinary, anthro-
pophysical and so on, but locally reticulated and organized via new 
organological arrangements. All these will fall within a fourth regime 
of individuation, which will constitute new forms of the noetic social 
body, widely territorialized but not necessarily in a sedentary mode, 
given that there are also nomadic forms of territorial organization, 
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which may proliferate within larger territorialized organisms, often 
to their benefit – such is the case, for example, within our intestines, 
which play host to more than a kilogram of bacteria, and without 
which we could not assimilate the food necessary for survival.
It is therefore necessary to constitute an eco-neuro-geopolitics 
focused on the emergence of a new noesis, and to do so from the per-
spective not of the struggle for life, that is, for subsistence, which 
characterizes vital individuation, nor just the struggle for existence, 
which characterizes psychic and collective individuation, but, rather, 
from the perspective of the struggle for consistence after the exhaus-
tion of existences deprived, precisely, of consistence, by the fulfil-
ment of nihilism, as Nietzsche foreshadowed and of which what we 
are calling disruption is the concretization, as the final stage of the 
Anthropocene before the great ‘shift’120 that is bound to lead either to 
the Neganthropocene or to the disappearance of noesis – along with 
the sixth mass extinction.
To struggle against this is precisely a matter of not delivering the 
new stage of exosomatization over to the market and its selection cri-
teria, which are essentially entropic, and which constitute the trans-
humanist project. It is instead a matter of struggling for the general-
ized enhancement of noetic potential at all organic and organological 
levels for new noetic organisms: such are the stakes of neganthropol-
ogy, which posits that noodiversity will be the key issue over the next 
few decades, and that this will require a noopolitics to operate above 
and below the emerging neuroindustry.
It is not a question, for me, of proposing some kind of assessment of 
the blessings or curses to be expected or feared from the endosoma-
tization of technics itself, in particular at the cerebral level: the pos-
sibility of such an assessment requires the elaboration of its practical 
and theoretical conditions of possibility and impossibility, which have 
yet to be identified. But it is in order to begin such an identification 
that I would like here to sketch some outlines, which must not fail 
to do justice to the excessiveness of what it is a question of thinking – 
we must not, in other words, fold this thinking back into commonly 
agreed wisdom that avoids the issue, or, as we say in French, noient le 
poisson, drowns the fish.
For, in fact, the new stage of the process of exosomatization accom-
plished as a second, industrially-effected endosomatization raises the 
question of the future of knowledge in all its forms – knowledge of 
how to live, do, conceptualize, spiritualize, that is, interpret, and so 
on – in such a way that the ‘well-known’ (in Hegel’s sense) forms of 
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knowledge find themselves destroyed, annihilated, devalued and hav-
ing to be transvalued in totality.
To recapitulate, our questions are the following. It is a mat-
ter of knowing:
1 if we are entering a new stage of psychic and collective 
individuation, or if, rather, we are coming out of this regime 
of psychic and collective individuation and entering into 
another regime of individuation, after the physical individu-
ation of the crystal, the vital individuation of the living and 
the psychic and collective individuation of ‘technical life’;
2 if a new political regime can be conceived that will preserve 
in this new regime of highly pharmacological individuation 
the care and concern to protect neganthropy against compu-
tational entropy;
3 what conception of education is required, in the context of 
this second endosomatization, where education is under-
stood as the noetic interiorization of new forms of knowl-
edge, themselves inherently exteriorized;
4 what macro-economic revolution is needed to make this 
new regime of individuation solvent, a regime that is clearly 
also a new form of economy – and a general economy in 
Bataille’s sense as well as a bio-economy in Georgescu-
Roegen’s sense.
For we who live in the twenty-first century, in the age of 11 September 
2001, of 13 November 2015, of the COP21 climate summit, which was 
a dismal failure disguised as success, and of what we should describe 
as a disruption in exosomatization, the question is the future [avenir] 
insofar as it is not reducible to becoming [devenir] and cannot count 
on being – which has ‘become’ Gestell in the sense it was referred to 
by Heidegger in ‘Time and Being’121 and Identity and Difference.122
What I have called the future – which I designate with reference to 
Dasein as it was existentially analysed by Heidegger, for whom it was 
above all constituted by its temporal ek-stasis, itself structured by the 
arche-protention of indeterminacy that is being-for-death, or towards-
death – is not simply anticipation: it is what requires Geschichtlichkeit 
and Weltgeschichtlichkeit, and it is what, as Entschlossenheit, as ‘reso-
luteness’, which is also to say, as singularity, is capable of inscribing 
into becoming a bifurcation.
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Such a bifurcation is what reason – or what the Greeks called 
logos – has as its function: I believe, like Didier Debaise, that here, 
Whitehead must be read with Simondon, and vice versa.123
Since the nineteenth century, the conception of the universe as a 
whole has been radically altered by the thermodynamic account of 
the dissipation of energy. This state of fact did not just theoretically 
or philosophically transform the understanding we have of the world 
in which we live: it changed the ‘understanding that there-being has 
of its being’ in its very banality – particularly given that this banal-
ity, when it corresponds to what we call the Anthropocene, continu-
ously increases the rate of entropy in the biosphere, and does so to a 
very significant extent – which amounts to a new form of the ‘banal-
ity of evil’.
The (co)production of phenomena by intuition and the understanding, 
as Kant described this cooperation in order to specify the characteris-
tics of noetic experience, is nevertheless conditioned by a hetero-con-
dition, that is, a hetero-poiesis, and this is what Kant remained unable 
to think. It is, however, something of which Herder had a presenti-
ment, and it involves an exosomatization that prescribes the ‘function 
of reason’ in Whitehead’s sense, as a speculative faculty that operates 
bifurcations. This is what follows from my argument about the role of 
tertiary retention in the genesis of apodictic reason – an idea that is 
taken up from Husserl’s ‘The Origin of Geometry’.124
The question of tertiary retention is not anthropological but organo-
genetic: it is the stage of organogenesis in which it becomes organo-
logical and pharmacological exosomatization, which poses not just a 
question but a neganthropological problem. This problem is that of the 
pharmakon in which any pursuit of exosomatization consists.
The true question is that of noesis – which is accessible only inter-
mittently [par intermittences]. And noesis must always and in principle 
confront the possibility of its non-human – if not inhuman – constitu-
tion. This is why Plato and Aristotle always relate this to the question 
of a god. In addition, noesis must always be capable of imagining, 
of fearing and of struggling against an inhumanized and de-noetized 
humanity, which is always imminent, and today more than ever.
The possibility of de-noetization is constitutive of noesis: it is the 
very ground upon which all noesis must be thought, and it is in this 
that it first confronts itself – in this affront. And hence it is that phi-
losophy was born in struggling against sophistic stupidity – or against 
the sophistical exploitation of a certain stupidity inherent to badly 
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cultivated logos. This is why Deleuze can and must pose the question 
of stupidity, which he takes up from Nietzsche.
As an expression of the fulfilment of nihilism, transhumanism is 
a project of de-noetization, that is, of noetic dis-interiorization (of 
proletarianization, loss of knowledge – of the knowledge of how to 
live, do and conceive), and this dis-interiorization is founded on the 
delegation of noetic services to analytical artefacts and to interfaces 
designed to optimize interactive reaction speeds – as in the case of 
implants designed to optimize the reaction speeds of fighter pilots via 
optical fibres operating almost four million times faster than nerves.
From this perspective, transhumanism is the anti-economic, 
because entropic, culmination of proletarianization carried to its final 
extreme – which then, too, is entropic to the ultimate degree.
The noetization of the living is its exteriorization. The latter obviously 
does not begin with man, and it may not end with him. Nevertheless, 
noesis seems indeed to begin with the promise of man, and it seems it 
may go out with him insofar as humankind cannot think itself other 
than as promise, and as the promise of Neganthropos, builder of the 
Neganthropocene.
‘Man’, in becoming Anthropocenic, becomes not a wolf to man,125 
but the enemy of ‘humanity’ and life in general. As the ‘last man’, he 
is no longer able to think the non-inhuman being that he can be only 
as noetic – which he can be only insofar as he is in-existent: only 
insofar as he does not yet exist, only insofar as he exists only as ‘not 
yet’, always already having become anthropic, all too anthropic.
Noesis is what should provide the criteria for a noetic exosoma-
tization that we also call the human, but where the human is not 
what is given but what must be produced, re-produced and repro-
duced, as I have argued elsewhere, through a commentary on Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction.126
The question of the promise is the question of the positive collective 
protention that alone allows the constitution of an epoch. The question 
of transhumanism is the question of an absence of epoch, in relation 
to which transhumanist ‘storytelling’ functions to conceal that this 
is the result of de-noetization, a de-noetization that transhumanism 
claims fills in for, or makes up for, a defect, a fault, a default, but 
where in fact the latter is precisely the origin of any noesis insofar as 
it participates in the neganthropic future that is non-inhumanity. The 
claim of transhumanism, that it makes up for a noetic flaw, resembles 
a discourse on the perfect human, that is, a project to eliminate that 
flaw, that default, which is noesis.
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To start from the human, even as a ‘transhumanist’, is to always be 
on the verge of designating sub-humans, and of doing so by reject-
ing the improper, that is, the default. To posit that the human does 
not exist yet, or barely exists, on the other hand, as Derrida reiter-
ated after Jean Jaurès in ‘My Sunday “Humanities”’,127 is to confront 
everything that we are in our daily inhumanities, in our cowardice, our 
pettiness, our envy, our ambitions, our betrayals – everything that 
makes us other than gods, we who think only by intermittences, and 
who live worthily only by intermittences.
In Heidegger’s final period, if we read it through the lens of Rudolf 
Boehm’s analysis,128 which I unfortunately do not have time to dis-
cuss here, technics, an issue that runs through Heidegger’s entire oeu-
vre, eventually resurfaces in the 1960s as his final word. In this last 
word, which is Ereignis (the Event or the Advent), a fundamental step 
is lacking, a leap into ‘co-propriation’, inasmuch as what this amounts 
to is the question of entropy and of its negentropic reversal, such that 
it therefore implies the need for a neganthropology, and such that it 
replays in their entirety all the questions of philosophy since its point 
of departure – which therefore demands that reason be rethought after 
Whitehead, reason that Whitehead himself calls a function beyond 
being, the latter having itself become Gestell.
This struggle is another name for Sorge, which must be understood 
in relation to the following statement by Georges Canguilhem:
Life tries to gain, to win out over death, in all senses of the 
word win [gagner], and firstly in the sense that a win is what 
is acquired by playing. Life is a play [or a gamble] against 
increasing entropy.129
Like Nietzsche, Marx and Engels never knew the problematic of neg-
ative entropy, and hence this problematic leads today to taking a step 
beyond dialectics, beyond the dialectics of nature and beyond dialec-
tics in general.
Faced with Lévi-Strauss’s assertion that human history amounts to 
an entropology, we tend:
 ▪ either to sink into metaphysical anti-humanism, that is, to 
ignore the play of entropy and negentropy such that one 
cannot overcome the other, which requires a new form of 
tragic thinking;
 ▪ or else to project ourselves towards the appallingly naïve 
(and nihilistic) temptation of proclaiming the necessity of 
Part One: Anthropocene, Entropocene, Neganthropocene 86
overcoming the human, and of doing so from, precisely, 
a transhumanist perspective, and in particular from a so-
called ‘extropian’ perspective.
To confront the absolute need for a new age of negentropy, it is nec-
essary to surpass anthropology, which, indeed, necessarily leads to 
entropy; and this surpassing of anthropology must pass through what 
Canguilhem called play (in a way that is close to Bataille), as the ben-
efit of this form of différance that is play (but where Derrida himself 
always defined différance as the play of différance).
Transhumanism is an industrial strategy, and the most astounding, 
stupefying consequence of what we are calling disruption, a disrup-
tion that commenced in 1993.
The situation of disruption and strategy of transhumanism together 
constitute the new stage of exosomatization in which noetic organo-
genesis consists. Exosomatization is now generated according to the 
development strategies of the lords of economic war without limit, that 
war in which this disruption precisely consists and whose result has 
already been intense de-noetization. Only a neganthropology can con-
stitute a rational critique of this situation and of the stakes of this war 
– with a view to an indispensable and sustainable noetic peace.
The question is the revaluation criteria that must, therefore, be 
actively extracted from this nihilism, in order to effect a leap, not 
towards the overman, but towards Neganthropos.
Stanislas Dehaene, in Reading in the Brain, describes the ‘neuronal 
recycling’ that was shown by Maryanne Wolf to be the condition of 
possibility of learning to read.130 The consequence of this recycling, 
which programs the possibility of a deprogramming (and of what 
Paul Ricoeur called the ‘collapsed zones’ of genetic coding131), is 
that the noetic cerebral organ, that is, the brain capable of question-
ing the truth and in return of transforming the world, is perpetually 
in dialogue with the artificial organs that it creates – from flint tools 
to smartphones, passing of course through writing, and in particular 
the alphabetical writing that we ourselves have learned to read, and 
that allows us to be trans-formed by Proust during the passage to the 
act of reading.
The exploration of these vertiginous questions opened by Wolf calls 
for the mobilization of new resources that have been provided by pal-
aeo-anthropology, especially through the problems posed by Merlin 
Donald, Kim Sterelny and Michael Tomasello, which must be brought 
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together with the way Jean-Pierre Changeux introduces the question 
of reading as taught by Stanislas Dehaene.
In the case of human beings, as Changeux points out, ‘the cultural 
cannot be thought without the biological and […] the cerebral does 
not exist without a powerful impregnation from the environment’.132 
Could we not, here, invert the perspective while modifying the trajec-
tory? Ought we not, more accurately, speak firstly of technics, and of 
its organs, and of the relationship between technical organs and bio-
logical organs, before investigating culture itself?
This would make it possible to establish the conditions in which 
culture may appear, namely: on the foundation of a transformation of 
organogenesis, which, with the appearance of tools, becomes an exo-
somatization. And this would in turn make it possible to better situ-
ate cultural technologies themselves within a broader becoming. As 
Changeux himself highlights, reading and therefore writing belong 
to a field of cultural techniques or technologies that amount to ‘men-
tal intermediaries’, a subject to which Ignace Meyerson, a founder of 
social psychology, was dedicated:
Culture should not be confused with writing […]. People 
without writing still produced […] mental intermediaries, or 
signs, to put it in the terms of Ignace Meyerson: works of 
art, whether visual or musical, ritual and symbolic systems, 
codes of conduct, essential […] to the community life of the 
social group.133
These mental intermediaries, in the reflection upon them that Lev 
Vygotsky, too, pursued throughout his whole psychology, enable the 
formation of what Gilbert Simondon called the transindividual, that 
is, meaning insofar as it is shared by noetic individuals belonging to 
the same group. And Simondon emphasizes that the condition of pos-
sibility of the transindividual is the existence of technical objects that 
support it and revive social sharing.
I have argued that these technical supports of the transindividual 
are tertiary retentions, that is, material exteriorizations of motor 
behaviours and mental contents that amount to an inorganic memory, 
external to the cerebral organ and the nervous system, but essential to 
its functioning from the moment it becomes noetic. To put it more pre-
cisely, tertiary retentions condition the play of primary and secondary 
retentions. What Maryanne Wolf shows, on the basis of an example 
taken from Proust’s On Reading, is the way in which these tertiary 
retentions are arranged and organized during the act of reading.134
Among these tertiary retentions, there emerges indeed a particular 
class, which I call hypomnesic, and which are specifically dedicated 
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to the conservation and transmission of mental contents. Such is the 
case for writing.
Tertiary retentions in general are ‘inscriptions in material that is 
more stable than nervous tissue: mineral pigments, earth, wood, stone, 
ivory, […] “there is no sign without matter”, as Meyerson wrote’.135 
Changeux stresses here that artificial retentions last beyond the fleet-
ing impressions that traverse the nervous system and that are metasta-
bilized in the form of neuronal connections in the brain, so long as the 
individual to whom the organ belongs remains alive.
Maryanne Wolf shows that the written text, which is the founda-
tion of Western culture, presupposes a long work of transformation 
of the cerebral organ in order that it can be read and interpreted. This 
work consists in arranging the primary and secondary retentions of 
the reader with the play of those tertiary retentions that compose the 
book that is being read – or written. Here, nothing is reducible to biol-
ogy: everything must be thought in terms of the composition of the 
organic and the organized inorganic, that is, of the tertiary retentional 
materials that form the organological milieu conditioning the survival 
of the organic-become-noetic.
This is also why Changeux urges us not to perpetuate the kind of 
confusion he sees in Steven Pinker:
Genetic disorders of spoken language […] reveal the impor-
tance of genes like FoxP2, which some, such as Steven 
Pinker, are in a hurry to call ‘language genes’. Yet we find 
these genes in the animal […], which doesn’t speak!136
Changeux concludes that there are
processes of another type, of an ‘epigenetic’ nature, that 
make possible a strong alliance of genes and experience in 
the construction of cerebral complexity.137
This alliance forms what I have called the epiphylogenetic,138 that is, 
what André Leroi-Gourhan called the third memory,139 and this radi-
cally changes the conditions of organogenesis, that is, of life itself 
qua evolution.
The margin of variability offered by an expanded genetic 
envelope [expanded by the ‘cognitive games of the newborn’] 
allow […] an ‘appropriation’ of developing neuronal net-
works and their amplification in the form of ‘cultural cir-
cuits’. Novelty enters into the incompletely specified human 
brain through its genetic equipment, and so it is that reading 
is inscribed in the brain.140
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These considerations call for a new conception of pharmacopeia and 
pharmacology – which should be expanded to include pharmaka as 
understood by Socrates in Phaedrus, but where Protagoras showed 
that we must extend this notion to artifices and expedients of every 
kind, that is, to the whole of technics (and this is also what we learn 
from Canguilhem) – in the framework of a ‘pharmacology of pro-
cesses of selection, amplification and reafferentation of interneuronal 
connections, both during development and in the adult’.141
In his great work, Gesture and Speech, Leroi-Gourhan posits that 
human memory and its development cannot be studied independently 
of the evolution of its techniques. The genesis of the latter falls under 
what Leroi-Gourhan called a ‘process of exteriorization’, through 
which is formed an artificial memory essential to the functioning 
of the nervous memory of human beings. The prehistorian stressed 
that human nervous memory is not self-sufficient, and is, from the 
outset (more than two million years ago), augmented and conditioned 
by a social memory that is not organic but organological, with which 
it co-evolves.
If flint tools (and other tools that accompanied them, but which we 
remain unaware of because they have disappeared) are not made for 
the conservation of memory, they nevertheless do keep the trace of the 
gestures through which they were fashioned, and, in this way, they 
already constitute supports of memory: the cut tool in fact preserves 
the memory of the techniques of cutting, and this is why archaeolo-
gists can reconstruct them (through the methods of experimental 
archaeology). But the memory that is conserved in this way is ges-
tural, not mental. It was only during the most recent periods of prehis-
tory that mental contents began to be exteriorized.
The co-evolution of nervous memory and technical mem-
ory involved, according to Leroi-Gourhan, a series of stages, 
during which:
1 It is first and foremost the cerebral organ and its cortical 
organization that is transformed, the pace of the expan-
sion of the cortical fan (that is, the formation of the cerebral 
cortex and its organization in the cortical regions) being 
directly correlated with the evolution of lithic tools.
2 The physiological evolution of the cortex was stabilized 
at the moment of the appearance of the Neanderthal, 
some 300,000 years ago, while the use of tools diversified 
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considerably, as if biological organogenesis had been 
replaced by exosomatic organogenesis.
3 In the Upper Palaeolithic, that is, in the epoch of cave paint-
ing, there appear the first forms of the exteriorization of 
mental contents, both as paintings and as inscriptions that 
anticipate what, after the Neolithic, will constitute the first 
forms of writing, ideogrammatic writing, until the appear-
ance of the alphabet as we still know it today.
We ourselves care very much, in our day, about what will become 
of educational institutions, and about the difficulties they face in 
undertaking the formation of the younger generations for which they 
are responsible. We have cause to be concerned. If education is so 
fundamental for us and for our children, it is because, for each new 
generation, everything that has been learned by the preceding genera-
tions must, as much as possible, be appropriated by the new genera-
tion, and this is possible only on the condition that they first prepare 
their cerebral organ by submitting to that process of learning we call 
‘elementary’, that is, that enables them to enter into the basic element 
of knowledge, which is, in this case, in the West, and for almost three 
thousand years, alphabetical writing – first handwritten, then printed.
Maryanne Wolf shows how this occurs: first, the acquisition of ele-
ments, followed by the acquisition of the knowledge derived from the 
reading that these elements make possible. And Wolf stresses that the 
‘reading brain’ that was formed in this way was in no way originally 
configured for learning to read: ‘we were never born to read’, she 
writes.142 Neuronal recycling, which makes the noetic brain capable 
of profoundly disorganizing and reorganizing itself in order to inte-
riorize the possibilities afforded by the artificial memorization that I 
call organology, is the condition of this exosomatic organogenesis in 
which consists the individuation of the technical organs that consti-
tute an artificial milieu, and where the pursuit of evolution no longer 
occurs by submitting to biological constraints but through the indi-
viduation of social organizations.
This is why, beyond the scientific and epistemological stakes of her 
work, the research of Maryanne Wolf greatly opens up the question of 
a politics of the organology of the brain in the context of what we are 
calling the disruption, that is, an epoch of innovation in which exo-
somatization is now completely controlled by economic powers and 
subject to the constraints of short-term profitability. Hence we must 
hear the alarm sounded by Proust and the Squid, even if we must not 
unduly dramatize it: the ‘digital brain’, which is being organologically 
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transformed at a dizzying rate, raises the question of the preservation 
of a capacity for deep reading and therefore for deep attention. What 
is being referred to here as ‘deep attention’, however, is nothing other 
than the ability to reason by inheriting the experience of our ancestors 
and by making a worthwhile contribution to the fruitful growth of 
this heritage.
It is clear that nanotechnology multiplies these questions almost to 
infinity. Will we take care of the reading brain that is becoming the 
digital brain and ultimately the endosomatically enhanced brain, and 
will we do so without losing our reason, and our minds?
5 Passages to the Act, Dialogical Interactions  
and Short-Circuits in Interactivity
Before I begin the lecture properly speaking, I should clarify what I 
mean by what I will here call spiritual works, or works of the mind, 
without particular regard to this or that facet of spirit – art, science, 
law, philosophy, literature, savoir vivre, savoir faire, all this amount-
ing to what I call spirit in the sense of νοῦς, that is, as that which is 
characteristic of what Aristotle called noetic souls. Spiritual works, 
understood in this way, are objects invested with spirit in Husserl’s 
sense,143 where this equally includes the book, the spoon and the tem-
ple,144 and where such works
 ▪ work only for interactions under certain conditions (from 
which applicatio, as thought by Gadamer, stems, something 
that is cited by Pietro Montani),
 ▪ and work in fact only insofar as they introduce into entropic 
becoming a process that is not just negentropic,
 ▪ but neganthropic.
Having made this preliminary remark, I would like to emphasize that 
everything I will have to say in what follows should be set within 
the context of the entropic becoming of the cosmos, and I would 
like further to stress that life is what consists in deferring entropy, 
postponing its eventual outcome, including death, Tod, which is the 
specific arche-protention of the noetic soul, and which constitutes 
Dasein as Dasein.
It is in this way that the noetic soul is a différance. This noetic dif-
férance, however, cannot be dissolved into negentropic différance in 
general, which we can also call vital différance. And this is why I 
distinguish, within negentropy, what I call neganthropy, as that which 
generates noetic différance. Noetic différance is in this way a specific 
case of vital différance, into which it introduces a bifurcation – and I 
use this word in the sense simultaneously of Borges,145 of what René 
Thom referred to as catastrophe,146 and of dynamical systems theory.
The specificity of noetic différance derives from exosomatization, 
which began some 2.5 million years ago, in the wake of ‘organic pro-
jection’,147 which commenced some 20 million years ago. In 1949, exo-
somatization was concretized as Gestell in the mind of Heidegger,148 
without this having the sense of neganthropy. In 2016 we are living 
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within what is now recognized as the Anthropocene, and we also 
know that Gestell could turn into the transhumanist project – even 
if, for Heidegger, Gestell would become ‘being itself’, as he wrote in 
‘The Turn’.149
We should note here that neither Hegel nor Marx, or Nietzsche, or 
Husserl, or Heidegger or Derrida ever acknowledged the immense 
cosmo-genetic upheaval that followed inevitably from the theories 
of entropy and negative entropy – unlike Bergson, who inspired the 
mathematician and economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, the lat-
ter having in addition highlighted, after Lotka, the singularity of the 
exosomatic species when compared with endosomatic organogenesis.
We will see later on how and why these considerations open up the 
prospects and perspectives that will be developed in what follows.
I responded enthusiastically to Pietro Montani’s invitation to con-
tribute to this encounter, the central theme of which is the imagina-
tion, as something about which we can try to think on the basis of the 
unprecedented rise of so-called interactivity – which we should relate 
to what Antoinette Rouvroy called ‘algorithmic governmentality’.150
The questions opened up by Pietro Montani and the organizers 
of this conference interest me a great deal, because they are situ-
ated within a path that I have myself attempted to trace ever since 
1999, starting from the question of transcendental imagination. This 
has led me to a conceptual position that I will now summarize in 
twelve points:
1. I posited in Technics and Time, 3151 that the schema presupposes 
what I call tertiary retention, and more precisely hypomnesic ter-
tiary retention, which begins in the Upper Palaeolithic, that is, with 
the first exteriorization (or exosomatization) of mental contents. 
Tertiary retention is exosomatized memory. It is called ‘tertiary’ 
because it conditions the relationship between primary retention and 
secondary retention, in the sense Husserl uses these terms in On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time152 – primary 
retention, which is also the synthesis of apprehension, being retained 
only on the condition that secondary retention seizes hold of it, and 
where secondary retention is itself the condition of the concept of 
understanding, which ‘seizes hold’ of the data of intuition, which is 
data only insofar as it is so seized.
The taking hold of primary retention by secondary retention 
involves a selection, and the latter operates according to the ways that 
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tertiary retention affords possibilities to secondary retention of ‘sche-
matizing’ primary retentions – and, in so doing, of selecting them.
To say that the Kantian schema presupposes tertiary retention 
means in more general terms that we must think the faculties – of 
knowledge, desire and judgment – in terms of technical evolution, that 
is, according to these new exosomatic functions that are incessantly 
produced in the sur-natural and sur-realist history of humankind.
The exosomatic functions, which accumulate, assemble and com-
bine into a system in the course of this sur-natural and sur-realist 
history, form a tertiary retentional milieu within which potentiali-
ties accumulate of what the Greeks called the Hades, and which are 
revenances, hauntings and spirits, all these being constituted by and 
inhabiting objects invested with spirit, including not just spoons but 
books, images, symbols and temples (which concurs with Simondon’s 
account in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects153).
2. I have tried to show in Symbolic Misery154 that libidinal economy 
is constituted organologically, as are all schemas and symbols, which 
require tertiary retentions such as the spoon and hypomnesic tertiary 
retentions such as the image or the book.
The history of the unconscious that the libido economizes (that it 
‘saves’) is a history of the organological defunctionalizations and 
refunctionalizations that occur in the course of exosomatization, as 
Freud suggested in his correspondence with Fliess on 14 November, 
1897,155 when he introduced the concept of organic repression (which 
reappeared in 1929 in Civilization and Its Discontents156), thereby 
showing that libidinal economy has its origin in the defunctionaliza-
tion and refunctionalization of organs, and especially of the feet, the 
hands, the sense of smell and the eyes. Freud failed, however, to see 
the exosomatic consequences of what he had revealed, even though 
in Civilization and Its Discontents he does refer to the appearance of 
ships, the telephone and other industrial innovations.157
3. I argued in Disbelief and Discredit158 that all this falls within the 
realm of grammatization, which lies at the heart of capitalism and 
leads to calculation being privileged in all human affairs, and to the 
dissolving of singularities by analytical computation, instead turning 
them into particularities.
We should, by the way, be careful to note that we must understand 
all the twists and turns that occur in this history of grammatization 
(that is, what Derrida called the history of the supplement – which he 
himself never undertook), and that, on this score, we cannot simply 
remain content with the usual deconstructionist generalities.
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4. In Automatic Society159 I tried to deepen this analysis, by stressing 
the fact that digital grammatization, which makes algorithmic govern-
mentality possible, results in a massive, generalized and systematic 
delegation of the functions of the understanding, and does so through 
an interactivity that, functioning four million times faster than ner-
vous systems, thereby outstrips and overtakes them – and, at the same 
time, overtakes reason, which is to say, the synthetic function.
The faculty of knowing, the cognitive faculty, is indeed composed 
of functions: that of intuition, which is donation, that of the under-
standing, which is analysis, that of imagination, which is schemati-
zation, and that of reason, which is synthesis, which is also to say 
of interpretation, or in other words, bifurcation. In saying this, I am 
thinking in particular of Alfred Whitehead.160
5. In my most recent book, Dans la disruption. Comment ne pas deve-
nir fou?161 I have tried to show that all this requires a specific kind of 
faculty of dreaming, since it is a question of the dreaming of ‘realiz-
able’ dreams, and hence precisely of noetic dreams, on which Paul 
Valéry (but also Walter Benjamin) gave us cause to meditate.
I have myself referred in this context to Hayao Miyazaki’s film, 
The Wind Rises (2013), to show why such dreams are both pharma-
cological and organological: they lie at the origin of the exosomatic 
organogeneses that constitute our material history – and this means 
both that it is always possible for noesis to turn into a nightmare 
and that pharmacological arbitration (that is, the therapeutic capac-
ity) is the function of reason insofar as it judges cognitively, sensibly 
and morally.
6. What I am trying to show in my current seminar is that there is a 
functional becoming of the ‘cognitive faculties’ as of the faculties of 
desiring and judging, a development that functions according to those 
defunctionalizations and refunctionalizations constantly induced by 
hypomnesic tertiary retention.
This is what Heidegger failed to understand when he lamented 
the change of the meaning of truth effected by Plato in Book 7 of 
The Republic, where ἀλήθεια (alētheia) becomes ὄρθοθης (orthotēs) 
– which foreshadows Kant’s division of the cognitive faculty into 
an analytical capacity (the understanding) and a synthetic capacity 
(reason) – and does so on the basis formed by Descartes’s Rules for 
the Direction of the Mind,162 which itself paves the way for Leibniz’s 
‘Characteristic’,163 that is, the basic concepts of information theory 
qua mathematical automation, the pharmacology of which was exam-
ined by Husserl in The Crisis of European Sciences.164
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7. It is this metaphysical misunderstanding that led Heidegger to his 
frightful discourse on Gelassenheit, in which he lauded rootedness in 
the earth – a discourse all the more frightening in that it contains a 
prophetic aspect, when he asserts that, in the future,
there could arise, hand in hand with the greatest ingenuity in 
calculative planning and inventing, an indifference towards 
meditative thinking, a total thoughtlessness.165
8. What constitutes the faculty of dreaming – while ensuring that it 
generates only pharmaka – is ὕβρις (hubris), which means that νόησις 
(noēsis) in actuality always borders on a passage to the act of mad-
ness, and it is this that connects Laocoon to the snake ritual.
9. The disagreement between Foucault and Derrida concerning mad-
ness and its relationship to reason stems from their mutual neglect 
of the real stakes of Cartesianism,166 which lie not in the opposition 
between reason and madness, but in the 15th and 16th rules of the 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind,167 which pave the way for what 
– passing through Leibniz, Babbage, Lovelace and the industrial 
concretizations of the exosomatization of the functions of the under-
standing (which begins with mechanography168) – will lead to what 
we now know as ‘big data’ and the ‘data economy’.
The latter prepares the path for the transhumanist delirium that 
our hyper-pharmacological reality could indeed become, while 
the Cartesian Rules made possible what we now refer to as the 
Anthropocene.
10. In 1936, in ‘The Origin of Geometry’,169 the object invested with 
spirit became, for Husserl, the hypomnesic condition of apodictic 
anamnesis – and this was not without consequences for anamnesic 
processes of all kinds, and in particular those that Aby Warburg traced 
in the works of the Renaissance – and which led in 1923 to the lecture 
at Kreuzlingen where the issue was the pharmakon.170
11. We are living in the year 2016. What presented itself in Warburg’s 
time as the possibilities (and impossibilities) of that analogue form of 
tertiary retention that is the photograph today presents itself – and, as 
ever, and in the same movement, absents itself – as the possibilities 
(and impossibilities) of digital tertiary retention, for which interactiv-
ity, which analytically short-circuits synthesis, and which we also call 
the ‘virtual’ in the belief that this is something we can oppose to the 
real, is the key fact that remains to be ‘care-fully thought’ [panser].171
To think the virtual in the epoch of interactivity is firstly to think 
interaction, that is, to rethink dialogism, in the sense of Socrates 
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(before the dialectic) and also of Bakhtin, and it is to rethink the vir-
tual in Bergson’s sense as well as the unconscious in Freud’s sense, 
individuation in Jung’s sense, the transitional object in Winnicott’s 
sense and Pathosformel in Warburg’s sense, on the basis of the facts 
of exosomatization and the tertiary retention that stems from it, in par-
ticular as hypomnesic retentions and anamnesic objects.
12. Every work is a pharmakon insofar as it is contingent, acciden-
tal, and hence insofar as, as a lesion of meaning, it inaugurates a new 
age of meaning: a necessity, a wound that I am becoming – as did the 
poet Joë Bousquet, for example, or the musician Django Reinhardt, 
and so on.172
This is what Warburg experienced of Laocoon in the Hopi ritual up 
until his madness returned, almost thirty years later, in Kreuzlingen – 
and on an immeasurable scale, where the metron of art exceeds itself 
in hubris and euphoria, the exosomatic ground of which is tekhnē.
At the heart of these questions is the function of imagination – which 
must be thought in terms of exosomatization, and as what realizes 
dreams, that is, as what the unconscious exteriorizes by giving it form 
[donnant corps], as the spatializaton of time in the form of tertiary 
retentions, and as the condition of the social cohesiveness [faire-
corps] of those exosomatic organizations that are human societies, 
that is, as organic solidarity and noetic philia (for there is also a philia 
of those beings that are aloga – without logos – that for Aristotle are 
the animals).
(We don’t currently have time for a question that deserves to be 
pursued patiently and in depth, and that was raised by Michel 
Foucault when, while still young, he contributed to awareness of 
Ludwig Binswanger and Daseinsanalyse, arguing that in Dream and 
Existence Binswanger made the dream the source of freedom – that 
is, of noesis: ‘the dream discloses […] the point of origin from which 
freedom makes itself world’.173 It would clearly be necessary to read 
this alongside an interpretation of Imagination et invention,174 the lec-
ture course by Simondon, who, in 1954, followed the same seminars 
and classes as Foucault – and in particular those of Canguilhem and 
Merleau-Ponty. And it should be noted that Foucault would, in his 
1971 response to Derrida concerning Descartes, make dreaming, con-
ceived of by Descartes as meditation, the essential issue of his reading 
of the Meditations.175)
The accumulation of tertiary retentions, as the accumulation of 
realized dreams – but where these dreams also and always remain 
Part One: Anthropocene, Entropocene, Neganthropocene 98
unrealized, that is, never enough, insufficient, disappointing, because 
they are pharmacological, and always call for a new exteriorization, 
and, therefore, an applicatio – this accumulation of realized dreams, 
of which Rome is as it were the capital, calls for and makes possible 
other dreams. Having said this, I will continue with the general argu-
ment of this symposium – and do so as a kind of applicatio, in the 
sense of Gadamer and as discussed by Montani.176
In all this, what has still not been thought, nor therefore under-
stood, is the question of entropy and negentropy – which was raised 
by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen through the introduction of the con-
cept of exosomatization.
A work [oeuvre] is first and foremost an exosomatization. And, 
as such, that is, insofar as it works, and therefore functions, it bifur-
cates from every expectation: it is the applicatio of the unfulfilled or 
incomplete noetic dreams that it realizes while surprising them. This 
surprise, this sur-prehension, which is also the question of reflective 
judgment, or, in other words, of the play of imagination and under-
standing, is what works by bifurcating, that is, by exceeding compre-
hension, or, again, by exceeding the understanding, and as a synthesis 
beyond any possible analysis, which is to say as reason, or, equally, as 
neganthropy.
What, in neganthropy, creates faults and defects, defaults that them-
selves work, that are works, and hence that exosomatize themselves 
as that which is necessary, as necessity, is hubris.
What works in this way – that is, reflexively, as the community of 
the default of community, as Bataille would say, as the sensus com-
munis, and as that which founds while unfounding, so to speak, what 
Esposito calls delinquere177 – is also the expectation of the unexpected, 
which always contains an echo of the anelpiston of Heraclitus,178 and 
which is inscribed in the arche-protentional horizon of what Being 
and Time calls Sein zum Tode.
What I am trying to do today, on the basis of these non-Kantian 
readings of Kant and non-Derridian readings of Derrida, essentially 
involves the following:
1 Reviving Whitehead and Canguilhem from the perspective 
of an exosomatic conception of noetic life, which I call a 
neganthropology, and doing so in order to find a way out 
of the Anthropocene, and to find a way to enter into the 
Neganthropocene – which are the stakes of what Heidegger 
called the Ereignis.
2 This also consists in thinking Canguilhem’s biology and, 
more generally, Whitehead’s reason as functions of life 
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– against death, but also towards death, zum Tode, and 
through the dead, that is, within a life that is what Derrida 
would come to call life/death, which is also what underlies 
the life and death drives, that is, negentropy and entropy, 
where the dead, that is, the mortified and exosomatized 
knowledge that is artifice, in all its forms, like all objects 
invested with spirit, that is, all works, all this is in 2016 sub-
mitted to what, in Marx, and in the epoch of industrial cap-
italism, had already become ‘fixed capital’, which is now 
automated, as anticipated in the Grundrisse – automated, 
that is, interactive.
3 This ultimately consists in trying to think biopolitics, on 
the basis of which it is a matter of thinking a bioestetica, in 
such a way that:
 ▪ such a biopolitics cannot fail to be inscribed in the wake 
of the sometimes inflammatory thought of the vital func-
tions of knowledge in Nietzsche, and in the wake of the 
will to power, which calls for a ‘great politics’ and a 
‘great health’;
 ▪ such a biopolitics cannot avoid specifying what charac-
terizes it in comparison to endosomatic life: there is bio-
politics only to the strict degree that there is artificial 
selection, that is, art, in this very general sense by which 
we translate the Greek tekhnē into the Latin ars, which 
is what Foucault does not enable us to think unless we go 
back to the Foucault of 1954;
 ▪ such a biopolitics must confront the bio-economics of 
Georgescu-Roegen, precisely insofar as it makes econ-
omy into a question of the functional organology of exo-
somatization from the perspective of a cosmic function in 
entropic becoming and as the différance of this entropy, 
noetic différance, which is, therefore, a neganthropy, and 
which raises the question of a locality that would be, not 
rooted in the earth in the sense promoted by Heidegger 
in Meßkirch, but, precisely, and completely otherwise, 
exosomatic, that is, artificial, and as such artistic – of 
which the question of Gestell is the avowal that is yet 
to be assumed.
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I am aware, of course, of the insistence of the argument of our encoun-
ter on the primordially political dimension of such questions. This 
leads me to emphasize that interactivity first presents itself, in every-
day life, and in the consolidation of its various effects, as automatic 
society: this refers above all to all those automatons that interactivity 
inscribes into all layers of everyday life.
And here we must return to Simondon’s concept of the associated 
milieu, in order to show how crowds have become technical functions 
associated with a technical apparatus, so-called Gestell, for which 
these crowds would be the Bestand, in such a way that this ‘associated 
milieu’ (contrary to what Simondon’s non-pharmacological reading 
allows one to believe) becomes inherently entropic, because the inter-
activity of the understanding, exteriorized in algorithms, outstrips and 
overtakes both the imagination and reason, after having suspended 
intuition. Hence it is, then, that this reticulated milieu in fact becomes 
a systemically dissociating milieu, because it is hyper-proletarianizing.
Having myself stressed for ten years, by drawing on the case of 
‘free software’, that interactive digital networks may well harbour 
the possibility of constituting networks of associated milieus (in 
the sense given to this phrase by Simondon to describe, not only the 
Guimbal turbine, but the articulation of the individual and its memory 
as always already transindividual and social), and that such networks 
thus open up the possibility of overcoming the dissociation and pro-
letarianization imposed by the industrial and functional division not 
only of labour but of the functions of consumption and production, I 
cannot help but note that what we see realized today with social net-
works is, on the contrary, the rise of the digital anthill – which is the 
very scenario about which I sounded a warning in Symbolic Misery.179
In the data economy, the individuals who are aggregated into 
crowds lose all their protentional capabilities, and, through that, all 
their goals, that is, all their reasons for hope. This is so because the 
algorithms that collect and analyse retentions, on platforms that sys-
tematize this collection, do so four million times more rapidly than 
individual nervous systems, and thereby produce automatic proten-
tions that short-circuit every faculty (of knowing, desiring and judg-
ing) by liquidating all ends and all reasons for hope: the subjective 
imagination is short-circuited by objectivated e-machination, so to 
speak, that is, by what Marx called fixed capital, or, in other words, 
by a calculation that outstrips and overtakes the synthetic capaci-
ties of reason by neutralizing the faculty of dreaming, which is also 
to say of meditation in the sense of Foucault reading Descartes with 
Binswanger. We note here in passing: reason is the faculty of the 
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realization of dreams supplied by the imagination – which, with the 
web, became e-machination, beginning twenty-three years ago.
These are the stakes of what I have tried to describe in my appli-
catio of Jonathan Crary’s 24/7 capitalism, ‘capitalisme à l’assaut du 
sommeil’,180 a capitalism that disintegrates the dream – and, in this 
regard, the most interesting moment of this book is Crary’s reading of 
Chris Marker’s film, La Jetée (1962).181
Here, the problem is not the automated abstraction of the proten-
tions provoked by digital grammatization. The problem is us, insofar 
as we are incapable – after Heidegger but also after Derrida, Deleuze 
and Lyotard, as well as so many others outside of France – of thinking 
these processes. And, consequently, the problem is our abandonment 
of any political or economic prescription of a therapeutics.
It is hypomnesic tertiary retention that, since the Upper Palaeolithic, 
and in all its forms, constitutes both: (1) the schemas through which 
the understanding seizes hold of the data of intuition; and (2) sym-
bolization as a tertiary protention that infinitely projects the neces-
sity of an end that makes a différance, by building a bridge between 
aesthetics and morality above and beyond the understanding of the 
faculty of knowing.
Every work is this kind of artificial – that is, exosomatic – matrix 
of tertiary protentions, which themselves effect a process of artificial 
selection, which constitutes a transindividuation process in which 
there occurs a Pathosformel. The stakes of these questions are, today, 
economic and political, to the extent that purely computational artifi-
cial protention liquidates the imagination – that is, the possibility of a 
noetic différance that produces neganthropic bifurcations – by short-
circuiting the faculty of dreaming.
To this we must oppose a new economic and political rationality that 
creates a process of production in a broad sense – in the sense of the 
noetic, exosomatic enlargement that began in the Upper Palaeolithic 
with Homo ludens, through rupestral projection and in the awakening 
of nascent noetic dreams – a system of neganthropic bifurcations of 
every kind, founded on works of every kind, including works of art.
We lack the time now to present this new process of production. It 
rests on the following principle: the imagination is the neganthropic 
principle that projects realizable noetic dreams in order to combat the 
pharmacological becoming of those dreams realized in the form of 
those tertiary retentions that are the schemas of this vast oneirology, 
of which the serpent ritual and Laocoon were unforgettable figures 
in the mind of Aby Warburg, impressed by the secret knowledge of 
the pharmakon that, throughout the ecumene, feared and expected the 
hubris of which the Pathosformel would be the protean expression.
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Had there been time, I would have explained that it is therefore nec-
essary to place the automated analytical faculty into the service of a 
reconstruction of the figure of the amateur, that is, into the service of 
noetic intermittence as the capacity for dis-automatization, and to do 
so in such a way that it forms the basis of an economy that would be 
founded on that resource allocation program that in France is known 
as the intermittents du spectacle scheme.
Thank you for your no doubt intermittent attention.
6 Welcome to the Anthropocene:  
Text for an Encounter between  
Bernard Stiegler and Peter Sloterdijk
Before I propose a few points for discussion with Peter – themes I 
have taken up in my most recent book, Dans la disruption. Comment 
ne pas devenir fou?182 – I would like to sketch out my current approach, 
which I adopt along with pharmakon.fr, Ars industrialis, the Institut 
de recherche et d’innovation and the Chair of Contributory Research 
of Plaine Commune, within the frame of which everything I present 
here will be inscribed.
Along with these groups, I argue that the Anthropocene is unliv-
eable, insolvent and unsustainable, and that it is therefore an 
Entropocene, which is to say that it implies a turn, a turning point, 
a detour, ein Kehre that, as Ereignis, turns into what we call the 
Neganthropocene.
Such a perspective obviously involves taking up the thermody-
namic theme of entropy, and of what, in biology, in order to avoid 
the risk of substantializing entropy and its variations, whether they 
are conceived as dissipative structures or as negative entropy in 
Schrödinger’s sense, we call différance, which must be ‘différanti-
ated’ into, on the one hand, vital différance, and, on the other hand, 
noetic différance, which is also an exosomatic différance that calls for 
a neganthropology.
Neganthropology is a response to the impotent thought of the 
last man formulated by Lévi-Strauss in the final chapter of Tristes 
Tropiques,183 and against which I have begun to argue by taking up 
Georges Bataille and his question of sumptuary expenditure. This 
general economy integrates political economy – and its dis-economy 
– into libidinal economy, which I conceive here with Freud and after 
Freud, that is, beyond Freud, and beyond not just the pleasure principle 
but Moses and Monotheism.184 What Freud fails to understand is the 
question of exosomatization and of what it introduces into the econ-
omy of life and death as the play of entropy and its différance within 
the psychic apparatus, irreducibly inscribed as it is within a social 
apparatus. This is what Simondon made clear, even if he himself had 
little understanding of Freud. Différance is always negentropic, if it is 
true that negentropy is always what differs and defers entropy.
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Having recalled all this, I will add that the central thesis of Dans la 
disruption consists in arguing that Foucault’s gesture in The History of 
Madness185 should be interpreted through a reading of his introduction 
to Ludwig Binswanger’s Dream and Existence,186 which we should see 
partly in terms of the work of Marc Azéma, a French archaeologist 
who showed not only that we can access the dreams of the people of 
the Upper Palaeolithic through their rupestral projections, but that 
this amounts to what Azéma calls prehistoric cinema.187 I myself have 
argued that the syntheses of the Kantian transcendental imagination 
and the schematism become possible only through the exteriorization 
of what I call tertiary retentions,188 and, in particular, the hypomnesic 
tertiary retentions that appear with the decorated caves of rupestral 
painting. This amounts to the beginning of grammatization, that is, 
of reproduction making the continuous discrete, which it does by spa-
tializing temporal mental contents – this is also the thesis that Husserl 
puts forward in ‘The Origin of Geometry’.189
Conceived in this way, exosomatization – which for Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen was the condition of the economy, replacing biol-
ogy, and which must be thought starting from the ‘law of entropy’ 
– is what results from the realization of noetic dreams, those dreams 
referred to by Valéry, which are noetic only inasmuch as they are real-
izable, that is, exteriorizable, for example in the form of hypomnesic 
tertiary retentions – and this is precisely what Descartes formulated 
in Rule 15 of his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and in Rule 16, 
which is most likely what inspired Husserl’s discourse on the origin of 
geometry – whether consciously or otherwise.190
In his response to Derrida, Foucault argued that, contrary to 
Derrida’s claim that the dream is a generalization of the question of 
madness, Descartes made the dream the condition of meditation in 
the sense of the Meditations. I believe that Foucault’s argument here is 
entirely justified. But both Foucault and Derrida ignore Rules 15 and 
16, through which Descartes played his part in setting up the madness 
of the Anthropocene, that is, the hubris through which calculation 
will allow – with capitalism, and through the process of disinhibi-
tion in which, according to Peter Sloterdijk, it consists, whose work I 
will discuss here all too briefly – the installation of the Anthropocene 
as an exorbitant and unsustainable increase of entropy, an excessive-
ness that is, today, that hubris which makes all of us go a little crazy 
– because arche-protention has been twisted in a striking and unprec-
edented direction. Arche-protention: which for Heidegger is being-
for-death, although Heidegger never understood how taking the law 
of entropy into account would have completely changed his account of 
the history of being and its epochs.
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Indeed, Heidegger says absolutely nothing about thermodynamics 
or about its second law, nor does he discuss negative entropy, which, 
according to Schrödinger, is life. And Derrida, too, whose path is tied 
so closely to Heidegger, himself has nothing to say about this, even if 
it is true that différance speaks of little else – while Marx, Engels and 
Nietzsche will all have denied its scope.
Nor did Heidegger see that meditation, which forms the stakes of 
Gelassenheit, presupposes calculation, just as negentropy presupposes 
entropy. To understand the Anthropocene from the neganthropologi-
cal perspective that results from such considerations is to redefine 
Gestell, the Kehre and what, starting from the becoming-Bestand of 
every resource, it should have the ability to produce as Ereignis. To 
understand the Anthropocene from a neganthropological perspec-
tive is, then, to redefine all this in terms of neganthropic bifurcation, 
recalling that a bifurcation is also, in the mathematics of catastrophe 
theory, that which generates a new stage in morphogenesis.
Transhumanist delirium is an ideological exploitation of these ten-
dencies, which are themselves in no way ideological, and this dis-
course, which is also a disruptive strategy for which the Singularity 
University is one key institution, is what we must fight against at the 
precise point where it absolutely fails to see that the singularity is pre-
cisely not anthropological, but neganthropological.
In the age of disruption, the technical system, which permanently 
changes beyond all limits, amounts to an extreme stage of a process 
of disinhibition that began in the fifteenth century, as shown by Peter 
Sloterdijk,191 and also by Jean-Baptiste Fressoz.192
Disruption amounts to a radicalization of innovation, one that pre-
vents any metastabilization with the other systems that constitute the 
social body, destroying in advance any capacity they might have of 
adopting the technical system,193 or of controlling its effects. In so 
doing, it constantly increases the massive capital accumulations that 
result from placing ‘disrupted’ sectors outside the law: disruption is 
above all the creation of legal and theoretical vacuums – what I call 
Wild West technology.
All this is an extension of what, in In the World Interior of Capital, 
Sloterdijk describes as the five hundred year old process of disinhi-
bition lying at the basis of capitalism and globalization. Consisting 
essentially in outstripping and overtaking social organizations, and, 
through that, in short-circuiting collective individuation and tran-
sindividuation, disruption is based on the destruction of all psycho-
social structures. It can only generalize and radicalize disinhibition, 
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that is, the unbinding of Eros and Thanatos that was already the issue 
in what, in 1944, Adorno and Horkheimer foresaw in terms of the cul-
ture industry.
With these new barbarians who are the disruptors, who seem per-
fectly willing to identify themselves as such, and who are the heirs 
of the buccaneers and pirates whose history Sloterdijk studies, this 
radicalization stems from the purely computational treatment of the 
traces left by individuals and groups who have been radically disindi-
viduated and radically harmed.
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz recounts how the taking of crazy risks has 
become not only possible but systematized, in order to struggle 
against those who would resist, and to ‘make reasonable’ what has 
in fact become a public opinion fabricated by techniques designed for 
the construction of this opinion and totally dedicated to that purpose – 
until, today, all this seems to have been upended.
We know today how this systematic risk-taking was made pos-
sible by a fundamental transformation of Christianity, which coin-
cided with colonization, the latter contributing, as Peter Sloterdijk has 
shown, to the development of the process of disinhibition. All this 
fundamentally complicates the Foucauldian schema of the history of 
madness in the classical age, and shows that this is where the roots of 
contemporary madness are to be found.
By reading Sloterdijk and Fressoz, it becomes possible to see the 
history of modernity from a very different angle than that adopted 
by Foucault: ‘modernity’ proves to be, above all, an immense process 
of disinhibition. Anthropotechnical modernity, the outcome of which 
is the Anthropocene, is what establishes the retentional dimension of 
madness, that is, of ὕβρις (hubris): Rules 15 and 16 pave the way for 
digital tertiary retention, the axiomatic bases of which were formal-
ized by Leibniz with his Characteristic194 – this being the very thing 
that neither Foucault nor Derrida were able to see.
While he constitutes the certainty of the cogito as the experience 
of doubt and the evil demon, Descartes effects the ‘great division’ 
described by Foucault, for whom Voltaire is the best example. In 
this Cartesian denial of madness as the condition of reason, it is the 
age of contemporary madness that prepares itself through the forget-
ting of the pharmakon, and precisely of its pharmacological charac-
ter, as the denial of this character: a denial prefiguring and engen-
dering madness.
The denial of the irreducibly pharmacological dimension of mod-
ern technics, founded on disinhibiting calculating technologies and 
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leading to the disruption, constitutes the ὕβρις of the modern will and 
beyond – and well before Descartes. This is why Sloterdijk can write:
The Portuguese and Spanish expeditions could never have 
been undertaken without motivating systems of delusions 
to justify these leaps into the unclear and unknown as sen-
sible acts.195
In other words, if it is true that Descartes excluded madness from rea-
son, and in fact from unreason (on which Derrida casts doubt), a ges-
ture that would, according to Foucault, be characteristic of the classi-
cal age, organizing and concretizing this exclusion through the ‘great 
confinement’ of the mad and the deviant, Peter Sloterdijk shows that 
the modernity of the Modern Age is based instead on triggering a new 
kind of madness through exporting the West as an extra-territorial-
ized barbarism.
Through the immense process of disinhibition characteristic of cap-
italism and installing the Anthropocene, madness becomes the norm 
that justifies rationalization – and ‘rationalization’ must here be 
understood in the sense, simultaneously, of Weber, Adorno and Freud.
The articulation of disinhibition (that is, of madness), and of the 
calculability characteristic of the classical age and its reason as 
mathesis universalis, is a kind of antithesis of the processes described 
by Foucault – which we might be tempted to conclude lead on the 
contrary to the systematic reinforcement of inhibition, both through 
‘morality’ and through the criminalization of deviance: this is 
Foucault’s theme in History of Madness. These two phenomena, of 
course, are obviously not contradictory: rather, they feed off each 
other – even if they do result from a dynamic of tendencies that are 
contradictory and that tertiary retention always sets up, this being 
precisely what makes it a pharmakon. This dynamic of inhibition and 
disinhibition feeding off one another constitutes an organology of 
temptation for which the monotheisms are curative at-tempts that, by 
turns, turn out also to be toxic.
This capitalism and this economy of disinhibition can become 
industrial only by combining with the great turning point that is the 
Reformation, where, in dissonant counterpoint to the puritanism that 
unfurls with Calvin, a process of disinhibition unfolds through the 
succession of disadjustments that eventually lead to the current stage 
of the Anthropocene that is disruption. The latter is a total disinhibi-
tion and, as such, and paradoxically, a kind of totalitarianism, appar-
ently ‘soft’ but in reality extremely violent: a violence (which is just 
beginning) that encompasses every realm – verbal, moral, sexual, 
policing, economic, delinquency, terrorism and so on.
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Behind the acts of madness that make history, such as those of the 
explorers whom Sloterdijk discusses, as well as all the campaigns 
of conquest undertaken by ‘historical figures’, it is always also and 
always firstly a matter of tertiary retention in a broad sense: in the 
sense that every form of technics is a tertiary retention, that is, a phar-
makon. Bearing technological epokhalities or borne by them, a new 
tertiary retention always reopens, in one way or another, the dehis-
cence in which ὕβρις consists, and within which alone can occur that 
process of disinhibition whose history and economy Sloterdijk under-
takes to examine.
From a Sloterdijkian perspective, the certainty that the foundation 
of the Cartesian subject is supposed to provide, far from dominating 
the classical age, in reality opens a space for risk-taking, for calcula-
tions of probability and for insurance mechanisms of all kinds, which 
rationalize the new ordinary madness of the conquerors, and which 
characterize the way that capitalism is accompanied by and consists 
in immense uncertainties.
This process of disinhibition requires, in the first place, globaliza-
tion itself, that is, the conquest of the high seas, where piracy played 
a key role – even though evangelizing missions accompanied these 
campaigns in a dynamic process conquering both minds and territo-
ries. The advent of the culture industry and its various wireless net-
works, and today the data economy and its digital networks, has obvi-
ously transformed the nature of this globalization.
Thirty years after Adorno and Horkheimer, all the consequences 
of decolonization unfold as the beginning of the ‘crisis’, which would 
profoundly transform the structures and goals of capitalism, until the 
advent of Hayekian ultra-liberalism, which advocates total disinhibi-
tion, glorifying hacking (but in a very peculiar way) – hacking, that 
is, piracy (the ‘hacktivists’, many of whom I count as friends, prefer 
to present themselves as so many Robin Hoods rather than as pirates, 
in the belief they are realizing the dreams of Hakim Bey at the very 
moment they are actually serving the cause of Hayek).
Sloterdijk exposes a propensity to madness characteristic of the 
whole Modern Age and beyond, of which the classical age would be a 
key stage of development, and on the basis of which capitalism would 
eventually undergo, in America and in the twentieth century, a funda-
mental evolution:
Columbus was an agent of a pan-European willingness to 
embrace delusion – though it was only psychotechnically 
perfected by the USA in the twentieth century (and re-
imported to Europe through the consultancy industry).196
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This analysis of the ‘consultancy industry’ completes the Adornian 
perspective on the culture industry: the well-known conflict between 
Habermas and Sloterdijk should not cause us to forget that Sloterdijk’s 
analysis extends the claims of Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialektik 
der Aufklärung – even if they argue on a very different register.
The current ‘consultancy industry’, which we must conceive in 
terms of a fundamental relationship with the absolutely computa-
tional capitalism of algorithmic governmentality, constitutes, first 
with the culture industry and now with the data economy, a totality 
that is formed from out of ‘the activity culture of modernity’.197 This 
activism emerges at the dawn of modern times with those madmen 
who are the explorers, pirates and swindlers [chevaliers d’industrie] 
who establish, through colonization, but on a much broader scale and 
within cities, an ‘organization of disinhibition’, thanks to which the 
whole ensemble of social structures begins to transform.
In this highly complex and often paradoxical process, the response 
of Ignatius of Loyola to the Reformation, conducted according to his 
Spiritual Exercises – which fall within what Foucault called tech-
niques of the self – prefigures, according to Sloterdijk, the develop-
ment of the psychotechnics that will be essential to globalization, 
from colonization until today:
As an explicit attempt at psychotechnical and medial modi-
fication, Jesuit subjectivity was driven by the longing to 
understand the successes of the Protestants better than the 
Protestants themselves. […] The first subjects of the Modern 
Age […] were […] the Jesuits.198
Just as spiritual exercises can lead to their opposite, namely, to psy-
chotechnologies in the service of what has been described today as 
an economy of attention, which is in reality a destruction of attention 
(its dis-economy), so too what seems to constitute the speculative or 
transcendental sphere of the life of the mind (or spirit) in otium in 
reality works (without knowing it) for the establishment of the hege-
mony of negotium:
The dominant figure of modernity is thus by no means the 
excess of reflective inwardness […]. What becomes manifest 
in the process is that the task of reflection is to prepare the 
desired disinhibition.199
Such an idea can be interpreted in many ways. For myself, it seems to 
express the dynamic involved in what I refer to as the doubly epokhal 
redoubling, that is, when, due to some exosomatic innovation that 
succeeds in generating a new technical system, there is a suspension 
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of circuits of transindividuation, for the epoch in which this new exo-
somatization occurs, so that it is only through a second moment of 
this double redoubling that new circuits of transindividuation can be 
elaborated. This was the case, for example, for the new circuits of 
transindividuation that arose with the Republic of Letters and mod-
ern philosophy (from Descartes to the Kantian Aufklärung), where the 
‘task of reflection’ is to trigger the technological and scientific epokh-
ality of the next stage – which has the paradoxical result that the ‘owl 
of Minerva’ arrives always too late, long before the disruption.
As Hegel taught at the moment when exosomatization suddenly 
accelerated into machinic becoming (the first steam engine arriving 
in Berlin in 1795) – thereby inaugurating the Anthropocene era – 
the life of the mind is the life of its exteriorization, through which the 
mind enters into a contradiction with itself that Hegel believed to be 
dialectical.
As for we ourselves, what we learn from disruption is that this 
becoming is not dialectical, but tragic, that is, pharmacological. This 
is what Foucault sought to grasp but without success, having failed 
to conceive ὕβρις in a tragic way (just as, very strangely, The Birth of 
the Clinic200 overlooked the industrial pharmacopeia and pharmaceu-
tical-chemistry that turned health into a market – just as Google is 
doing now with the digital industry – even though Foucault’s teacher, 
Georges Canguilhem, did indeed raise the question of drugs and of 
their place within care).
Sloterdijk shows how disinhibition results from the delay and 
advance that plays out in the exteriorization that we are here call-
ing the doubly epokhal redoubling. It is in this way that disinhibi-
tion constitutes the condition of possibility of the Anthropocene 
and of the passage to limits that has already led this era to a criti-
cal turning point. Disinhibition is what leads to the authorization of 
committing crimes: it is this that became clear to Dostoyevsky at the 
Crystal Palace.
It is starting from this relation to crime (to ὕβρις), and as the 
extremity or radicalization of disinhibition (in the epoch of what, in 
the world of Dostoyevsky, one refers to as nihilists), that Sloterdijk 
conceives innovation and what will become the economic theory of 
‘creative destruction’, all this conceived as theory of progress, which 
is also to say, of disadjustment201:
Two generations after Raskolnikov, Joseph Schumpeter 
would state in his theory of economic development that in 
economic life, functionally speaking, there are ultimately 
only innovators and imitators.202
Welcome to the Anthropocene 111
This state of fact was established, then, by the systemic organiza-
tion of disinhibition in which capitalism consisted at the dawn of the 
Modern Age, an organization that resulted from new regimes of the 
doubly epokhal redoubling, all of which seems, today, after the fact, 
to have reached that critical threshold of the Anthropocene we are 
calling the disruption. But, from this, we must not conceive a ‘naïve 
ontology of progress in which the distance between the vanguard and 
the main body can consistently be interpreted as the pilot function of 
those at the forefront’.203
Those at the forefront, in other words, have no use, therefore, for 
those who lag behind, for those who are ‘late’: the former are the 
pirates and criminals who mercilessly clear out territories for dis-
inhibition, without the least regard for what might otherwise have 
remained of ‘civilization’ – which, coming always too late, can only 
fill them with contempt:
In this schema, the advance of those who are extraordinary 
is made possible by a vocation to disinhibition that forges 
ahead solely through active contempt for the restrictive 
power of morality and convention – hence the thesis of the 
inevitable criminality of the innovators.204
The one who thinks progress and advance on this register, that is, 
as philosophy of becoming, and no longer as ontology, is Nietzsche. 
With ‘Thus Spoke Zarathustra […] Columbus’s deed had arrived in 
thought’.205 This event, which is the advent of nihilism in Nietzsche’s 
sense, leads to the fading away of all the narratives of origin, that is, 
of territorial and historical belonging, and to the pre-eminence of risk 
and novelty: ‘A human of his type exists not from their origin, but 
rather from their advance’.206 Hence will America become the country 
of immigrants-cum-‘pioneers’, who hunt, destroy or enslave its indig-
enous inhabitants.
The disruption now underway, as a new stage of the organization of 
disinhibition and an extremization of those tendencies characteristic 
of the Anthropocene, is at the same time being extended, via digital 
networks functioning at two thirds of the speed of light, to the entire 
planet. Among its effects is the breakdown of inherited territorial 
immunities – in the United States and everywhere else – heritages, 
cultures and social structures originally emerging from their origin, 
and not their advance: all this can do nothing but prepare the way for 
an immense counter-reaction, triggering a chain reaction of incalcu-
lable consequences.
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In addition to statistics, which is, for Alain Desrosières, the science 
of the state in the service of what Foucault called biopower,207 the cal-
culation of probabilities, which is something similar (but which, like 
algorithmic governmentality, is essentially distinct from it208), is what 
shapes psychopower as the control, pooling and amortizing of proten-
tions through the use of probability calculations. This probabilization 
of protention is what leads very early in the Modern Age to a kind of 
reflective madness:
Here the risk society comes about as the alliance of well-
insured profit-seekers. It unifies the insane who have 
thought everything through beforehand.209
These are those rational madmen who are always so keen to distin-
guish themselves from ‘ordinary madness’, the better to maintain 
their business affairs:
The blooming of the insurance idea in the middle of the first 
adventure period of globalized seafaring shows that the 
great risk-takers were willing to pay a price in order to be 
taken seriously as reasonable subjects. For them, everything 
depended on establishing a sufficiently deep divide between 
themselves and ordinary madmen.210
This leads to a differentiation between reason and madness, but by 
a pathway completely different from that traced by Foucault: as the 
Modern Age becomes the classical age, philosophy, like insurance, 
begins to legitimate these ‘insane who have thought everything 
through’, and vice versa.
Such insurance systems as Modern Age philosophy drew 
their justifications from the imperative to separate reason 
and madness clearly and unambiguously.211
Insurance replaces worship as a means of consolidating a possible 
future in the chaos of improbabilities. The improbable is replaced by 
probabilities as the protentional horizon within which improbability 
is dissolved:
one defines modernization as a progressive replacement of 
vague symbolic immune structures […] with exact social 
and technical security services. […] Prayer is good, insur-
ance is better: this insight led to the first pragmatically 
implanted immune technology of modernity.212
According to Sloterdijk, the development of insurance that eliminates 
the improbable – and that leads towards the ‘death of God’ – would 
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find its ‘inner basis of certainty’ in Cartesianism’s success in ‘mod-
ernizing self-evidence’, and as its reassuring logical ground:
Perhaps the rationalist branch of continental philosophy that 
followed on from the emigrant Descartes attempted pre-
cisely that: providing a new breed of risk-citizens […] with 
an unshakeable logical mainland on which to stand.213
This ‘foundation’, however, this ‘basis’, inexorably loses its credit 
thanks to the effects of what it makes possible, namely, the new ‘tech-
nical world’ that is the Anthropocene:
On the market of modern immunity techniques, the insur-
ance system, with its concepts and procedures, has com-
pletely won out over philosophical techniques of certainty. 
[…] Insurance defeats evidence: this statement encapsulates 
the fate of all philosophy in the technical world.214
It was piracy that opened these pathways, by practising atheism in an 
empirical and factual way:
In this context, piracy – […] the foremost manifestation of 
a naïve globalization criminality – […] is the first entre-
preneurial form of atheism: where God is dead, […] the 
unimaginable is indeed possible.215
This leads us, once again, back to the libertarians, who in France, 
today advocate their ‘new barbarism’,216 which is an-archist in the 
sense that it is fundamentally hostile to all public power and all ἀρχή 
(arkhē): ‘the moderns conceive of the dangers of libertarian and anar-
chist disinhibition in terms of piratical atheism’.217 The question of the 
relationship between power, inasmuch as it constitutes itself in social 
structures, which are here primarily called immunitary structures, and 
the spheres that, in Sloterdijk’s philosophy, constitute there-being, 
falls within what he names macrospherology.
On this point, which leads to the consideration of the relationship, 
today, between psychic individuation and collective individuation – 
which are articulations between micro- and macro-spherology – the 
conclusion of In the World Interior of Capital, published two years 
before 2008, does not manage to reach the heights of what precedes it:
In truth, money has long since proved itself as an operatively 
successful alternative to God. Money contributes more today 
to the cohesion of things today than a Creator of Heaven and 
Earth ever could.218
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This statement ignores the question of arche-protention and of its 
‘existential’ conditions in Heidegger’s sense, of which, of course, 
Sloterdijk is well aware. It is this overestimation of probabilities – 
which are the condition of the ‘operative success’ of ‘money’ – that 
leads Sloterdijk to virtually ignore the existential question itself.
In Sloterdijk – as, for that matter, in Simondon – there is no pharma-
cology: there is none of the sense of the tragic around which Foucault 
turned in 1961, without the latter ever quite seeing where, precisely, 
the question of madness in all its forms (in the sense of Foucault and 
Sloterdijk) truly lies. This is why Sloterdijk does not (in 2006) feel 
the rise of this question: the question of what we refer to as a ‘new 
ordinary madness’, within that new form of barbarism that Adorno 
and Horkheimer already feared in 1944 – which in France, in 2015, 
becomes that of the new barbarians, and, in the world generally, that 
of disruption in general, and, in the Middle East, that of Daesh.
The new ordinary madness is what, in issue 413 of the journal 
Esprit, and under the title ‘Aux bords de la folie’, Marc-Olivier Padis, 
Jacques Hochmann and Michaël Foessel describe as a form of mal-
être.219 This ‘ill-being’ results from what makes existence impos-
sible, whereas Sloterdijk still believes that existential opportunities 
can emerge from the fact of disinhibition itself, in which he seems 
ultimately to invest unfailing trust – and there, perhaps, lies his own 
‘propensity to madness’:
From the [moment, in the crystal palace that is global capi-
talism, that] a radical de-scarcification of goods [occurred,] 
a leap [took place] in the pampering history of Homo sapiens 
– a leap that opened up an enormously expanded space of 
existential opportunities.220
In this cynical tone, Sloterdijk celebrates excess – that is, ὕβρις, which 
is also to say, crime – which he relates also to chaos, and he does so by 
referring to Deleuze and Guattari:
The wretchedness of the conventional forms of grand narra-
tive by no means lies in the fact that they were too great, but 
that they were not great enough. […] For us, ‘great enough’ 
means ‘closer to the pole of excess’.221
It is here that Sloterdijk quotes Deleuze and Guattari: ‘And what 
would thinking be if it did not constantly confront chaos?’222 What 
‘confronts chaos’ [se mesure au chaos], however, what finds its mea-
sure in chaos, is not just excess [démesure]. It is, precisely, chaos as 
the opportunity to bifurcate. Excess, that is, ὕβρις, is its condition. But 
this condition is not sufficient: it lacks a therapeutic.
7 Governing Towards the Neganthropocene
Before asking what good government is, we must ask what to govern 
means. It is particularly important to do so right at this moment, as we 
enter the age of cybernetic government – our epoch being that of digi-
tal networks, which are themselves the fruits of what, around 1950, 
Norbert Wiener conceived as a science of control.
First and foremost, to govern means to control the rudder [in French, 
gouvernail, but firstly from the Greek, kubernan, origin of both gov-
ern and cyber]. Now, what is a rudder, a gouvernail? It is an organ 
that, in turn, is part of another organ, the boat. The boat, which is an 
ensemble of artificial organs, is what makes it possible to navigate, 
that is, to sail somewhere, without necessarily reaching the destina-
tion, obviously: hence Christopher Columbus, who sailed of course 
by boat, including the famous Santa Maria, began with a correct intu-
ition – that the earth is round – but reached, not what was then called 
the Indies, soon to become the East Indies, but instead discovered 
what they would call the West Indies, encountering for the first time 
the inhabitants of this new continent, whom they will call Indians.
A boat consists of a hull, a bridge, a keel, a mast, sails, oars, a rudder 
and so on: it is a set of organs. But if this is a set of organs, shouldn’t 
we call it an organism? An organism, too, is indeed a set of organs. 
Take for instance a bean: its organs are the roots, the stem, the leaves 
and so on. But a boat is not an organism, on the one hand because it 
does not reproduce itself, and on the other hand because it does not, 
alone, govern itself. This is what Aristotle explains in Physics.
In order to orient itself, in order, for example, to distinguish Orient 
and Occident, east and west, a boat needs an organism in the sense 
given to this term by Lamarck in 1809 in Philosophie zoologique,223 
and, more precisely, it needs that living thing we call a human being, 
that is, a being itself capable of producing artificial organs, such 
as flint tools, or rudders, or boats, and capable of making use of or 
directing those who use them.
Over time, boats become ships, which have a crew, and he who gov-
erns the ship is called the captain, which means the governor. The 
governor governs a set of artificial organs via this organ of command 
and control that is the gouvernail, the rudder. In this way he pilots the 
boat by commanding the naval officers of the crew who, too, are thus 
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governed by the captain, and this hierarchical crew itself controls 
various functions, for example, the sails if it is a sailboat, the engine if 
it is a steamship, and so on.
It is Plato who refers to the governor of the boat and to its rudder in 
order to understand good government in the Republic.224 It is impor-
tant to note that, for Plato, the city is the macrocosm of a microcosm 
that is the citizen himself.225 From this double metaphor, we can learn 
something quite interesting and important. If we follow it step by step 
– which turns it into an allegory – we find that:
 ▪ on the one hand, the governor has at his disposal an organ 
of command and control;
 ▪ on the other hand, this organ is not part of an organism, but 
rather of something that is itself an organ composed of a set 
of organs: a boat.
And there are an infinite variety of others.
Living organs, too, can themselves aggregate, thereby forming 
organisms that are really aggregates of cells, each of which can have 
different functions, and where these aggregates can themselves con-
stitute an organ, such as, for example, the liver.
Man has a liver, as do all vertebrates. But unlike other verte-
brates, or so it seems, the human liver is susceptible to dysfunction 
in ways that generate not only intestinal disturbances but psychic 
disturbances, which may themselves be engendered by disturbances 
wrought by artificial organs, the latter being that for which, according 
to Greek mythology, Prometheus is responsible, through his theft of 
fire, as told in Hesiod’s Theogony.
To govern is therefore to navigate by steering a course – with a rudder 
– after having established this course – with the appropriate instru-
ments. If we must govern, not only on the sea, but also in time, it is 
because the world is constantly changing – and it is man himself who 
effects this change, and does so from the beginning of his trajectory, 
through which what we call nature becomes history – or prehistory. 
But this is an issue that really becomes explicit in philosophy only 
with Hegel, even if the latter did not really give consideration to pre-
history – the idea of which did not yet exist in his day. That the world 
is constantly changing is generated by the logic of what Bertrand 
Gille called the technical system,226 which is itself what results from 
a transformation of animal organogenesis into exosomatic organogen-
esis, that is, artificial and technical organogenesis.
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To govern in the twenty-first century is to govern in the context 
of an immeasurable acceleration of the evolutionary process char-
acteristic of human societies, that is, of exosomatization. This is the 
question raised by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen227 – exosomatization 
being itself what Alfred Lotka showed to be an immeasurable accel-
eration of the organogenesis that is life, but one that occurs by means 
other than life.228 The contemporary acceleration of exosomatization 
is itself incommensurable with previous forms of exosomatization, 
and it takes to its furthest extreme a turning point in exosomatization 
that began 250 years ago, which has been called the Anthropocene: 
commencing in Europe, before migrating to America, and eventually 
becoming a globalized process.
This recent, extreme direction taken in the Anthropocene is what 
has been referred to as ‘disruption’,229 that stage of the Anthropocene 
that began in 1993, the lived experience of which is like a storm car-
rying populations along with it, as if borne along in rudderless vessels.
Cybernetics, which was conceived as the science of government, 
is thus now the concretization of what is commonly understood as a 
‘new industrial revolution’. As such, it is radically transforming the 
instrumental conditions of decision-making, just as it is radically 
transforming the future of work – in the context of a massive decline 
in employment due to the effects of automation, which will have 
immense macro-economic consequences on a planetary scale.
What I’d like to do now is try to convince you that, in this angst-rid-
den context, which calls for a surge or a boost of reason and therefore 
of responsibility in order to confront the unleashing of irresponsibil-
ity, the public authorities and private powers that intend to maintain 
the course of rationality must completely recompose their fundamen-
tal relations at the regional scale, and they must do so in the service 
of new local pacts capable of constituting a contributory society and 
through which a new era can be established: the Neganthropocene. 
These concepts (contributory economy and Neganthropocene) them-
selves govern an experiment currently underway in the northern 
suburbs of Paris, in Plaine Commune, a description of which can be 
found in French and English at recherchecontributive.org.
If it is not always the case that exosomatization has transformed 
the biosphere, it did at least fundamentally begin to do so from the 
dawn of the noetic era, the motives for which are described here by 
Georges Canguilhem:
Man, even physical man, is not limited to his organism. 
Having extended his organs by means of tools, man sees 
in his body only the means to all possible means of action. 
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Thus, in order to discern what is normal or pathological for 
the body itself, one must look beyond the body. With a dis-
ability like astigmatism or myopia, one would be normal in 
an agricultural or a pastoral society but abnormal for sailing 
or flying. From the moment mankind technically enlarged 
its means of locomotion, to feel abnormal is to realize that 
certain activities, which have become a need and an ideal, 
are inaccessible.230
This fundamental transformation of the biosphere has been possible 
because exosomatization introduces a new, dynamic process of tech-
nical individuation, which Leroi-Gourhan describes in Gesture and 
Speech,231 a process that amounts to exosomatization itself, and even-
tually leads to what Heidegger called Gestell, where the latter is con-
cretely expressed through an extra-terrestrial exosomatization that 
may extend very far indeed (such as to other planets), but also and 
especially to the limits of the biosphere.
It has, therefore, always been necessary to govern, to steer a way 
along paths of governance that have been highly diverse – shamanic, 
basilic, imperial, theocratic, republican in the sense described by 
Kant in ‘What is Enlightenment?’,232 or democratic, but in a sense 
from which we have veered off course. And, if we must govern, if 
we must steer a course with a rudder that must not be allowed just to 
serve the market, which is always self-destructive, but must instead 
serve a government, it is because the market is inherently short-
termist, leading at regular intervals to catastrophes that are increas-
ingly irreversible.
If we must govern, then today it is a matter of changing course, 
beyond the dead end into which the world has been locked by the con-
servative revolution. But what we must reckon with and govern with, 
today, is the combining of robots with artificial intelligence.
Faced with this, what politics of automation, and of the delegation 
of cognitive functions to machines, should we adopt, and what limits 
should we assign to this new reason, to use the terms of the question 
that Kant raised for his own age,233 the question of what we will our-
selves call the reason of automatisms, and which implies both a new 
critique of political economy234 and a new critique of reason in the 
broad sense, which I have tried to delineate in Technics and Time, 3?235
Answering this question involves passing through Whitehead, and 
notably The Function of Reason,236 through Lotka and Georgescu-
Roegen, and through Amartya Sen,237 as well as through new read-
ings of two of Marx’s texts, The German Ideology and the Grundrisse. 
We must reread these texts:
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 ▪ on the one hand, in order to understand how and why the 
capitalism that today dominates the planet amounts to an 
epistēmē, which is in fact the question of what Marx called 
the ‘general intellect’;
 ▪ on the other hand, in order to critique this epistēmē that is 
reaching its limits, if not the limits of capitalism itself.
Only on this basis will it be possible to elaborate new policies for 
science, culture, education, industry and the economy, and to do so 
on new constitutional bases, themselves reimagined starting from 
a neganthropic re-evaluation of the history of humanity and of its 
future, that is, of the history and future of noesis, which also requires 
a new conception of the republic and of democracy in the context of 
what I call planetary exorganisms – and it is this question that I will 
now take up.
Government, in the modern sense of the term, arises in urban milieus 
after the Neolithic era. It does so inasmuch as the dynamism of the 
town or the city is what supplies the functions by which decisions can 
be made, including the noetic functions broadly speaking, and there-
fore the deliberative functions that they nourish, which amount to the 
various forms of government, in the way we think of it in particular 
after Machiavelli, who points to the shock of the Renaissance, then 
Hobbes, who opens the modern debate on the state and government.
As for us, urbanites of the twenty-first century, we are entering 
the era of automatic cities – and beyond that of automatic economies, 
based on the data economy. What place remains in this situation for 
‘government’? And if there is such a place, what then would consti-
tute good government?
We call these automated urban regions ‘smart cities’. But what 
would make a city truly intelligent? What would be its relationship to 
automatisms? And, between an intelligent city and an automatic city, 
is it necessarily a question of choosing?
Let us ask, firstly, what a really intelligent city would be, and even, 
more generally, what a city has to do with intelligence, and further-
more what intelligence is – this question is indeed necessary, given 
that we belong to a time when the mean IQ is known to be decreas-
ing,238 as indeed is life expectancy,239 and given that it is an epoch 
in which, more generally, functional stupidity seems to have become 
inherent to organizations,240 of which cities are of course cases.
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With respect to this epoch that is ours, the ‘smart city’ implies a 
new functional intelligence that would constitute a new urbanity: dig-
ital urbanity. These questions cannot be approached independently of 
those that arise more generally with the data economy, and with the 
‘robolution’ that is on the way to reshaping and upsetting the entire 
macro-economic landscape, fundamentally threatening the sustain-
ability of the economy stemming from what we call globalization, the 
latter now so widely challenged.241
Addressing these questions means thinking the city starting from the 
concept of exosomatization as the pursuit of organogenesis, such that, 
from the advent of hominization, it becomes ‘organic projection’, as 
Ernst Kapp said without understanding its significance.242
The first exteriorizations of mental contents appear in the Upper 
Palaeolithic, followed in the Neolithic by the first sedentary settle-
ments, then by the great empires and the first urbanizations, involv-
ing, in particular, the development of archive, memory and represen-
tation functions. The consequences for the present day must be drawn:
 ▪ on the one hand, by conceiving the process of urbanization 
above all from the perspective of urban morphogenesis and 
as an exosomatization constituting all kinds of exosomatic 
exorganisms, such as, for example, malls, or specific and 
functional architectures such as the Parisian wholesale mar-
ket, Les Halles, which Émile Zola described in Le ventre de 
Paris (1873),243 exosomatic exorganisms, functional con-
centrations of organisms that are themselves exosomatic, 
that is, us, we ourselves, these aggregated exosomatic exor-
ganisms also amounting to exorganic territories, in a sense 
that I am about to explain;
 ▪ on the other hand, these urban concentrations are always 
regulated by a process of grammatization that begins in the 
Upper Palaeolithic, continuing with the various forms of 
writing, which themselves develop with various forms of 
towns and cities, and which opens, in India, with its diverse 
forms of writing, the era of grammars in specific urban 
forms, and ultimately the writing of the entire world that 
will eventually lead, in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries, to digital writing, which has its own apparatus.
When writing is ideographic, it governs the relations between 
the scribes or clerics or officials of an empire, who in China are the 
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governors of the Empire serving the Emperor, who may dream of his 
ideal organization, that is, of good government, these imperial func-
tionaries, then, organizing the relations with the urban and rural pop-
ulations that the Emperor commands imperatively, that is, imperially.
When writing becomes alphabetical, it constitutes a city that opens 
up a citizenship, where there are isonomic relations between citizens 
and through which the city becomes, develops, decides about itself. 
The city is an exorganism that at first evolves slowly and sporadi-
cally, but this evolution then accelerates: hence, for example, the same 
Parisian mall that in the 1970s replaced the wholesale market that 
Zola had described at the end of the nineteenth century, itself became 
obsolete so rapidly that in the last decade it was replaced yet again. 
All this falls within the scope of ‘creative destruction’ as theorized by 
Schumpeter.244
Printing, which in Europe extends the practices of reading and 
writing in the religious field, also paves the way for the advent of 
capitalism, which will intensify every kind of exchange and extend 
grammatization to gestures, initiating industrial automation, the lat-
ter nevertheless creating ‘employment’. From there, grammatization 
is then extended to perception and eventually to the understanding.
Today, grammatization has become digital, and this has resulted in 
generalized automation. The macro-economic impact of the latter has 
been and will be immense, simultaneously involving the smart city, 
the robolution and the data economy. On the basis of these very gen-
eral analytical elements, I have for some time been running a pro-
gramme in Plaine Commune with the goal of transforming this region 
in ten years, creating there both a living laboratory and what we are 
calling a contributory learning territory – referring to Pierre Veltz’s 
Des territoires pour apprendre et innover.245
A town or a city is the social concretion of a society individuating 
itself exorganically, which grows exorganically, and at a pace and a 
rhythm that, since the nineteenth century, has accelerated unimagin-
ably – thanks to disruption.
Before our present disruptive age, territorial exosomatic growth, 
whether in the form of a city, a metropolis or a village, territorial-
ized an authority. Such authorized exosomatic growth localized a 
spirit, a soul – a sense of place, an esprit des lieux as we say in French, 
animated by a soul itself founded on a diversely symbolized history, 
more or less monumentalized, and more or less ancient.
Functional arrangements were, then, territorially constituted, set-
ting up more or less diversified modalities of what Simondon called 
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processes of psychic and collective individuation, processes that are 
more or less temporary or permanent. I myself have argued that these 
processes of psychic and collective individuation are based on a pro-
cess of technical individuation – which is the process of exosomatiza-
tion referred to by Lotka and Georgescu-Roegen.
People who have worked together for twenty years in a corporation 
or a company belong to a process of psychic, collective and technical 
individuation that is the corporation itself, which is more or less ter-
ritorialized, and which constitutes a kind of exorganism comparable 
to a ship animated and piloted by a crew – ships being themselves 
instruments capable of waging war.
The city, as an exorganic landscape forming a local authority, itself 
supports those exorganic processes of individuation that are busi-
nesses and corporations. The latter are, as it were, outgrowths of the 
territory, formed between the technical system, which is ‘embodied’, 
so to speak, by those businesses and corporations, which are the con-
cretion and stabilization of technical individuation processes, and the 
social systems – systems of education, language, taxation and so on, 
and obviously the law and especially the law and right of citizenship 
– which are specific forms of psychic and collective individuation.
How is all of this and how will all of this be transformed by the dig-
ital exosomatization that is leading to the automatic city – the smart 
city – where data is no longer produced through statistical apparatus 
but instead with social networks dedicated to capturing data, oper-
ating via sociograms fixed no longer on the territorial exorganism 
but on global, planetary exorganisms, and using satellites that are an 
advanced and geostationary stage of exosomatization, more or less 
specialized, functioning as relays for networks of all kinds?
All this transforms local territorial dynamics and affects the man-
agement apparatus used by territories to predict their population of 
inhabitants, producers, consumers, their flow, and so on. It is faced 
with all these questions that we must conceive a truly intelligent city, 
one that is more intelligent, and we must do so in the epoch of the 
growth of stupidity, which means that we must reverse a dynamic that 
has become negative.
This more intelligent, truly intelligent, ‘really smart’ city must 
seize hold of automated processes, above all in order to prescribe 
boundaries, performance characteristics, functional characteristics, 
in order, in other words, to undertake territorial design. This is pos-
sible only on the condition of arranging the various processes of psy-
chic and collective individuation among themselves via technical 
individuation. That is: by conceiving a territorial reticulation capable 
of reconstructing a territorial dynamic that produces a sense of place 
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[esprit des lieux] and a positive local animation, in a context where 
it is also and perhaps especially a matter of rethinking the relations 
between work and society at a moment when employment is in irre-
versible decline.
All this raises the question of forming a cohesive social body 
[faire corps] in the sense referred to by Spinoza. A city, or a network 
of towns and cities forming a political unity, is the way in which a 
society, by forming a ‘body’, participates in the concretization of an 
urban exorganism.
Under what conditions can a social body form when urban exor-
ganic time and space is riven with perpetual conflict – for example, 
conflicts between a commercial zone and the animation of a city cen-
tre? How do we conceive processes of individuation in an exorgan-
ism that is constantly transforming – which is vastly different from 
what occurs with endosomatic organisms, that is, organic rather than 
organological organisms? Organic organisms do not modify their 
structure at the level of the individual, and their evolution occurs on a 
timescale that is inaccessible and imperceptible to them.
For us, on the other hand, we who are not only organic and endoso-
matic but organological and exosomatic, we are constantly in the pro-
cess of transformation, both in terms of the exorganisms that we form 
and in terms of those within which we live. The latter are perpetually 
changing, or they may suddenly sprout up like mushrooms, such as 
Sarcelles (the neighbourhood where I grew up between the ages of 
7 and 15). This is especially so since the twentieth century, and this 
acceleration also corresponds to that of creative destruction, which is 
based on continuous economic development, that is, more or less, on 
organized and organizing obsolescence – a situation that has led to the 
installation of the Anthropocene that has now become the disruption.
It is starting from these very general considerations, and in this highly 
specific context, that the Plaine Commune project aims to constitute a 
learning territory capable of thinking and territorializing these ques-
tions in order to become a territory of reference, that is, a prescriber, 
where all the actors this involves will want to learn along with the ter-
ritory, at the same time that they teach it.
At the origin of Plaine Commune lies the formation, in the early 
1990s, of a cooperative involving nine municipalities, set up at the 
instigation of Patrick Braouezec, which led to the constitution of a 
new exorganic body and a new territorial authority. As this shows, 
exorganic bodies can occur over the top of other exorganic bodies, or 
gather exorganic bodies together – those of the psychic individuals 
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that we are – which individuate themselves collectively on the basis 
of a technical system that allows them to do so.
At the origin of Plaine Commune, there is a conurbation, the ter-
ritory of Seine Saint Denis, north of Paris, from within which a sub-
conurbation has emerged that is the cooperative, now inscribed within 
the exorganism that is called Grand Paris [Greater Paris]. And if I 
insist on the fact that this establishment was originally conceived as 
a cooperative of municipalities, it is because what we want to create 
with Plaine Commune is a cooperative of knowledges – based on a 
training and knowledge transmission network.
There are, as we said, all kinds of exorganisms: boats, businesses, 
companies and factories, the latter conceptualized for the first time by 
Andrew Ure, political organizations and regional administrations at 
differing levels and represented by symbols or institutional buildings 
or monuments. Today, the relations between all these exorganisms are 
ever more subject to deterritorialized exorganisms, also called plat-
forms, founded on the technology of cloud computing, global, purely 
reticular technology that makes possible new forms of control.
It is undoubtedly a question of grafting onto this apparatus – as 
Plaine Commune has been grafted onto the department, the terri-
tory, the local dynamics of psychic and collective individuation and 
technical individuation. But it may indeed be equally necessary to 
reimagine all of this, and to do so technologically, economically and 
politically, which is what is at stake in the NextLeap programme, one 
partner of which is the Institut de recherche et d’innovation (IRI).
These are the questions that must be asked of a truly smart city 
– about its boundaries, its insertion into the positive and negative 
dynamics of Gestell, and by very deliberately prescribing its arrange-
ments with other distant and deterritorialized social networks, while 
nevertheless maintaining its territorial integrity. It must also contrib-
ute to the establishment of other exorganisms, for example in terms 
of business investment within the territory, which has effects on this 
territory, transforming it, producing other effects in return, since this 
territory nourishes it – at least in part.
How can these effects be positively potentializing, keeping in mind 
that they can also be very negative, especially in the era of full and 
generalized automation?
To confront such questions requires the creation of a territorial aware-
ness, a territorial consciousness to underpin the formation of a territo-
rial social body, a consciousness that is far from being simply that of 
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the citizen – even if a key question remains the place of citizenship in 
this consciousness.
A consciousness rises: conscience takes hold, we realise, we wake 
up, we become aware. How? In this taking hold, for this becoming 
aware, there are instruments for creating and shaping consciousness, 
and law-governed practices of such instruments – practices that may 
sometimes be not just lawful but exclusive forms of control, for exam-
ple those of the police, who have lawful and exclusive functions and 
instruments, weapons, intelligence and so on (here we should refer to 
Walter Benjamin246 and to his critique of violence, Gewalt, as well as 
to Heidegger).
Fostering consciousness, and the instruments for doing so, gener-
ally implemented by institutions, are the very conditions of citizen-
ship, which is always the expression of pacific relations: citizenship is 
what makes it possible to make peace, firstly civil peace, then between 
nations, and today the possibility of a peace between economic actors 
that could again make civilization possible in a new way, given that 
the disruption is increasingly experienced as a war, a war leading, like 
all wars, to barbarism.
Europe has replaced military war with economic war – and for the 
European nations this experience is very unpleasant: they feel them-
selves to be, if not ruined, at least on the verge of ruin. But this is so 
because there is no longer any territorial intelligence in Europe – at 
any territorial scale: there is no understanding of what plays out in the 
new dynamic of exosomatization that is the disruption.
We need to elaborate, in France, in Europe and in Asia, together, 
a new geopolitics of exosomatization, making it possible to realize 
a territorial and extra-territorial politics of exosomatization, and we 
must do so through political cooperatives of exosomatization.
The inhabitants of urban regions must become co-operators of 
a deliberate and deliberative exosomatization, that is, reflexive and 
no doubt disruptive, but appropriated and prescribed by territorial 
actors, and where businesses come into this territory in order to work 
with these educated, instructed and equipped co-operators, in order to 
provide them with means, but also to learn from them new forms of 
intelligence, which requires a territorial pact of cooperation between 
these co-operators.
For this, we must reread and reinterpret the works of Amartya Sen 
by reflecting on them alongside those of Marx and Georgescu-Roegen.
Let’s summarize: towns and cities, aggregated in countries, are exor-
ganic processes within which forms of life are produced, processes of 
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psychic, collective and technical individuation more or less institut-
ing the spirit of a place, and so on – yet today the whole world knows 
that cities are increasingly haunted by an urban ill-being, and that the 
experience of city life is increasingly inurbane. How is it possible to 
design ‘truly smart cities’ through which an era of digital urbanity 
could be invented, and the inurbanity of the automatic city reversed?
This malaise is directly tied to what I have described as systemic 
stupidity, or functional stupidity, itself connected to the decline of life 
expectancy, and to all those ‘blues’ resulting from so-called ‘down-
grading’ [déclassement]: of an economy, a society and so on. How 
can this malaise and ill-being be anything other than immeasurably 
increased by the disruptive process that gives rise to the automatic 
city, itself inscribed in automatic society?
To pose this question correctly, we must begin by again stating 
what we mean by disruption.
Disruption operates through short-circuits: it proletarianizes indi-
viduals and replaces them with automatisms, which, through this very 
fact, bypass and short-circuit them. These short-circuits begin with 
the proletarianization that Adam Smith deciphered in The Wealth of 
Nations, where the hyper-division of labour, leading to automation 
that will eventually become Taylorist, gives rise to a process that 
deprives the producer (that is, the worker) of his savoir faire, his work-
knowledge, eventually doing the same thing to the supervisor, then 
the technician, and so on, right up to Alan Greenspan, who explained 
this himself at a hearing of the American senate.247
After the advent of the culture industries, which made it possible to 
control ways of life, but which could do so only at the cost of a total 
proletarianization of the consumer, today’s ‘data economy’ amounts 
to a new stage of this proletarianization, one that outstrips and over-
takes our will and our volitions via platforms, which Benjamin 
Bratton describes in The Stack.248
A truly smart disruptive city, one that is truly urban, habitable, 
desirable and attractive, is possible only if we reinvent automatic soci-
ety, and reinvent it in every town and every city, so that every city 
becomes a laboratory for the production of a truly social automatic 
society – rather than allowing it to produce a dissociety, an automatic 
dissociation and disintegration that could only pave the way for a 
social explosion.
This is possible only on the condition that this ‘truly smart city’ 
is also and above all a place where we can think, at every level, the 
arrangement between automatons and processes of dis-automatiza-
tion: in education, in the public sector and public administration, in 
business, and so on – just as in art schools, football stadiums, etcetera.
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This requires a social and civic life that provides communications 
infrastructure and networks specifically designed to valorize automa-
tisms in the automatic city and to do so by providing capabilities for 
dis-automatizing, that is, for deliberating. Hence it is that in a small 
French town, Loos-en-Gohelle, sensors have been installed that, 
rather than automatically triggering algorithmic processes, instead 
convene town meetings, inviting residents to deliberate.
Our ambition at Plaine Commune is to become a model in the field 
of ‘truly smart cities’, by reticulating this territory on the basis of 
completely new data architectures that are profoundly socialized at 
every exorganic scale of this exorganism, which is what a territory of 
this type amounts to. We believe that, to achieve this, the web must 
be completely redesigned along lines that we have experimented with 
in the academic context, and that we plan to experiment with in the 
administrative context, as well as providing outreach services for the 
telecommunications operator Orange, but also for Dassault Systems, 
from the perspective of intelligence and engineering interests. This 
process of reticulating this whole territory and all of its exorganic 
organizations aims to enable deliberative processes to be set up at 
all levels, and to be articulated with one another – because they will 
share the same deliberation protocols. Our intention is to use these 
deliberative processes to generate local forms of knowledge capable 
of engendering negentropy – to place automatisms at the service of 
dis-automatization.
We refer to a negentropic, contributory economy, based on a con-
tributory income. The aim is to give rise to a new urban conscious-
ness composed of territorial and extra-territorial forms of knowledge. 
Cities have from the beginning been places of knowledge. The pro-
duction of knowledge is concentrated there. Of course, life-knowledge 
and work-knowledge existed prior to this, which were then augmented 
by new, urban knowledge that gradually replaced feudal, rural and 
tribal knowledge. In cities, new forms of knowledge are invented, 
enabling the development of urbanity, that is, of manners, elegance, 
refinement, all that which was, for centuries, in Europe, the dream 
of the bourgeoisie, and which has today been totally annihilated – 
because today there is no longer any bourgeois culture.
Organic life is that which defers that entropy described by 
Clausius on the basis of the works of Sadi Carnot, and in relation to 
which Schrödinger showed that every form of life is the local for-
mation of a counter-tendency, which he called negative entropy.249 
Exosomatization is the continuation of this process, but in a new sense, 
producing an increase of entropy and of what results from it, disorder, 
but also a new form of negentropy, which I call ‘neganthropy’, that 
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is, the production of those new forms of locality that are, precisely, 
exorganisms.
Tomorrow’s challenge is to increase neganthropy, and to develop 
an economy that valorizes it systemically. This is the goal of 
Plaine Commune, which has for this purpose instituted a Chair in 
Contributory Research, to carry out this experimental research by 
testing a contributory income.
I would have liked to have explained why and how all this is also 
a response to some opposing arguments that can be found in Tristes 
Tropiques, by Claude Lévi-Strauss, where he talks about what he 
called entropology,250 and why I respond to this with a general organ-
ology that thinks exosomatization in terms of ‘neganthropology’, but, 
unfortunately, I’m out of time.
8 Five Theses after Schmitt and Bratton
Preliminary remarks
The goal of the NextLeap project is to accomplish a leap in the devel-
opment of network digital technologies, where this would involve:
1 a new use of cryptographic technology;
2 technologies of decentralization, that is, of the distributed 
relocalization of storage capacities, computing power and 
software tools, all of these, today, being caught in the grip 
of ‘cloud computing’ and ‘software as a service’.
To put this in Benjamin Bratton’s terms, this is a question of envis-
aging an alternative to ‘the Stack’, and of proposing a new architec-
ture.251 We will see from Bratton’s analysis that such an ambition can 
only be conceived as a new geopolitics of computing technology at 
a global level: as planetary-scale computation. But we will also see 
that the latter must be understood in terms of its relation to Vladimir 
Vernadsky’s concept of the ‘biosphere’.252
With respect to what Bratton calls ‘alter-totalities’, which would 
emerge from an alternative design of platforms, NextLeap hypoth-
esizes that such a re-design should begin with the limiting of what 
Bratton describes as ‘compulsory transparency’, and with a reorga-
nization of the Cloud, which, according to Bratton, is one of the six 
layers of the Stack: Earth, Cloud, City, Address, Interface, User. If 
we had more time I would add, to these six layers, six correspond-
ing theses that extend but also modulate and even contradict Bratton’s 
account. The time for this is, unfortunately, lacking, but it is some-
thing I will do on another occasion – in the framework of the Chair of 
Contributory Research we have created in Plaine Commune.
If I persist in referring to Bratton’s analysis of the Stack, it is partly 
because it feeds into my own analysis of platforms insofar as they are 
planetary-scale computational functions of what, in 1926, Vernadsky 
called the biosphere, installing the reign of what, in 1949, Martin 
Heidegger would call Gestell,253 but which must, in turn, be taken 
further via the analysis of what, in 1945, Alfred Lotka had already 
described as a process of exosomatization.254
The advent of platforms, which form planetary-scale exorganisms, 
occurs according to a rhythm which is that of ‘disruption’, which is to 
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say through the unfurling of a digital technical system that outstrips 
and overtakes social systems. This has established a situation, a state 
of fact, that awaits its state of law, whose prerequisites I attempted to 
formulate in Automatic Society.255
By raising questions about the secrecy that cryptographic technolo-
gies must protect, and about the decentralization of data storage infra-
structure presupposed by distributed localization, NextLeap argues 
that, in terms of law:
1 We cannot impose total transparency without then falling 
into the totalitarianism of computational totalization, which 
dissolves the individual into the calculable and comput-
able whole, where everything finds itself reduced to pure 
calculation – carried out at two thirds of the speed of light 
– which would be to bring back what Alexander Zinoviev 
described as the very basis of Stalinism.
2 At the same time, we cannot eliminate – and this is the 
same question – locality and localization, which, as what 
develop, if not in secret, at least in a space that is protected 
and local in this sense, are the basis of what I will describe 
here as neganthropological noodiversity.
These issues lie at the heart of the project that IRI and Ars Industrialis 
are leading in Plaine Commune, in that:
1 Cryptology, which is the science of preserving secrets, is 
central to a reconsideration of the fundamental principles 
of law, and of a new arrangement between reticular digi-
tal technology and law: the right to secrecy and the duty to 
protect it are the basic and essential conditions of any delib-
eration, whether this involves the dialogical discussions of 
Angela Merkel or those of a researcher interpreting a cor-
pus. I will return to this example, which raises the question 
of an age of secrecy insofar as the secret is not pro-phanes 
(outside the temple), that is, public, which means pub-
lished via some or other technology of publication, in this 
instance alphabetical writing, as was shown by Jean-Pierre 
Vernant,256 and such that the law is what leads to the delimi-
tation of a new sphere of secrecy, which is also that of inti-
macy, and which is embodied by Hestia in her transductive 
relation to the public sphere, whose god is Hermes. Hestia 
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and Hermes are the polar figures – the bipolarity – who, by 
distinguishing them, bind together psychic individuation 
and collective individuation. As they do so, they consti-
tute a new philia, a new binding force for the human group, 
which, along with alphabetical writing (the god of which 
is Hermes) that enables the law to be published and thus to 
be transparent to the citizenry, installs the polis. What the 
Greek city-state thereby upholds is that the citizen is the 
individual who bears the legitimate right to interpret and 
transform the law – provided that he respects it and respects 
the procedures of its interpretation, as well as those of its 
transformation in the bouleutērion, where the latter is the 
space of deliberation that is itself the condition of law inso-
far as law is not automatic, but reflexive. If we had more 
time, we would at this point bring in Henri Bergson’s analy-
sis of the law as bound to evolve, that is, to individuate.
2 The decentralization of infrastructures, and therefore of 
architectures, must be thought in close articulation with 
localization, which is the condition of formation of those 
bifurcations that we are calling neganthropic, in a world 
that has become fundamentally anthropic, and which thus 
threatens to self-destruct, through which what we call the 
Anthropocene becomes the Entropocene. It is notable that 
Bratton refers in this regard to Carl Schmitt, and in par-
ticular to his argument that there is no law without nomos, 
nomos being founded on taking possession of land, that 
is, on conquest.257 One might obviously suggest that, with 
this discourse that relates law to earth and to the seiz-
ing of land, Schmitt thereby tends to legitimize the belli-
cose enterprises of Nazism, not to mention primordial and 
extreme nationalism. And such a suggestion would clearly 
be valid, even though The Nomos of the Earth was not writ-
ten until after the fall of Nazism. As for myself, I posit that 
Schmitt, by assigning nomos to the locality of a plot of land 
and its borders, unwittingly raises the inherent problem 
of locality involved in any negentropic bifurcation, in life 
– in Erwin Schrödinger’s sense – and in any neganthropic 
bifurcation, where the latter must be thought on the basis of 
Lotka’s analysis.
If, rather than rejecting the Stack of platforms, we propose to rethink 
it profoundly, this implies that we must struggle against the entropic 
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tendencies that are unleashed by a calculation that eliminates all sin-
gularities and all secrecy, through a dictatorship of transparency itself 
founded on exosomatic deterritorialization, in turn founded on exo-
somatic functions that have become planetary. It is indeed, then, 
a question of reconstituting processes of localization, which are 
always more or less temporary, processes of spatialization operating 
via localities and enabling a temporalization that is itself localized: 
all this ultimately falls within the realm of what Jacques Derrida 
called différance.
My intention with these long preliminary remarks is firstly to say 
that, if it is indeed a question of making a leap with the Stack, this leap 
must lead to a thorough reconsideration of the architectonics of digi-
tal networks, where the latter must themselves be situated within the 
history of exosomatization and as exosomatization. Exosomatization 
begins as a new stage in organogenesis through which the living com-
plicates itself by originally combining itself with the non-living. This 
is the passage from organic life to organological life, life based on the 
fabrication of its organs. I say ‘based on’, in that:
 ▪ on the one hand, an exosomatic being cannot survive with-
out its artificial organs;
 ▪ on the other hand, the major part of its survival in the pres-
ent-day world rests on its ability to participate in the pursuit 
of exosomatization, that is, on ‘production’ in the sense that 
Marx and Engels gave to this word in their fight against 
German idealism, through which they became the first 
thinkers of exosomatization.
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen argued on the basis of exosomatiza-
tion that economics, as the sphere that regulates the relations between 
organs and organisms, replaces biology.258 If biological laws ensure 
the unity and perseverance of organic living beings, it is economic 
laws (and we must understand ‘economy’ here in a broad sense that 
includes Georges Bataille’s account of general economy and Freud’s 
account of libidinal economy) that ensure the unity and perseverance 
of exorganic beings, whether these are simple or complex. A complex 
exorganic being would be, for example, the unit of industrial produc-
tion as described by Andrew Ure,259 whose analysis Karl Marx takes 
up in order to describe the factory as a ‘vast automaton’,260 or, again, 
those platforms that, in our own time, as Bratton describes, amount to 
planetary exorganisms, which, moreover, tend to impose monopolies 
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in the sense of so-called natural monopolies, as these appeared with 
nineteenth-century networks on a national scale, but which become, 
with platforms, functional monopolies on the scale of the biosphere, 
based on the orbital and therefore extra-terrestrial infrastructure of 
geostationary satellites.
We are told by Bergson that law is necessary in order to bind 
together social atoms, which are what I am here calling simple exor-
ganic beings (and that Gilbert Simondon called psychic individuals) 
within complex exorganisms (which are the fruits of what Simondon 
called collective individuation), tied by obligations that are no longer 
of the order of instinct but of the order of morality, religion and jus-
tice – an order from within which elements of disorder constantly re-
emerge, which may form the origin of a new order, as emphasized by 
Rudolf Arnheim.261 This dynamic, which for Arnheim is that of art 
and indeed of all human affairs, amounts to the local production of 
negative entropy by organisms that localize their boundaries: for a 
cell, the membrane, for an organ, connective tissue, for a multicellular 
body, skin. They do so on the foundation of ever-increasing entropy, 
to which the organism always ultimately returns, when it becomes a 
corpse that once again turns to dust.
In the case not just of organisms but exorganisms, this boundary 
becomes a border, or a gateway, defined by convention, which we also 
call law, and which is applied locally as that which binds together the 
exorganic atoms that are those whom we still refer to as citizens – but 
who, after the advent of platforms, become what Bratton calls Users.
I insist on this question of locality in order to advance five theses:
1. The question of law is the question of the regulation of relations 
between exosomatic organisms, which I also call exorganisms, 
and which can be either simple or complex: psychic individuals in 
Simondon’s sense, citizens in the Greek sense and Users in Bratton’s 
sense all constitute simple exorganisms, while collective individu-
als, such as a professional body, a unit of production in Ure’s sense, a 
city, a nation or a platform, are all examples of complex exorganisms. 
Law is what governs the relations between simple exorganisms and 
complex exorganisms, and, secondarily, the relations between two or 
more complex exorganisms. In the epoch of the planetary exorgan-
isms that platforms tend to form, however, this question is raised in 
completely new terms, as Bratton highlights.
2. Unlike Bratton, I argue that this question must be approached 
from a perspective that is not only negentropic, but neganthropo-
logical, and which requires a neganthropology. If Schrödinger could 
define negative entropy, or negentropy, as the local slowing down of 
Part One: Anthropocene, Entropocene, Neganthropocene 134
the increase of entropy through the organization of life, that is, by its 
organogenesis materializing its organization, the exosomatic pursuit 
of this organogenesis induces a new regime of entropic deferral and of 
the localization of anti-entropy (a term I am taking up from Norbert 
Wiener) that I therefore call neganthropic.
In neganthropic becoming, which constitutes a neganthropology, 
exosomatic organs are pharmaka, which is to say, poisons and reme-
dies, which can increase both anthropy and neganthropy. Hence law is 
what aims to maintain the unity of exorganisms perpetually threatened 
by anthropy, and to do so by protecting and intensifying the negan-
thropic potentials of both simple exorganisms and complex exorgan-
isms, that is, their capacity for neganthropic bifurcations, and, with 
that, the capacity for the law itself to evolve, the constant possibility of 
putting it into question, and, through this alone, of respecting it.
From this perspective, the law is always what preserves both the 
possibility of secrecy, such as, for example, the secrecy of our beliefs, 
which are never illegal, and the legal conditions of publication, such 
as, for example, the possibility that our beliefs may become illegal if 
they are made public – as is the case in France for anti-Semitic dis-
course or racist discourse in general. In referring to this last example, 
it is not a matter of defending this particular French law, but of noting 
that, if opinion is free, its actualization, whether in the form of speech 
or otherwise, is not.
In a totalitarian regime, whether or not it is a state formation, trans-
parency is required and the secret is systemically eliminated. This 
is the whole question involved in the complex positions espoused by 
Alexander Zinoviev, including in his critique of Glasnost.
Now, we propose that such a question must be intimately tied to 
the question of what we call a neganthropic contributory economy, an 
economy that struggles against the anthropy that platforms increas-
ingly produce through the network effect and its self-referential con-
sequences, such as the fact that the heterogeneity of exorganic atoms 
tends to be homogenized, even as, all the while, the Entropocene 
accelerates. Following Marx’s critique of law, we posit that law can be 
just only if it is codified economically, so to speak, which is to say, as 
the formalization of social relations producing value that goes beyond 
the conception of value derived from the coupling of use value and 
exchange value.
3. The juridical question and the economic question are not separa-
ble, because, while the law is what produces values beyond all calcu-
lation, the economy calculates values on the basis of a standard that 
itself has no price, since it constitutes the canon of any evaluation. 
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Here we rediscover the question raised by Plato in Timaeus, where he 
argued that, were everything made of gold, the only thing that would 
be invisible would be gold.262 The value of all values can, for struc-
tural reasons, have no price, since it is that in relation to which price 
is given, and hence it is in a strict sense inappreciable, and therefore 
infinite, that is, incalculable.
The resulting link between economy and law, which in Trinitarian 
theology is also called oikonomia, is the link between what is calcu-
lable and what is not, each incapable of doing without the other – the 
one and the other constituting the two conditions of any value. Crime 
consists precisely in transgressing a supreme value of the law, such 
as, for example, the production of human life, in the name of a calcu-
lable interest, which is in the final reckoning always particular, the 
whole being itself incalculable because it is a holistic process such 
that this holon is superior to the sum of its parts, a superiority that was 
once called, and that we sometimes still call, God.
These two distinct yet inseparable questions have in common the 
imperative question of the protection and development of negan-
thropic capabilities, without which it is impossible to create wealth – 
this creation of wealth being that which is produced by work.
Without such protections, both in law and by the macro-economic 
rules that this law ought to sanction, generalized proletarianization 
and the liquidation of knowledge, the latter replaced by the reticulated 
computational systems of intensive computing, are bound to increase 
consumerism’s entropic toxicity, which threatens to produce a decline 
both in life expectancy and in IQ.
4. To carry out such aims, we must profoundly rethink the architecton-
ics of digital networks, both at the level of data formats and at the level 
of the conditions for the building of social networks. To put this more 
precisely, if the question of secrecy obviously begins with cryptog-
raphy, it cannot end there: it must also be based on the constitution 
of incalculable fields, which is to say, fields irreducible to averages. 
The reduction of value to averages is what generates an anthropy that 
destroys all values, as Frédéric Kaplan has suggested in his account 
of linguistic capitalism and its tendency to lead to a decline in lin-
guistic value.263 This also equates to the struggle against the destruc-
tion of exceptions – that is, of singularities – by levelling, which lies 
at the base of Nietzsche’s entire thought. These are also the stakes 
of everything described by Quételet, subject to a radical critique by 
Gilles Châtelet,264 and it also constitutes the specificity of Kakania, 
according to Robert Musil.265
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Technologies that calculate averages through the use of Markov 
chains, and the algorithms of intensive computing based on the theory 
of computable functions, do in fact give rise to an anthropic tendency 
that threatens those retentional fields that are societies, where societ-
ies are understood to be regimes of mutual obligations, that is, sys-
tems of rules. And this includes, for example, the rules of language, 
which, as Frédéric Kaplan has shown, are performatively altered and 
algorithmically reduced to a set of averages, on the basis of services 
rendered. What this leads to, however, is the regularization of lan-
guage, which is to say, in the final analysis, to its profound alteration: 
such is the contradiction not only of linguistic capitalism, but of what 
might be called the capitalism of the average man, who emerges from 
smartification, and who also becomes the average baby.
Once we realize that what makes language evolve are exceptions, 
and that they do so as exemplary deviations from the mean, an exem-
plarity whose absolute necessity is underlined by Bergson, we can-
not but be disturbed by the computational reductionism that literally 
disintegrates neganthropic social systems, which thereby become 
anthropic, and as such gravely threatened with disappearance, incit-
ing an immense and dangerous ressentiment.
5. Guaranteeing the local integrity of an open exosomatic unit – which 
is indeed the object of the Plaine Commune contributory learning ter-
ritory – and doing so in order to integrate a local neganthropic econ-
omy into a macro-economy itself neganthropic, that is, guaranteeing 
relations of scale between orders of magnitude respectful of localities 
and of the heterogeneity that they alone provide, involves the chal-
lenge of redefining computational processes and technologies of scal-
ability, such that they ought never short-circuit deliberative processes. 
They should never, in other words, proletarianize decision-making.
Virilio’s words in 1977, in Speed and Politics, foreshadow every-
thing we have been discussing here today,266 to which we must 
obviously add the questions raised by AI, which we will address in 
December as the question of artificial stupidity. In an upcoming semi-
nar to be held in the Salle Triangle, I will try to show why we must 
protect what Jacques Lacan called ‘extimacy’,267 which amounts to 
the irreducible necessity of a private sphere based on the secret, on 
a secrecy so secret that even the one who possesses it is unaware of 
it: it is hidden in the unconscious. This ultra-secrecy that founds the 
psychic apparatus is also what I call the power of infra-thin bifurca-
tion,268 insofar as it is the condition of every other possibility of bifur-
cating, and which is therefore what, more than anything else, must 
be protected.
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Such protection, however, must not be limited to defending this psy-
chic locality that is capable of bifurcating only through the branch-
ing of its desire: it also requires the protection of the ability to share 
secrets between friends, allies, associates, colleagues and so on. It is 
such sharing that enables the secret to be transformed into a bifurca-
tion, through what I call, borrowing a term from Simondon, processes 
of transindividuation.
The goal of the Plaine Commune territoire apprenant contributif is 
to constitute a network that would be founded on this dual protection, 
and would be physically localizable through decentralized data stor-
age, forming a network between regions themselves networked. This is 
what we are developing in partnership with Orange, in order to apply, 
to all kinds of neganthropic territorial activities tied to the contrib-
utory economy that this program has the primary goal of elaborat-
ing, technologies that we have been experimenting with, before test-
ing them further with the pharmakon.fr organization, and with the 
Université de Compiègne. Our present goal is to bring this approach 
up to the level of scalability required by the shift from the regional 
micro-economy to the new macro-economy required for what we call 
the Neganthropocene, and in order to accomplish this we are work-
ing to develop adapted contribution technologies that break with the 
dominant model of social networks.
Let’s conclude with two remarks on Bratton’s analysis, which will 
lead to the addition of two supplementary theses. On the one hand, 
Bratton proclaims, by referring to Carl Schmitt, the possibility of a 
‘nomos of the Cloud’, while on the other hand he speaks of the ‘dire 
inevitability’ of the computational structure of the totality to come.269
Both of these arguments must be contested:
1 For Schmitt, a nomos of the Cloud is simply impossible: the 
nomos is what can be constituted only on the basis of the 
earth. Of course, one must free oneself of all that is fore-
boding and frightening about such an assertion, especially 
after the Third Reich. Nevertheless, its force lies in the fact 
that it refers not just to the land [terre] but to the locality of 
a negentropic-cum-neganthropic process, giving itself a law 
with the goal of forming a complex exorganism itself com-
posed of complex exorganisms, themselves consisting in sim-
ple exorganisms and isolated exosomatic organs, as Bratton 
himself says.
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2 The form of computation derived from the exorganic func-
tions exercised at the scale of the biosphere by the archi-
tectonics of the ‘cloud’ is in no way an ‘inevitability’: it 
is, on the contrary, the very thing that must be changed. 
And, given that NextLeap is a program supported by the 
European Union, it is appropriate to conclude with the affir-
mation that only a reconceptualization of data architectures, 
and, more generally, of the architectonics that constitutes the 
computational epistēmē of capitalism, will open up a path 
that could lead us out of what has already been called the 
Trumpocene.270
9 Capitalism	as	Epistēmē	and	Entropocene
1 Statement of the work program covered  
by this communication
The way capitalism has evolved in the twenty-first century spectacu-
larly confirms, in every detail, the hypotheses laid out by Karl Marx 
in the Grundrisse with respect to: (1) automation; (2) the evolution 
of the economic function of knowledge; and (3) the corresponding 
transformations of value. Nevertheless, in 1857, and until the death of 
Engels, decisive concepts were lacking through which it would have 
been possible to undertake a detailed functional analysis of the evo-
lutions anticipated by Marx. Today, we are finding these evolutions 
concretely expressed right before our very eyes, through the informa-
tional and computational transformations of technology that dominate 
today’s fixed capital.
I propose to describe and prescribe this immense transformation 
via the following thirteen points:
1 Capitalism amounts to an epistēmē, materialized by the 
fixed capital of the reticulated apparatus of production that 
capital has become. This epistēmē hegemonically reconfig-
ures every instrument of calculation, by functionally inte-
grating271 them as instruments of statistics, measurement, 
simulation, modelling, observation, production, logistics, 
mobility, orientation, bibliometrics, scientometrics, market-
ing, lifelogging (producing the ‘quantified self’) and so on.
2 Information is the ‘allagmatic’272 operator of this epistēmē, 
via computational technology that is perfectly homogenous 
with capitalism: with a capitalism that submits all those 
exchanges in which psychic life and social life consist to 
the calculations of the market. This calculation, through 
which reticulated artificial intelligence is set in place, is 
based on taking cognitivism as the general paradigm of all 
forms of knowledge.
3 The cognitivist epistēmē, however, is an anti-epistēmē: it 
develops only by installing a process of generalized prole-
tarianization.273 The correlationist mythology of ‘big data’, 
as developed by Chris Anderson in ‘The End of Theory’,274 
is a prime example of the way in which ideology is being 
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reshaped – both via the cognitivist paradigm and via mar-
keting, itself now reticulated, mimetic and computational.
4 The cognitivist anti-epistēmē imposes absolute non-knowl-
edge (the age of ‘post-truth’): it operates only through the 
dissolution of all knowledge into and by calculation, and, in 
so doing, it accomplishes nihilism – that is, the devaluation 
of all values. The anti-epistēmē of absolute non-knowledge 
concretized as fixed capital, however, ties the latter to 
entropy, as we shall see. To think [penser] this fact in order 
to overcome it – to take care of it in order to tend to it or to 
heal it [panser]275 – requires a new critique of Hegel, which 
would also be a new critique of his dialectic, which it is a 
matter of ‘transvaluing’ into a pharmacology in Socrates’s 
sense in Phaedrus, Derrida’s sense in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’,276 
and Deleuze’s sense in Difference and Repetition.277
5 The history of the concretization of this absolute non-knowl-
edge coincides with the history of the Anthropocene.278 The 
latter is now reaching its limits, thanks to its disruptive 
acceleration, thereby showing itself to be an Entropocene. 
This Entropocene is characterized by the regression of 
knowledge, but, after knowledge is replaced by ‘skills’ or 
competences (that is, by capacities of adapting to tasks and 
to the system that realizes them), the latter find themselves 
in turn replaced by algorithms. This rise of algorithms con-
stitutes the stage of the generalized automation of fixed cap-
ital, and it is leading to the collapse of wage labour, where 
the latter is what, since Roosevelt and Keynes, has been 
referred to as employment, understood as the condition of 
the ‘growth’ to be derived from ‘creative destruction’.279
6 Creative destruction, however, comes at the cost of the 
destruction of knowledge, leading to absolute non-knowl-
edge, which engenders the Entropocene because the forms 
of knowledge thereby destroyed are those involved in the 
work activities through which what Georges Canguilhem 
called the technical form of life takes care of its own con-
ditions of possibility: knowledge – beginning with biology 
– is a care that technical life takes of itself, by struggling 
against the entropy that its technical and artificial organs 
inevitably generate – whereas living nature seems to spon-
taneously (without being ‘aware’ of it) preserve its local 
anti-entropic capabilities.
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7 The Entropocene names the disruptive stage of the 
Anthropocene as it reaches its vital limits, because reticu-
lated fixed capital, which is a global technical system, func-
tionally short-circuits every social system, and, along with 
them, all the deliberative processes in which they consist, 
all the forms of knowledge on which they rest, and all the 
forms of care they cultivate (justice, law, education, cul-
ture, urbanity and so on). In this eschatology of the bio-
sphere-cum-Entropocene, capitalism is confronted with 
the contradiction and the entropic contraction that its thor-
oughly computational development contains, and continu-
ously intensifies, as a chaotic phase – whose various social 
regressions are felt throughout the world as its symptoms.
8 A leap beyond this entropic situation is required, beyond 
this state of fact, a bifurcation from this chaos that would 
be capable of opening up a new era, upon which we 
shall bestow the name, ‘Neganthropocene’. To enter the 
Neganthropocene will require a complete redefinition of 
the relations between epistēmē and tekhnē on the basis of 
a pharmacological understanding of the latter, as well as a 
redefinition of the transformation of tekhnē into industrial 
technology, which Marx called ‘industrial capitalism’ or 
‘large-scale industry’, and which Heidegger called ‘modern 
technology’ (modernen Technik) and Gestell. With the gen-
eralized reticulation of industrial technology via what we 
will hereafter call ‘digital tertiary retention’, based on the 
network and data architectures prescribed by the profitabil-
ity requirements of shareholders, fixed capital has become 
inherently and purely informational and computational.
9 The critique of the absolute non-knowledge to which com-
putational proletarianization gives rise must be built on a 
critique of information theory, inasmuch as the latter has 
always defined information as a calculable signal. To con-
ceive information in this way (the advent of which Hegel, 
who recommends regularly reading the morning news-
paper, has no inkling) is to dissolve knowledge insofar 
as the latter is irreducible to calculation. Participating in 
what Whitehead called the function of reason, where syn-
thetic reason is not soluble into analytic understanding, 
knowledge is a generator of improbable, which is to say 
incalculable, bifurcations. This conception of knowledge 
is possible only in a universe in concrescence,280 that is, a 
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universe understood as process, wherein life creates locali-
ties that defer the rise of entropy qua increase of disorder, 
while technical life (that is, the life of the producer, as Marx 
and Engels put it at the beginning of The German Ideology) 
struggles against entropy through the anthropization of its 
milieu, which itself accentuates entropy, leading Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, at the end of Tristes Tropiques, to propose that 
anthropology might be renamed ‘entropology’.281
10 What Marx calls the producer is in the first place the pro-
ducer of its own organs, and in this it is exosomatic. In the 
case of the exosomatic being, the issue is to get beyond 
Schrödinger’s notion of the anti-entropy characteristic of 
life: living things are, in Schrödinger’s analysis of life, 
those beings that generate endosomatic organs, organs that 
are spontaneously and integrally anti-entropic (except when 
they are diseased), that is, which exclusively serve to con-
serve the organism in its integrity. In the case of exosomatic 
organisms, which we will call exorganisms, the organs they 
produce are artefacts that produce new negentropic possi-
bilities but also new entropic possibilities. But we must dis-
tinguish these contradictory possibilities of thermodynamic 
entropy and biological negentropy, as well as of entropy 
and anti-entropy as they are conceived in information the-
ory: the contradictory character of the latter stems from its 
inability to think the specificity of exorganisms and their 
exosomatic organs. It is for this reason that we prefer to 
speak of anthropy and neganthropy.
11 The struggle against anthropy must become the object of a 
neganthropology, itself based on rethinking the concepts of 
entropy, negentropy and anti-entropy starting from the exo-
somatic perspective developed by Alfred Lotka in 1945.282
12 Overcoming the anthropic eschatological tendencies of 
computational, reticular capitalism requires the reconstitu-
tion of an epistēmē that would, on the basis of the tertiary 
retention integrated by fixed capital that has given rise to 
the Entropocene, be capable of generating new forms of 
knowledge characteristic of neganthropology, the latter con-
stituting a set of therapeutic prescriptions (and economic 
arrangements of new knowledge) that aim to socialize the 
pharmaka that are these mechanical, analogical and digital 
Capitalism	as	Epistēmē	and	Entropocene 143
tertiary retentions integrated by platform capitalism (as we 
shall see below).
13 Such a program involves a detailed specification of the fea-
tures of platform capitalism. It presupposes a critique of 
data and network architectures, as well as of their under-
lying architectonics, in order to prescribe the principles 
of a process of organological invention conducive to the 
intensification of neganthropological potentialities and 
to the limitation of the anthropic tendencies these induce. 
Such an approach is exemplified by the work of Yuk Hui283 
– whereas the ‘accelerationists’ understand nothing of the 
challenge this involves.284
2 Complementary remarks on cognitivism
With the recent developments in probabilistic mathematics applied 
to the data economy, cognitivism in its various senses285 has become 
neo-computationalist. This is what is now being concretized as new 
reticulated artificial intelligence – which at the Pompidou Centre in 
December I will analyse in terms of artificial stupidity, as a radical-
ization of what Alvesson and Spicer have referred to as ‘functional 
stupidity’,286 which is the effective reality (Wirklichkeit) of cogni-
tive capitalism.
Artificial automated stupidity is the concretization of the anti-
epistēmē that is thoroughly computational (algorithmic and reticu-
lated) capitalism, where the ‘post-truth’ ordeal is imposed as the 
eschatology of generalized de-noetization, itself the result of general-
ized proletarianization – occurring just as we enter the Entropocene, 
recently referred to in The Guardian as a Trumpocene.287
In order to develop these points – within the limits of our meeting 
here – we must return to three questions:
 ▪ cognitive capitalism;
 ▪ the notions of the proletariat, proletarianization and the 
power of the negative;
 ▪ the dialectic of Herrschaft and Knechtschaft.
3 Pharmacology of cognitive capitalism
Computational and informational capitalism is what Antonio Negri 
(along with many others) calls cognitive capitalism.288 The latter 
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results from the digital becoming of hyperindustrial society. This 
digital becoming constitutes the most recent stage of a process of 
grammatization that requires detailed study. Generalized digitaliza-
tion begins in 1993 with the opening of the World Wide Web, thereby 
setting up what Simondon called an associated milieu. Two contradic-
tory tendencies cut across this new associated milieu:
 ▪ On the one hand, contributory practices (anticipated by 
‘free software’ as early as 1983 in the context of the inter-
net), undertaken in all fields, which effect a break with the 
structural and sequential opposition that lies at the origin 
of proletarianization and defines the industrial economy: 
the mutual opposition between design, production and con-
sumption. This transformation of the relations of production 
is a de-proletarianization to which ‘bottom up’ innovation 
will later be related, itself then followed, in a similar way, 
by ‘open innovation’. New forms of ‘living labour’ thereby 
emerge, and, with them, positive externalities, for instance 
in the form of wikis and the social web, an emergence 
which, therefore, occurs outside the sphere of production as 
it was analysed by Marx and Engels.
 ▪ On the other hand, this technogeographic associated milieu, 
to which, as a process of functional integration, all human 
resources must submit, is a process of extreme and general-
ized proletarianization that reduces every kind of activity to 
an information chain capable of being treated algorithmi-
cally at near light speed, operating at the scale of the planet 
via intensive computing, machine learning, reticulated 
artificial intelligence and so on – all of which completely 
inverts the processes described in the preceding point as 
contributory practices. It seems, in this instance, that the 
new associated milieu made possible by the web turns con-
tributors into functions of the system, in precisely the way 
Marx described in the unpublished sixth chapter of Capital 
(1863–66), but where it would be possible for us to replace 
the word ‘worker’ with the word ‘contributor’:
The situation looks quite different in the valorization 
process. Here it is not the worker who makes use of 
the means of production, but the means of produc-
tion that make use of the worker. Living labour does 
not realize itself in objective labour which thereby 
becomes its objective organ, but instead objective 
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labour maintains and fortifies itself by drawing off 
living labour; it is thus that it becomes value valoriz-
ing itself, capital, and functions as such.289
The repetition of this inversion of relations – between what we will 
here refer to, not as living labour on the one hand and objective labour 
on the other, but as, on the one hand, primary and secondary retentions 
and protentions, and, on the other hand, tertiary retentions and proten-
tions – is characteristic of the effects provoked by a new pharmakon.
The new organization of fixed capital has become all the more com-
plex and opaque as a large part of its apparatus comes to be ‘priva-
tized’ in the form of consumer items such as smartphones, and as it is 
reordered on a global scale as a function of its infrastructure becom-
ing, in the Entropocene, biospherical: at this point we could refer to 
soft capital, or fluid capital, if not liquid. The Entropocene consists, 
through the reticulation of fixed capital, in planetary exorganisms that 
exist on the functional scale of the biosphere. To move beyond this 
Entropocene, we must analyse the pharmacological duplicity of fixed 
capital, which has become highly flexible and plastic, both hyper-
centralized via cloud computing and arche-distributed via exosomatic 
organs, such as, today, the smartphone, or, tomorrow, implants – at 
least if we are to believe Elon Musk’s Neuralink project.290 But all 
of this requires us to take up the question of the pharmakon from its 
inception, at the origin of Western philosophy, in Greece.
The question of the pharmakon, as it was posed by Socrates in the 
late fifth century BCE, is the first formulation of the paradox of pro-
letarianization as disindividuation. The pharmakon is required by 
knowledge insofar as the latter must be exteriorized and spatialized 
(that is, materialized291) through the work of a différance.292 Through 
this différance, which in this way is noetic, mental and temporal 
flows and fluxes, composed of primary and secondary retentions and 
protentions,293 are exteriorized, spatialized and organized upstream 
and downstream of the process of interiorization in which knowl-
edge consists.
For an interiorization to occur there must be an exteriorization, 
where this interiorization has two ‘moments’, as Hegel understood:
 ▪ on the one hand, interiorization as apprenticeship, as learn-
ing, that is, the internalization of inherited noetic activities;
 ▪ on the other hand, interiorization as noesis, that is, as the 
first moment of a new noetic process (this is what opens 
the chapter on ‘Sense-Certainty’ in the Phenomenology of 
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Spirit), forming what, with Ars Industrialis, we call a cir-
cuit of transindividuation.294
I am not going to expand further on these themes, which are my 
starting points, and which have been explained on a number of occa-
sions.295 What I must reiterate, however, is the following: if capital-
ism is possible, particularly in its industrial form, that is, so that it 
becomes possible to take progressive control of all economic functions 
(design, production, logistics, consumption) through the calcula-
tion enabled by computational technologies, this is because all these 
functions are formalized through a protean grammatization process 
that rests on hypomnesic tertiary retentions (mnemotechnologies) 
of four kinds:
1 Literal, printed tertiary retention (the condition, as Max 
Weber described, of capitalism’s emergence from out of the 
Reformation, equipped with accounting hypomnēmata).
2 Mechanical tertiary retention (combining Watt’s steam 
engine with Vaucanson’s automatons, which lead to the 
mechanical loom and then the automatic machine in gen-
eral, including Babbage’s difference engine).
3 Analogue tertiary retention (enabling the development of 
the culture industries, and hence the proletarianization of 
consumers, deprived of their social knowledge and of what 
Amartya Sen calls ‘capabilities’).
4 Digital tertiary retention (recoding the whole ensemble, and 
transforming all economic functions by integrating them 
in real time, via feedback loops of the kind conceived by 
Norbert Wiener in 1948, and by concretizing them – in the 
sense both of Simondon and of Whitehead – as the ‘data 
economy’, ‘smartification’ and ‘industry 4.0’, the major lab-
oratories of which are China and Singapore).
It is the tertiarization of primary and secondary retentions and pro-
tentions that leads to proletarianization. This is the entire issue in:
1 The key assertion in The Communist Manifesto: describing 
the fate of knowledge as generalized proletarianization,296 
which destroys knowledge, and does so by transforming it 
into fixed capital, that is, into a computational system of 
tertiary retention that has now become soft, flexible, plas-
tic and ultimately liquid, which is to say, speculative and 
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insolvent, producing ‘liquidities’ at the cost of a massive 
and systemic destruction of consistences.
2 The visionary analysis of the Grundrisse: extrapolating the 
consequences of automation, through which fixed capital 
tends to lead, structurally and dynamically, to an impasse 
that only a revolution of work could overcome.297 (This 
interpretation of the stakes of the ‘Fragment on Machines’ 
is obviously partial, in both senses of the word: our goal, 
here, is precisely to defend the need to take a step beyond 
the interpretation that Marx, on his own, was capable of 
putting forward – and to do so by introducing the questions 
of exosomatization and neganthropology, as forming the 
new horizon through which alone it will be possible to over-
come the Entropocene.)
So-called cognitive capitalism is what bears these two realities at once:
 ▪ On the one hand, digital tertiary retention, which consti-
tutes the epistēmē of capital and capital as epistēmē, is an 
anti-epistēmē because, as instrument of hyper-control 
and generalized proletarianization, it amounts to the most 
advanced stage of capitalism qua process of proletarianiza-
tion, that is, as a process that destroys knowledge.
 ▪ The digital tertiary retention developed by capital, which it 
develops as a new basis of fixed capital (one that Marx could 
never have anticipated), is, nevertheless, a pharmakon, and 
one with the potential to completely invert this state of fact, 
through the establishment of a new state of economic law: 
the establishment of such a law is not required in some edi-
fying way, as some means of respecting the concerns of 
social justice, but as the obligation to find a new economic 
rationality, which must lead to a revalorization of work and 
to a revaluation of value.
This last point ought to pass through a consideration of Nietzsche, but 
unfortunately I will not have time to develop this now.
4 What is revolution?
On the basis of these considerations, we must elaborate three points, 
which open up a new economic perspective that is certainly not an 
exit from capitalism, but the opening of another path from within the 
Entropocene, faced as it is with the Trumpocene, which is itself an 
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impasse. This other path is that of the Neganthropocene as new revo-
lutionary project – which could prescribe terms to Chinese strategic 
policy in terms of Internet Plus, generalized automation, ‘smart cit-
ies’ and neganthropic industries – within an economy of contribution 
founded on transitional investment towards the Neganthropocene.
We must completely reconsider the following three issues:
 ▪ the power of the negative;
 ▪ the proletariat;
 ▪ what has wrongly been called the dialectic of master, 
Herren, and slave, Knecht.
1. Let us start from the last of these points: the Knecht, who is not at 
all a slave (Sklave),298 is the one who, by his work, develops knowledge 
that exceeds the master. He can, then, be neither a proletarian nor a 
slave. It is in reality the bourgeois who, at first an artisan, and hav-
ing emancipated himself from serfdom, constitutes the ‘bourgs’, which, 
becoming cities, will engender the various industrial revolutions, and 
which will constitute the bourgeoisie as the revolutionary class in the 
sense explained in The Communist Manifesto.
By referring the figure of the proletarian to that of the Knecht, 
and in so doing ascribing to it the power of the negative, Marx and 
Marxism lock themselves into an impasse on the basis of a misin-
terpretation of Hegel: if the proletarian is the one who is deprived of 
knowledge by grammatization, that is, by mechanical hypomnesic 
exosomatization, which expropriates this knowledge by inscribing it 
in the machine as fixed capital, in no case can this proletarian become 
the power and the revolution of the negative in some way that would 
enable the overcoming of capitalism.
2. It then becomes a question of de-proletarianization through con-
tributory inversion, which is not a dialectical reversal but a quasi-
causal appropriation in the sense that Deleuze takes from Stoicism 
and Nietzsche.299
It is a question of quasi-causally inverting the play of literal, 
mechanical, analogical and digital hypomnesic tertiary retentions, 
functionally integrated by the digital and the reticulation it makes 
possible (as interoperability via protocols and formats300), this play 
having become the infrastructural apparatus of the general intellect. 
And it is a question, then, of constituting a new age of noesis (here we 
must show that noesis realizes itself as the process of the exosoma-
tization of the functions and faculties of reason, in the sense of Kant 
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and of Whitehead, but for this I refer to a lecture given at Berkeley in 
October 2016301).
To organize an economy founded on de-proletarianization, and as an 
economy of contribution: this is what we are currently doing in Seine-
Saint-Denis, in the northern suburbs of Paris, in a region of 410,000 
inhabitants, where it is a matter of valorizing work at a moment when 
employment as the vector of redistribution – conceived by Keynes 
as a function of growth in order to make Fordist Taylorism solvent – 
is now called into question by an evolution that Marx anticipated as 
early as 1857.
3. Such an evolution is possible, however, only on the condition of 
redeveloping, on new epistemic and epistemological bases, the data 
and network architectures302 that currently constitute platform capi-
talism as analysed by Benjamin Bratton.303 On this point, I refer to the 
lecture I gave at the Pompidou Centre in the context of the NextLeap 
program,304 from which I would like to highlight two points:
 ▪ On the one hand, such an alternative design of fixed capi-
tal in the midst of its liquefaction, so that it could become 
a multi-territorialized contributory platform constituting 
knowledge cooperatives everywhere, requires us to take 
up the analyses of Adam Smith, Andrew Ure and Marx 
in terms of the perspective of Alfred Lotka,305 that is, by 
reviving the fundamental thesis of The German Ideology 
from a biological and extra-biological perspective, which 
necessarily goes through Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen.306
 ▪ On the other hand, value must then be totally redefined, 
in order to invest in the Neganthropocene on the basis of a 
new theory of knowledge inasmuch as the latter constitutes 
the functions of exorganological life, in the sense in which 
Canguilhem defines the role of biology in technical life, and 
which produces what is not just negentropy locally strug-
gling against the entropic flow that fundamentally charac-
terizes the process of the expanding universe (this is what 
Engels excludes from the Dialectic of Nature, as I have 
shown in my seminar in Nanjing in 2016), but neganthropy 
inasmuch as it takes care of exosomatic organs in order to 
limit their anthropic effects, which is to say their proletari-
anizing effects, and to increase their neganthropic effects, 
which is to say their knowledge-generating effects.
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For this, we must begin by completely reconstructing the architecture 
of academic organologies (a project that Nietzsche outlined in vari-
ous texts307), which we are currently undertaking in Plaine Commune 
with contributory annotation platforms.
5. Conclusion
The question of fixed capital, and the general intellect contained 
therein, is not founded in an adequate way on documentation or 
research, due to Marx’s profound ignorance of the question of ter-
tiary retention, and this is what, in Book I of Capital, leads him 
into a regression compared with the positions he maintained in The 
German Ideology – in particular with respect to the bee and the archi-
tect: this is what I have tried to show at the end of Automatic Society, 
Volume 1.308
If we follow the hypotheses of the Grundrisse, but do so from the 
perspective of contemporary realities, the question is not the power 
of the negative that the proletariat would somehow embody, but the 
power of the positive that the pharmakon would contain as the possi-
bility of a reversal opening up the formation of a communist economy 
that would itself amount to a new therapeutics. But, in this case, it 
would be better to refer to an ‘affirmative reversal’ rather than to the 
‘positive’, because ‘positive’ remains within the oppositional dialectic 
of negative and positive, that is, within metaphysics. The ‘affirmative’ 
raises a different question, which is, obviously, that of Nietzsche. And 
the latter should here be mobilized for two main reasons:
 ▪ on the one hand, because thoroughly computational capital-
ism accomplishes nihilism;
 ▪ on the other hand, because it does so as a levelling of negent-
ropy by the power of averages.
Marxism recuperates the idealist Hegelian dialectic by reversing it, 
but in so doing maintains its metaphysical character: by ignoring its 
pharmacological, tragic dimension. The latter is a question not of 
the power of the negative but of the inversion of the potentialities 
of fixed capital generating an opportunity for de-proletarianization. 
And this possibility in fact becomes a necessity thanks to the logic 
of automation described in the Grundrisse, but this is something that 
the fundamentally Hegelian dimension of Marxist philosophy ulti-
mately obscures.
Cognitive capitalism, in fact, obviously requires and initiates a rev-
olutionary movement of de-proletarianization – otherwise it would not 
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be ‘cognitive’, in the sense of Negri and Vercellone – but, at the same 
time, this state of fact is not ‘assumed’ as such, confronted as we are 
with that other state of fact that is the generalized proletarianization 
generated by purely computational capitalism. De-proletarianization 
is therefore not claimed as the objective of a new state of law – per-
haps because challenging and calling into question the ‘revolutionary 
power of the proletariat’ (whether it is called the ‘working class’ or 
simply ‘work’, which is more often than not confused and confounded 
with employment and wage-labour) is a very large and difficult opera-
tion, and one that passes, precisely, through questioning and challeng-
ing the dialectic of Herrschaft and Knechtschaft.
Behind the misinterpretation of this relation between Herrschaft 
and Knechtschaft, a relationship that, ultimately, is not dialectical, 
and where both Marx and Hegel lack the concept of tertiary retention, 
there lies the question of knowing what epistēmē means – if it is true 
that it is the Knecht, the producer, who engenders it, whereas philoso-
phy will always have posited that it is the Herren, devoted to skholē 
and otium, who has done so.309
The epistēmē that is capitalism today is negative and constitutes an 
absolute non-knowledge, that is, an anti-epistēmē and an eschatologi-
cal limit of toxicity, engendering the Entropocene qua Trumpocene. 
This is so because this epistēmē dissolves into calculation that which, 
in knowledge, remains incalculable – incalculable because stemming 
from those neganthropological potentials that make bifurcation pos-
sible, and hence which, alone, provide any hope of finding a way out 
of the Entropocene become Trumpocene. Such are the stakes of a war 
of noesis against de-noetization.
To de-proletarianize means to re-establish knowledge, a knowledge 
that is always limited, multiple, distributed and impure, because it is 
pharmacological and always provisional, because it is neganthropo-
logical, that is, always on the way to becoming a non-knowledge in 
the form of anthropic dogma. Such a re-establishing of knowledge 




Screens, Dreams, Power 
and Powerlessness
10 The Organology of Dreams and Arche-Cinema
I argued in Le temps du cinéma, that is, in the third volume of Technics 
and Time, that we must refer to arche-cinema just as Derrida spoke of 
arche-writing. I propose today and in principle that the dream is the 
primordial form of this arche-cinema – and this is why an organization 
of dreams is possible. The arche-cinema of consciousness, of which 
dreams would be the matrix as arche-cinema of the unconscious, is 
the projection resulting from the play between what Husserl called, on 
the one hand, primary and secondary retentions,310 and what I, on the 
other hand, call tertiary retentions, which are the hypomnesic traces 
(that is, the mnemo-technical traces) of conscious and unconscious 
life. There is arche-cinema to the extent that for any noetic act – for 
example, in an act of perception – consciousness projects its object. 
This projection is a montage, of which tertiary (hypomnesic) reten-
tions form the fabric, as well as constituting both the supports and the 
cutting room. This indicates that arche-cinema has a history, a history 
conditioned by the history of tertiary retentions. It also means that 
there is an organology of dreams.
A temporal process occurs through the continuous aggregation of pri-
mary retentions: time passes only because the present instant retains 
within it the preceding instant. In the temporal flux or flow of sen-
sible intuition that is perception, consciousness apprehends the per-
ceived by primarily retaining data that it selects on the basis of those 
secondary retentions (memories of past experience) that constitute the 
selection criteria in the flow of primary retentions.
Each consciousness is constituted from specific secondary reten-
tions that weave its experience, that is, its memory. It is for this reason 
that, confronted with the same object, two different consciousnesses 
experience two different phenomena: the phenomena are projected by 
the consciousness. This projection also projects protentions, that is, 
expectations. The arrangement of primary and secondary retentions 
with protentions constitutes an attentional form: attention is what is 
woven between retentions and protentions.
Just as it is necessary to distinguish between primary retentions 
and secondary retentions, so too is it necessary to distinguish primary 
protentions and secondary protentions. Secondary protentions are 
contained and concealed in secondary retentions, whereas primary 
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protentions are inscribed with primary retentions – so that they acti-
vate, in passing into secondary retentions, associative modalities such 
as those described by Hume (contiguity, resemblance and causality).311
On the basis of an object, consciousness projects a phenomenon that 
is an arrangement of primary and secondary retentions and proten-
tions, and the same object will, each time, result in different phenom-
ena for different consciousnesses. Furthermore, if one and the same 
consciousness repeats an experience of the same object at different 
times, a different phenomenon will be generated each time. This is so 
for two reasons:
 ▪ firstly, the consciousness that encounters an object for the 
second time is no longer the same as the one that encoun-
tered it the first time, for the precise reason that the primary 
retentions and protentions from the first encounter have 
since become secondary retentions and protentions, which 
in the second encounter supply new selection criteria for the 
primary retentions and protentions of the object – of which 
the phenomenon is different each time;
 ▪ secondly, the way in which secondary retentions select 
primary retentions in the temporal flow is the result of the 
play between two types of secondary protentions contained 
and hidden in secondary retentions: some of these second-
ary protentions, which become practically automatic, con-
stitute stereotypes, that is, habits and volitions, while oth-
ers constitute traumatypes – which are either repressed, or 
expressed by default in symptoms and fantasies.
From all this it follows that the same object can:
 ▪ either activate traumatypes, which means that the phenom-
enon that it engenders constantly differentiates itself by 
intensifying itself, and that consciousness projects itself 
into the object by individuating itself with it;
 ▪ or activate stereotypes, which means that the phenomenon 
of the object is its impoverishment, and that the attention 
that consciousness has for this object fades away, disindi-
viduating itself by reinforcing these stereotypes.
The constitution of phenomena, woven from stereotypes and trauma-
types that a consciousness thus projects onto an object, is the result 
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of attentional forms that are conditioned in specific ways by ter-
tiary retentions that support secondary retentions. These are in fact 
woven from collective secondary retentions, which are elaborated and 
transmitted from generation to generation, and which form symbolic 
milieus metastabilizing what Simondon called the transindividual, 
that is, signification [signification].
For example, the memory of secondary retentions is to a significant 
extent composed of verbal traces that are themselves conditioned by 
a language that is inherited by the consciousness – or what I call the 
psychic individual. To put this in the language of Gilbert Simondon, 
psychic individuation is always inscribed in processes of collective 
individuation through which it shares collective secondary retentions, 
which form significations, that is, the transindividual.
The transindividual is formed in and by circuits of transindi-
viduation at the core of which there forms a compromise between 
diachronic traumatypes and synchronic stereotypes – stereotypes 
forming significations as common usages, and traumatypes forming 
meaning [sens] as object investments that disrupt common usage.
The transindividual can metastabilize itself only because it is sup-
ported by tertiary retentions, that is, technical supports of various 
kinds. Technical objects in general are themselves such supports, 
and they form what Leroi-Gourhan312 described as the third memory 
of technical and noetic life, appearing some two million years ago: 
beyond the common genetic memory of the human species and the 
epigenetic memory belonging to each individual human, there is an 
epiphylogenetic memory that constitutes the various forms of inher-
ited and transmitted human knowledge, and through which the trans-
individual is metastabilized.
It should be noted here that technical and hypomnesic objects play 
a major role in the dream as analysed by Freud in his Interpretation 
of Dreams, and that desire is constituted in Freud around the fetish, 
that is, the artefact – which means that, like the artefact, the libido 
is detachable and can move from organ to organ (both artificial 
and corporeal).
Rupestral mnemo-technical supports, cave paintings, appear 
around thirty thousand years ago, and these project mental contents 
outwards, constitute hypomnesic tertiary retentions and initiate a pro-
cess of grammatization.
Grammatization, as I use the term, refers to the process by which 
the mental temporal flows experienced by the psychic individual are 
recorded, reproduced, discretized and spatialized. When we see the 
Chauvet cave paintings, we are aware that what we see are the traces 
of what was seen and experienced by those who painted them. We 
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are aware that we are accessing a new empathic possibility that did 
not exist prior to the Upper Palaeolithic era, even though it is also 
true that those tertiary retentions that every object constitutes already 
allow us to access the artificial memory of a form of life itself artifi-
cial, and of which we are the heirs.
The appearance of hypomnesic tertiary retentions results in new 
regimes of individuation through the play of the primary and second-
ary retentions and protentions in which attention consists: it leads to 
new attentional forms. On the basis of the example of the melody that 
Husserl used to construct his concept of primary retention, I have 
tried to show that tertiary retention conditions the play of primary 
retention and secondary retention, and therefore the play of primary 
protention and secondary protention: I have highlighted the fact that 
the analogue tertiary retention in which the phonogram consists, 
insofar as it enables the identical repetition of the same musical tem-
poral object, results in a new primary and secondary retentional and 
protentional experience of a piece of music. In fact, each repetition 
manifestly generates a difference from out of one and the same object, 
and this experience of the production of difference through analogue 
repetition constitutes a new experience of music itself – a new form 
of experience that is a new form of attention, dating very precisely 
from 1877, and there is no doubt that this contributed to the musi-
cal experience inaugurated by Schönberg as well as to what is called 
‘acousmatic’ music.
This new attentional form in fact considerably dramatizes and 
intensifies the difference between two forms of repetition (those 
referred to by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition313): in the first 
case, stereotypical protention repeats itself and exhausts the object 
because the phenomenon it generates is a little weaker each time until 
in the end it disappears; in the other form of repetition, however, the 
object generates new phenomena every time, intensifying and deepen-
ing its difference.
Similarly, cinema is a new experience of life that begins in 1895. 
These dates, 1877 and 1895, constitute two immense turns in the 
organological history of the power(s) to dream.
Between stereotypes and traumatypes there is play involved in the 
putting to work of secondary retentions and protentions that select 
primary retentions and protentions, and this play is overdetermined by 
tertiary retentions as organological conditions of repetition. As such, 
a tertiary retention always constitutes a kind of transitional object, 
in the Winnicottian sense according to which the first retentions and 
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protentions that form the baby’s psychic apparatus are articulated 
with the retentions and protentions of its mother through the transi-
tional object that opens the transitional space of play.314
I argued in What Makes Life Worth Living that the transitional 
object is a pharmakon, and in fact the primordial pharmakon – just as 
for Plato writing was a pharmakon, and just as all tertiary retention is 
a pharmakon, that is, a poison and a remedy.315 Winnicott showed that 
the transitional object, which is the condition of the formation of the 
infantile psychic apparatus, can also become a pathogenic factor if the 
mother fails to locate the therapeutic value of the object and so allows 
it to become an object of pure addiction.
Tertiary retention, which is itself irreducibly pharmacological, is 
what Socrates grasped for the first time in the Phaedrus through writ-
ing – this being a literal (that is, lettered) form of tertiary retention. 
Socrates showed that literal tertiary retention can bring about short-
circuits in the play of psychic secondary retentions and can result – 
via collective secondary retentions that form topoi (commonplaces) 
– in stereotypical ways of selecting primary retentions, that is, it can 
disindividuate collective individuals and psychic individuals, and 
transform them into crowds and masses.
It is because analogue tertiary retention is also such a pharmakon 
that Benjamin could be concerned about the importance of radio to 
Italian fascism, that this radio could support the language of the Nazi 
Third Reich, as Viktor Klemperer described,316 and that Adorno and 
Horkheimer were able to suspect cinema of short-circuiting the tran-
scendental imagination.
And yet, I argue that tertiary retention in general, and in particular 
literal tertiary retention, analogue tertiary retention and digital ter-
tiary retention, all also constitute positive pharmacological possibili-
ties, that is, they generate new attentional forms, forming therapeu-
tic practices from those pharmaka that are tertiary retentions, and of 
which the cinematic art is one case.
From these general considerations, I would like now to return to 
the question of arche-cinema, of which the dream is the primordial 
form, in order to pose the question of an organology of the dream in 
general. And, on the basis of this question, I would like to investigate 
the future of cinema in the epoch of digital tertiary retention.
I argued in the third volume of Technics and Time that Adorno and 
Horkheimer, by placing themselves within the Kantian perspective on 
the transcendental imagination, closed off all possibility of thinking 
a positive pharmacology of the cinema – that is, of the cinematic art 
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itself.317 For in fact, the cinematic pharmakon as art is what makes it 
possible to struggle against the cinema as toxic pharmakon, that is, as 
what enables the short-circuiting of the play of the traumatypical sec-
ondary retentions and protentions of psychic individuals by reinforc-
ing their stereotypical secondary retentions and protentions.
Adorno and Horkheimer did not take into account that the three 
syntheses of the imagination described by Kant presuppose a fourth 
synthesis, which I call the technological synthesis of the imagina-
tion, and which is that of tertiary retention. The first three syntheses 
(apprehension, reproduction and recognition) describe and correspond 
to the play of primary retention (apprehension), secondary retention 
(reproduction) and protention (recognition). I have tried to show, how-
ever, by re-examining the Kantian example of numeration, that the 
schematism, as projection by the transcendental imagination of pure 
concepts of understanding in the ‘manifold of intuition’ (that is, in the 
retentional flow that constitutes phenomena), presupposes schemas 
that are themselves constituted through tertiary retention – and on the 
basis of sensorimotor schemas.318
The consequence of this point of view is that so-called ‘transcen-
dental’ imagination presupposes a primordial exteriorization of mem-
ory and therefore of the imagination itself, that is, of anticipation and 
temporalization, such that, passing through artefactual schemas con-
figured by technical organs as tertiary retention, it is supported by a 
spatialization.
Tertiary retention in general is the spatialization of time enabling 
its repetition and exteriorization, and the trans-formation of the time 
of retentions and protentions into a space of retentions and proten-
tions. In a general way, all technical production of the technical form 
of life, by the desiring and dreaming beings that we are, constitutes 
such a spatialization of experience and thereby also enables its inter-
generational transmission: such is epiphylogenesis, which constitutes 
the origin of what Canguilhem called the technical form of life inso-
far as it breaks with the conditions in which life had evolved up to that 
point – it breaks with evolution as conceived by Darwin. It is this rup-
ture that constitutes arche-cinema, establishing a libidinal economy 
of movement.
What I call tertiary retention is what Derrida called the supple-
ment insofar as it has a history, that is: as the genesis of technical 
concretizations of arche-writing (or the arche-trace). I am not in com-
plete agreement with Derridian theory stricto sensu to the extent that 
this theory does not seem to me to distinguish primary retention, sec-
ondary retention and tertiary retention as such. In this, my ‘theory 
of the arche-trace’, so to speak, which is not only arche-writing but 
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arche-cinema, that is, a system of editing and post-production of pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary retention and protention (which consti-
tutes differentiated regimes of traces), differs considerably from the 
exposition in Of Grammatology, above all because I think the supple-
ment essentially in relation to tertiary retention, that is, to technics, 
whereas for Derrida the arche-trace constitutes the living trace in gen-
eral – well before the appearance of tertiary retention.
In any case, within this framework, the history of the supplement 
means the history of tertiary retention, and it is necessary to distin-
guish between epochs. In particular, the epoch of grammatization 
must be distinguished: grammatization as the capacity to project 
mental temporal contents into spatial forms. It seems that this pos-
sibility, which appeared during the Upper Palaeolithic, brought about 
the emergence of what the archaeologist Marc Azéma describes in La 
Préhistoire du cinéma319 as the origin of cinema, insofar as it brought 
with it the discretization and proto-reproduction of movement, of 
which that cinema that appeared in industrial form in 1895 would be 
the mechanical culmination.
In other words, arche-cinema – which constitutes the omnitempo-
ral conditions in which, in a general way, the technical form of life 
(which is also the noetic and oneiric form of life, that is, the form of 
life that desires), rests on processes of the projection through mon-
tages of primary, secondary and tertiary retention and protention – 
was concretized in the form of retentional systems projecting and spa-
tializing movement in prehistoric caves (on the walls of these caves), 
and this led, eventually, to movie theatres and movie screens as we 
know them today, as phenomena typical of the twentieth century (in 
the sense stated by Godard).
It should be noted here that this cinema of caves and theatres is 
staged by Plato at the beginning of Book VII of the Republic as a kind 
of dream: as the dream of that dream that would be the lie of life lived 
in the cave – that is, in the pharmakon. Now, we see that whereas the 
philosopher wants to leave the cave, the film-lover, the amateur de 
cinéma, would like to get behind the camera or into the screen: what 
the film-lover loves is the pharmakon and the pharmacological condi-
tion itself insofar as it is also the condition of desire.
We must now return in a more precise way, however, to the question 
of knowing in what grammatized tertiary retention consists, so that 
we may attempt to grasp what is at stake with the advent of digital 
tertiary retention in the history of cinema.
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There are epochs of tertiary retention, and these are the result of 
the ‘organo-genesis’ in which consists the transformation of psychic 
and social organizations that result from the transformation of techni-
cal and technological organs. In a general way, the becoming of the 
pharmakon that is tertiary retention is overdetermined by the play of 
psychosomatic organs, technical organs and social organizations. The 
relations between these three types of organs are regulated by ‘thera-
peutics’ that define social organizations through social systems (in 
both Niklas Luhmann’s320 and Bertrand Gille’s321 sense of ‘social sys-
tem’). Such therapeutics, which aim to strengthen the curative aspect 
of pharmaka and to limit their toxicity, are libidinal economies, them-
selves conditioned by the organology of tertiary retention, which 
means that, in each epoch, an organology of the dream concretizes 
and specifies the primordial matrix of arche-cinema.
In other words: arche-cinema constitutes the general principles by 
which primary, secondary and tertiary retention combine, irrespec-
tive of the form of tertiary retention. The history of the supplement, 
however, which implements this arche-cinema, that is, this libidinal 
organization of technical life in general, is what is concretized dur-
ing the course of organo-genesis – and notably as what since 1895 we 
refer to as ‘cinema’. We, however, find ourselves living in 2012, that 
is, in the epoch of digital tertiary retention, and this makes possible, 
among other things, a cinema without film.
What type of cinema might emerge from this new stage of the his-
tory of the supplement as the concretization of the arche-cinematic 
power to dream? To try and pose this question correctly, we must 
return to the history of tertiary retention such as it is inflected through 
grammatization.
A text is a fabric woven from literal tertiary retentions constituting a 
spatial linguistic object, whereas oral speech is a temporal linguistic 
object. When a reader reads a text, this spatial object is re-tempor-
alized: reading is the trans-formation of space back into the time of 
reading. A film, too, is a spatial object that can be re-temporalized 
only via the mediation of that piece of apparatus we call the projec-
tor, just as playing a record requires a turntable. In general, however, 
whereas I myself play my records on my own turntable, films are on 
the contrary screened on a projecter operated by a projectionist, who 
does so on behalf of the movie-going public in the movie theatre.
In all of these cases, re-temporalization constitutes a projection in 
the course of which readers, listeners and spectators pro-ject their 
own secondary protentions and retentions into the textual, musical 
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or cinematic flux, and select primary retentions, which then generate 
primary protentions. Consequently, the fact that these selections are 
each time singular (conditioned by the retentional and protentional 
characteristics of each of us) means that nobody ever reads the same 
book as anyone else, or hears the same music, or sees the same film.
And yet, a book, a piece of music or a film have effects on their 
public, their audience, that seem to go beyond the diversity of ways 
that these effects are experienced. This is so because:
 ▪ on the one hand, each type of tertiary retention configures 
attentional forms that are specific, but common to those 
who practise this tertiary retention: attention is what results 
from the play of (primary and secondary) retention and pro-
tention in general, and the various types of tertiary reten-
tion, by conditioning this play, thereby constitute atten-
tional forms;
 ▪ on the other hand, a writer, a musician or a filmmaker in 
each case mobilizes a common retentional and proten-
tional ground (or fund) constituted by proto-retentions and 
proto-protentions, typical of a cultural region and an epoch, 
and which itself takes shape on an arche-retentional and 
arche-protentional ground, that is, on the basis of archaic 
elements that derive from what Simondon called the ‘pre-
individual’ (under the influence of Jung and his theory of 
individuation).
In the course of a projection, whether of a book, a record or a film, 
the play of primary, secondary and tertiary retention enables the pro-
jection of repressed elements, individually as well as collectively. 
This is why I say, in Ken McMullen’s film An Organization of Dreams 
(2009), that a film is always the arrangement of an individual his-
tory and a collective history. Conversely, and through introjection, the 
viewer of a film interprets his own retentional and protentional funds 
on the basis of the transindividual material that is presented during 
the screening and that comes to meet the audience like an event.
Cinema, however, is a pharmakon, as Frank Capra showed:
Film is a disease. When it infects your bloodstream, it takes 
over as the Number One hormone; it bosses the enzymes; 
directs your pineal gland; plays Iago to your psyche. As with 
heroin, the antidote for film is more film.322
And this means that the cinematic experience can either reinforce 
stereotypes held by the public, or, on the contrary, put to work its 
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traumatypes. In order to examine these questions, which will lead to 
the question of the cinematic condition in the epoch of digital tertiary 
retention, it is necessary that we more closely analyse the organology 
and pharmacology of the cinema as an industry of analogue tertiary 
retention at the service of the consumerist libidinal economy, that is, 
as destructive of this economy, as destructive of the libido insofar as 
it is an economy of the drives, and, finally, as destructive of atten-
tion insofar as, as the arrangement of psychic retention and protention 
forming motives (objects of desire) from the fabric of collective reten-
tions and protentions, it takes care of its objects insofar as they are 
objects of desire.
Cinema is seen by Adorno and Horkheimer as a functional element 
of a system whose aim is to disseminate an ideology and stimulate 
consumer behaviour. This view of cinema is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of the French New Wave, except that the latter saw 
cinema as a pharmakon, and not just as a poison (this pharmacology, 
for example, forms the background of Godard’s Contempt, 1963).
The cinematic art, according to Capra, struggles against the dis-
ease that is cinema with the means of cinema. This pharmacology, 
I suggest, is that of desire, that is, of the dream. What is a dream? 
It is a compromise between traumatypes buried and repressed in the 
unconscious, and the stereotypes in which they are clothed in order 
that they may manifest themselves as ‘latent content’. The manifesta-
tion of this content remains latent, so that it may be translated in wak-
ing life into action, and interpreted through our actions – which may 
include speaking, as in the psychoanalytic cure.
In other words, we must think of this as a loop (that is, a circuit) the 
moments of which must not be separated – and this is what Simondon 
taught us in Invention et imagination: for Simondon, in the imagina-
tion, every image founded on sensorimotor schemas, and passing 
through what he calls the image-object, results in an invention, that 
is, an individuation – and a film is such an individuating invention.
A film is a kind of dream had in common, a daytime dream, via 
the means of the industrial production of tertiary retentions that are 
themselves industrial. Insofar as it is a dream, film manifests a desire 
– a desire that we imagine to be that of a public, that is, of an epoch, 
and not just that of a filmmaker. This is why Godard, under the (false) 
belief that he was citing Bazin,323 could say that ‘cinema replaces our 
gaze with a world that conforms to our desires’.
In reality, it is a matter of the desire of the filmmaker in that – like 
the desire of any artist – he or she succeeds in sharing this desire 
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through their work, and, in so doing, the filmmaker becomes a vec-
tor of the transindividuation of his or her epoch. Furthermore, this 
transindividuation works by socializing and transindividuating the 
tertiary retentions of the epoch, reinforcing psychic individuation as 
well as collective individuation, rather than disindividuating them, 
that is, reinforcing stereotypes.
Adorno and Horkheimer argue that, more than anything else, cin-
ema is this process of disindividuation. And one could say that this 
is the drama of cinema, and the drama portrayed and confronted by 
every great director. This is also and especially the case for Federico 
Fellini, who, in Intervista (1987), inscribed this pharmacology of 
cinema within the perspective of its becoming television. Fellini 
is a particularly interesting director in terms of an examination of 
the relation between cinema and dream – and Intervista is indeed a 
dream, as depicted in the first scene of the film. But this dream is 
also a kind of nightmare – the nightmare that Berlusconi will bring to 
Italy and to Italian cinema, but also that of the Mussolinian origin of 
Italian cinema, which is a recurring theme in Fellini, as can be seen 
in Amarcord (1973).
Beginning in 1960, when he first started to see the Jungian analyst 
Ernst Bernhard, Fellini would sketch his dreams each morning. These 
dreams were transcribed in notebooks, which were later published.324
In terms of the animated image, we are yet to leave the prehistoric 
age. And the true history of tele-vision begins, perhaps, with Skype. 
Television is certainly not cinema.325 But what is cinema? Is it, for 
example, tied to actual celluloid film? Films are analogue forms of 
tertiary retention. So are videotapes. But what happens to arche-cin-
ema in the age of digital tertiary retention?
The retentional change brought about by digital tertiary retention 
radically changes the relation to the moving image and sound, both 
because it turns this into an everyday practice engaged in by everyone 
(for example through Skype, webcams and smartphones), and because 
it makes possible, for example, what Godard dreamed of during a visit 
to Canada in 1978:
just as a novelist […] needs to have a library to know what 
is being done, to receive books by others […], so as not to 
have to read only his own books; and, at the same time, a 
library that would also be a printing press, a print workshop 
[imprimerie], to know what it is to print [imprimer]; so too, 
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for me, a film studio, an atelier, is at the same time some-
thing like a novelist’s library and a print workshop.326
We are in this way living through a transformation comparable to that 
which resulted from the passage from hieroglyphic writing to alpha-
betical writing. What does all this do to our dreams? This question 
is at the same time psychological, political, economic and industrial. 
And, in this context, YouTube now creates open studios everywhere 
throughout the world, where one may learn, share and create.
A dream is a moment within a noetic sensorimotor loop, and it 
internalizes an artefactual (that is, heteronomic) retentional organiza-
tion, into which the dream tries to introduce a coherence – a coherence 
with desires that are, however, in conflict with the social organization 
that is concretized around this organology, and which is incarnated by 
a superegoistic structure.
Such a structure produces much stupidity: through the use of col-
lective retentions in order to keep a rein over individual and collec-
tive traumatypes, it generates stereotypes. By constantly reinforcing 
these stereotypes, and by taking them to the extreme, the consumer-
ist capitalist economy, which is initially cinematic and then becomes 
televisual, in the end destroys the libido, which decomposes into the 
drives. This proves deadly for the power of cinema to dream: aside 
from some highly remarkable exceptions, cinematic dreams become 
drive-based nightmares, that is, horror movies.
The film industry has been the capitalist stage of the libidinal econ-
omy and of the organology of dreams – which are the workshops or 
studios of this libidinal economy. It was in this capitalist and indus-
trial context, in which cinema is put at the service of consumption and 
leads eventually to television, that Capra understood cinema above all 
as a form of dependence that ‘takes over as the number one hormone 
[…], bosses the enzymes [and] directs the pineal gland’. This pharma-
kon is dangerous because it may take the place of something that you, 
your body and your brain, ordinarily knows how to do itself, which is 
also to say, to produce – ‘as with heroin’, as Capra puts it, that is, in 
that case, in relation to endorphins.
Since the pharmakon turns out to be better at producing it than you 
are yourself, you ‘unlearn’ how to produce it. This is the very fate that 
befalls the heroin addict. It is also what happens with writing, if we 
are to believe Socrates. And it is what industrial organology produces 
in the form of proletarianization, which Marx described as being 
first and foremost a loss of knowledge. In the case of the cinematic 
pharmakon that becomes the televisual pharmakon, which proletari-
anizes consumers and deprives them of the capacity to produce their 
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own savoir-vivre, of the life-knowledge through which they have the 
capacity to know how to live, it is the primary and secondary identi-
fication processes, which constitute the condition of formation of the 
psychic apparatus, and therefore the condition of production of libidi-
nal energy, that are effectively short-circuited.
That cinema is an industry has meant that its model and its means 
of production have been based on an opposition between ‘produc-
tion’ and ‘consumption’: this opposition, according to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, expresses itself as a teratological exteriorization of 
the transcendental imagination. But what they fail to see is that the 
problem is not exteriorization, which has always already begun, but 
rather the short-circuit that inevitably results from the hegemony of 
de-symbolizing, disindividuating and imagination-destroying cul-
tural consumerism, because it reinforces stereotypes and represses 
traumatypes.
Digital tertiary retention establishes a new industrial organology that 
poses all these problems in new terms that make possible new dreams 
– and, on this precise point, we must also relate this to the projections 
made possible, in France, by the Super 8 camera (as Alain Resnais, 
for example, shows in Muriel, 1963) and, in the 1950s, the 16 mil-
limetre camera.
With regard to what was said by Jean-Luc Godard in his Histoire(s) 
du cinéma (1988–98), a project anticipated in his Introduction à une 
véritable histoire du cinéma, in which he dreamt of a film library as 
has today become available online – well not quite yet, but it soon will 
be and in the true sense, for soon we will be able to browse films, and 
access them in conditions made possible by their digital grammati-
zation, as foreshadowed by Lignes de temps – in regard to Godard’s 
dream, we must understand that his films are immediately and com-
pletely underpinned by this dream and its organology. And this sug-
gests that we may have much to expect from digital organology, inso-
far as we know how to desire, to dream and to concretize this positive 
pharmacology.
In the late 1950s, when Godard and the critics of Cahiers du cinéma 
were dreaming, when cinema was the dream, and because their 
dreams were organologically constituted by the cinema, these lov-
ers of cinema – Godard, Truffaut, Resnais and so on – became the 
New Wave of cinema through their political and economic thought 
of an emerging organology, just as Fellini had such a thought in rela-
tion to cinema in general: Fellini’s cinema, like the appearance of the 
New Wave, derived not from an organological causality but from an 
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organological conditionality, that is, a pharmacological conditionality, 
so that, for example, in the context of Berlusconian television, Fellini 
rethought, in the course of a dream, the Mussolinian pharmacology of 
delusion that gave birth to Italian cinema.
In the age of Cahiers du cinéma, the appropriation of the 16 mil-
limetre camera radically changed the relations of production at the 
core of the cinematic machine, and thus changed the cinematic imag-
ination of filmmakers and their audiences, who became, in a struc-
tural way, amateurs, film-lovers: one of the very specific features of 
the New Wave was that its public was composed of film-lovers. Now, 
these filmmakers were themselves lovers of cinema who took hold of 
the 16 millimetre camera in order to show what they had seen in 35 
millimetre cinema. One cannot see the films of the New Wave without 
being a lover of cinema, just as the directors of the New Wave were 
themselves film-lovers.
At the beginning of Intervista Fellini is in the middle of a dream. 
The film shows a dream that builds on notes made by Fellini in his 
sketchbook. It is a question, here, of note-taking: of the organological 
conditions of the dream as it is elaborated through the taking of notes. 
What is a dream, if not a kind of montage of these notes that are ‘day 
residue’, to speak in psychoanalytic terms? Intervista, however, is a 
waking dream, a kind of daydream. But what is a work, an oeuvre in 
general, if not such a dream – made out of artefacts, that is, fashioned 
from transitional objects of all kinds?
During a dream, I transindividuate within myself in a way that 
runs counter to the dominant transindividuation – the dream puts into 
movement traumatypes that are hidden behind stereotypes, which 
is also exactly what happens in any good movie – yet my potential 
[puissance] to dream is the condition of my potential to act, the one 
like the other being conditioned by the same organological powers 
and impotencies. By articulating and arranging organs, the brain with 
the bladder, for example, as a source of internal sensations, or with 
the ear, as a source of external sensations (these are examples given 
by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams), via such a symbol, which 
is always a tertiary retention, that is, an artificial organ, organology 
mobilizes phenomena occurring during the day (daily residue) that it 
brings back up – as Fellini did with his memories of the years from 
Mussolini (at the beginning of Italian cinema) to Berlusconi (in the 
age of Berlusconian television).
Nocturnal organology is not diurnal organology. This passage from 
night to day, of which the industrial dream projected in the movie 
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theatre blurs the difference through ‘day for night’ techniques (a 
technique that in French is called ‘la nuit américaine’), may result in 
traumatypical liberation but in the guise of stereotypes. In this way, 
cinema can be turned into a political power to harm stupidity327 by 
working with it – through these stereotypes that are the pharmacologi-
cal condition of traumatypes, and, in this regard especially, Intervista 
is exemplary.
We are projectors (as Godard said), projectors capable of project-
ing traumatypes, of socializing, of transindividuating on the basis 
of our means of production, that is, on the basis of the organological 
powers and knowledge of which we are capable – that we are capable 
of putting to work. And this capacity forms the stakes of a political 
struggle, especially in the cinematic context emerging from the epoch 
of digital retention. The economy of the ‘means’ of oneiric production 
raises the question of the ownership of the means of production of the 
dream, the imaginary and the symbolic.
In Close-Up (1990), Abbas Kiarostami tells the story of Hossein 
Sabzian, who finds himself in prison because he ‘se faisait du cinéma’, 
as we say in French, meaning that he gets caught up in his own lies – 
and, in these lies of his, in his movie, he dreams of making a movie. 
In other words, there are, for Sabzian, two dimensions to his cinema: 
the movie that he lies about [le cinéma qu’il se faisait], and the movie 
that he cannot make, the film that he does not get a chance to real-
ize, to direct.
Kiarostami has made a film, and in a way he has realized Sabzian’s 
dream – which was to make a film. Kiarostami interprets Sabzian’s 
action by suggesting that Sabzian dreamed of passing into the screen. 
It seems to me, however, that, in fact, his dream was to get behind 
the camera. Sabzian’s dream was to make films: he therefore had the 
same dream as Godard, Resnais and Truffaut. Close-Up shows that 
this dream is, to a degree, shared by all the Iranians we see in the film 
– not just Sabzian. Furthermore, Mohsen Makhmalbaf has Iranians 
speaking about their dreams of making films in his own film, Salaam 
Cinema (1995), a film that was shot in the wake of Close-Up.
In Close-Up, everyone is more or less a film-lover. As for Sabzian, 
a poor, unemployed resident of Tehran, he manages to find the means, 
even though he barely has enough to eat, to buy a copy of the screen-
play of The Cyclist (1987), a Makhmalbaf film he greatly loves. He 
was so in love with it that he wanted to study it further – and we 
see during his trial (filmed by Kiarostami) that he had been writing 
screenplays for a very long time, and that he accuses his father of 
The Organology of Dreams and Arche-Cinema 169
having taken him to the cinema, that is, of having initiated him into 
and encouraged a passion that would eventually lead him to prison.
An ancient thesis states that, in fact, the origin of technics is the 
dream, and that, as such, technics can never be defined as the causal 
factor, since the cause of any invention must be the idea through 
which it has been dreamed up – one could say the fantasy, or the 
protention. This is, in a way, the argument of both André Bazin and 
Georges Sadoul.328
Sony, a large film and audiovisual equipment manufacturer, has 
based its advertising on just such a representation of the genesis of 
technics. In reality, dreams generate technics, which itself gener-
ates dreams: dream and technics cannot be separated. In Préhistoire 
du cinéma, Marc Azéma begins by referring to dreams: while ani-
mals do dream, he says, nevertheless only human beings externalize 
their dreams.329
I agree, and I believe that this is how tertiary retention forms. This 
exteriorization of dreams, as the capacity to produce what, at the 
beginning of Imagination et invention, Simondon called, precisely, 
invention – which he defined as the fourth moment of what he referred 
to as the cycle of images – presupposes tertiary retention as the pro-
cess of grammatization of arche-cinema, that is, as the concretization 
of this arche-cinema, but which would also be its transformation.
The transformation of desire by this arche-cinema is what makes 
technical and technological projection and invention possible. And it 
does so on the basis of earlier technics and technologies – tertiary 
forms of retention generate, under certain conditions, other forms 
of tertiary retention, when what we refer to as the technical system 
of the imagination or the ideas has reached its limits. We ourselves, 
today, are at the limits of the imagination and ideas generated by ana-
logue tertiary retentions, and we have entered into a new system, the 
digital system.
I do not mean that the invention of the digital occurred because 
the analogue system had reached its limits: I mean that the onei-
ric being that we are, which is also the noetic being, is essentially 
constituted by the co-evolution of its dreams and its technics. In 
fact, Sabzian’s dream was of something that could, indeed, actually 
happen, something that the Medvedkin groups realized with Chris 
Marker, inspired by Medvedkin himself, something that the militant 
workers of Besançon actually managed to bring about.330 These were 
not exactly French Sabzians but to some extent they bore a resem-
blance. While going on strike in the extreme conditions of 1967, they 
at the same time wanted to incorporate a library and a cinema into the 
factory. Paul Cèbe actually did this, and he did it at the initiative of 
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these groups,331 producing something that is of the order of an organo-
logical dream.
In 1978, eleven years after the Medvedkin groups, Godard conceives 
cinema in terms of the relationship between impression and expres-
sion: ‘cinema […] enables you to impress an expression and at the 
same time to express an impression. On television there are both’.332 
This can be linked to what Simondon said about the cycle of images.333 
Godard, too, speaks of a cycle of images – he thinks cinema, however, 
in relation to desire, whose pharmacological and organological condi-
tions he investigates through cinematic invention.
In the book from which these quotations are taken, whose exact 
title is Introduction à une véritable histoire du cinéma et de la télévi-
sion, one of the first images that Godard uses and that he projected 
during those conferences where some of his films were screened, set 
against films taken from the history of cinema, dramatizes the ques-
tion of the relation between film and video.
If Godard emerged from the 16 mm and Super 8 revolution, which 
played such an important role for Resnais, if he continues to write 
in ways that articulate different types of analogue tertiary retention, 
assembling them with one another (for example, by making note-
books and collating drafts and notes such as I spoke about in relation 
to dreams), then by 1978, twenty years after the appearance of the 
Beaulieu camera and the birth of the New Wave, he is investigating 
video: ‘People should write scripts on video rather than – seeing a 
shot would help you decide how or how not to shoot it’.334 Godard 
emphasizes that television could be used to see, but that at the moment 
it is used to prevent seeing. Or, in other words, it is a pharmakon: 
‘because everyone has a TV [they] have to make people forget that it 
can be used to see’.335
Hence Godard is already raising the question of moving from ana-
logue film, based on silver halides, to electronic film – while stress-
ing the pharmacological dimension of cinema in terms reminiscent of 
Capra: ‘cinema […] impresses in advance the great movements that 
are going to take place. And it is in this sense that it shows illnesses in 
advance’.336 The digital could and should eventually fulfil the expec-
tations of Godard’s dream of a library of cinema that would also serve 
as a print workshop, as well as Sabzian’s dream of offering everyone 
the opportunity to make films – provided a politics of the organologi-
cal condition and the pharmacological situation of human dreams is 
placed at the heart of political economy. This means that the political 
world must make this its motive. But this will not be possible if the 
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film world (amateurs and ‘professionals’) does not mobilize itself in 
this direction.
Karl Marx argued in The German Ideology that idealism is based on 
an inversion of cause and effect that forgets the role of the means and 
relations of production in the genesis of ideas, comparing this illusion 
to the reversal of the image in the retina. For Plato himself, the cave 
was a place of illusion – and he founded idealism by suggesting that 
it is necessary to get out of the cave in order to re-locate what Adorno 
himself called the light of day: it is necessary to leave the movie the-
atre. What Sabzian wants, and what Godard, Resnais and Kiarostami 
want, what all amateurs du cinéma want, all film-lovers, who embody 
this arche-cinema described by Plato but without his having any way 
of seeing the scope of what he was describing, is not to leave the pro-
jection room: it is to get behind the camera.337 Such are the stakes of 
the digital, and this constitutes a new page, still completely blank, of 
the history of arche-cinema.
11 The Writing Screen
Everything acts as a screen. It is firstly for this reason and as such that 
we live among screens – that is, this is, in a way, how it has always 
been. The totem and the transitional object, as well as the fetish, are 
screens – that is, supports of projections that conceal [dissimulent]. 
But digital screens, like those of Samsung, for example, or, again, 
those today being designed by Amazon and Netflix, these screens, 
which are simultaneously electric, electronic, optoelectronic and 
more and more frequently tactile, are now what both support and 
occlude the question of the totality of the future, and of the future as 
totality, and they do so as the fulfilment of nihilism – as well as being 
what, alone, make it possible to imagine something beyond this fulfil-
ment of nihilism.
Having become the basic supports of what I will describe as the 
data economy, which deploys what Thomas Berns and Antoinette 
Rouvroy have analysed as algorithmic governmentality, digital 
screens both support and occlude the projection of a future for what 
I will call neganthropic being – Neganthropos, that is, this being 
that, as Heidegger said, we ourselves are. And Neganthropos is a 
being that, as we ourselves, as the gathering of the beings that we 
are, as being-together, is caught within entropy, in such a way that we 
ourselves, as the real projectors of all these screens and on all these 
screens, as Jean-Luc Godard said and showed so well,338 this negan-
thropic being that we ourselves are, has become a threat to itself, like 
the deinotaton referred to at the heart of Antigone. This is so, to the 
point that this neganthropic being, in this being-among-screens so 
characteristic of our epoch, should now become the subject of what, 
during a seminar dedicated to the critique of anthropology, I began to 
call ‘neganthropology’.
The becoming-screen of everything occurs within a techno-logical 
context in which industries exploit the data we produce on these writ-
ing screens, and do so via the operations of ‘big data’ – a development 
controlled by the ‘light’ industry in general, which is also to say, of 
course, by an industry operating at the speed of light. This amounts to 
the constitution of what I, along with Ars Industrialis, call the econ-
omy of light-time, which is replacing the economy of carbon-time, an 
example of which would be the financial industry of high frequency 
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trading. This process of the becoming-screen of writing, this screeni-
fication of writing, materializing and emerging from all sides, there-
fore constitutes:
 ▪ on the one hand, a threat, enacted through the mediation of 
the fully computational and automated system that is set up 
on the basis of the traces sent and received by these screens, 
which are various kinds of interfaces: interfaces for the 
systems of social networking, for user profiling, for smart 
cities and so on, through which truly massive amounts of 
data are captured and channelled, to which the technolo-
gies of high performance computing are applied in real 
time (at the speed of light), enabling the treatment of so-
called ‘big data’;
 ▪ but, on the other hand, the becoming-screen of writing 
also constitutes a chance, an opportunity to renew com-
mentary, to reconnect with the ‘gloss’, through a completely 
rethought hermeneutics, a chance to renew and reconnect 
with that which, in the past, made the Republic of Letters 
possible, and that could therefore constitute a new critical 
space, by making disputation the dynamic principle of its 
individuation.
These screens make it possible to capture data because they are 
screens not just of writing but of ‘reception’: screens for receiving 
messages, entertainment, information, texts (and therefore for read-
ing) and so on. They are interactive surfaces, and in this way they are 
screens not just for reading but for writing – although what is written 
via these writing screens is not always done so wilfully by those who 
possess them, who often and indeed mostly take part in acts of self-
traceability without being aware of doing so.
The screen and writing, écran and écrit, are what – through a taste 
for alliteration that can sometimes lead us too far astray, or, on the 
contrary, keep us rooted to the spot – were already placed into oppo-
sition quite some years ago by Paul Virilio. During that time, I had 
many exchanges with Virilio, and I know for certain that he wanted 
to dramatize what he believed to be a fundamental opposition between 
the deferred time of writing, of this différance that is writing, and the 
real time of what were then called ‘new technologies’, computing 
and interactivity, which were then emerging in all areas of everyday 
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life – the novelty of this interactive environment now having largely 
faded, especially after the advent of the web in April 1993.
I myself have always argued against Virilio on this score, from the 
moment he began to continually dramatize this opposition, an opposi-
tion I have always believed to be superficial. And I made my argu-
ments in these areas public, through an exhibition held in 1987 at the 
Pompidou Centre entitled Mémoires du futur.
At that time, I argued that the twenty-first century would be char-
acterized by the proliferation of writing screens, which is also to say, 
screens connected to networks and databases that I maintained would 
soon be audiovisual. I also said that reading, writing and the memo-
ries produced during these acts of reading and writing (to speak with 
and beyond Wolfgang Iser) would revolutionize industrial society, 
and, for the symposium that accompanied this exhibition, I invited 
researchers who were working towards this revolution.
Starting from the assumptions that lay behind this exhibition, I have 
since argued that the computer, with its interactive screen, could and 
should become a hermeneutic device, based on annotation and con-
tributory categorization technologies like those currently being devel-
oped at IRI in cooperation with pharmakon.fr and Ars Industrialis.
We argue that, in order to live with decency and dignity among 
screens today, to live a good life, a vita activa, or indeed to live by 
suffering through screens what is produced by ‘algorithmic govern-
mentality’,339 requires holding on to the promise of a new hermeneu-
tic epoch borne by these screens, which operate on a network, and 
which have become the unavoidable interfaces of the data economy, 
but which, for the moment, are more agents of entropy than elements 
of a hermeneutics – that is, of what I earlier spelled, dysorthographi-
cally, as neganthropy.
There is an entropic danger contained in what we call the general-
ized anthropization of the world, an anthropization that gave rise to 
an era that we now think of as the Anthropocene. This is what we 
discover, for example if we thoroughly analyse the discourse of Chris 
Anderson with respect to what he calls the ‘data deluge’,340 and to the 
way that Google exploits this data, for what Anderson claims is that 
there is no longer any need for either theory or experience.341
When Socrates said to Phaedrus, through the intermediary of 
Thamus, that writing both conserves memory and threatens it, he 
might as well have been saying that writing creates a memory screen, 
a writing screen, or a subjectile, as Artaud said, and on which Derrida 
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commented,342 a hypokeimenon, or, as we ourselves might say, twist-
ing slightly the meaning of this Greek word, a substant: a sub-stance.
This sub-stance is ultimately what I call a tertiary retention, and, 
more precisely, a grammatized and hypomnesic tertiary retention, 
as arises with the first screens, namely, in the caves of the Upper 
Palaeolithic – those caves where Marc Azéma claims the history of 
cinema began,343 and that seem so close to the scene with which Plato 
opened Book VII of the Republic. This sub-stance, then, which is 
irreducibly pharmacological, and which screens firstly in this sense, 
this pharmaco-logical sub-stance, is what any screen constitutes, any 
hypomnesic support, insofar as it both manifests and dissimulates, 
reveals and conceals (as Heraclitus said344) what I would like to call 
the Zeit Geist, that is, ‘epokhal’, geschichtlich truth. And this truth is 
always the truth of this epoch’s screens, of the screens of this epoch 
of truth, of what Foucault called its regime of truth, which is a post-
Nietzschean interpretation of the question of truth, alētheia, un-veil-
ing, or, in other words, the question of meaning as trans-individuation.
That being said, I argue that today the digital writing screen must be 
addressed in terms of all these dimensions, and firstly from a phar-
macological perspective, in Socrates’s terms. This is obviously true of 
every form of hypomnesis insofar as it always forms a screen, insofar 
as the screen conceals at the same time that it lures us and makes us 
dream – which is perhaps what is most essential.
All this means that the pharmakon makes us think, and that today 
it is a question of thinking the pharmakon itself, insofar as it is what 
makes us think as well as what prevents thinking. It is not just that 
only stupidity truly makes us think, as Nietzsche said, and as Deleuze 
repeated, but that, for example, the pharmakon can prevent not only 
thinking but even the cultivation of the possibility of thinking, the pos-
sibility of developing this noetic potential to which Aristotle referred 
in his treatise on the soul, where this soul can pass into noetic actual-
ity only intermittently, since ‘God alone enjoys such a privilege’345 – 
that is, the privilege of being always in actuality.
What I would now like to show is that the epoch of interactive writing 
screens, an epoch that is more generally that of digital tertiary reten-
tion, for which these screens are the main mode of access, opens a 
political alternative. It calls for a struggle against the entropy caused 
by these screens insofar as they are digital devices for the automa-
tion of decision-making – not to mention the effects they have on 
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infantile synaptogenesis, which have been analysed by Zimmerman 
and Christakis,346 in relation to which it is necessary to read 
Maryanne Wolf’s research into the history and science of the read-
ing brain.347 The reading brain: that is, the brain that has internalized 
the writing screen that was, for it, the book, insofar as this brain can 
both read and write, on the subjectile of papyrus, parchment, paper or, 
today, with pixels, and where this internalization takes ten or twenty 
years to really be accomplished in depth, and to form ‘deep atten-
tion’, as Katherine Hayles puts it.348 Maryanne Wolf has shown that 
this brain is an organic organ, that is, a biological organ, but one that 
has the capacity to become organo-logical, that is, techno-logical, to 
dis-organize and re-organize itself completely, and where the way it 
does so depends on which screens make an impression upon it, and of 
which I would thus like to say that the brain becomes, in return, the 
‘expression’.
Jonathan Crary has recently published a book in which he describes 
the world formed by these screens as characteristic of what he terms 
24/7 capitalism.349 The latter would tend, by destroying all cal-
endarities, but also and especially by destroying all intermittence, 
thereby preventing both sleeping and dreaming, to lead to their inter-
minable extenuation, and to a kind of hell – and I cannot deny that, 
when I take a look at the world around me, this is indeed how things 
sometimes seem.
What Berns and Rouvroy themselves say is that when, in this form 
of digital capitalism that is algorithmic governmentality, someone 
produces a trace, often without being aware of doing so, for example, 
by entering a query into a search engine or sending out a message, the 
interactive system they use to generate the message anticipates their 
words, their phrases, and so on, which is to say that it outstrips and 
overtakes them.
This ‘outstripping and overtaking’ depends on all kinds of autom-
atons, which are founded on user profiling, search engines, social 
engineering taking advantage of the network effect, and, of course, 
on ultra-fast algorithms capable of capturing, triggering and channel-
ling traces more quickly than the time it takes for them to be pro-
duced or completed. Consequently, the writing screens of 24/7 capi-
talism produce a completely new kind of performativity in light-time, 
which perhaps neither Lyotard nor Derrida were capable of imagining 
– although Derrida did touch upon these questions in ‘No Apocalypse, 
Not Now’.350
I would like to demonstrate that this outstripping and overtak-
ing is possible thanks to a delegation of the analytical functions of 
the understanding to computational automatisms, and that what is 
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thereby short-circuited is what Kant – and then Lyotard – referred to 
as ‘reason’. Having previously tried to show351 that the transcendental 
deduction of the categories is unable to integrate the question of the 
schematism inasmuch as the latter is, in my view, generated by the 
history of tertiary retention, and not constituted a priori, I would like 
also to demonstrate that this problem of the organological character 
of the schematism is precisely that it is produced historically and sup-
plementarily – which does not mean, however, that it would be totally 
empirical and a posteriori – and that it is always possible for it to be a 
screen of reason.
Today, in this epoch in which we don’t just live among screens but 
through them, this is what occurs via these interactive writing screens 
that capture our retentions and protentions by performatively outstrip-
ping and overtaking them in light-time, and through the constitution 
of an absolutely entropic – that is, absolutely un-reason-able – auto-
matic understanding. It is this to which Alan Greenspan drew atten-
tion on 23 October 2008.
I will not give you a detailed exposition of the arguments of Berns 
and Rouvroy, or of what I admire in their exemplary work – even 
if I do not always go along with their conclusions right to the end. 
I give such an exposition in Automatic Society, Volume 1.352 What I 
would prefer to do now, however, is go straight to what is essential, 
and to suggest that there is an alternative to the hell or the night-
mare that both they and Crary describe. For this we must return to 
Chris Anderson.
In his article, Anderson argues that the algorithms of big data have 
in fact made science and its experimental methods obsolete. Hence 
he describes a state of fact. And in fact, in some cases, algorithms 
are indeed more efficient than scientists in anticipating reality. But 
this is so only because they have installed a performativity of fact that 
destroys all performativity of law, that is, all authority of any knowl-
edge whatsoever – whatever its form, whether juridical, scientific, 
political, symbolic or of any other kind.
Rouvroy herself argues that the state of fact imposed with algorith-
mic governmentality requires a new way of thinking law and right. If 
I had time, I would like to demonstrate that this means that we must 
think law beyond Foucault. In any case, I myself argue that this state 
of law, which amounts to a regime of truth in Foucault’s sense, pre-
supposes an approach to organology that is not only theoretical but 
practical, that is, which develops new organologies.353
Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide Web and director of 
W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), has declared his dream of a new 
age of the web, of what he calls the ‘semantic web’:
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I have a dream for the Web [in which computers] become 
capable of analyzing all the data on the Web – the content, 
links, and transactions between people and computers. A 
‘Semantic Web’, which should make this possible, has yet 
to emerge, but when it does, the day-to-day mechanisms of 
trade, bureaucracy and our daily lives will be handled by 
machines talking to machines […]. The ‘intelligent agents’ 
people have touted for ages will finally materialize.354
Berners-Lee inscribes this project within the broader perspective of 
what he calls ‘philosophical engineering’, which is similar to what is 
also called ‘web science’. The goal of the semantic web is to take to 
the extreme the automation of the treatment of information by com-
putational models, but to do so in the service of the noetic individuals 
that we are.
But as noetic individuals we are, in the first place, knowing beings, 
and there is no form of knowledge that is reducible to the computa-
tional treatment of information (which is only an extension of the ana-
lytical faculty of understanding without reason). We are formed – that 
is, individuated – by our knowledge (of how to live, do and conceptu-
alize) insofar as it is constituted by processes of collective individu-
ation, and insofar as these processes of collective individuation are 
subject to public rules and form circuits of transindividuation through 
bifurcations (which in the given conceptual field lead to ‘paradigm 
shifts’, ‘scientific revolutions’ and ‘epistemological breaks’) that dis-
automatize the implementation of rules of certification.355
The semantic web, inasmuch as it enables the automated pre-treat-
ment of the informational hyper-material that digital tertiary reten-
tions constitute, cannot in any case produce knowledge. Knowledge 
is always bifurcating knowledge, that is, an experience of non-knowl-
edge capable of engendering, through a new cycle of images356 (which 
is to say, on the basis of new dreams), a new circuit in the process 
of transindividuation in which all knowledge consists. Knowledge is, 
as such, thoroughly neganthropic: all knowledge contains the pos-
sibility of being dis-automatized through the act of knowing, where 
this knowing internalizes the automatisms in which this knowledge 
also consists, but which through being automatized becomes anti-
knowledge, that is, a dogma that can be dogmatic only by conceal-
ing from itself its dogmatic character, or in other words, its automatic 
character.357
What Berners-Lee describes with the project of the semantic web 
is on the contrary a complete exteriorization of automatisms, where 
the artefacts that constitute the web are utilized to deprive those 
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conforming to the semantic web of the possibility of dis-automatiz-
ing. This is why such an automated semantic web must be designed in 
direct connection with a dis-automatizable hermeneutic web (with the 
aid of the semantic automatons made possible by the semantic web). 
This dis-automatizable hermeneutic web will be founded on:
 ▪ a new conception of social networks;
 ▪ a standardized annotation language;
 ▪ hermeneutic communities emerging from the various 
domains of knowledge that have been established since the 
beginning of anthropization, and as the varying modalities 
of neganthropization.
Such an organological upheaval must be implemented by Europe – 
where the web was invented – and it should become the foundation of 
a continental development strategy. Europe should plan this strategy 
as a conflict of interpretations on the global scale of algorithmic gov-
ernmentality, in order to shape a dis-automatizable automatic society, 
one that would be critiquable, that would take advantage of the auto-
mated semantic web, and that would be desirable – because it will 
generate neganthropic bifurcations.
This upheaval, founded on highly noetic invention, must be social-
ized – that is, must generate new circuits of transindividuation – 
through being implemented in public research and education.
These ideas form part of the program of the Digital Studies Network 
run by IRI, and they are developed in Automatic Society, Volume 1: 
The Future of Work. They will be pursued more deeply in La Société 
automatique 2. L’Avenir du savoir, and will also be presented next 
December in the sessions of Entretiens du nouveau monde industriel 
to be held at the Pompidou Centre on December 14 and 15, with the 
title, La toile que nous voulons, ‘The Web We Want’.358
12 Power, Powerlessness, Thinking and Future
‘To experience politics is today, for most of us, to experience pow-
erlessness’: this is one of the opening sentences in the ‘Manifeste 
pour une contre-offensive intellectuelle et politique’ published by 
Geoffroy de Lasagnerie and Edouard Louis in Le Monde on 27–28 
September 2015.359
Having been inundated by critiques of power, in particular by 
Foucault but more generally by ‘French theory’, now we must think 
political powerlessness – which is obviously not the disappearance of 
all power, and which is obviously an impotence that is not just politi-
cal. To think powerlessness is difficult because it is also and firstly to 
think the impotence of thinking itself, its inability to pass from duna-
mis (power or potential in Greek) into action (energeia). This also and 
at the same time necessarily involves thinking the relations between 
knowledge and power, or knowledges and powers, and so on.
The manifesto by de Lagasnerie and Louis raises necessary ques-
tions. But in my view their way of asking them lacks perspective. And 
it contains some sweeping statements, perhaps in the hope of striking 
and mobilizing minds and spirits, but, as is so often the case, what 
they achieve proves to be the opposite of the intention – and such 
statements therefore seem to me to be not only questionable, but dan-
gerous. When they write, for example, that the phrase ‘“right-wing 
intellectual” is based on an oxymoron, or better: an impossibility’, 
this is totally unacceptable – and for several reasons.
In the first place, for any thinking that claims to think powerless-
ness (and ‘to say things other than what is already agreed’), the com-
mon noun ‘intellectual’ (‘an intellectual’, ‘intellectuals’) must not 
only be the subject of critique, but should be scrupulously avoided. 
Intellectual is not a noun but an adjective. The substantive is already 
mired in the impotence of political thinking and political action. The 
figure of ‘the intellectual’ is an unfortunate invention that unques-
tioningly internalizes the opposition between ‘manual workers’ and 
‘intellectuals’, an opposition that clearly belongs to the ‘class dis-
course’ of whose existence de Lagasnerie and Louis rightly wish 
to remind us.
According to this insidious vocabulary, wallowed in by those 
who refer to themselves as ‘intellectuals’, there would be specialists 
of the intellect, and therefore of thinking, and then there would be 
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everyone else, who thus often feel they are being taken for fools – to 
speak plainly.
Behind all this lies proletarianization, which today affects all forms 
of knowledge, and firstly as a destruction of knowledge – of how to 
live, do and conceptualize. Those who define themselves as ‘intellec-
tuals’ internalize this situation, oblivious to the fact that today they 
themselves have been proletarianized. And here we should recall that 
in The Communist Manifesto Marx and Engels defined proletarianiza-
tion not in terms of poverty but by the loss of knowledge (one conse-
quence of which is pauperization), which in the end, they say, affects 
‘all layers of the population’.360
After its destructive effect on savoir-faire, on knowledge of how 
to do, proletarianization began to destroy savoir-vivre, knowledge of 
how to live, shared culture, when consumer capitalism replaced this 
knowledge with the behavioural prescriptions produced by market-
ing. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is conceptual 
knowledge that is finding itself ruined, proletarianizing the ‘intellec-
tuals’, who try to hang on to their existence by adopting attitudes and 
poses rather than by producing concepts.
I describe in a recent book361 how Alan Greenspan, appearing 
before a House Committee on 23 October 2008 and asked to explain 
what responsibility he bore for the breakdown of that year, defended 
himself by arguing that economic knowledge had been transferred to 
machines and automatons: he thereby sketched the figure of a new 
kind of proletarian, upholding the Marxist analysis according to 
which proletarianization is indeed bound to affect ‘all layers of the 
population’.
It is here that the issue of powerlessness arises. And it continues 
when, failing to understand this, and to understand how it now affects 
all of us, whoever we may be, we internalize this fact, and all of a 
sudden find we are incapable of overcoming it: of identifying it and 
struggling against it, and of opposing to it a new rationality. For prole-
tarianization is also the widespread generalization of entropic behav-
iour, that is, behaviour that leads to the destruction of life. Such is the 
horizon of the new question of rationality.
Let us recall that entropy came to prominence in the nineteenth cen-
tury, understood as the unavoidable dissipation of energy – whereas 
in the twentieth century life was defined as what opposes to this 
universal tendency a negative entropy, a negentropy characterized 
by its ability to organize entropic chaos. When we refer today to the 
Anthropocene, we are referring to a process leading to an immense 
chaotic disorganization, involving a considerable increase in the rate 
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of entropy, among the consequences of which are, for example, that 
systemic mutation we refer to as ‘climate change’.
Returning to the question of the ‘right-wing intellectual’, a phrase 
that according to de Lagasnerie and Louis amounts to an oxymoron, 
let us consider instead ‘right-wing thinking’. I believe there are count-
less great thinkers of the right, among them Sigmund Freud, who the 
‘leftist intellectual’ Michel Onfray would consign to oblivion, him-
self being among those who, if I correctly understand the manifesto in 
question here, would be in the course of betraying the left. Among the 
thinkers of the right one can also find Heidegger, Luhmann, Blanchot 
for a time, and many others it would be too tedious to name.
Instead of producing sweeping statements that are merely a smoke-
screen (through which we cast our impotence upon others), is the 
point not rather to know what ‘right’ and ‘left’ mean, and to under-
stand how they relate to what this word ‘intellectual’ supposedly 
designates, and which it is not difficult to believe is something that 
requires thinking? But to think this, we must remember that there was 
thinking before the right and before the left, and there will be think-
ing after – Inshallah.
The current crisis of thinking derives from an immense transfor-
mation unfolding not only in the political spheres (French, European, 
Western and throughout the entire world), not only in economic and 
financial organizations (and therefore in the relations between capital 
and work, and between work and jobs), but indeed in anthropogen-
esis as such.
Marx and Engels showed at the beginning of The German Ideology 
(1845) that humanity consists above all in a process of exosomati-
zation that pursues evolution no longer through somatic but through 
artificial organs (which was already glimpsed by Herder seventy 
years prior to these two early theorists of the role of technology in 
the formation of social relations and knowledge). But humankind has 
now discovered to its stupefaction that this exosomatization is now 
directly and deliberately produced by the market – and without offer-
ing any choice, in respect to the immense transformations to which it 
gives rise, other than, in the best case, the profitability of investment, 
or, in the worst case, the pure speculation involved in the increasingly 
tight connection between the casino economy, marketing and R&D 
conceived according to inherently short-term, and therefore specula-
tive, models of disruption.
Technology is disruptive because the pace of its evolution and its 
transfer to society (so-called ‘innovation’) has become extremely 
rapid, causing what Bertrand Gille called the social systems (law, 
education, political organization, forms of knowledge and so on) to 
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always arrive too late. Now, it might be objected that, as Hegel said, 
the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk – and hence that philosophy has 
since long ago always arrived too late. Certainly. But I believe that 
today, in this disruption, this lateness is unsustainable and irrational, 
and that it must be in advance overthrown, not by rejecting technology, 
that is, exosomatization, which could only be purely illusory, but by 
elaborating a new politics (evoked in July 2014 by Evgeny Morozov in 
a remarkable article in the Guardian362).
Geoffroy de Lagasnerie and Edouard Louis deplore the absence 
of intellectual debate. For my part I deplore that, like Manuel Valls, 
they have apparently never heard either of Pharmacologie du Front 
National or of States of Shock – in which I argue that so-called ‘post-
structuralism’ has significantly contributed, in France and elsewhere, 
to the legitimation first of neoliberal discourse and then libertar-
ian discourse, the libertarians being those who are the practitioners 
of disruption.
This is occurring not only because ‘intellectuals’ yield to the drive-
based ideology of the extreme right as it continues to gain ground. It 
is because there is no thought of the present age worthy of the name 
– and here, where I am resolutely ‘on the left’, I would never say that 
such a thought ‘worthy of the name’ would necessarily be on the left.
The ‘intellectuals’, whether of the ‘left’ or the ‘right’, are stuck in 
an antiquated opposition between ‘intellectual’ and ‘manual’ that 
refers in a more profound way to the opposition between logos and 
tekhnē against which Marx fought, and which he posited as the basis 
of the ideology that was then called ‘bourgeois’. This has largely been 
forgotten, in particular by the heirs of Althusser and firstly by Alain 
Badiou. For the consequence lies in the fact that, contrary to what 
Badiou’s hero, Plato, wants to prove, knowledge is always constituted 
by technics, which in so doing always constitutes a social relation.
It is by starting out again from these questions that the relationship 
between right and left must be rethought. This is profoundly tied to 
industrial history. If the distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ occurs 
during the French Revolution, this is because the latter was the effect 
of a transformation of society by the bourgeoisie, and where the divide 
that organizes social dynamics and historical blockages ceases to be 
the opposition between ‘nobles’ and ‘peasants’ but becomes instead 
that between capital and labour.
The left defends labour and the right defends capital. Freed from 
the constraints of the Ancien Régime, the bourgeoisie were able to 
constitute industrial society, which was the major achievement of the 
First French Empire, and in which two completely different dynamic 
contradictions co-existed: on the one hand, the Ancien Régime and 
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Revolution, which endured long after the French Revolution – as 
evidenced by the Restoration and the Counter-Revolution – and on 
the other hand, right and left, which are different categories again, 
describing the new division arising when the Ancien Régime was 
truly gone – a transitional world lasting until Napoleon III, which was 
described, notably, by Balzac and Flaubert.
It is in this context that the notion of ‘Progress’ arises, and conse-
quently the notion of the ‘Enlightenment’: the discourse of the left is 
a conception of what is rational in an industrial society, that is, such 
that it can be characterized as ‘Progress’. ‘Progressive’ then means 
‘left-wing’. The discourse of the right is another conception of what is 
rational in this respect, often consisting in wanting to limit ‘Progress’ 
– but not always. There have been, rarely, right-wing discourses that 
would intensify ‘Progress’, but that question whether the priority of 
‘Progress’ is the reduction of social inequalities.
Today, the promoters of what is now called ‘innovation’ rather than 
‘Progress’ are frequently ‘right-wing’. And those who criticize it, and 
sometimes oppose it, are often ‘left-wing’. All this has gone through 
many stages. As for Marx and Engels, what they admired in the bour-
geoisie was its ability to concretize this ‘Progress’, and what they 
denounced was the social injustices to which it gave rise (all this can 
be found in the opening of The Communist Manifesto – 1848).
Rarely have these evolutions been analysed and consequences 
drawn – Morozov’s analysis of what he calls technological solutionism 
is one of the few examples. Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition,363 too, represents a moment in which these changes were 
analysed, but I have tried to show why this analysis is no longer suf-
ficient,364 and the disastrous (for the left) ambiguities contained in this 
work, which also opens up a thousand fundamental questions.
The context of these questions is disruption. In this disruption, soci-
ety is literally disintegrated by innovation, in turn driven exclusively 
by the market, itself in the hands of shareholders. This can lead only 
to what Nietzsche (rather an opponent of ‘left-wing’ thinking, if not 
himself ‘on the right’) called ressentiment. And Nietzsche distrusted 
those who were called not yet ‘leftist intellectuals’ but ‘democrats’ 
and ‘socialists’, because they seemed to him figures of ressentiment.
The great question of our time is that of becoming in the 
Anthropocene, in the course of which exosomatization, of which 
Marx and Engels were the first thinkers, has passed completely into 
the hands of the most speculative, irresponsible and self-destructive 
capitalism. And here the question of surrogate motherhood, which 
has stirred ‘social debate’ in France (thereby diverting attention from 
social, political, intellectual and economic poverty), would merit a 
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debate on some basis other than the indigent logorrhoea incited by 
this ‘social issue’.
Surrogacy, along with genetically modified organisms and other 
technologies of life, constitutes a new age of exosomatization. It is 
as such that these issues must be addressed, and it is as disruptive 
technologies that the market promotes them. ‘Progressive’ or ‘con-
servative’ attitudes are nothing more than two ways of denying this 
new state of fact, which remains to be thought – that is, to be trans-
formed into a state of law, rather than exploited in order to distract 
attention from the fundamental issues, of which these technologies of 
life are cases.
Immense unrest has seized hold of the world. The risk is that this 
unrest will turn into something more than just disquiet, and more 
even than anguish: into terror. This danger is obvious to anyone who 
is not too afraid to look at what is taking place, and it is fundamen-
tally connected to the becoming of the Anthropocene: the direction in 
which this geological age is unfolding is increasingly seen by human-
kind as an inexorably fatal form of becoming.
All of us more or less think that this eventuality – the fatal becom-
ing of the Anthropocene – is the most likely outcome. Why do we not 
ourselves say so? According to Hegel it is by starting from unrest that 
we begin to think. If we do not think with unrest, the latter engenders 
fear, then regression, then terror. Ought we not engage ourselves in 
thinking what everything suggests is the context and the horizon of 
what Lagasnerie and Louis call the experience of powerlessness, and 
undertake an experiment of thought by posing the enormous question 
of disruption that is the current stage of the Anthropocene?
I write here in my capacity as president of Ars Industrialis, which 
is engaged in debating these questions in the European context. We 
argue that to combat the protean regression afflicting our age, we 
need to look clear-sightedly at the world, in order to propose a new 
macro-economic organization. The latter must be based on the sys-
temic and systematic valorization of negentropy – which requires a 
redefinition of the theory of value, as Marx called it in his ‘Fragment 
on Machines’ in the Grundrisse,365 a text ignored in France (except 
by Lyotard).
Entropy is becoming, devenir. Negentropy is what inscribes within 
it a future, avenir. Becoming and future have until today been con-
fused. It is this confusion that makes us powerless, and it is what the 
impasse of the Anthropocene reveals. Such a perspective is also an 
immense building site for intellectual construction – open to all those 
who still have the ability to think for themselves, rather than vainly 
repeat received ideas. This implies in principle the need to constitute a 
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neganthropology by reopening the questions raised by the theories of 
entropy and negentropy in the second half of the twentieth century, in 
France and elsewhere.366
Part Three
Caring Beyond the Entropocene
13 What is Called Caring?  
Thinking Beyond the Anthropocene
In honour of Rudolf Boehm
A few years ago, while visiting or, rather, rummaging about 
Notre-Dame, the author of this book found, in an obscure 
nook of one of the towers, the following word, engraved by 
hand upon the wall: –
ΑΝΑΓΚΗ
These Greek capitals, black with age, and quite deeply 
graven in the stone, with I know not what signs peculiar to 
Gothic calligraphy imprinted on their forms and upon their 
attitudes, as though with the purpose of revealing that it 
had been a hand of the Middle Ages which had inscribed 
them there, and especially the fatal and melancholy meaning 
contained in them, struck the author deeply.
He questioned himself; he sought to divine who could 
have been that soul in torment which had not been willing 
to quit this world without leaving this stigma of crime or 
unhappiness upon the brow of the ancient church. […]
Thus, with the exception of the fragile memory which 
the author of this book here consecrates to it, there remains 
today nothing whatever of the mysterious word engraved 
within the gloomy tower of Notre-Dame – nothing of the 
destiny which it so sadly summed up. The man who wrote 
that word upon the wall disappeared from the midst of 
the generations of man many centuries ago; the word, in 
its turn, has been effaced from the wall of the church; the 
church will, perhaps, itself soon disappear from the face 
of the earth.
It is upon this word that this book is founded.
Victor Hugo367
Introduction: On Ill-Being
I Being and evil in the ordeal of the extremely  
bad mood called ‘post-truth’
In the new edition of the first three volumes of Technics and Time,368 
reissued by Fayard, an afterword will be included with the title 
‘The New Conflict of the Faculties and Functions’.369 It conjoins the 
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concepts put forward in Cinematic Time, which was published just 
prior to 11 September 2001, with those developed after this immense 
catastrophe, and up until 2016. The function of the present work is to 
complete this supplement, while at the same time inscribing it into 
the course of events that led to the election of Donald Trump on 8 
November 2016.
This text370 is therefore an attempt both:
1 to specify the exceptional situation occurring with 
this election;
2 and to situate and project the first three volumes of Technics 
and Time, and to prepare the writing of the next volume, in 
the context of the Anthropocene – here characterized as an 
Entropocene.
We will see that in the absence of epoch provoked by disruption as 
noetic desertification – which accomplishes nihilism, where this has 
been called ‘post-truth’, an expression that has been designated the 
2016 Oxford Dictionaries ‘word of the year’371 – a systemic and func-
tional link arises between truth and entropy.
The ordeal of post-truth in the Entropocene is eschatological in the 
sense that ἔσχατον refers in Greek to the limit, where eschatology is 
a discourse on the extreme limit. That pseudo-religious resurgences 
proliferate in the twenty-first century is not merely an avatar of the 
industry of fantasies and frustrations that drive-based capitalism, 
having become psychotic,372 cultivates, just as a mad scientist may, 
beyond any φρόνησις (phronēsis), culture a deadly virus – note here 
that it is not by chance that marketing has become ‘viral’, or that Peter 
Thiel was trained in the Girardian philosophy of ‘mimetic desire’.373
Post-truth is not just a deviation from the scientific understanding 
of truth, or from the formation of public opinion. Post-truth presents 
itself first as a mood [humeur]. And, more precisely, as an extremely 
bad mood. To understand this, and therefore to characterize the 
Entropocene era, we must return to the question of ill-being that was 
posed in the subtitle of La technique et le temps 3. Le temps du cinéma 
et la question du mal-être.
To refer to a time of cinema, and to approach it as a question of ill-
being, was to assert – on the eve of 9/11 – that the ‘question of being’, 
and the ‘history of being’, and, through that, the history of truth, must 
all be reconsidered from the perspective of cinema inasmuch as, as an 
industry commencing from a screening in 1895 at the Boulevard des 
Capucines in Paris, it gave rise to the question of an arche-cinema, 
which, after Technics and Time, 3, we have tried to show374 takes shape 
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during the Upper Palaeolithic with the appearance of the first hypom-
nesic tertiary retentions.
That one could describe 9/11 as the biggest blockbuster [super-
production] in showbiz history375 [histoire du spectacle] is a notion 
we should consider quite seriously. But we can understand what is at 
stake in doing so only if, whatever hypothesis we envisage, we relate 
it to the global dimension of what seems to be developing via the pro-
liferation of screens within a biospherical cave with no outside – in 
Peter Szendy’s376 sense, when, passing through Carl Schmitt, and in 
order to approach Kant and the cosmopolitical question he raises, he 
philosofictionalizes the end of the political age [fin des temps poli-
tiques] as we have known it until now: as that of a city delimited by 
a free outside, as Schmitt says, and inasmuch as it has enabled the 
formation of a cosmopolitical discourse anticipating the possibility of 
a society of nations.377
That tele-vision, realizing a massacre in real time for an audience 
numbering in the billions, has the capacity to generate the feeling of a 
kind of coming apocalypse (firstly for the murderers who ensured the 
‘superproduction’ of the event), finds its default of origin in the Upper 
Palaeolithic: cave decoration prefigures cinematographic hallucina-
tion through a primordial, discretized noetic projection.
‘The New Conflict of the Faculties and Functions’ tries to show 
that, in these adorned caves, a process of the exosomatization of 
noetic functions was initiated, including, in particular, the function of 
imagination, insofar as primary and secondary retentions and proten-
tions are henceforth arranged via tertiary retentions. The latter, from 
the teddy bear to the fetish object, constitute screens for all manner 
of projections, right up to their most recent habitable extremities: the 
Twin Towers, setting for the horrendous [épouvantable] in the great 
tragedy that will open the twenty-first century.
In what follows we will return briefly to this Palaeolithic default 
of origin of arche-cinema, which will be developed in more detail in 
Symboles et diaboles, in order to confront the birth of the history of 
metaphysical truth, that is, via the interpretation of the cave allegory 
to which Heidegger would constantly return (notably in 1925, 1931 
and 1940). It will then be a question – and we will pursue this with 
Peter Szendy and Carl Schmitt – of knowing if we must leave the 
cave, and if so, how, and if not, what to do.
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II Retentions, protentions and exosomatization:  
from vital différance to noetic différance
To approach this age of cinema [temps du cinéma] and the question 
of arche-cinema that it contains as the question of ill-being, or as 
what remains unquestioned in this ill-being,378 which would also be 
what remains unthought, untreated and uncared-for [impansé],379 is to 
understand, from the perspective of this arche-cinema, the advent of 
the industrial ‘time of cinema’ as a bifurcation. At the origin of noe-
sis, and as default of origin, there lies just such a bifurcation – which, 
as we will see below, is accomplished in two stages: on the one hand, 
the time of primordial exosomatization, which constitutes the archaic 
basis of tertiary retention, and, on the other hand, noetic exosomatiza-
tion, which arranges the noetic functions such as philosophy tries to 
think them and, in so doing, to think itself.
Tertiary retentions in general, and hypomnesic tertiary retentions 
in particular, as they arise in the course of exosomatization, condition 
the arrangements of primary and secondary retentions and proten-
tions. Starting from the bifurcation in which the advent of industrial 
cinema in the late nineteenth century consists, retentions and proten-
tions380 are knotted together [se nouent] and play out [se jouent] com-
pletely otherwise than during the ‘history of being’.
The ‘history of being’, in other words, is trans-formed by the evolu-
tion of hypomnesic tertiary retention. During the course of its trans-
formations, it trans-forms truth, such that, as a-lētheia, it arranges 
retentions and protentions via circuits of the transindividuation of 
truth [circuits de transindividuation véritatifs] that amount to proten-
tional selections whose criteria are retentions.
Retentions and protentions are arranged by attention – and noesis 
is what constitutes rational attentional forms381 in the sense that the 
latter, which are cumulative, and which constitute syntheses, that is, 
judgments, are founded on analyses themselves exposed to critique, 
that is, to the discernment (κρίνω) whose necessity is imposed dur-
ing crises. ‘Rational’, here, does not mean logical, referring to apo-
dictic truth as canon and so on (the logical and the apodictic con-
stituting a specific configuration of the exosomatization of noetic 
functions and faculties), but everything that assumes the function 
of reason as the capacity to effect a noetic bifurcation after a doubly 
epokhal redoubling.
The ‘history of being’ is a succession of such crises (κρισεις) 
generated by the tensions provoked by the succession of doubly 
epokhal redoublings in which the process of exosomatization and its 
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acceleration consist – up until the limit that the Anthropocene consti-
tutes as it becomes, as limit, that is, as ἔσχατον, the Entropocene.
The age of post-truth is eschatological in that, as a confrontation 
within the ordeal of hegemonic calculation in which thoroughly com-
putational capitalism consists, and, consequently, as the test of its 
extreme limits as the Entropocene, post-truth, which is this test and 
this ordeal (this suffering), puts an end to this ‘history of being’ as the 
series of the epochs of the forgetting of being, which will have been 
the epochs of the denial of tertiary retention, that is, of tekhnē, and of 
tekhnē inasmuch as it opens up the ordeal of δίκη (dikē) and ἀδικία 
(adikia), and vice versa – tekhnē and dikē thus forming a transductive 
relation, as will be reaffirmed in the final chapter of the present work.
Noetic différance crosses the process of the exosomatization of 
life, and, as it does so, it bifurcates (in two stages382) in relation to 
vital différance, thereby establishing, on the basis of vital individu-
ation (which is endosomatic), a new regime of individuation – psy-
chic and collective individuation in their inseparability from techni-
cal individuation. In the course of the evolution of noetic différance, 
therefore, collective retentions and protentions form and accumulate 
during an evolution that is no longer simply that of life, but of the 
exosomatic itself.
III Exorganisms and their transformations – from protohistory 
to the ‘end of history’, that is, to the Entropocene
Through the combinations configured by this exosomatic différance, 
exorganisms are formed. Exorganisms are those complex and protean 
exosomatic beings that tend to territorialize themselves starting from 
the Neolithic. During the seventeenth century, Hobbes and Spinoza 
tried to conceive them as social cohesions [faire-corps] occurring 
beyond the psychic soma. But they did not consider them in terms 
of exosomatization, which enters the scene as such only with Marx – 
even if Bacon was clearly already pointing in that direction.
Through territorialization, territories themselves become exorgan-
isms on which retentional accumulations occur, while hypomnesic 
retentions also induce cumulative circulations that traverse territo-
rial exorganisms, giving rise to new dynamics – in particular those 
that liberate technical tendencies383 (and technical lineages384), which 
emancipate themselves from ethnic milieus and concretize themselves 
as technical facts. Technical facts are such concretions: always par-
tial (even negative) concretions of tendencies that constitute territorial 
exorganic functions. Today, the latter tend to become totally deterrito-
rialized as they become functions of the biosphere on a planetary scale.
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Through territorial retentional and protentional accumulation – 
through which what Technics and Time, 3 describes as retentional sys-
tems form, and such that they may also result in sedimentation,385 that 
is, an institutional sclerosis within the transindividuation produced by 
this territorial accumulation – collective retentions and protentions 
constitute what becomes, at once:
 ▪ a constantly regenerated potential for psychic and collective 
individuations;
 ▪ an obstacle to new retentions and protentions, to their selec-
tion and to their inscription onto new circuits of transindi-
viduation différantially arranging the ‘flows’ and ‘stases’ 
that characterize exosomatic evolution, such that it shapes 
the dynamic tension of the doubly epokhal redoubling386;
 ▪ a sedimentation of traces of all kinds – from the anthropized 
landscape to the ruin, passing through the museum, 
the monument, pollution, the social network, nuclear 
waste and so on;
 ▪ the formation of deterritorialized exorganisms, which, 
between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, tend 
to emancipate themselves completely from territorial 
exorganisms.
Retentional and protentional accumulation and sedimentation thereby 
constitutes both a memory and a forgetting – this is already at stake 
in On the Genealogy of Morality and its mnemotechnics.387 But what 
Nietzsche still did not see clearly388 is that this ‘both’ is what charac-
terizes the pharmakon.
The accumulation of waste becomes perceptible as such (as the 
intrinsic character of an irreducibly pharmacological exosomatiza-
tion) only when the threshold has been crossed that means the entire 
biosphere has been saturated by anthropization, where there is no lon-
ger a square metre of virgin territory left to be found, where a stage 
of toxicity has been reached that is comparable to Freud’s description 
of the fate of protists that destroy themselves due to their inability to 
eliminate the toxins they produce:
An infusorian, therefore, if it is left to itself, dies a natural 
death owing to its incomplete voidance of the products of its 
own metabolism. (It may be that the same incapacity is the 
ultimate cause of the death of all higher animals as well.)389
Part Three: Caring Beyond the Entropocene 194
In the course of the history of truth, and as the onto-theological his-
tory of the denial of the pharmakon (of its irreducible toxicity regard-
less of any remediation), a denial that usually comes at the expense 
of a pharmakos, the accumulation of collective retentions and pro-
tentions thereby forms epochs. These retentional and protentional 
epochs, which always end by themselves becoming toxic, are char-
acterized by forms of knowledge that always end up turning into non-
knowledge. This knowledge and non-knowledge is tied to retentions 
and protentions via circuits of transindividuation. These connections 
are metastabilized by synchronic configurations, which, in their 
mutually allagmatic390 relations, form epistēmai.
Synchronic and diachronic relations constitute macrocosmic and 
microcosmic scales that configure and metastabilize – via instruments 
of macroscopic and microscopic observation, control, regulation, obli-
gation and so on – the circuits of transindividuation forming a local 
dynamic and exosomatic system, that is, a local exorganism. Circuits 
of transindividuation themselves metastabilize transductive relations 
of scale, within which allagmatic relations take shape. These allag-
matic relations are operational schemes that open up opportunities for 
trans-formative operations.
Because they are also sedimentations, the accumulations that these 
epistēmai constitute through the metastabilized circuits of their tran-
sindividuation also contain non-knowledge. This non-knowledge 
consists of arrangements of retentions and protentions forming ste-
reotypes (that is, indurations and stases) and traumatypes (that is, 
troubles and disturbances). This is why we must understand this non-
knowledge in two senses:
 ▪ There is the non-knowledge that lies beyond knowledge, 
that is, as its future, which has a ‘consistence’ that exceeds 
all knowledge because it is the knowledge of what does not 
exist, of what has never existed, of what will never exist, 
being a promise of knowledge remaining always yet to 
come, and belonging through projections to what Aristotle 
called the timiotata – to what is most precious, to that 
which is priceless391 – which traumatypically affects noetic 
individuals (troubling, disturbing, moving them in the 
sense of e-moting them, hence putting them metabolically 
into movement).
 ▪ There is non-knowledge inasmuch as, through the process 
of exteriorization in which the retentional and protentional 
accumulation of knowledge consists, this exteriorization 
bars access to forms of knowledge insofar as the latter are 
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in fact savourous only as living, reanimating and regener-
ating what, in accumulated knowledge, has become dead, 
stereotypical, automatized, so that the exteriorization of 
knowledge (and, in that, its automatization) in all its forms 
is its condition of possibility, but where this is thus also its 
mortification, its condition of impossibility392: its irreduc-
ibly tragic tenor.
IV The epistēmē of capital as totalization and extreme ill-being 
in the face of ‘absolute danger’ and ‘monstrosity’
Non-knowledge, understood in this second sense, is what the epistēmē 
of capital has generalized, an epistēmē that arose with mechanical ter-
tiary retention at the end of the eighteenth century.393 This general-
ization of non-knowledge has led to the current situation of extreme 
ill-being that characterizes the Entropocene in its most recent phase 
and insofar as it is disruptive as such, as we shall understand better 
through a reading of Alfred Lotka.394
It is this non-knowledge that has led to thoroughly computational 
capitalism395 – which amounts, as I will try to show in what follows, 
to automated totalization, and to a planetary totalitarianism and a 
global market that are both ‘smart’ and ‘soft’. As such, capitalism 
constitutes a negative epistēmē, and an absence of epoch in that it 
is an epoch of absolute non-knowledge. This ‘absolute’ confirms the 
Hegelian analysis of the phenomenology of spirit, but inverts it, and, 
ultimately, overturns it as an eschatology of extreme limits sometimes 
referred to as the ‘end of History’ – where there arises an absolute 
emergency [urgence absolue].
This overturning inversion [inversion renversante] is not that under-
taken by Engels and Marx: it also to a large extent overturns their 
analyses, in particular with respect to the proletariat as bearing a 
negative potential. This is why, without questioning and problematiz-
ing in new ways the dynamic elements that remain to be developed 
in the Marxist thought of capital – in particular in the Grundrisse – 
as well as the limits of these analyses, and sometimes their regres-
sions in the Marxist corpus itself, it will be completely impossible to 
struggle against the ideological underpinnings that have led to the 
Trumpocene,396 and, notably, the arguments of Francis Fukuyama and 
Samuel Huntington, but also, more recently, the less well-known the-
ses of Peter Thiel.
With the advent of industrial cinema, Hollywood reconfigured the 
‘American way of life’ as a function of consumption, just as Taylorism 
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reconfigured the function of production. Subsequently, in the ‘post-
truth’ world of algorithmic governmentality, the question of evil 
resurfaces, and it does so macrocosmologically – and not morally – 
after the Nietzschean attempt to leap (Sprung) beyond good and evil, 
and as the threat from within the biosphere to the biosphere itself. We 
will see in the next chapter how Lotka, as a thinker of exosomatiza-
tion, anticipated this threat.
The question of evil returns in what presents itself more than ever 
as a cave with multiple planetary dimensions, but with no way out397 
– filled with simulacra, a word we should understand in the sense of 
Nietzsche, Deleuze, Baudrillard, Simondon, as well as Winnicott, 
and, beyond all of these authors, from the perspective of exosomatiza-
tion. This immense cave incubates a macrocosmic and microcosmic 
ill-being that is also a dangerous psychosocial malaise, which, after 
the questions raised in Technics and Time, 3, has turned into the reign 
of stupidity and a world going mad – as it sinks into the filth [immon-
dices] of post-truth, a filth whose variations are as diverse as the types 
and functions of excretions in endosomatic life.
To take up such questions, to assume them, such that they put the 
‘question of the question’ itself into question, as Jacques Derrida 
reopened it in Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question,398 is also to 
reinterpret, in a new way, Book VII of the Republic and its allegory. 
‘In a new way’ here means: beyond Martin Heidegger, but passing 
through him.
This pathway explains why Stephen Barker’s translation of La tech-
nique et le temps 3. Le temps du cinéma et la question du mal-être as 
Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise is 
both justified and problematic. Mal-être, ill-being, is certainly a mal-
aise, and a psychosocial malaise, as we have just affirmed – it is a 
humour, a mood, a Stimmung: a disposition, an ‘affective tonality’. 
But this malaise, which is not simply psychic, is an ill-being in the 
sense that it stems from a cosmic disorder affecting – and as its ill-
ness [mal] – the being of Dasein, and, beyond Dasein, ‘being with-
out beings’.399
This ill-being is not just a malaise because it is not only a mood: 
it is also and above all what, as the macrocosmic disorder of the bio-
sphere, provokes400 a dis-integration of configurations that, in the 
course of the history of truth, and in a fundamental relationship to 
science, being and evil will constantly impose in the denial of tertiary 
retention and its primacy – and where this denial characterizes the 
history of the West that Heidegger called the history of being, and that 
Nietzsche called nihilism.
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The provocation (Herausfordern401) involved in this reconsideration 
of the history of truth, and as its objective deconstruction, is what, at 
the end of the exergue of Of Grammatology, Derrida opens up under 
the names of absolute danger and monstrosity:
The future can be anticipated only in the form of an absolute 
danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with constituted 
normality and can thus announce itself, present itself, only 
as a kind of monstrosity.402
This provocation of danger, insofar as it presents itself as monstrous 
– presenting itself firstly, after the Second World War, before the 
École and its clerics, and then, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, to the eyes of everyone, in various ways, from the École to 
those who voted for Trump or for Le Pen – is therefore that within 
which Derrida’s deconstructive approach presents itself and imposes 
itself. And it is that which deconstructs the deconstructive approach 
of Heidegger, where the latter comes to an end with a consideration of 
danger as the source of what alone can ‘also save’.
To what extent will Derrida himself have taken the measure and 
exceeded [mesuré et démesuré] what is at stake here? And what about 
the ‘Derridians’?
V Negative teleology of total proletarianization: 
grammatization and pharmacology
‘Absolute danger’ and ‘monstrosity’ are what arise [apparaît] in and 
as the Entropocene, that is, as the negative phenomenology of a nega-
tive teleology. Hence the ordeal presents itself: the ordeal of what 
challenges us and creates questions as a pharmacology and through 
the symptomatology403 of a denial – of which the election of Donald 
Trump, as advent of the Trumpocene, is a caricature, as reign of 
‘post-truth’.
This inapparition – which Derrida, in dialogue with Jean-Luc 
Marion, did not himself relate [rapportée] to negative theology, even 
if he did, if I may put it like this, deport [deportee] from it404 – un-
does and de-feats [de-faits], in the great sorrow of its eschatology and 
in the form of ‘post-truth’, the questions that accumulated during the 
course of metaphysics as collective retentions and collective proten-
tions. Hence arises, at ‘the end of philosophy’, the misunderstanding 
that ‘there-being has of its being’.
The Entropocene un-does and de-feats the questions of metaphys-
ics: it unravels them by de-constructing them through what Derrida 
himself describes as an objective deconstruction. At the risk of 
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seeming to be the legitimation of this state of fact,405 Derridian decon-
struction merely gathers up this defabrication of preceding noetic cir-
cuits by the disruptive fabrications of a capitalism that, in the ordeal 
of ill-being that is its result, and which is the eschatological ordeal of 
nihilism, fulfils [accompli] the latter as de-noetization, that is, as total 
proletarianization.
Derrida will introduce the question of the pharmakon one year after 
publishing Of Grammatology – the pharmakon was yet to appear in 
the earlier work. The pharmakon is what, as tertiary retention, puts in 
question the possibility of questioning itself: it forms an obstacle to 
anamnesis, that is, to what fulfils [accomplit] the question. The pos-
sibility of questioning is, in Being and Time, what defines the being 
that we ourselves are, Dasein, and it is this possibility that, in the 
existential analytic that is Being and Time, makes Dasein the privi-
leged being whose existential structures are to be analysed in order to 
clarify being itself as time, and in what Heidegger calls the historiality 
(Geschichtlichkeit) of the ontological difference of being and beings.
But Dasein can question only because it is itself put into question. 
And what puts it into question is the pharmakon. The pharmakon, 
as a technical (exosomatic) upheaval, is what puts into question the 
one who questions, which is to say the very possibility of question-
ing. Dasein, the privileged being, questions only inasmuch as it is put 
into question by that which precedes it and at the same time exceeds 
it beyond all questions,406 thereby forming what Bergson called an 
obligation.407
This putting into question of the being who questions by the phar-
makon hence puts the question itself into question. The question is 
what leads – as its fulfilment – to what Socrates calls anamnesis. But 
anamnesis, which is provoked and in a way invoked by the exosomatic 
hypomnesis that is the pharmakon, which is as such curative, is also 
what this hypomnesis can impede. This is why the putting into ques-
tion of the question itself, which will be the key issue in Of Spirit: 
Heidegger and the Question, is already in play in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 
and as that which grants play, which is also to say that which gives the 
rule of the game: what Derrida shows is that hypomnesis is the condi-
tion of anamnesis, itself constituting the question as such.
Such a rule is the an-archic rule of an absence of rule: the rule of the 
default as the default of the rule that is necessary [la règle du défaut 
comme défaut de règle qu’il faut].
But this means that the pharmakon is always that in relation to 
which a bifurcation can and must operate, such that it is offered by 
the pharmakon, against the pharmakon, and as its quasi-causality, 
beyond any Aufhebung, any dialectical synthesis, whether ‘idealist’ 
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or ‘materialist’: pharmacological quasi-causality always ends by itself 
generating new pharmaka, which revive the tragic situation in which 
exosomatization consists inasmuch as it opens promises that it can 
keep only by différantiating the horizon anew.408
Such a quasi-causal bifurcation in exosomatization, which engen-
ders a promise by reviving all the promises already broken, is what 
can and what must be described today on the basis of questions stem-
ming from theories of entropy and anti-entropy409 reconsidered from 
the perspective of exosomatization – something that Derrida never 
took into account in his publications, except in The Post Card, which 
referred to the ‘energetic “model”’410 of Carnot-Clausius only to 
exclude this perspective evoked by Breuer and Freud.411
Reconsidered and deconstructed on the basis of a deconstruction 
of the Heideggerian and Derridian deconstructions, these theories, 
which were ignored by Heidegger as they were by Derrida, and the 
promises they make it possible to revive and reactivate on the basis 
of this reconsideration, constitute what we claim here to be a negan-
thropological enterprise in the Entropocene, where this is what tries to 
care-fully think [panser] the Entropocene.412
By starting from the aperiodic crystals that form the genetic enve-
lopes of the species, Erwin Schrödinger showed in 1944 that endoso-
matic organogenesis as vital différance is what enables the dissipation 
of energy to be locally and temporarily deferred, and that it is through 
this process that the organogenetic differentiation we refer to as evo-
lution is engendered, whereas the dissipation of energy constitutes 
the thermodynamic law of inorganic realities. ‘The New Conflict of 
the Faculties and Functions’ attempts to show that we must integrate 
Schrödinger’s analysis with that of Lotka in 1945,413 when he showed 
that the human species is exosomatic,414 and hence that it requires an 
economy and a différance of entropy that Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 
would later describe as the continuation or replacement of biology.415
Such a passage from biology to economy requires, however, tak-
ing a step beyond what, with Schrödinger, would allow life to be 
described as the local and temporary production of negative entropy – 
more correctly called anti-entropy416 – through an endosomatic organ-
ogenesis that shapes the organic limits of species and the individuals 
of which they are composed.417 Exosomatic organogenesis fundamen-
tally displaces these limits by projecting them beyond the living, and 
it pursues evolution by constantly displacing them. This is what Freud, 
in Civilization and Its Discontents, called the ‘perfecting’ of organs.418
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VI Noesis and acceleration: informational indifférance
This constant displacement of limits occurs ever more rapidly. And 
the more the organs are perfected, the greater the side effects they 
produce – which are the price of the pharmacological character of 
exosomatization, and which constantly require further improvements 
[perfectionnements] – and the more exosomatic organogenesis over-
takes social organizations, and, ultimately, disintegrates them. It is 
starting from this observation, and from the extremely destructive 
effects of the two world wars that would shape the twentieth century, 
that in 1945 Lotka put forward his theory of exosomatization.
This disintegration419 is what, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, reaches a limit point with digital tertiary retention and the 
calculation and transmission speeds it makes possible. It is this that 
has been called ‘disruption.’420 And this is what we are trying to think 
here in terms of the possibility of a new type of doubly epokhal redou-
bling in the absence of epoch, which as such constitutes, and as the 
ordeal of post-truth, the eschatology of what Heidegger called the 
‘history of being’. It constitutes a new era of noesis,421 that is, a new 
arrangement between its functions, and as the organological reconsti-
tution of a future of knowledge.422
To take responsibility [prendre en charge] for such questions, today, 
is to show that the concepts of entropy and anti-entropy, as they have 
been mobilized by information theory and cybernetics, do not allow 
our exosomatic and pharmacological situation to be either thought 
[penser] or taken care of [panser], a situation that, in the epoch of 
computational capitalism, becomes not only toxic but irreversibly 
destructive. This eschatology therefore constitutes the imperative of 
a decisive bifurcation that is all the more worrying inasmuch as its 
accomplishment is in a strict sense improbable and literally in-cred-
ible [in-vraisemblable]: it requires a leap beyond common sense, the 
latter having proven to stem from a stupidity [bêtise] that is the most 
widely shared thing in the world in the epoch of post-truth.
The microcosmic and macrocosmic symptom of this situation is the 
extremely bad mood. To remain unaware of this situation – which is 
the common blindness characteristic of the absence of epoch – will 
therefore take the question of improbability to its extreme limit, 
insofar as the improbable refers to any bifurcation emerging from 
différance, whether vital or noetic. This extremity is untreatable 
[impansable] in fact, but not in law. Law is even what affirms, beyond 
the law, and as its very promise, a justice that will never eventuate, 
which will therefore never be cured of injustice (incurable as such, if 
not untreatable [impansable]), yet which it is a matter of treating and 
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thoughtfully caring about [panser]: it is precisely [justement] a mat-
ter of care-fully thinking it [panser], and doing so against all odds 
[envers et contre tout].
To take thoughtful care [panser] of the absence of epoch is to treat 
and take care of the entropology of the Entropocene423 – such that it 
must now traverse the ordeal of post-truth, and face up to the danger 
that Donald Trump incarnates from head to toe and passing through 
Twitter. This is possible only by returning:
 ▪ to Heidegger’s and Derrida’s silence with respect to the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics;
 ▪ to the limits or errors involved in the use of thermodynamic 
theory in information science and cybernetic theory.
The concept of information, concretized and put in play as fixed capi-
tal (ignored by Shannon, but not by Wiener), is what tends to elimi-
nate noetic différance itself (which worries Wiener), as well as vital 
différance, and does so through the generalized proletarianization not 
just of production and consumption but of conceptualization.
As the opening of a widening gap in relation to what is now called 
(officially and hypothetically since August 2016) the geo-logical era 
of the Anthropocene – an era that affects the very notion of geology, 
and, along with it, the notion of scales of time, disrupted as they are 
by the speed of the pharmaka emerging from the industrial era – the 
notion of the Entropocene is the outcome of the work carried out after 
Technics and Time, 3, and it introduces a number of new questions, 
concepts, themes and problems in relation to those that the introduc-
tion to Technics and Time, 1 tried to specify in 1994.424
Henceforth, the pharmacological situation is what imposes itself 
in the biosphere as an inescapable test – one that can therefore not 
be deferred in its ‘as such’ – of the structural ambiguity of this posi-
tively and negatively dynamic situation, which is to say a situation 
both promising and dangerous, as was already foreshadowed in what 
in 1949 Heidegger called Gestell. But it is also what imposes itself 
through the reactions and operations of denial that it provokes – and, 
first and foremost, on the part of Heidegger himself, and where this 
is what the Derridian deconstruction of Heideggerian deconstruction 
pursues without itself escaping this fate – which is the issue at stake 
in Monsieur Teste.
This denial is a primary functional trait of capitalism, which, 
becoming with digital tertiary retention thoroughly computational, 
constitutes a ‘smart’ capitalism based on a permanent and planetary 
totalization itself constituting a ‘soft’ totalitarianism, industrially and 
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mathematically exploiting the drives and the mimetic archaisms that 
underlie them. This vast industry of lies, addiction and flights into 
compensatory fantasy prospers by exploiting the inherently destruc-
tive denialist tendencies that constitute the arche-protention of being-
towards-the dead,425 which is not just being-towards-death but negan-
thropological différance, and as being-for-life.
Neganthropological différance, which is noetic différance inso-
far as it always exceeds Anthropos, defers, through its exosomatic 
organs, the completion of an irreducible entropic tendency that is also 
anthropic precisely in that these organs are pharmaka. Anthropy des-
ignates this problem of living that Anthropos constitutes as a species 
that is entropically self-destructive – what Lévi-Strauss calls entro-
pology – and which, as such, destroys life in general.
To the anthropic tendency, we must not oppose but impose a negan-
thropological tendency, by quasi-causally inhabiting the anthropic 
tendency and in so doing reversing it, that is, localizing it, through 
a neganthropic bifurcation – which Lévi-Strauss never succeeded in 
imagining due to having failed to read Leroi-Gourhan seriously,426 
and which Heidegger both gave to thought and care [donnée à panser], 
while himself leaving it unthought.
VII Caring for the pharmakos:  
ill-being’s chosen one is not the Antichrist
To differ from and defer the anthropic tendency, expressing an entro-
pic tendency itself irreducible: this has the structure of a promise that 
is never kept but always awaited – because its condition of possibility 
is also its condition of impossibility, and vice versa (which means that 
desire only ever wants the impossible, that is, the infinite: the incalcu-
lable that is the singular insofar as it is incomparable).
Neganthropology concerns the animal who makes promises, and it 
is this that is concealed within the Derridian concept of différance. 
But it is not developed there – since it fails to consider life and sur-
vival after the thermodynamic question, and its différance from the 
living as anti-entropic locality. The denial of the pre-eminence of the 
thermodynamic question after Clausius is common to most of those 
who have tried to overcome metaphysics, that is, passive nihilism: 
Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. Freud and Bergson (and, to 
a lesser extent, Lacan) are, however, exceptions, as will be argued in 
La technique et le temps 6. L’idiotie.427
The work on ill-being that must care-fully think [panser] the 
Entropocene resumes the work begun in Technics and Time, and does 
so at the moment when the Anthropocene becomes the Trumpocene. 
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Everyone knows that Trump is the elect(ion) of ill-being. Does this 
mean he represents the election of evil, if not the Chosen One of Evil 
– the Antichrist? In no way, except in the sense that it would be a mat-
ter of overcoming the nihilistic figure of the Antichrist. By dressing 
up this noun, Evil, with a capital letter [majuscule] – the majesty of 
capitals that in French empties all substantives of their substance – we 
make this Evil opposed to good, which thus becomes ‘the Good’. What 
characterizes the post-truth of which Trump is the incarnation at the 
head of the planetary digital Leviathan428 is this miniscule evil borne 
by the law of averages that is today the de-composition of tendencies, 
which, from a neganthropological perspective, must always compose.
The decomposition of neganthropic compositions is that in which 
the process of nihilism consists, of which Trump embodies the 
extreme limit and hence the eschatological dimension. Trump, how-
ever, is not, and even precisely not, Evil. He is bad, an evil, but this 
evil is above all the symptom of an ill-being that did not wait for 
him in order to impose itself. And it has been imposed, notably, by 
the structural carelessness of the Clinton family and the ‘Democrat 
camp’, which is also to say, in large part, ‘intellectuals’, academics, 
artists and all those who, while in principle protectors of noetic and 
neganthropic différance, have, in making their profession,429 for too 
long bent themselves, capitulated, to a lamentable state of fact: that, 
precisely, of this ill-being that, too often, they have given up trying 
to treat or take care of. Failing to consider it, they have fled from 
this situation or denied it by a thousand lines of flight that evince 
no care-ful thinking [rien de pansant], and that stem from a great 
noetic cowardice.
Trump was elected by staging a scene of scapegoats, and doing so 
through the systematic and systemic use – with the help of Peter Thiel, 
experimenting with and interpreting in his own way the Girardian 
hypotheses of ‘mimetic desire’430 and the scapegoat431 – of those con-
temporary tertiary retentions that are pharmaka, triggering immense 
malaises and a terrifying ill-being, retentions that we must now think 
‘as such’ in order to be able to think and care about them and think 
and care with them [les panser et panser avec elles].
Faced with this, this flight – which has nothing to do with the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian line of flight as the pansée (as quasi-causality) 
of a bifurcation432 – consists in turning the one who designates scape-
goats into another scapegoat, that is, a living exosomatic organ onto 
which one discharges oneself and one’s responsibilities by instrumen-
talizing him and by sacrificing him on one altar or another.
What it is a matter of breaking with, here, is thus a vicious and infer-
nal circle of the designation of a pharmakos, opposing one pharmakos 
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by designating another. This circle works by exonerating oneself 
from the duty to care-fully think the pharmakon, where such a duty 
would be – in the Trumpocene, that is, ‘at the end’ of History and as 
the ‘actually effective’ (wirklich) end of the ‘history of being’ – the 
‘task of thinking’ (all this Heideggerian jargon will be revisited in 
what follows).
1 Thinking care-fully in the Anthropocene 
 in order to ‘try to live’
Halfway through the second decade of the twenty-first century, we, 
non-inhuman beings that we are, find ourselves trying to live within 
a state of emergency that is permanent, universal and unpredictable, 
and that seems bound to become unliveable. We all feel this urgency. 
But most of the time we deny it – except when we have no choice 
but to observe its immediate and disastrous effects upon our everyday 
existences, which tend thereby to find themselves reduced to subsis-
tence, that is, to survival.
This permanent, universal and unpredictable state of emergency 
affects the entire biosphere, threatening every form of life. And, from 
the side of the noetic form of life – that of the non-inhuman beings 
that we try to remain – it affects all forms of investment and therefore 
all social constructions, leading to their disintegration and threaten-
ing to lead to the worst kinds of political regression: witness the proc-
lamation in France of a ‘state of emergency’ allowing the government 
to suspend normal law and paving the way for all manner of states of 
exception that remain still to come.
In the next few years, this exceptional state will continue to dete-
riorate, because it is now that we are reaching the limits of that geo-
logical era known as the Anthropocene, in which Anthropos has 
become a key factor in the evolution of the biosphere – which is also 
the Capitalocene, and doubtless also what Martin Heidegger called 
‘modern technology’ (modernen Technik).
In 1993, the Anthropocene crossed a threshold: via the World Wide 
Web, that is, with global digital networks (in 2016, half the world’s 
population is ‘connected’ whenever and wherever it may be), the con-
ditions required for the installation of the disruption have now been 
met.433 The latter enables capitalism, which has now become thor-
oughly computational capitalism, to systemically short-circuit any 
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theoretical elaboration, any social appropriation, any collective indi-
viduation, any legal framework and any political deliberation.
In the disruption, the technology of digital tertiary retention out-
strips and overtakes thinking, whatever forms it takes, creating theo-
retical vacuums and legal vacuums in every quarter. This raises the 
question of how it might still be possible to think in the Anthropocene 
– in particular if we agree with Hegel’s definition of thinking as being 
not just an isolated mental and psychic activity, solitary and atom-
ized, but a process through which spirit is socialized – and is so in the 
experience of its fundamental lateness.434
This lateness is the experience of what I tried to think in Technics 
and Time as an originary default of origin – of which we must take 
care [pansé]. And this is what, after the most recent volume of that 
series, I have understood as the question not of dialectics, whether 
idealist or materialist, but as the necessity (Ἀνάγκη) of quasi-causality 
such as it was elaborated by Deleuze on the basis of Stoic morality 
and the Nietzschean conception of the will to power.
Quasi-causality, thus understood, is what takes up the default of ori-
gin so that it can become that which is necessary. The first three vol-
umes of Technics and Time described the consequences of the default 
of origin as the periods, eras and epochs of what Derrida called the 
‘history of the supplement’, based on what Leroi-Gourhan described 
as a process of exteriorization. Subsequently, Automatic Society and 
Dans la disruption introduced the questions of entropy, negentropy, 
the Anthropocene, the Capitalocene and the concept of exosomatiza-
tion. The last of these, exosomatization, was borrowed by Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen from the works of Alfred Lotka, with the aim of 
regrounding economic theory.435
Under what conditions can we still think in the Anthropocene? 
On the condition that we think it [penser] in order to take care of 
it [panser].
To think [penser] in order to care [panser] is to ‘try to live’ – in 
the sense of the sublime tension of the beautiful Cimetière marin436 
(repeated and interpreted in Hayao Miyazaki’s 2013 film, The Wind 
Rises) – for example, by practising biology as a vital function in exo-
somatization, such as Georges Canguilhem treated it [panse] when, at 
the beginning of Knowledge of Life, he stated, as a starting point and 
as a point of method, that is, a way of opening a path, that ‘knowing 
only in order to know is hardly more sensible than eating in order to 
eat, killing in order to kill’.437
Part Three: Caring Beyond the Entropocene 206
2 Anti-anthropy
To care-fully think [panser] the Anthropocene is to think beyond 
the Anthropocene – towards the Neganthropocene.438 The 
Neganthropocene is the prospect that must be opened up from within 
the blocked horizon that is the Anthropocene. But this requires a 
neganthropology.439
Neganthropology defines the noetic form of life as neganthropic. 
Neganthropy is what results from that combination of the capaci-
ties of the living to temporarily and locally defer entropy (which 
Schrödinger called negative entropy) that have arisen since the fact of 
exosomatization. Exosomatization does not simply produce negative 
entropy, or anti-entropy440: it produces neganthropy, or anti-anthropy.
Such a process is a noetic différance, that is, a temporalization and 
a spatialization occurring as exosomatization. Exosomatization is a 
form of organogenesis that produces organs that are non-living yet 
essential to the survival of the organism, which is thus equipped with 
organs that are not just endosomatic, that is, organic, but exosomatic, 
that is, organological.
Unlike organic organs, however, the mutual relationships between 
organological organs are indeterminate, as are the relations they 
maintain with endosomatic organs, the psychosomatic organisms 
that they compose and the social organizations wherein they develop. 
Hence exosomatization engenders a pharmaco-logical situation where 
exosomatic supplementation simultaneously saves and threatens the 
noetic form of life that is exosomatized life – as anthropy and as 
neganthropy.
Noesis, here, has the vital function (in Georges Canguilhem’s sense 
and in Alfred North Whitehead’s sense) of increasing the negan-
thropic potential and reducing the anthropic impasses to which exoso-
matization always inevitably and simultaneously leads.
3 Hypercritique
To care-fully think [panser] the Anthropocene in the twenty-first cen-
tury is to think at the limit of the thinkable [pensable] – and of the 
‘care-able’ [pansable]. This thinking that cares at the limit requires us 
to think the limit441; it requires what Technics and Time, 3 described as 
a new critique – which is also a hypercritique, which, so to speak, car-
ries the concept of the limit to its limit in a test of cosmological limits 
that would have been inconceivable to classical critique, and which 
simultaneously arises as the entropic processuality of the expanding 
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universe, the anthropic impasse that is the Anthropocene and the exo-
somatic condition of all noesis.
Hypercritique is what thinks the limits of thinking, that is, of cri-
tique itself in the conditions and under the condition of exosomatiza-
tion such that it thereby constitutes and destitutes the there (Da) and 
as that which there is (es gibt), that is, as that, es, which gives, gibt.442 
Exosomatization, insofar as it ‘transcends’ noetic life by imposing 
itself upon it, is what trans-forms surrealities into various forms of 
transcendence. These surrealities, which extend throughout the his-
tory of exosomatization (as magic, divinities, the one true God and 
resulting forms of sacredness, including in secular law as politics and 
the profane sacredness of law, if we can put it like that), constitute 
what La Société automatique 2 will describe as a surrealist cosmology.
It is in this sense that, within what Heidegger tried to think under 
the name of Gestell, which is the empty surreality of that desert that 
Nietzsche saw coming as the endpoint of ‘nihilism’, after Kant, and 
in the Anthropocene (such that, as the Capitalocene, it leads to the 
generalized proletarianization imposed by calculation, which replaces 
thinking as well as knowledge, that is, care), the hypercritique that 
cares about and cares for [panse] the limits of thinking, and therefore 
of critique itself, must be an organology as well as a pharmacology.443
Organology considers noetic life from the threefold perspective of 
psychic individuation, technical individuation and collective indi-
viduation. These three forms of individuation, the relations between 
which are transductive (which means that no one of them can occur 
without the other two), result from the process of exosomatization – 
that is, from the fact that some three million years ago a form of life 
arose that is incomplete in its material form, that is, in its organogene-
sis. This was the advent of a neotenic form of life, whose constant pro-
duction, through the generations, of new artificial organs is the condi-
tion of its survival, in turn requiring social organizations to ensure the 
exchanges of organs between exosomatic organisms and to ensure the 
arrangements of these organological organs with the organic organs 
of these organisms.
According to this perspective, words, too, are organs, fruits of 
poiēsis, and each generation must relearn them, pending the direct or 
indirect coining of new ones. To coin new words, like the creation 
of instruments and other organological organs, is always a collective 
activity, and this collectivity produces circuits of transindividuation, 
which in turn support this collectivity.444
The organizational functions that ensure the cohesion of the social 
[faire-corps au social] – in the sense indicated by Durkheim when 
he refers to organic solidarity – are, as exchanges of organological 
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organs, the economy, and, as the arrangement of these organological 
organs with the psychosomatic bodies in which this life consists, edu-
cation. To learn to speak, or to shoot an arrow (which is vital in an 
Amerindian society, where it therefore begins at an early age), or to 
play an instrument, or to count, and ultimately to care for things [pan-
ser] in a thousand ways, is what exosomatization requires from the 
first moments of a newborn’s life.
It is magic, the supernatural, religion and/or politics that govern the 
relationships between economy and education – at least until the dis-
ruption occurs as the final extremity of the Anthropocene inasmuch 
as it breaks with exosomatization conceived as social solidarity [faire-
corps social]: with disruption, whose radicalized form is transhuman-
ism, society disintegrates.
That the production and exchange of exosomatic organs is the con-
dition of the form of life of the noetic beings that we are, or that we 
are trying to be, is the primary thesis elaborated by Marx and Engels 
in The German Ideology. They showed in that work that, through these 
exosomatic organs whose production is the rule of social evolution, 
systems of domination are created and operate, themselves supported 
by knowledge, and that this leads to a struggle between classes.
Furthermore, what would become Marx’s great theme in The 
Communist Manifesto of 1848 was already present in the third of the 
1844 Manuscripts: that in the epoch of industrial capitalism, that is, 
with the emergence of an exosomatic development that would lead to 
the Anthropocene within what Vernadsky called the biosphere, the 
capturing of knowledge, holding it within the apparatus of produc-
tion, would lead ‘abstract labour’ (as Marx and Engels referred to it) to 
destroy living knowledge. The Anthropocene thereby leads – and as 
the disruption – towards what the Grundrisse would in 1857 describe 
as full automation.445
The current period of the Anthropocene consists in just such a pro-
cess of automation, which we call the disruption. The latter has, how-
ever, in terms of automation, become structurally insolvent: it destroys 
purchasing power and therefore market solvency.446 What this means 
is that macro-economic change is required on a global scale.
Living knowledge, as Marx conceived it in 1844,447 is, in its struc-
ture, open to the infinite and the improbable. As such, it is negan-
thropic. The annihilation of living knowledge to which we contribute 
with the data economy, which transforms it into calculable infor-
mation through the process of digital grammatization, is the most 
advanced stage of fixed capital as it becomes a production force that 
excludes living knowledge.
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Fully automated informational fixed capital, moreover, tends to 
close in upon itself, so that it becomes a closed system: in its struggle 
against the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, it tends in a struc-
tural way to increase the rate of entropy. Self-referential, and turning 
the users of the information system into its servants, that is, ‘techno-
geographical’448 functions of the system, which thereby constitutes an 
associated milieu,449 the individuals dissolved into this system thereby 
become ‘dividuals’,450 and repetition (which Derrida also called ‘itera-
tion’) no longer produces either différance in Derrida’s sense, or dif-
ference in Deleuze’s sense. Hence the desert grows.
The issue here is hypomnesic tertiary retention. And the first to 
conceive this issue, which is the exteriorization of knowledge and the 
possibility of its proletarianization, was not Marx but Socrates, for 
such are the stakes of the question of the pharmakon451 – it was in 
Protagoras that the theme of the pharmakon first appeared. Hence the 
question of pharmacology constitutes the first and last issue in the his-
tory of philosophy, and does so starting from an organological situa-
tion in relation to which what, after Heidegger and Derrida, we call 
‘metaphysics’ (as the object of deconstruction) would amount to the 
constant denial.452
Conceived in this way as a process of exosomatization, where 
what Whitehead called the function of reason would be to provide 
the incalculable, improbable and as such neganthropic criteria for the 
therapeutics required by this pharmacology – this therapeutics form-
ing what we call forms of knowledge – the test and the ordeal of the 
limits of noesis is at present required because in this ‘present’, the 
Anthropocene itself is reaching its limits: the Anthropocene is enter-
ing its final phase, as disruption, and as a ‘shift’453 approaches that 
would complete a chaotic bifurcation (and that would also be cata-
strophic, in René Thom’s sense of the word).
To think care-fully [panser] in the Anthropocene is to evaluate and 
transvaluate disruption as the final extremity of nihilism – an evalua-
tion carried out from the perspective of a transvaluation of that trans-
valuation of all values that Nietzsche affirmed as the urgent need to 
leap (Sprung) beyond the ‘last man’. And it is to do so beyond the 
nihilism that has led to the global spread of ressentiment454 in the 
hegemony of levelling and the calculation of averages.
In the next volumes of Technics and Time, as in La Société automa-
tique 2. L’Avenir du savoir, it will, indeed, be a question of transvalu-
ing the Nietzschean transvaluation, precisely because what Nietzsche 
could neither know nor think was exosomatization.
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4 Vocation, provocation, falling
To care-fully think [panser] the Anthropocene is to think it from the 
perspective of a leap capable of piercing the blocked horizon.455 What 
Heidegger called Dasein, constituted by its ‘possibility of question-
ing’ being,456 can question in fact only insofar as it is itself put in ques-
tion.457 And this putting in question (or questions), this challenge, is 
the fact of technics, such that, itself emerging from prior challenges, 
from prior instances of putting in question to which it responds as 
the operation(s)458 of Dasein put into question (the insistence on this 
word, operation, will be explained later), it always provokes new chal-
lenges and new questionings, and always poses new problems – in 
passing through the vocations to which it also gives rise.
Today, the being put into question and the provocation (heraus-
fordern, ‘challenging forth’) in which this consists, confronted with 
problems now posed by previous responses to prior challenges, is 
crossing a threshold that paves the way for a bifurcation of immeasur-
able magnitude – in the history of what Heidegger called Dasein, as 
well as in the history of what Derrida called différance and the supple-
ment. This bifurcation is a leap into the im-mense, that is, into excess: 
into hubris and violence (Gewalt459), opening onto what Heidegger 
called the Abgrund – the abyss [sans fond].
This questioning and challenging is what Heidegger, confronted 
in the 1940s with what had become inconceivable in this putting 
into question(s), began to call Gestell – as that which requires a leap 
towards the Ereignis.460 The being put into question(s), resulting from 
the provocation in which Gestell consists inasmuch as it might put 
an end to any possibility of questioning whatsoever,461 is occurring 
as the completion of the Anthropocene – which is what in his time 
Heidegger called ‘modern technology.’
The completion of the Anthropocene thus conceived is the comple-
tion of the period of nihilism-become-capitalism: it is nihilism as 
computation. And it is from algorithmic and reticulated computa-
tion that disruption installs what Berns and Rouvroy call algorithmic 
governmentality – as the thoroughly computational capitalism that is 
establishing an era of absolute non-knowledge.
In this absolute non-knowledge, knowledge itself disintegrates 
into the information generated by fully automated calculation, and 
into fixed capital, which, along with ‘big data’, forms the hyper-syn-
chronized associated milieu – or what I call the digital Leviathan462 
– produced via the applied mathematics of correlational algorithms. 
In this hyper-synchronized milieu, the diachronic can no longer 
exteriorize itself other than diabolically, that is, outside of any circuit 
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of transindividuation, or, in other words, outside of any synchronic 
metastability.
It is on the basis of this Herausfordern, and as a new age of what 
Heidegger called ‘standing reserve’ (Bestand), that there has arisen, 
today, in the disruption, a pseudo-scientific ideology calling itself 
‘transhumanism’. This transhumanism is embodied in a global indus-
trial project in the form of a strategic marketing of unprecedented 
virulence.463
This pro-vocation (as the first moment of the doubly epokhal redou-
bling), however, calls for a struggle against transhumanism, and this 
combat (polemos, and not only eris) is a vocation (in the sense devel-
oped in Acting Out464), that is, the production of noetic circuits open-
ing the era of a new epistēmē. This Herausfordern calls for the second 
moment of the doubly epokhal redoubling that is the Ereignis, and as 
‘vocation’: fordern, to demand, claim, require.
Transhumanism tries to inscribe into exosomatization itself the 
structural short-circuiting of this vocation that is the function of rea-
son – and it is in this way that the Capitalocene tries to impose its 
hegemony ad vitam aeternam through the unlimited extension of 
computational power.
The pro-vocative putting in question(s) that is the Gestell, prod-
uct of the noetic dreams of the Aufklärung, is more than ‘historial’ 
[geschichtlich]: it puts historiality itself in question. Hence it invites us 
to revisit the entire Heideggerian corpus starting from the question of 
Geschick (fate) – as well as that Nietzschean phrase: amor fati. This 
challenge to historiality also challenges noeticity, and this manifests 
itself today, massively, as de-noetization, but it is also the very thing 
of which Heidegger was the first victim.
The falling prey [déchéance] that would entangle Heidegger in the 
wake of the Nazi movement stems from an earlier de-noetization, 
described by Husserl in The Crisis of European Sciences – a cri-
sis that translates into a transgenerational withdrawal [défection] of 
knowledge, arising from a pharmacological crisis.465 That someone 
who claimed to be a thinker of falling, of verfallen and Verfallenheit, 
would himself fall prey makes it all the more essential to undertake 
a meticulous reading of his thought and its history. And, in this con-
nection, Rudolf Boehm, in ‘Pensée et technique’,466 has indeed shown 
how Heidegger’s inaugural, tortuous question of tekhnē thoroughly 
traverses the individuation of Heidegger’s own Dasein.
The historic falling prey of Heidegger to Nazism has everything to 
do with the detours he took in his attempt to think tekhnē. As phar-
makon, and as the unthought of science, but also of philosophy and 
law, and therefore of politics, tekhnē is what provokes the more or less 
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local regressions that characterize the twentieth century – of which 
Nazism is the worst expression – and that all foreshadow the great 
planetary regression that at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
we all find ourselves forced to endure.
In 1935, after the plebiscite that brought Hitler to power, and in 
relation to which it is highly doubtful that Heidegger would either 
have voted no or abstained, Husserl wrote in The Crisis of European 
Sciences that it is possible, ‘today’, to listen to the ‘Hymn to Joy’, so 
characteristic of the epoch of the Aufklärung, ‘only with painful feel-
ings […]. A greater contrast with our present situation is unthink-
able’.467 Hitler had on 19 August 1934 obtained 89.93 percent of 
the votes cast, for his proposal that, with the death of President von 
Hindenburg, he himself should combine the functions of president 
and chancellor, and so become the full Führer of the German people, 
according to the will of the people expressed by its ‘free vote’:
Firmly and deeply convinced as I am that all state power 
derives from the people and must be sanctioned with a free 
and secret vote, I ask that the decision of the government be 
submitted to the German people without delay with a free 
plebiscite.468
This would be a freedom to vote in relation to which philosophi-
cal courage – which is always also a political lucidity, and in which 
any philosophical truth before all else consists (as Foucault recalled 
in the months before his death) – would prove to be absolutely defi-
cient in Heidegger, who never managed to care for the default that 
is necessary.
5 The courage to care-fully think the present
To think – in the sense that Heidegger claims to do, when he defines 
thinking as care (Sorge), that is, as care-ful thinking [panser], panser 
in the sense that it is a matter of taking thoughtful care of care itself 
[panser le panser lui-même], and, in so doing, of thinking thinking 
itself, as What is Called Thinking?469 invites us to do – is always to 
think and to care for and about the general form of what any age refers 
to as today. It is always to think and to care about it in and from the 
singularity of today that is or that becomes or that happens here [là], as 
the Da of Da-sein, as that which happens in and with this today, so to 
speak, as ‘our present situation’.
In the situation within which it presents itself, this ‘today’, if it 
does, indeed, present itself, now presents itself as never before as 
remaining irreducible to any generalization – irreducibly intransigent: 
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‘intractable’, as Roland Barthes said of what he referred to as the 
punctum,470 which, precisely as such (inasmuch as this irreducibility 
exceeds the studium, being extra-ordinary), is what requires, as an 
imperative, the ‘courage of truth’.
The courage of truth, which was obviously lacking in the thinker 
of verfallen and Verfallenheit (falling prey, entanglement, degrada-
tion, decline, ruin, decay, collapse, enslavement), is just as lacking in 
those who repeat his discourse like asses astonishingly equipped with 
the capacity of the parrot, and equally so in those who refuse to read 
it.471 In 1936, counter to this historial cowardice of thinking, Husserl 
gave a lecture on ‘The Origin of Geometry’ in which he called his 
own entire project into question, challenging an enterprise that he had 
begun at the end of the nineteenth century by confronting the crisis 
of mathematical foundations. In so doing, he reopened the question 
of the pharmakon that had appeared at the very origin of philosophy.
The scope of this calling into question(s), which has still not been 
explored in depth even after Derrida, continues to escape most pro-
fessors of phenomenology – confirming for today’s younger genera-
tions the idea that in order to understand the singularity of the present 
situation and to consider its being there, phenomenology is presently 
useless and vain. It is true that our there isn’t there [notre là n’est pas 
là] – and that therein lies the whole problem, which is also that of the 
‘epoch’ of the ‘absence of epoch’.
Nevertheless, it is only after phenomenology, brought to its most 
extreme point by Husserl and ‘elevated’ [relève] by Derrida as the 
logic of the supplement, that it is possible to consider this useless-
ness and vanity. Heidegger, that Dasein who was Heidegger, was 
incapable of elucidating the situation that revealed itself to Husserl’s 
eyes between 1934 and 1936, a crisis that would subsequently lead 
to a not-being-there where today all those fantasies return that had 
ensnared Heidegger (as well as some others, who are not themselves 
negligible), only because Heidegger and these others did not know 
and could not think the pharmakon, which also means that they could 
not take care [panser] of it – precisely unlike Husserl, that is, to the 
différance of Husserl’s introduction, in ‘The Origin of Geometry’, of 
the question of the technical condition of alētheia conceived as hav-
ing an essential relation to apodeixis,472 and, in that noetic différance, 
creating an exosomatic différance.
As for today in general – insofar as, being there, it constitutes the 
present historially, that is, in Heidegger’s terms, insofar as it presents 
being as ‘destination’ (Geschichtlichkeit) and as an epoch of the his-
tory of being – as for today in its ‘generality’, and inasmuch as, ‘for 
any time’, today is what constitutes an epoch, and presences itself as 
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such, as that which, therefore, represents itself, the temporality of this 
today stems from what Heidegger was aiming at when he referred to 
Anwesenheit as a way of thinking the time of being.473
Presence, Anwesenheit, in the today of Germany in the 1920s and 
1930s, that today understood by the Da-sein of Heidegger, is always 
in general and also what presences – when a ‘destinal’ (geschichtlich) 
moment occurs and for Dasein in general insofar as it is the being who 
questions in general – only as the overturning putting in question of 
the Gegenwart, of the present: it is as such always also its absenting, 
that is, that which hollows out an expectation in the present, in a kind 
of not-being-there(-yet).
Now, nothing is more ambiguous and necessary than such an 
expectation – which is a protention, and, more precisely, it is the 
arche-protention that stems from being-towards-death (Sein-zum-
Tode). This Sein-zum… is indeed oriented towards the actualization 
of entropy that is death, but, as Entschlossenheit in the Eigentlichkeit, 
that is, in ‘ownmost temporality’ or ‘originary’ or ‘authentic’ tempo-
rality, this being-towards…, or being-to…, is not only negentropic, 
but neganthropological.
I have begun to investigate this in Dans la disruption474 by posit-
ing that being-towards-death is not just also but in fact firstly – and 
as being-towards-the-future [avenir] insofar as it cannot be reduced 
to becoming [devenir] – the arche-protention required by a being-for-
life that exceeds life. This is something that Being and Time does not 
investigate.
The arche-protention of being-for-life presents itself at the heart of 
this presence only as the hollow of an absence that is also an anxiety. 
This anguishing hollow that inhabits any Sein-zum-Tode is the haunt-
ing (the spectrality) that returns from tertiary retention inasmuch 
as it constitutes a Weltgeschichtlichkeit, but this is what that Dasein 
who was Heidegger did not manage either to think or to care for [ni 
penser, ni panser], or to take care of (verbinden, versorgen) – which is 
the condition of possibility and impossibility of what Derrida called 
‘survival’, or ‘living on’ [la survie].475
6 To think the wound in the experience of p(a)nser
As Heidegger might have said had he been French, it is in old French 
that we can hear what it contains for thinking.476 For penser, to think, 
previously meant soigner, to care, to treat:
[The word panser] was first written penser, a spelling used 
until the eighteenth century, although panser and pancer 
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can be verified from 1453. In the seventeenth century, both 
forms were used to distinguish the two meanings, resulting 
in the separation of the two verbs. Panser first means ‘to 
care for, to feed (a horse)’, the meaning of ‘feeding’ coming 
from the influence of another verb panser, meaning ‘to nour-
ish, to fill the belly/rumen’ (from panse); the verb is always 
used in relation to a horse, but in the sense of ‘giving care to 
its grooming, brushing, combing’ (1453).477
These histories of panse, which would no doubt have delighted 
Nietzsche, call for an organology of pansée, inasmuch as it is also 
written as – and hence ‘thinks itself’ (so to speak) as – pensée, and as 
the act of taking care firstly by nourishing, this question of nourish-
ment being a question of assimilation, on which Nietzsche would both 
meditate and ruminate.478
In 1680, Richelet reported panser les oiseaux, ‘feeding the 
birds, caring for them’, a meaning that has fallen into disuse. 
The modern medical sense, ‘treating the wounds of a man’ 
(1314), is found in the old locution penser la plaie, before 
the direct construction as panser une plaie, un blessé (1472), 
and the absolute construction (1845–46, panser à sec). The 
word is sometimes used in a figurative sense as meaning ‘to 
relieve, to appease’ (early fourteenth century).479
To think would therefore be to take care, to care for, which is also 
to say, to act, to do, to make – (the) différance: it would always be to 
think the wound. But what wound?
The wound is hubris, delinquere, the violence (Gewalt) of the nec-
essary default, which also affects Persephone and as her palaiou 
pentheos, her very ancient mourning, her old affliction, her ‘ancient 
wound’.480 This wound is a disease, an affection, and this affect can 
also become infected.
Hubris therefore needs those who can dress, treat, care for and heal 
this wound: panseurs. The word panseur is ‘found in the fifteenth cen-
tury in relation to those who care for a horse and after 1623 in medi-
cine (panseurs de vérole, pox dressers)’.481 To think would always be 
to exert therapeutic activity: hubris, which as we will see Heidegger 
names both violence (Gewalt) and in-quietude (Unheimlichkeit, uncan-
niness),482 is what, as the excessiveness of exosomatization, generates 
pharmaka that require panesurs. This requirement, this request, this 
‘demand’, this ‘call’, requires a vocation – fordern.
To deepen this path of care [pansée], which passes through 
Taking Care of Youth and the Generations,483 and which leads us to 
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introduce some neologisms that are particularly awkward in their 
spelling – p(a)nsée and p(a)nser, and here we would need to return 
to what Derrida wrote concerning the misspelling, the fault of 
orthography, that différance assumes484 – we must return to the first 
steps that were taken at the beginning of Technics and Time on the 
basis of an analysis of Leroi-Gourhan’s palaeo-anthropology: where 
there appears the traceology of the default that it is a matter of care-
fully thinking [panser] in order to do what is necessary, and as the 
traceology of thinking.
7 What can exosomatic différance do?
During the period of those Leroi-Gourhan referred to as the 
Archanthropians,
tools and skeletons evolved synchronously. We might say 
that with the Archanthropians, tools were still, to a large 
extent, a direct emanation of species behavior.485
This statement appears in ‘Technics and Language’,486 and it con-
tradicts the opposition that Leroi-Gourhan would make in ‘Memory 
and Rhythms’487 between the specificity of animal groups (in the 
sense that the species is the centre) and the ethnicity of human groups 
– leaving between the terms of this opposition a kind of theoretical 
vacuum that would maintain itself between specific différance and 
ethnic différance.
Technics and Time, 1 put forward the concept of epiphylogenesis 
in order to exceed this opposition, and to characterize exteriorized 
memory – exosomatized memory – and its function on this side of and 
beyond just the ethnic form of technical life: as the situation that con-
stitutes the unity of the technical form of life, that is, its ēthos, and 
as the evolutionary process during which what we call ‘humankind’ 
does not cease trans-forming itself.
This evolution and this transformation deviate from the law of 
the evolution of species, and from any natural selection: they occur 
at a remove from the ‘struggle for life’ whose result is this natural 
selection. And, whereas specific memory is internal to the organism, 
that is, endosomatic, epiphylogenetic memory is external to organ-
isms, that is, exosomatic: it supports social organizations while also 
exceeding them – until today, when exosomatization seizes hold of 
endosomatization itself through synthetic biology, biotechnology and 
neurotechnology.
Exosomatic memory supports social organizations while also 
exceeding them, and does so as technical tendency: this is what 
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Leroi-Gourhan posits in Milieu et techniques,488 where he shows that 
within what he calls the ‘ethnic cell’, those who form the ‘technical 
group’ always (hubristically) exceed the ‘ethnic group’, who, how-
ever, cannot do without them insofar as they are the bearers of the 
technical milieu that constitutes the ethnic milieu, while also exceed-
ing it. Hence the question is opened up of the infidelity of the milieu 
that Canguilhem raised at virtually the same moment (1943) in his 
medical thesis, though it was not published until 1966.489
The new concepts deriving from the pharmacological perspec-
tive on exosomatization that have emerged since the first volume of 
Technics and Time allow a refinement of what we will no longer call 
anthropogenesis, but neganthropogenesis. Neganthropogenesis des-
ignates the appearance of a form of life that is not just negentropic, 
in the sense in which this term has been used since Schrödinger, but 
neganthropological, in the sense that organological and instrumental 
differentiation, which exosomatically continues endosomatic organo-
genesis while at the same time breaking with it, supports epiphyloge-
netic memory – which no longer proceeds according to the laws that 
govern life as biological science has understood it since Darwin.
The concept of exosomatization, as it has been inscribed by 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen into the concept of entropy, considerably 
enriches Leroi-Gourhan’s concepts of ‘technical tendency’, ‘techni-
cal fact’ and ‘exteriorization process’, which were developed between 
1943 and 1965 – and, reciprocally, we should read The Entropy Law 
and the Economic Process and Energy and Economic Myths in light of 
L’Homme et la matière and Milieu et techniques.
Lotka’s concept of exosomatization enabled Georgescu-Roegen to 
provide a new foundation for economics by understanding the latter 
as the theory and practice that must replace biology in order to regu-
late the socialization of exosomatic artefacts – in order to organize 
the evolving cohesion and coming-together [le faire-corps évolutif] 
in which this différance consists, but where this différance would no 
longer be simply vital, but noetic. And it is noetic in that it is techno-
logical, that is, exo-somatic, which raises, in a new way, the question 
of knowing ‘what a body can do’.
Logos is what, in being ex-pressed, primordially exo-somatizes 
itself by inscribing its différance outside, and by thereby constituting 
this outside as ‘world’, in the there of a being-in-the-world. Here it 
is no longer the organic body of biological organisms that evolves, 
but the organological organs and the social organizations that pro-
duce them, and that they in turn support by constituting their organo-
logical functions, which are constantly challenged and put back into 
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question, in return constantly challenging and putting into question 
these same organizations.490
8 The intelligences of exosomatization
The passage from the endosomatic to the exosomatic occurs very 
slowly.491 It is a highly complex process, full of nuances – nuances 
and complexities that North American and Australian palaeo-anthro-
pologists are freshly investigating today, unfortunately always seem-
ingly without any awareness of the work of Leroi-Gourhan.492 If, in 
‘Technics and Language’ (the first volume of Gesture and Speech), 
Leroi-Gourhan contradicts what he will write in ‘Memory and 
Rhythms’ (the second volume), it is because these concepts remain 
approximations, something he conveys with the phrase, ‘to a large 
extent’ (‘We might say that with the Archanthropians, tools were still, 
to a large extent, a direct emanation of species behavior’).
The stakes of this large extent [mesure] are significant, because 
the latter is precisely the commencement of an excess [démesure] – 
restricted, limited, but just the same an excess, and of course we can-
not fail to notice that such an expression, ‘limited excess’ [démesure 
limitée], is an oxymoron. Gesture and Speech posits that in this excess, 
and as this excess, on the basis of which will arise the question of the 
fate of the technical form of life (a fate that Leroi-Gourhan investi-
gates at the end of ‘Memory and Rhythms’493), there emerges what 
would not yet be noesis in the strict sense, but which would neverthe-
less already be that exosomatization on the basis of which epiphyloge-
netic memory will be constituted.
Technics and Time, 1 showed that:
 ▪ this necessary differentiation between Archanthropians and 
Homo sapiens sapiens leads Leroi-Gourhan to establish an 
opposition between ‘technical intelligence’, which would be 
that of ‘early man’, and a ‘spiritual’ or ‘intellectual’ (that is, 
noetic) intelligence, which would be what occurs after these 
first humans;
 ▪ this is an opposition in the sense that technical intelligence 
would not be noetic, while conversely, noetic intelligence 
would not be technical.
This perspective, however, completely ignores the technicity of the 
mind or spirit itself, which is the question of tertiary retention as 
the condition of a ‘phenomenology of spirit’, inasmuch as the latter 
is only in and through the excess of its exteriorization – to which it 
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nevertheless tries to provide a measure, a metron, and we shall see 
why the Greeks referred to this as dikē.494
Leroi-Gourhan, therefore, ultimately leads back to a philosophi-
cal perspective that was established with Plato. Technics and Time, 
1, however, took as its starting point that we should consider epi-
phyologenesis – such as it is inscribed in the organogenesis of 
Archanthropians, and as their default of origin, that is, as their con-
stantly recommenced exosomatic organogenesis – to be a feature com-
mon to both Archanthropians (referred to generically by Bataille, after 
Bergson, as Homo faber) and Homo sapiens sapiens, the experience of 
the default of origin characterizing the life of the spirit as exterior-
ization (as work). Epiphylogenesis, in other words, is what takes care 
[prendre soin] of the exosomatic situation, where thinking means car-
ing [penser signifie panser], and vice versa.
To this critique of the highly classical and metaphysical opposition 
re-established by Leroi-Gourhan between the manual and the intel-
lectual, between Homo faber and Homo sapiens – a sapience that is 
rooted in what, after Huizinga, Bataille calls Homo ludens – we must, 
today, add further specifications, with significant implications for the 
meaning and history of epiphylogenesis.
We should begin by recalling Leroi-Gourhan’s words concerning 
those he referred to as the Palaeoanthropians:
With the Palaeoanthropians […] we witness the first upsurge 
of new cerebral aptitudes that both counterbalance and stim-
ulate technicity. […] Reflective intelligence, which not only 
grasps the relationship between different phenomena but is 
capable of externally projecting a symbolic representation 
[schéma] of that relationship, was the ultimate acquisition of 
the vertebrates, and cannot be conceived before the anthro-
poid stage […]. All this occurs, at the level of ‘gratuitous’ 
intellectual operations, as if the gradual development of the 
frontal and prefrontal areas entails a progressively growing 
faculty of symbolization.495
That the ‘new cerebral aptitudes’ provide a ‘counterbalance’ to tech-
nicity is what entails that this ‘reflective intelligence’ is not itself 
technical. By suggesting that it consists in a capacity for external 
projection, however, Leroi-Gourhan places this into an immediate 
relationship with tertiary retention, thereby anticipating what we will 
soon see with Marc Azéma496: the noesis in which this ‘reflective 
intelligence’ consists projects its dreams and the ‘representations’ in 
which they consist onto the walls of caves, which, starting from the 
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Upper Palaeolithic, are adorned with what, for Bataille, amounts to 
the birth of art.497
Leroi-Gourhan, however, relates these ‘gratuitous intellectual oper-
ations’ to cerebral development, which would be the origin of these 
‘exteriorized symbolic schemas’, and not to a transductive relation 
developing between the ‘interior’ (that is, the endosomatic), and the 
‘exterior’ (that is, starting from the Palaeoanthropians, the exoso-
matic and hypomnesic). This hypomnesis establishes a new kind of 
feedback loop through a hypomnesic transductive relation, wherein a 
spiral forms through which the synaptic circuits that must be regener-
ated in each generation are metastabilized via what we call education. 
But, at the same time, education both ‘dephases’ itself and metasta-
bilizes itself through social organizations, which ensure the inter-
generational and transgenerational continuity of these regenerations 
– beyond the exosomatic transformations that occur under the impact 
of their productions.
By assigning the emergence of ‘gratuitous intellectual operations’ 
to ‘cerebral development’, Leroi-Gourhan ignores this question of 
education, which itself presupposes what Michael Tomasello calls 
‘joint attention’, as well as hypomnesic exosomatizations that lead to 
the beginning of the process of grammatization, which supports the 
analytical and synthetic functions of what will become the ‘faculty of 
knowing’.498
Tertiary retention appears from the earliest moments of epiphylo-
genesis (the second and third volumes of Technics and Time at times 
incorrectly refer to tertiary retention as ‘tertiary memory’: it is not 
a question of memories but of retentions). But it is only during the 
Upper Palaeolithic that hypomnesic tertiary retention appears, which 
gives rise to an intergenerational and transgenerational form of joint 
attention that amounts to a new attentional form.
This hypomnesic attentional form is noesis properly speaking, 
that is, such as we recognize it, such as Bataille recognizes it within 
himself, and such that it opens the traceological possibility of vari-
ous forms of ‘deep attention’, an affair that is less ‘cerebral’ than it 
is transgenerational, social and organological. It requires the appear-
ance of new types of exosomatic organs: hypomnesic organs, that 
is, organs whose primary function is the exteriorization, expression, 
conservation and transmission of memory, which through this very 
fact becomes noetic.
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9 The economy of the pharmakon and the hypomnesic 
exosomatization of the noetic faculties
After Technics and Time, 3, the question of the relations between 
primary, secondary and tertiary retentions and protentions has been 
systematically pursued further. Various retentional types have been 
specified, beyond purely psychic primary and secondary retentions: 
hypomnesic tertiary retentions, collective secondary retentions and 
accompanying collective secondary protentions, arche-retentions and 
accompanying arche-protentions, proto-retentions and accompany-
ing proto-protentions. For his part, Yuk Hui has investigated tertiary 
protentions.499
Within hypomnesic tertiary retention, and with the concept of 
grammatization, new hypomnesic types have also been distinguished, 
in particular those emerging firstly from mechanical tertiary reten-
tion, which is the origin of the grammatization of the body and the 
proletarianization that occurred at the beginning of the industrial 
revolution (that is, at the beginning of the Anthropocene, which is 
as such both a Capitalocene and a new age of exosomatization), then 
through analogue tertiary retention, and lastly reticular, digital ter-
tiary retention, which enabled disruption, the final period of the insol-
vent and unliveable Capitalocene that demands a leap (Sprung) into 
the Neganthropocene.
Digital tertiary retention stems from cybernetics, which for 
Heidegger was the final stage of metaphysics and the condition of the 
installation of Gestell.
The types of primary, secondary and tertiary retentions and pro-
tentions, and their arrangements, which form collective retentions 
and protentions, together constitute epochs that continue to unfold up 
until the ‘epoch of the absence of epoch’. These arrangements, which 
are overdetermined by the exosomatic evolution of tertiary retention, 
constitute the history of the epiphylogenetic supplement that sets off 
from [enchaîne sur] the history of the supplement as the play of reten-
tions and protentions in general, as Of Grammatology described this 
supplementarity, and inasmuch as it constitutes vital différance. This 
connection [enchaînement], however, is a default of connection, a kind 
of dis-connection or un-leashing [de-chaînement]: hubris, the absence 
of any origin, a fate remaining always to come.
The epiphylogenetic supplement thus inscribes a bifurcation in vital 
différance, where it makes an exosomatic différance, which in the 
Upper Palaeolithic becomes that which makes a noetic différance – by 
passing through hypomnesic tertiary retention. This prehistory, which 
becomes proto-history and then history, is that of ‘spirit’ – in the 
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sense of Geist appearing to itself by exteriorizing itself. Hence this 
history has a palaeo-history, which is that of exosomatization, itself 
specifying the periods of prehistory, and, starting from the Neolithic, 
opening up the periods of proto-history, in the course of which, fol-
lowing on from the rupestral projections of the Upper Palaeolithic, the 
retentional and protentional conditions of the noetic attentional form 
we know today are consolidated, a form that is now unravelling before 
our very eyes in the Gestell – as the experience of the full and gener-
alized proletarianization and de-noetization produced by algorithmic 
automation.500
The noetic stage ‘properly speaking’ emerges during the Upper 
Palaeolithic as the possibility of spatializing mental secondary reten-
tions and protentions in tertiary form, and not just the motor behav-
iours of which tools are both the fruits and the traces. During the 
palaeogenesis of the epiphylogenetic supplement, exosomatization 
is functionally transformed, giving rise to functions that are not just 
endosomatic or exosomatic, but psychic and social, and which must 
be cultivated – through ‘cults’ and forms of worship that will lead to 
culture and eventually to its collapse into what Michel Deguy has 
called ‘the cultural’,501 and which takes to an extreme level the philis-
tinism that Hölderlin, Nietzsche and Arendt all saw coming.
If the evolution towards what we are here calling noetic différance 
passes through the stage of what Leroi-Gourhan called ethnic mem-
ory, then the latter, which is only a phase, has today become essen-
tially phantasmatic: ethnic communities in the strict sense, inasmuch 
as they are protected from exosomatic incursions (and inasmuch as 
they form what Milieu et techniques called ‘ethnic cells’), have almost 
disappeared – with the exception of some micro-regions in Africa and 
the Amazon. This raises the question of what opportunities remain 
for noodiversity – where noesis primarily consists in such noodiver-
sity as the intensification of psychic singularities – after the installa-
tion of Gestell as de-territorialization, in the process wiping out those 
idiomatic différances that can be constituted only on the basis of the 
diversity of idioms.
If idiomatic différance is the essential condition of noetic dif-
férance, then this is the very thing that is short-circuited by the idiom-
atic indifférance that seems to prevail with algorithmic anthropy. To 
investigate these questions – which, after the analyses of to deinota-
ton by Heidegger,502 who would himself succumb to Nazism and anti-
Semitism,503 can but seem literally terrifying and terrible – requires 
the constitution of the prehistory, palaeo-history, proto-history and 
history of the exosomatic and noetic supplement, both as a general 
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organology and as a pharmacology, where the exosomatic organ 
appears from the outset to be well and truly a pharmakon.
This organology that is also a pharmacology has continued to 
develop since Symbolic Misery and Disbelief and Discredit – where 
the noetic functions resulting from arrangements between endoso-
matic organs, exosomatic organs and social organizations are what 
general organology studies as an economy of the pharmakon. This 
economy, which is essentially a bio-economy in Georgescu-Roegen’s 
sense – but where this means precisely that exosomatized life is no 
longer thinkable on the basis of biology alone – is the pharmacol-
ogy of general economy in Bataille’s sense, which is itself a libidinal 
economy in Freud’s sense in The Ego and the Id.
Noesis, inasmuch as it characterizes what we call Homo sapiens 
sapiens, and such that we recognize it within ourselves – as Bataille 
affirms as he stands before the paintings of Lascaux504 – stems from 
the palaeo-history of the supplement through which the process of 
grammatization is engaged (in a sense that has been described on 
several occasions since Technics and Time, 3), and does so as the 
intensification of the tension between negative pharmacology and posi-
tive pharmacology, which is to say: as the question of the therapeia 
required by any hypomnesic tertiary retention.
Grammatization is a process, and this process opens up and con-
stantly reconfigures the hypomnesic period of epiphylogenesis dur-
ing which are articulated and disarticulated the faculties of knowing, 
desiring and judging.505
10 Double différance and noetic pansée
We must understand the concept of grammatization – which began 
with the appearance of hypomnesic tertiary retention as the exosoma-
tization of individual psychic and mental contents, and as ‘representa-
tions’ – by referring to La Préhistoire du cinéma, where Marc Azéma 
begins by highlighting the capacity to exteriorize oneiric images to 
which cave paintings bear witness.506
In light of this recent work, we must refer the oppositional differen-
tiations made by Bataille and then Leroi-Gourhan, between faber and 
sapiens, to stages in the history of tertiary retention (and of the pri-
mary and secondary retentions and protentions they make possible), 
which does not mean that ‘thinking’ would emerge only starting from 
hypomnesic tertiary retentions: it means that it would become noetic 
‘properly speaking’, that is, as the exteriorization of Geist, and as the 
investigation of its own possibility as such, such that it gives rise to a 
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transgenerational feeling of being a ‘we’, only with the oneirological 
revolution507 that occurred during the Upper Palaeolithic.
One might object that this ‘properly speaking’ repeats Leroi-
Gourhan’s ‘to a large extent’. Such an objection should not be left 
unanswered: properly speaking is here directed at the question of 
the as such and of what constitutes the noetic spirit as such, namely, 
its ability to understand itself functionally as such, which therefore 
constitutes a function, a function that is characteristic of any noesis 
– by way of, for example, metalanguages (in the senses of Barthes, 
Wittgenstein, Lyotard and Auroux) – but which appears from the first 
experiences of reproducibility in Benjamin’s sense.
(Contrary to superficial readings, reproducibility begins with cave 
paintings, which is the objection Adorno makes to Benjamin508 with-
out understanding that this is what Benjamin himself says – rock 
art reproduction must be thought in relation to sexual reproduction-
become-desire, that is, artifice, and by taking into account the self-
referential exception that Bataille saw evidenced in the ‘man in the 
well’ figure.509)
The oneirological transition and its self-referential and metalin-
guistic consequences, that is, metaretentional and thereby hypomne-
sic consequences, but which are also, and by the same token, anamne-
sic, all form the entire stakes of the reading of the question of Geist 
in Heidegger, and in Derrida’s Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. 
But what is less clear is whether Derrida ever truly confronted the 
question of care [pansée] that lies behind all of this – and that lies 
behind it as noetic différance.
This is why Technics and Time, 1 posited that noetic différance, 
which is no longer just vital différance and which seems to us to 
be exosomatic, is built on an ‘agreement’ [con-vention, a coming 
together] of flint and cortex that together constitute the prehistoric 
layer of the sedimentation within which are formed noetic preindi-
vidual funds ‘properly speaking’.
In this sedimentation of the noetic preindividual (which is also the 
issue in ‘The Origin of Geometry’ and in the interpretation given by 
Derrida in his ‘Introduction’), the tendencies of a specular ‘double dif-
férance’ are negotiated, such that
cortical evolution might well itself be codetermined by exte-
riorization, by the nongenetic character of the tool. There 
would be a double emergence of cortex and flint, a con-
vention of the two, an arche-determination that would sur-
pass them and that would be the double work of a double 
différance abysmally mirrored [s’abîmant en miroir]. The 
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whole problem will be to exhume the complex (transduc-
tive) dynamic of this ‘Epimethean complex’. Saying ‘to a 
large extent’ is a way of avoiding or forgetting this problem, 
of allowing its stakes to go unnoticed, the consequence of 
which is the reintroduction of a spirituality.510
And, in this instance, the reintroduction of a pure, a-technological and 
a-pharmacological spirituality: without default, in-fallible, thoughtful, 
but not thoughtfully caring [non pansée, ni pansante], and not before 
being (such will be the dialectic of Plato in Phaedrus).
11 Lost in disruption: not-being-there
In a collapsing gap [écart effondremental] in relation to Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology,511 but also by following this fundamental 
ontology as closely as possible (given my deficient understanding of 
the German idiom512), in this gap that is a fault, a wound into which 
everything always threatens to collapse, therefore, through being 
infected, the first three volumes of Technics and Time have tried to 
conceive the necessity of the immeasurable upheavals generated by 
the hubris that is the not-being-there of exosomatization as constitut-
ing time while destituting it, and by this process that, occurring in two 
moments, oscillating between two times, is the doubly epokhal redou-
bling, through which the vagaries of intermittence proliferate.
Today, this upheaval is reaching a limit, peiras, which is the 
absence of epoch.513 This negative epokhē that is the absence of epoch 
is also, overwhelmingly, the accomplishment of nihilism.514 The cur-
rent absence of epoch, which is the reality of the state of emergency 
that is the end of the Anthropocene, requires a transvaluation of what 
Nietzsche himself called transvaluation, which he could not pursue 
beyond the Da that was his: the Da of Nietzsche’s epoch was not yet 
aware of the accidents that would befall ours (which is also to say, first 
and foremost, our analogue and digital tertiary retentions – inasmuch 
as they would reshape capitalism in ways completely different from 
what Nietzsche, Marx or Engels would ever know). Nietzsche would 
never know the point at which we ourselves have arrived, via the his-
torical fulfilment of capitalism, that is, as absolute non-knowledge.
After the great ordeals of Nazism and Stalinism, and after their 
calamitous consequences for academic knowledge, still widely 
ignored, and in particular for philosophy – consequences that have 
directly affected noesis ‘in the making’, and which only add to the 
immense process of proletarianization and disapprenticeship in which 
capitalism has consisted, where the latter becomes purely and simply 
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computational by profoundly distorting the sciences, which are lit-
erally disintegrated,515 as well as life-knowledge [savoir vivre] and 
work-knowledge [savoir faire] – we have now reached the extremity 
of the Anthropocene.
Lost in this disruption, close to despair, we await a ‘shift’, if not to 
the Neganthropocene – an expectation that, ‘initially and for the most 
part’,516 presents itself only in the mode of negation, itself founded 
on a denial. The absence of epoch is denied because it constitutes the 
abyss [sans fond] – Abgrund – that we must relate to hubris, which 
Heidegger ultimately did not do, despite his reference to the to dei-
notaton that is the human being in the language of Sophocles and the 
chorus of Antigone: the frightening,517 which it is only in that it is pri-
mordially affected by this hubris.
The bottomless abyss [sans fond] – which may yet have a bottom, 
which Heidegger perhaps failed to think, the ground that there is (es 
gibt) and that sometimes we touch when in true ordeals we ‘hit bot-
tom’, in the encounter with that ‘rock bottom’ which provided the title 
for a work by Robert Wyatt518 – there, in that there is that is not, this 
abyss, this ‘without ground’, would be as such a double bottom that 
‘presents’ itself only by ‘absenting’ itself, that is, by doubling or split-
ting itself [se dédoublant].
It is this ‘presentation in absence’ that Derrida called différance. 
The double bottom would be what, as Anwesenheit, presents itself 
only in the Gegenwart that is the today in general, and especially and 
very singularly in the today of today – today as never before – only 
by default, only by the default, as the default, and as the new stage of 
a différance that remains to be made in and after what is called the 
Anthropocene.
Thought [pensée] can today be only what we could therefore call, 
on the condition that we write it, and as that which thus refers to 
différ(a)nce, the experience of care-fully thinking [p(a)nser] how the 
absence of epoch must, as a last resort, constitute not a ‘new epoch’ 
but rather another epokhality, which would come to think care-ful 
treatment [pansements] otherwise, that is, cares, that is, illness and 
health. But for this it would be necessary to reread Nietzsche with 
Canguilhem, and reread Heidegger with that Nietzsche who would, 
precisely, escape Heidegger.
Let us call the Neganthropocene the possibility of what presents 
itself firstly as impossibility, which is to say, as wholly other – as a 
wholly other era.
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12 Prometheia, epimetheia, hermeneia
It is on the basis of my first attempt to interpret the myth of 
Prometheus, Epimetheus and Hermes in Protagoras that what I call 
thinking today, that is, in the Anthropocene, means taking care [pren-
dre soin]519 of the pharmakon. In passing through ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, 
this interpretation of the myth narrated by Protagoras led me to argue 
that it is the pharmakon derived from the process of exosomatization 
that constitutes the shock (most often after a very long delay, as in 
the ‘dreadfully ancient’520) on the basis of which we think. It is this 
shock that we must interpret as that which, each time, puts back into 
play (into question(s)) aidōs and dikē, which are the dimensions of 
the therapeia required by the pharmakon, that is, the dimensions of 
care whose fruits form the knowledge that provides the hermeneutics 
of the pharmakon. Such an interpretation constitutes a bifurcation – 
inasmuch as a shock occurs in a doubly epokhal redoubling by echo-
ing and replicating the primordial shock of the default of origin.
Care-ful thought [pansée] is always a form of Sorge, which, accord-
ing to Heidegger’s vocabulary in Being and Time, is the ‘origi-
nary’ dimension of ‘originary time’521: Sorge is precisely what, for 
Heidegger, takes care of the originary. What we are positing here is 
that this care will always pass through and will always be the care of 
what, in Protagoras, presents itself already (well before Phaedrus) as 
a pharmakon.
Care-ful thinking [panser] always consists in retracing transgener-
ational circuits of transindividuation through intergenerational circuits 
of transindividuation, where these transgenerational circuits form 
arrangements of retentions and protentions via which what Simondon 
called the transindividual is metastabilized, and which characterize 
intergenerational epochs themselves belonging to transgenerational 
eras. In its various forms, pansée, which is the forming of noesis – as 
life of the spirit in all its forms, the knowledge of how to live, do and 
conceptualize – is today being destroyed by the generalized proletari-
anization that is our experience of the Anthropocene as de-noetiza-
tion, brought to its ultimate extremes as the disruption.
The life of the spirit is exteriorization inasmuch as it constitutes a 
loop, wherein the secondary interiorization of primarily effected exte-
riorization constitutes, in an après coup, noesis as technesis – which 
always ultimately leads to the formation of a new pharmakon gen-
erated by the organological condition of the noetic soul insofar as it 
dreams, that is, inasmuch as it can realize its dreams, and can do so 
only at the risk they may turn into nightmares.522 Such a pharmakon 
may be a new instrument, a new drug or a new work [oeuvre]: a work 
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works only by inscribing itself into a present, which it temporalizes 
only by spatializing it as its différance, a différance that is pharmaco-
logical through and through.
Any work is a tertiary retention, and, therefore, a pharmakon, 
whether this refers to Being and Time or Margins of Philosophy, which 
included the lecture on ‘Différance’. Kant reminds us of this in ‘What 
is Enlightenment?’, where he affirms that a book is what can also and 
firstly, flattering the ‘laziness and cowardice’ of those who want noth-
ing more than to remain minors, ‘have understanding in place of me’, 
just as a ‘spiritual adviser’ can have a conscience for me and a doctor 
can dispense with my taking care of myself by myself523 – for therein 
lies health: as this knowledge that I can have of life only by singularly 
being this form of life that I am as such only noetically. This is also 
what Canguilhem says.
The circuits of transindividuation in which the life of the spirit con-
sists, within which care-ful thought [pansée] presents itself in highly 
diverse forms, are induced by the shocks provoked by successive 
types of tertiary retentions and of the différances in which they each 
time singularly consist, in and as the history of the supplement, con-
stituting the organogenesis of pharmaka over the course of the time of 
noesis, that is, in the course of its evolution, which is the evolution of 
what Canguilhem described as the technical form of life.524
Let us call pansée the accumulated but constantly renewed, revived 
and reactivated history of ways of thinking and caring that result from 
the set of questionings and challenges constantly provoked by phar-
maka. This is what Husserl himself thinks and cares about in ‘The 
Origin of Geometry’, geometry being constituted as apodictic knowl-
edge through the exercises of polishing, surveying and writing. It is 
by being themselves socialized and transindividuated that these ways 
of thinking and caring always lead, eventually, to the generation of 
new pharmaka, emerging from the therapeutic responses to previ-
ous pharmaka.
Pansée, accomplished, that is, transindividuated, and transindivid-
uated as the therapeutic responses in which these cares consist, de-
sists and is destituted over time inasmuch as it always engenders, with 
it but also against it, new pharmacologies – and this is what calls for 
the anamnesic reactivation of the condition of ‘pansée’ by new forms 
of pansée responding to new types of pharmaka. It is ultimately this 
loop that constitutes the ground of what Sigmund Freud describes in 
Civilization and Its Discontents.525
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13 Grammatization, noesis and the Socratic dialogues
The shocks of which the ‘history of the supplement’ is composed (a 
history that Derrida would never actually write) form a chain, like a 
set of replicas of what Blanchot called the dreadfully ancient, which, 
having never been present, remains always yet to come – ever since, 
at some time during the Upper Palaeolithic, a process of grammatiza-
tion was initiated, which Blanchot’s friend Bataille considered to be 
the birth of art.
Marc Azéma, whose work we have already mentioned, has shown 
that this ‘birth of art’ was also the beginning of grammatization – 
confirming, but on a different basis, the hypotheses put forward by 
Leroi-Gourhan and discussed by Derrida. By understanding this as a 
process of grammatization, which Derrida expressed as a ‘history of 
the supplement’ that remains to be carried out (which cannot be done 
merely as a history in the strict sense, since it is the condition of pos-
sibility of any history, including ‘natural history’, as Derrida never 
ceased to show, to the point of himself abandoning the task526), I try 
to care-fully rethink [repanser] this ‘history’ as organogenesis and as 
neganthropological différance.
I have borrowed the concept of grammatization from Sylvain 
Auroux.527 ‘Grammatization’ means both the reproduction and the 
discretization of the retentions and protentions woven in noesis. 
This is a question of repro-duction, and not just re-production – as is 
explained in Technics and Time, 3528 – just as the process of exterior-
ization is what constitutes interiorization in a transductive relation, as 
is explained in Technics and Time, 1. This weaving, for which tertiary 
retention is irreducible, and constitutes noesis insofar as it makes [fait] 
(the) différance at once as exteriorization, reproduction and discern-
ment, is also what undermines [défait] noesis: it is as such that writing 
is a pharmakon.
Noesis, as I ‘translate’ this into French with a word that is itself 
untranslatable, ‘pansée’, occurs [se faisant] – as process of exterioriza-
tion, expression, invention and realization of works in all their forms 
– only by undoing itself, defeating itself [se défaisant], and undoing 
itself through its grammatization. P(a)nsée, thus conceived, is not lim-
ited to the discretization of mental flows: gestures have been analysed 
and reproduced by automatons ever since the artifices of Vaucanson, 
and are both constituted and altered by grammatization, which also 
means that they are part of the destruction of noesis by noesis (such 
as through the grammatization that occurs in the engineering and 
design offices that organize production in factories where automation 
is imposed).
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The same is true for sensory perception and intuition, (re)consti-
tuted and altered by the hypomnesic retentions derived from analogue 
grammatization (which, too, discretizes it, firstly chemically and/
or acoustically, through camera movements, framing, editing and 
so on). And this is also the case for the functions of the understand-
ing, social dynamics and so on, all of which can now be formalized 
and calculated via data formats, interoperability standards and treat-
ment algorithms.
Such are the true stakes of Marx’s materialism. Speech, too, is 
itself ‘grammatizable’ only because it is composed of the gestures 
made by the tongue and the mouth, as was noted by Joseph Beuys529 – 
these being the linguistic gestures that enable the play of differences 
conceived by Saussure and deconstructed by Derrida in the name 
of différance.
Gestures are short-circuited by their discretized reproduction when 
the proletarianization of manual workers is concretized through the 
use of the automatons of mechanical tertiary retention, and as the 
onset of ‘large-scale industry’, that is, of industrial capitalism. But 
this process was care-fully treated [pansé] by Socrates in relation to 
the hypomnesic field that is writing. It is in this light that we should 
reread the history of ‘metaphysics’, and, more generally, the history 
of philosophy, at the origin of which, contrary to what is suggested 
by hasty readings of Derrida and Plato, Socrates does not ‘condemn’ 
writing: he prescribes it.
The Socratic prescription (mē amelēsēte, do not be careless) remains 
locked within the différance of the texts of Plato, inasmuch as Plato 
himself becomes indifférant, patiently and inexorably concealing it 
behind his redefinition of the dialectic, beginning with the erasure of 
dialogism in Phaedrus, which puts forward a dialectic exclusively sub-
jected to the play of analysis and synthesis – analysis and synthesis 
becoming the play of being and constituting its very truth. Socrates, 
on the other hand, who still belonged wholly to the tragic age, posited 
that the pharmakon is the irreducible condition of all noesis – and that 
he is as such being faithful to the piety that commemorates the abduc-
tion and return of Persephone to Eleusis every spring.530
For Socrates, writing is a pharmakon, and the therapeutic prescrip-
tion of this pharmakon is above all a way of life constituting a technics 
of self and others (a pansée) that consists in undertaking that dialogue 
made possible by reading and writing – and this is why, before ques-
tioning the slave Meno, Socrates asks him if he knows how to read. 
And, just as Plato begins to prescribe it in Phaedrus, this is what the 
dialectic loses sight of, to be blocked forever in the later dialogues: 
Phaedrus thereby lays the foundations for the Republic, Theaetetus 
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and the Sophist, that is, for the ‘history of being’ as the ‘forget-
ting of being’.
14 The hermeneia of the default of origin, the tragic paradox of 
knowledge and proletarianization
The contemporary question of proletarianization stems from the 
extreme concretization of tragic experience such as it consists in the 
experience of the pharmakon and its irreducible duplicity – of which 
the snakes of Hermes and Asclepios are the signs, as Aby Warburg 
made clear in his lecture on the serpent ritual.531
The duplicity of the pharmakon – that is, of the exosomatic situ-
ation – results from the ‘proletarianization’ in which, in one way or 
another, the exteriorization of knowledge always also, and ‘always 
already’, consists, even though exteriorization is the condition of the 
constitution of knowledge itself. This is a condition of possibility that 
Derrida consequently described as a condition of impossibility, which 
means the condition of the impossibility of it finishing, that is, a dif-
férante condition.
To think care-fully [panser] is to experience this ‘stricture’ that 
stretches between possibility and impossibility as the play of reten-
tions and protentions. To care-fully think today, and to care what 
‘today’ means (which is in one way or another what panser always 
means), is to be capable of caring for this stricture that in earlier forms 
of care-ful thought was mostly concealed – which does not mean that 
these earlier forms of caring did not yet think, or that they did not 
think or care within the stricture, or that they cared nothing about 
and thought nothing about the stricture: it means that, today, it is this 
stricture that, as such, puts us in question at the risk of interrupting 
any possibility of questioning.
It is already this pharmacological condition of all pansée, that is, 
inasmuch as care-ful thought consists in an organogenesis, to which 
Protagoras will refer in his scintillating language. And the entire 
Platonic apparatus will be constructed against this, so as to reduce 
it to silence, which will in effect mark the end of the tragic age and 
the opening of the ontotheological age. This is what is still perpetu-
ated today by the Platonist Alain Badiou – despite the teachings of 
Marx, which he also claims for himself but in so doing forgetting 
everything, and first of all the critique of political economy that is The 
German Ideology.
It is Prometheus (requested by Zeus), redoubled by Epimetheus 
(who ‘wants to do the distributing’), himself in turn redoubled 
by Prometheus (who must steal ‘the fire and the creative genius of 
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tekhnai’), and that Hermes finally rejoins, conjoins and in a way cov-
ers over, even erases, through a reversal (as when he made the cat-
tle of Apollo that he wanted to steal walk backwards, and thus put 
into reverse the traces of their footsteps,532 thereby constituting, as 
god of writing and reading, the hermeneutic and as such mystagogi-
cal dimension of every tragic therapeutics533 of the pharmakon that is 
the fire stolen from Hephaestus) – it is Prometheus, Epimetheus and 
Hermes who constitute the question of what is called panser (noeō) in 
and as the hermeneia required by the default of origin of pansée.
To try and care-fully think in this way is to interpret the pansée 
inherited from Nietzsche534: we think care-fully only after that stu-
pidity through which pansée comes to us, in some way precipitously, 
always and ever anew – and that we must always interpret anew, 
which means that our thinking and caring is only ever intermittent.535 
To try to think care-fully in this way is to thought-fully care about 
the fact that panser involves accepting this intermittence – as we are 
taught by Socrates (in Protagoras) and by Aristotle (in Metaphysics), 
both of whom refer on this score to Simonides.
I have myself evoked this intermittence by referring to the allegory 
of the flying fish,536 who sees the water only by leaving it, but whose 
inevitable fate it is to plunge back into it, and therefore to constantly 
forget whatever it believed it had learned during its flight over the 
aquatic surface.537 In Phaedrus, too, the allegory of the ‘winged soul’ 
turns on this intermittence.538 But it was ultimately to turn against this 
that Plato introduced the notion of the dialectic as a movement of the 
question of truth, become orthotēs, in Book VII of the Republic.
As I understand it through my heterodox interpretation of Aristotle’s 
treatise, On the Soul, water is the analogon of the prosthetic milieu: 
the latter constantly misleads us but nevertheless bears us as this 
hypokeimenon through which we can and must find the resources to 
act on the urge to leave this milieu – through a moment of elevation 
that is always (already) a relapse, a falling back. This hypokeimenon 
is epiphylogenetic, hypomnesic and pharmaco-logically retentional, 
which is to say that it is composed of tertiary retention. This is what 
Bergson was never able to think about care-fully, however close he 
may have come to doing so539 – nor after him was Deleuze, and in 
truth neither was Simondon, even though, like Derrida but in another 
way, it was Simondon who made it p(a)nsable.
15 Today
Since November 2014,540 in order to try to care-fully think about the 
disruptive, automatic and reticulated society that has arisen since 
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1993, I have revived these questions from the perspective of theo-
ries of (positive and negative) entropy derived from thermodynam-
ics, biology, cybernetics and information theory. I have done so in the 
dual context, on the one hand, of the development of ‘big data’ and 
applied probability theory,541 and, on the other hand, of the worldwide 
debate concerning the Anthropocene.
This new path of pansée tries to confront the proletarianization of 
pansée as such, celebrated by Chris Anderson in his article ‘The End 
of Theory’,542 where he asserts that data science makes linguistics 
‘obsolete’, for which Google substitutes the applied mathematics of 
‘linguistic capitalism’.
This new path of pansée became extremely steep when, in April 
2015, I read, in a work collectively authored by L’Impansable, these 
words spoken by a boy named Florian, fifteen years old at the 
time of writing:
You really take no account of what happens to us. When 
I talk to young people of my generation, those within two 
or three years of my own age, they all say the same thing: 
we no longer have the dream of starting a family, of having 
children, or a trade, or ideals, as you yourselves did when 
you were teenagers. All that is over and done with, because 
we’re sure that we will be the last generation, or one of the 
last, before the end.543
In its most recent period, the Anthropocene, which everyone currently 
understands in terms of the challenge of climate change, amounts to 
an unprecedented and incommensurable putting in question that sus-
pends and breaks all those circuits of transindividuation established 
throughout the millennia from the Neolithic to the Great Empires, 
and through the various theologico-political civilizations, and finally 
secular civilizations. This was a matter of learning to create such cir-
cuits with the pharmaka that made them possible, and that did so as 
all those archives that, whether explicitly or not, hypomnesic tertiary 
retentions always constitute, and which underpin the retentional sys-
tems in which social systems fundamentally consist.
At the end of the Anthropocene, that is, today, and as the experience 
of disruption, hubris as such (the notion of which led to the formation 
of Pre-Socratic Greek civilization and therein the noetic foundations 
of the West) returns to mortals as a massive increase of entropy on 
a global scale, and necessitates the development of an entropology. 
But, in contrast to Lévi-Strauss’s nihilistic discourse at the end of 
Tristes Tropiques, when he refers to such an entropology in a rather 
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disillusioned tone,544 I argue that this entropology more profoundly 
calls for a neganthropology.545
In the remainder of this text,546 I will try to draw the consequences 
that follow from the Anthropocene having reached its critical phase, 
and I will attempt to do so by reconsidering what Derrida named ‘dif-
férance’ – as the neganthropological condition of thinking.
16 Disruption
Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz distinguish vari-
ous periods within the Anthropocene (Thermocene, Thanatocene, 
Phagocene, Phronocene and Polemocene). As for the new, current 
and, if not ultimate, at least penultimate or ante-penultimate period, 
it constitutes the entry into a critical phase of the Anthropocene that 
will itself undoubtedly be divided into a number of sub-phases. Here, 
‘critical phase’ means both that it is leading to a denouement, to a 
katastrophē, and that we must, therefore, make a decision, krisis – 
which we can relate to a dis-covering, apocalypsis.
Such a period would be the commencement of the impossible cri-
tique of the Anthropocene, that is, of its analysis and its pansée, 
which, constituting the synthetic possibility of its analytically impos-
sible overcoming, would pursue the question of hermeneia, occur-
ring in and as the après coup of prometheia and epimetheia, and as 
the ground of any heuristic, that is, of research, science, thinking and 
care, as well as teaching (didactics), and, especially, secondary and 
tertiary education intended as pedagogical preparation for science, 
research and pansée.
This means, here: dedicated to engendering a bifurcation that would 
be analytically impossible from the internal perspective of the ‘system’ 
from within which it is produced.
What I am here calling ‘impossible critique’ therefore means the 
impossibility of keeping it to the analytical plane, and the necessity of 
projecting it onto the synthetic plane. This amounts to an interpreta-
tion of what Whitehead called the function of reason inasmuch as 
it decides [tranche]. We will see why such a necessary impossibility 
must be conceived and cultivated as the improbable possibility in this 
sense of a neganthropic bifurcation.
With respect to such questions – hermeneia,547 heuristics, didac-
tics, pedagogy – it is striking to note how Derrida and GREPH fore-
saw what is happening today, and yet how that epoch (of the 1970s 
and the Haby Plan) still managed to drastically underestimate, in 
a way that in retrospect is startling and literally unimaginable, the 
extreme gravity of the situation that was then beginning to take shape 
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(the excessiveness of which would receive consideration only from 
Heidegger, and on the basis of the Greek question of hubris – even 
though he himself failed to draw the consequences).
In this extremely grave situation, any form of true noetic knowl-
edge necessarily becomes, as true pansée, research (heuristics) into an 
exit from the Entropocene that is the Anthropocene, so as to enter the 
Neganthropocene, and does so as therapeutic interpretation (as herme-
neia) of the pharmacological situation.
Let us not forget that Of Grammatology spoke of monstrosity, 
which for Derrida announced itself ‘in the form of an absolute danger’ 
through ‘what is still provisionally called writing’:
Perhaps patient meditation and painstaking investigation 
on and around what is still provisionally called writing […] 
are the wanderings of a way of thinking that is faithful and 
attentive to the ineluctable world of the future that proclaims 
itself at present, beyond the closure of knowledge. The future 
can be anticipated only in the form of an absolute danger. It 
is that which breaks absolutely with constituted normality 
and which can announce itself, present itself, only as a form 
of monstrosity.548
Neither Derrida nor GREPH saw coming what had in fact already 
arrived ‘on doves’ feet’, which is now, if not ‘present’, at least latent, 
and at times patent: a telluric ‘disruption’ through which it seems as 
if everything is destined to disappear, beginning with critique (and it 
is no doubt Maurice Blanchot who was here the most analytically and 
synthetically lucid – and therefore the most serious, the gravest, if not 
the gloomiest).
In this epoch, we still greatly underestimate the gravity of 
what weighs upon us and seems to crush us. Today, faced with the 
Anthropocene and the gravity that expresses itself in and as its criti-
cal phase, to which Florian bears witness in no longer being able to 
have diurnal dreams, a period in which the question of an organol-
ogy of nocturnal dreams also arises (which lies behind the analyses 
of Jonathan Crary549 as well as the 2009 Ken McMullen film, An 
Organization of Dreams), the challenge is not to plead for a ‘right to 
philosophy’,550 as Derrida did with GREPH (and to defend the perpet-
ually-threatened teaching of philosophy in the final year of French 
secondary education – a right that must also obviously be defended). 
The only legitimate approach, the only approach capable of legitimat-
ing such a defence, attesting to it as a self-defence [légitime défense], is 
to assume the duty of philosophy.
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The duty of philosophy is pansée, a new care-ful thinking of what is 
called thinking – a pansée of pensée such that it requires us to care for 
thinking, including from within an organological and therefore phar-
macological perspective wherein facts are destiny, imposing in a new 
way the question of how to distinguish the right facts, and as their dif-
férance against the indifférance of de-noetization.
What is the duty of philosophy – and of the pansée that philoso-
phy tries to embody in its broader vitality, that is, in the acuity of its 
untimely timeliness – to encounter, to listen, to receive and to inter-
pret the testimony of Florian, and to do so in a context where we sud-
denly see from Pope Francis an unhoped-for, if not totally unexpected, 
opening, and which calls for a response?551 And in what dialogue with 
religions? This question arises in France in a singular way after the 
tragedies of January and November 2015, then of 14 July 2016, after 
which 14 July will forever more be a national mourning of the national 
holiday that, since 1790, has celebrated the Fédération.
These questions of our time do not present themselves: they absent 
themselves – through what I have attempted to describe as a denial. 
This is what results from an absence of epoch that is the suffering 
of Florian, and that Daesh exploits so as to mobilize, in France and 
in the entire world – in the youth of the entire world – the agents of 
what we can call negative sublimation. So long as we have failed to 
reflect on the excessiveness of the Anthropocene, of which suicidal 
and criminal behaviours of this kind are symptoms, we will only 
increase its destructive power, which accumulates to the limits of the 
Anthropocene as it reaches its greatest extremity. It is this extremity 
that we call the disruption.
17 Thinking care-fully about the emergency
The duty of philosophy imposes itself today in a state of extreme 
urgency – an emergency [urgence] that has long been foreshadowed. 
The question of the right to philosophy should in no way allow this 
extreme state of emergency to be obliterated or denied – under the 
false pretext, for example, that this urgency would make thinking 
impossible. It is only through urgency that it is possible to think, and 
this is why all thinking cares [panse]. It is possible to think care-fully 
[panser] only in and as the very urgency of thinking that cares [pen-
sée qui panse].
The first duty of philosophy is to consider the sudden and abso-
lutely singular aggravation of a situation that has been described as 
‘l’homme sans gravité’,552 man without gravity, without weight or 
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seriousness, but the result of which is extremely grave – which is what 
gives to Florian’s words their immeasurable weight.
With this gravitational loss characteristic of our age, the ‘grave’, 
as ever and paradoxically, no doubt presents itself in its very gravity 
– but does so, in general, through a denial whose forms vary widely, 
and in relation to which Florian constitutes an exception. To philoso-
phy falls due the duty of eliciting what has thus been denied, that is, 
the grave – the immeasurable weight not just of the world [monde] but 
of the squalid and the befouled [immonde].
This falling due that, in the twenty-first century, it falls to phi-
losophy to think care-fully about – philosophy thereby finding itself 
obliged to think and care otherwise, that is, to change the very mean-
ing of thinking – this falling due, the maturing of this obligation, pres-
ents itself not just as the test of the always late tenor of this pansée 
called philosophy, but as the ordeal of the absolute monstrosity that 
we have seen was heralded by Jacques Derrida in the opening of his 
Grammatology – and it is this to which Florian, too, bears witness like 
none before.
A duty of retrospection arises out of the inadequacy of the philo-
sophical analyses appearing after the Second World War, from 
the deconstruction of metaphysics to Marxism and psychoanaly-
sis, which became institutions and ‘small business’ – in Jean-Luc 
Godard’s sense553 – but so too did epistemology and anthropology, 
among others.
Only a consideration of the ‘gravity’ of the next fifty years, after 
a critical retrospection of the past fifty years of philosophy, has any 
prospect of earning back the credit required for it to take care of 
knowledge, of science, of law itself, with these forms of knowledge, 
and of all other forms of the life of the spirit, and therefore of art: all 
these figures that seem, today, in the eyes of the vast majority of our 
fellow men and women (and especially the youngest), to be little more 
than zombies.
18 The tribunal of the future and the organology of reason  
as the différance of becoming
In 1967, Of Grammatology situated itself from the outset as lying 
within the epoch of the absence of epoch, that epoch of ‘absolute dan-
ger’ that presents itself ‘as a sort of monstrosity’.554 It is far from clear, 
however, that readers of Derrida have yet taken the measure of this 
situation – any more than did that reader of Of Grammatology who 
was Derrida himself. This was in fact one of the issues discussed dur-
ing my thesis defence.555
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The contemporary situation is that of an imminent catastrophe 
of which Of Grammatology was an advance warning, and it is this 
imminence that twenty-two signatories tried to formally declare in 
an article published in Nature in 2012, with the title, ‘Approaching 
a State Shift in Earth’s Biosphere’.556 It is a question of a catastrophe 
or a ‘shift’ (an upheaval, a mutation, a bifurcation) – which we can 
understand in the (different) senses of René Thom or of Ilya Prigogine 
and Isabelle Stengers. Conditions are gathering for a bifurcation but 
as yet we do not know in what direction it will propagate. Philosophy 
and with it knowledge in general have the obligation, before any other 
task, of weighing or rather of exceeding the gravity of this situation: 
of highlighting and curatively bearing hubris such that it inverts not 
only the traditional instruments of measurement but the concepts that 
they materialize.
Philosophy must endure the anticipation of the bifurcation and the 
obligation that it establishes as the experience, brought to its limit, of 
structural melancholy, which it has become crucial to express as such, 
and which for Aristotle originally constitutes the ‘negative’ treasury 
of noetic life. The consequences of this situation can now be ignored 
only if we remain not only blind but cowardly, in the precise sense of 
cowardice that befell Heidegger in his time.
The protentional structure of our age, awaiting a shift whose prob-
ability is widely felt, and expressed through a symptomatology of 
denial – in the face of which Florian’s candour erupts – is accom-
panied by a stunning mutation of the arrangements of retentions and 
protentions that constitute the expectant, pending beings that we are. 
This mutation has everything to do with the industry of traces (the 
‘data economy’) as well as with the fulfilment of the Anthropocene, 
which is nothing other than the effective fulfilment of nihilism as the 
generalization of entropic becoming.
This structurally entropic becoming as effectively fulfilled nihil-
ism summons reason itself before the tribunal of the future [avenir], 
conceived as the différance of becoming [devenir].557 Reason thus 
summoned is what Alfred North Whitehead understood both as an 
organ and as a function – at the core of what constitutes a specula-
tive cosmology.
The duty of philosophy today is to consider the entropic catastro-
phe to which the Anthropocene is leading us – which is an event, but 
which is more precisely the advent of nihilism as Entropocene. I say 
this, just as Lévi-Strauss said that (in the Anthropocene) anthropology 
becomes an entropology.558 But, unlike Lévi-Strauss, I do not believe 
that we should abandon the responsibility of which neganthropol-
ogy is the question as well as the study. Neganthropology studies the 
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conditions of possibility and impossibility that bifurcations always 
require, in a manner that exceeds all calculation and analysis, that is, 
that exceeds the understanding by convoking reason.
Neganthropology can be constituted only within a speculative cos-
mology, that is, only by conceiving the cosmos as a process within 
which localities are produced that give rise to various feedback loops 
or discontinuities of the kind that Schrödinger, Atlan and Prigogine 
have all tried to describe, and where, on another register that I can 
only briefly mention, so too did Shannon, Wiener, von Foerster and, 
in some respects, Simondon.559
These thinkers, however, all leave out one essential element of 
the neganthropological situation, one that requires us to reinterpret 
Derrida’s most fundamental concept – which is less the trace, the 
arche-trace or arche-writing than it is différance as the deferral of 
entropic and anthropic deadlines by pansée.560
19 Indifférance and pharmacology
Différance traverses the fields of what, describing the operating prin-
ciples of the Collège international de philosophie, Le Rapport bleu 
called ‘interscience’.561 Having already retrospectively interpreted 
and commented on this concept of interscience in States of Shock, I 
will not return to it in detail here. In that work, I posited in principle, 
and in reference to the creation of the University of Bologna, that ‘an 
“interscience” for the twenty-first century must take shape within uni-
versities worldwide, united by an internation of law’.562
The internation was conceived and projected by Marcel Mauss, who 
at that time, in 1920, foresaw the coming reticulation of the world, 
and the acceleration it would produce. Such an acceleration, which 
has everything to do with the current grave severity of generalized 
entropy, and which deprives Florian of the right and faculty of dream-
ing, is the reason why I state: ‘This interscience, which is inseparable 
from techno-logical becoming, must undertake and critique the gene-
alogy of the acceleration of the transfer time of technologies, in order 
to effect a bifurcation’.563 And I add: ‘This absolute acceleration short-
circuits governments and public powers, that is, it literally disinte-
grates the political sphere as such’.564 It is, in other words, a machinic 
regime of différance that destroys law as that which constitutes the dif-
férance of organological facts – which is to say, here, in this case, of 
techno-economic facts, which is the key issue in Polanyi565 – thereby 
establishing indifférance, that is, de-noetization.
Furthermore, in this ‘epoch of the absence of epoch’, numbed by 
its immeasurable supplementarity and indifférant appearance, that 
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is, where machinic différance short-circuits noetic différance, ‘indif-
férantiating’ it, in such an absence of epoch, then, industrial hypom-
nesis is the Wirklichkeit of the anamnesis that is missing [qui fait 
défaut], and where, as I said in States of Shock (which we must quote 
here at length):
The question of the inside and the outside of the academic 
sphere, therefore, becomes that of the way in which these 
hypomnemata that are [digital] tertiary retentions constantly 
redistribute the process of psychic and collective individu-
ation that is the noetic community in totality (the interna-
tion). And this redistribution of the effective conditions of 
individuation is not confined to the academic sphere […] but 
extends to extra-academic processes of collective individu-
ation. The latter include all those collective individuation 
processes with which the academic collective individuation 
processes that are the disciplines must compose, and with 
which they must work, while forming as well their objects, 
beginning with the process of collective individuation that 
is language.
This hypomnesic overflow both frames academic life at its 
most intimate levels (if tertiary retention is indeed the condi-
tion of reason, for example, ‘addressing the entire reading 
public’) and at the same time constitutes its heteronomy, 
because this also frames its outside, which can in any case 
appear as such only on this condition. This overflow, this 
heteronomy and autonomy in which it trans-forms itself – by 
the therapeutic work of the academic disciplines – is today 
constituted by a global industrial landscape (that of the 
internation), so that the inside work of academic transindi-
viduation is thoroughly transfixed and framed by digital 
hypomnemata.
These digital hypomnemata have become the framework 
through which all extra-academic social relations are gram-
matized (familial relations, friends, work relations, commer-
cial, financial, political and diplomatic relations, and so on), 
rearranging the fabric and the retentional material of psychic 
life at its most intimate, as well as the systems of retentional 
(and protentional) selection in which consist the most insti-
tutionalized forms of social life, and of which the academic 
disciplines are in principle the referents.566
To make the right to philosophy into the duty of philosophy is to con-
quer this right in and through a positive pharmacology, that is, through 
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a différance of the hypomnesic trace inasmuch as it imposes itself (lit-
erally, mechanically, analogically or digitally), each time singularly, 
as the bearer of a negentropic potential and a neganthropological indi-
viduation – as the individuation of the internation, of the intergenera-
tional and of an interscience founded on the theory and practice of the 
instruments of knowledge.
Tertiary retention, that is, hypomnesis, is the pharmakon. We have 
seen that Socrates did not ‘condemn’ writing: he wanted to submit it to 
a prescription, which Plato called dialectics, and which he described 
as that knowledge which precedes the practice of the pharmakon. 
Derrida countered that it is the pharmakon that conditions (and pre-
cedes) prescriptive dialectics. He showed, in other words, that there 
can be no academy or university without condition – and that any 
philosophy is a positive pharmacology. This is obviously not what he 
himself actually said. But it is how he wrote, that is, what he did. And 
so this is how, in so doing, he made the différance, which nevertheless, 
in that, escaped him.567
Nobody’s perfect.
20 Regimes, eras and epochs of différance
The questions that arise as to the duty and the right of philosophy 
and to philosophy, in this highly entropic environment that prevents 
Florian from dreaming, demand a detailed reading of an article by 
Lawrence Lessig published in Harvard Magazine in January 2000. 
Before surveying and then specifying the ‘gravity’ of the indifférance 
of which it is a matter of making the différance after Derrida, I would 
like to linger a little on the question of the relationship of philoso-
phy to law and right [droit], in order to clarify a question that tends 
to remain in the background when I myself refer to the process of 
grammatization, appropriating and significantly modifying a concept 
forged by Sylvain Auroux.
There are regimes, eras and epochs of différance, regimes falling 
within the regimes of individuation distinguished by Simondon, and 
eras and epochs opening up spatiotemporal localities within psychic 
and collective individuation. The latter is a premier diversality con-
stitutive of the noodiversity that the universality institutionalized by 
the university (and which becomes an instrument of, firstly, theologi-
cal power, then political power, and then economic power) vectorizes, 
starting from the Greek concept of truth – alētheia (which Schmitt 
inscribes into an irreducible pluriversity).
What it is first and foremost a matter of thinking care-fully about, 
therefore, in making (the) différance, is différance itself, precisely 
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insofar as it différantiates itself epokhally – and through a doubly 
epokhal redoubling. And it is here that questions of ‘code’ arise – that 
is, questions of the fact and law of the trace, inasmuch as it constitutes 
itself in tekhnē.
Auroux’s fundamental proposition is that, in the process of gram-
matization, scriptural technique, as the discretization of what is 
grammatized, precedes the grammatical description of language and 
its theoretical consideration – which it makes possible and conditions 
(this is the overlooked background of the dialogue that Derrida568 
entered into with Benveniste569 with respect to the relationship 
between grammar and the categories of thought in Aristotle).570
If, as I have proposed, the concept of grammatization can be 
extended to all operations that ‘discretize’ a continuous flow, then 
digitalization is a generalized grammatization occurring at phenom-
enal speed. Algorithmic operating procedures proliferate and change 
at a dizzying rate as a result of constant and generalized reticula-
tion, teeming with feedback loops based on recursive functions, and, 
along with it, with what Yuk Hui calls ‘digital objects’.571 These logi-
cal automatons trigger and control digital processes operating more 
quickly than lightning, because they are founded on recursive func-
tions themselves operating at two thirds of the speed of light, which is 
also to say between two and four million times faster than the nerve 
impulses circulating within noetic bodies572 (lightning itself propa-
gating at one third of the speed of light).
The digital trace is one case of ‘tertiary retention’. The letter, which 
is another case, emerged from the process of grammatization that 
gave rise to the alphabet. ‘Literal’ tertiary retention constitutes the 
specific era of différance that opens the question of logos as such – 
and more precisely the question of what Derrida himself, commenting 
on Heidegger, presented as the question of the as such – and, beyond 
that, of monotheism and its eras, and where the question of droit is 
conceived as a regime of truth inasmuch as it firstly presented itself, 
for the Greeks, in apodictic geometry, thereby constituting logos as 
such, that is, as the capacity to constitute its objects as such.
Is digital tertiary retention capable of constituting the différance of 
another epoch of logos? If so, how do we make this différance?
I have always been perplexed by Derrida’s position, which excludes 
studying the specificity and privilege of literal tertiary retention. To 
say there is a privilege of the letter is not to say that literal tertiary 
retention is superior to other forms: it means that each regime of ter-
tiary retention is specific, and as such requires a privilege, that is, a 
specific law, constituting a juridical regime and establishing a right. 
If we are to refer to a right to philosophy and to a co-constitution of 
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logos and nomos – from which philosophy arises two centuries later 
– and if we wish to confront digital tertiary retention as constituting 
the absence of epoch, that is, the absence of law and right, then it is a 
question of knowing:
 ▪ how logos, nomos and philosophia relate to the specificity 
of literal tertiary retention;
 ▪ how hypomnesic tertiary retention (whether literal, 
mechanical, analogical or digital) always bears within it the 
right and the duty of making a différance capable of perfor-
matively establishing a new juridical regime.
In the context of the Anthropocene, such a right is a bifurcation 
through which we must bring about a neganthropological reversal of a 
highly entropic metastable situation, which is to say, a situation on the 
verge of catastrophic instability.
21 Code and law: orienting oneself in pansée
In January 2000, Lawrence Lessig published an article in Harvard 
Magazine entitled ‘Code is Law’, which began with the fol-
lowing words:
Every age has its potential regulator […]. Ours is the age of 
cyberspace. It, too, has a regulator [but] we don’t even see 
the regulation in this new space. […] This regulator is code 
– the software and hardware that make cyberspace as it is. 
This code, or architecture, sets the terms on which life in 
cyberspace is experienced. […] [U]nless we understand how 
cyberspace can embed, or displace, values from our consti-
tutional tradition, we will lose control over those values. The 
law in cyberspace – code – will displace them.573
‘Code’, here, refers to the languages of computer programming, that 
is, digital tertiary retention. There are, however, other forms of cod-
ing, which are other forms of hypomnesic retention. Any positive 
right presupposes a code. All positive law is codified, distributed in 
modern law according to genre (civil code, penal code and so on), 
which raises the question of what exactly is codifiable,574 and where 
code is never self-sufficient: courts define procedures and processes 
for the interpretation of codes – where the relationships between code, 
law, right and justice are, however, irreducibly conditioned by the spe-
cific tertiary retentions supporting them.575 This is also what Poincaré 
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and Einstein made clear at the beginning of the twentieth century 
with respect to notions of space and time in mathematical physics.576
(Jacques Derrida and I published Echographies of Television577 
after a lawsuit was brought against TF1 by Arnaud Montebourg, who 
accused the network of having wronged viewers by broadcasting a 
fake interview with Fidel Castro. The court dismissed the complaint 
on the grounds it was not competent to rule on questions of audiovi-
sual montage – that is, on analogue tertiary retention.)
A right to philosophy must not fail to investigate the retentional root 
common to philosophy, apodictic geometry and law in the everyday 
sense – a common retentional root that provides them with the pre-
coding and precodifying of its materials in positive law, politics and 
critique, through the courts and tribunals that interpret them on the 
basis of a noetic capacity founded on this common root, which, lit-
erally, provides to noesis a new analytical dimension. Investigating 
in this way the hypomnesic conditions of noesis insofar as it is itself 
the condition of droit, that is, of judgment, a right to philosophy can-
not today ignore the new différance required by the coding effected 
by digital tertiary retention, and the consequent transformations 
of judgment.
This is also the question of the retentional root of all knowledge 
and of all rational interpretation of knowledge, as Husserl posited it in 
‘The Origin of Geometry’. In 1953, when he was twenty-three years 
old, Derrida spoke ironically of this text whose author seemed to him 
rather laughable.578 Some years later he would completely reverse his 
position. But I remain doubtful that he ever fully accepted this rever-
sal – which should be interpreted starting from the questions posed by 
Heidegger to which we will return via Rudolf Boehm.
The conceptualization of hypomnesic tertiary retentions – which 
are fruits of the grammatization that commenced with the painted 
caves of the Upper Palaeolithic – must pose anew the question of 
hermeneutics. And the latter should be conceived as the ‘assumption’ 
of the Olympian prescription (according to Protagoras) that – after 
prometheia and epimetheia, which form the time of the pharmakon, 
and do so as thanatology – Hermes must bring to mortals the power, 
the knowledge and the duty to interpret them, by granting them the 
feelings of aidōs and dikē, shame and justice.579 The objects of shame 
and justice are codified by tertiary retentions, which with Hermes 
become hypomnesic, Hermes being the god of writing.
Countless analysts and commentators are exploring what the cap-
ture of personal data means for law, and proposing changes that are 
just so many ‘patches on a wooden leg’: when someone points them 
towards the Moon, they see only the finger that’s pointing and not 
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the Moon itself. We must, of course, know how to look at the finger: 
the finger is precisely the object of ‘digital studies’ conceived as the 
organology and pharmacology of digits. But it is not enough to look at 
the finger: we must consider the direction that it indicates and how it 
grants vision, or, on the contrary, leaves us blind.580 And what is true 
for fingers is equally so for numbers.581
The retentional mutation currently underway leads to the disin-
tegration of law itself and as such, and this is what the internation 
must reject. This requires us to profoundly reconsider the inextricably 
retentional and institutional conditions of right and law in general, as 
well as the relations between the psychic apparatus, technical systems 
and social systems in general. This is what Alain Supiot has tried to 
develop (in general terms) in Homo Juridicus,582 and it is what Thomas 
Berns and Antoinette Rouvroy have tried to do by adopting a some-
what more Foucauldian approach. This requires a return to Schmitt 
and Luhmann, and, prior to that, a rereading of Hobbes and Spinoza.
As for Lessig, he presents himself in his article as an opponent of 
regulation – either by the state or as a result of the control of net-
works by hegemonic market players. In other words, Lessig defends 
a libertarian perspective that in my view is both highly naïve (if, as I 
do, one credits him with good faith) and dangerous. The law, whether 
droit or loi, is not a code – at least in the sense understood by jurists, 
and the juridical understanding of this vocabulary should absolutely 
be defended.
But this is possible only on the condition that we raise the question 
of the role of code in the history of law, in its theory and in its practice 
– this role being conditioned through and through by tertiary retention 
– and where we must always also posit that justice is a consistence583 
(as what, after Diotima, Socrates and Plato, we understand as an ideal-
ity). Justice stands ‘beyond the law’ because it is the compass of the 
principle of subjective differentiation between fact and law that con-
stitutes the stakes of ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’584
As Peter Galison has shown with respect to Poincaré and Einstein,585 
such an instrument of orientation, without which there would be no 
science, requires one or many sciences or one or many philosophies 
to prescribe therapeutic practices. This means that juridical science, 
too, has need for philosophy, redefined in its rights and duties in the 
Anthropocene epoch, and in view of the Neganthropocene, and for 
society, reconstituted by this same convocation, and through what, 
with Plaine Commune,586 we call contributory research – the very 
object of interscience in the internation.
And vice versa: philosophy has need both for law and for society.
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22 Making the (ontological) différance  
as Gelassenheit (as indifférance)
There are all kinds of ways of thinking [penser] and these amount to 
so many ways of caring [panser] – functionally dependent on tertiary 
retentions, that is, pharmaka, of which the thinker takes care [prend 
soin], and with which he thinks care-fully [panse]. Such is noesis, 
which is obviously not limited to conceptual knowledge: it places that 
which emerges from the organs of exosomatization – tertiary reten-
tions – into the service of a différance that is also a differentiation, 
which, as such, is neganthropic.
Every way of thinking/caring is inscribed onto a circuit formed 
by such exosomatic and thus pharmacological organs. As exoso-
matic organs appear, noesis, too, is transformed, de-functionalized 
and re-functionalized. Hypomnesic tertiary retentions, starting in 
the Upper Palaeolithic, set in train that history of functions that, over 
the course of the history of noesis, grants the noetic faculties their 
specific features as new possibilities of exosomatizing the life of 
the spirit – of exteriorizing it in the sense involved when Hegel does 
phenomenology.
It is here that Marx draws conclusions opposed to what with Engels 
he calls idealism, which he describes as the foundation of ideology, 
itself based on an inverted perspective (and causality) where spirit 
would be the origin of technics, whereas it is in technics, which Marx 
and Engels call the means of production of human existence, and 
which in the history of life amounts to the process of exosomatiza-
tion, that the origin of spirit would lie.587 And it is this issue that lies 
behind Heidegger’s resistance to materialism.
With hypomnesic tertiary retentions, exosomatic différance intensi-
fies, which also means that it noetically differs and defers (spatially 
and temporally) by increasing noodiversity. This increase is reflected 
in the multiplication of neganthropic works, in the form of all manner 
of expressions and exteriorizations, constituting noodiversification 
as the accumulation and sedimentation (in the sense of ‘The Origin 
of Geometry’588) of a potential for supplementary diversifications to 
be reactivated through the constitution of protentions, where these 
form more or less convergent or divergent horizons of expectation 
(for example, that of the We of geometers) – possibilities of diver-
gence and convergence that are also the stakes of Spinoza’s Ethics and 
Political Treatise.
These diversifications, however, are established on the basis of 
what presents itself in the process of transindividuation as univer-
sifications, which constitute exosomatic ages, and on the basis of 
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exosomatic layers that are increasingly unified by hypomnesic reten-
tions and through which common horizons of practice are metasta-
bilized. Around these universifying hypomnesic retentions, powers 
form that cultivate forms of knowledge, which, over millennia, even-
tually become what we still today call the sciences – whose functions 
themselves evolve with the biopolitical evolution of these powers.589
In the civilizations where knowledge provides the criteria for deci-
sions (that is, for artificial selections) on the basis of which psychic 
and collective individuation is accomplished, thereby forming the 
epochs and zones of noetic life, the sciences put increasingly complex 
hypomnesic pharmaka skilfully to work in the service of the formu-
lation of prescriptions certified by communities of peers. These pre-
scriptions set out the conditions in which it is or is not possible to pro-
duce new organs and stages of exosomatization, or new arrangements 
between exosomatic organs and psychosomatic organisms, whether 
existent or emergent – in so doing bringing them together [faisant 
ainsi corps] as social organizations.
Over centuries and millennia, however, and after having been the 
mark par excellence of the power founded on the pharaoh, the emperor 
or the basileus, the specificity of hypomnesic retentions and of those 
who master them becomes part of common consciousness. With the 
polis, the practice of these retentions becomes increasingly accessible 
to those who become citizens to the precise extent that they them-
selves cultivate hypomnesic practices. During the great transforma-
tions that will lead to the birth of capitalism, passing through money, 
printing and the mechanical tertiary retention that appears with indus-
trial machinism, hypomnesic retention leads to the grammatization of 
somatic motility and thus affects so-called ‘manual’ knowledge.
The Anthropocene is established on the basis of this submission 
of work-knowledge [savoir faire] to grammatization, which gener-
ates proletarianization, then the submission of life-knowledge [savoir 
vivre], through the behavioural control made possible by analogue ter-
tiary retention. Hypomnesic retentions are thus themselves profoundly 
transformed, in particular with the appearance of devices that mean 
there is no longer any need for the technical and hypomnesic individ-
uation of the psychic individuals that are psychosomatic organisms, 
nor for the collective individuation of social organizations and of the 
social systems of which they are composed. Now that all the functions 
that are in one way or another involved in the formation of noetic cir-
cuits have been integrated into automated hypomnesic devices operat-
ing with digital tertiary retention, psychic and collective individuals 
find themselves short-circuited, that is, proletarianized.
Part Three: Caring Beyond the Entropocene 248
What we are here calling panser means, in Being and Time, mak-
ing (the) différance by taking care of being – that is, by distinguishing 
being in beings. Heidegger (who did not himself conceive this dif-
ference as a différance) begins by quoting the passage of the Sophist 
where Plato has Socrates say that we have forgotten the meaning 
of being, a situation that leaves philosophers at an uncomfortable 
impasse [embarras], that is, in an aporia. Hence reactivating what he 
would later call the history of being, by thinking being and its history 
as the ‘pansée’ of being (Sorge, care) on the basis of an ‘interpretation 
of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of 
being’,590 Heidegger set up the thanatological question as the horizon 
of any authentic (eigentlich) temporality, which could be given only 
from the facticity of a there, Da.
The question of being can put Dasein into question, and, in so 
doing, summon it to take care of the difference between being and 
beings, and hence to itself question, only starting from a here (Da) and 
a now (today). To panser is, for Heidegger, to question (the meaning 
of being, and as the difference between being and beings). The ques-
tion is historial (geschichtlich) in that it can present itself only through 
the horizons, each time specific, of a being-in-the-world that requires 
both the structure of ‘reference’,591 that is, a cardinality immanent to 
the world of Dasein who questions here and now, and a datability592 
that inscribes this now, after the past that has ‘always already pre-
ceded’ it, only insofar as this datability establishes a tertiary reten-
tional order that defines an era, as a temporal horizon of reference, 
encompassing Weltgeschichtlichkeit.
This means that:
 ▪ everything described in the existential analytic of Dasein 
is inscribed within a primordial retentional facticity, 
where what is at stake is clearly a pharmacology, and 
where it is only within such a pharmacology that there can 
arise the necessity of making (the) différance – between 
being and beings;
 ▪ this anamnesis of the ‘question of being’ in Being and Time 
does not succeed in going back to the question of hypom-
nesis as it was introduced in the Phaedrus – where it was 
introduced metaphysically, that is, by denying the irreduc-
ibly pharmacological character of the pharmakon, which 
leads modern philosophy in general and Descartes in par-
ticular to a discourse of mastery that makes anthropocenic 
exosomatization possible, so to speak, opening the age of 
noesis conceived as calculability.593
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For Heidegger, to think care-fully is to think the ontological differ-
ence of being and being, that is, to pose the question of the as such 
through which (question) difference is made. For us, coming after 
Derrida, this means to think care-fully about différance, and to make 
it, and to do so in supplement(s), and not in some originary element 
that would be eigentlich temporality. But ‘to make it in supplements’ 
is to make it according to the history no longer of being but of exoso-
matization, and to do so as artificial selection within différance and as 
différance insofar as it must decide.
In thinking care-fully about the as such, it becomes a matter of 
thinking care-fully about pharmaka as such: it is to think ‘care’ [soin] 
on the basis of the care-ful treatments [pansements] required by the 
noetic, that is, exosomatic, form of life – inasmuch as it cannot be 
cured of exosomatization, except to disappear as the faculty of negan-
thropically making (the) différance.
Starting with Phaedrus, and echoing Protagoras, pharmaka as 
such, and, in the first place, the pharmakon of knowledge and power 
that is writing, are that of which philosophy intends to take care by 
denying their irreducible and primordial toxicity. Here, ‘primordial’ 
means: preceding as its past the dialectic of analysis and synthesis 
in which, according to Phaedrus, ontology consists. And ‘as its past’ 
means: that hypomnesic condition whose artificial, factical character 
no anamnesis can reduce. What cannot be reduced, in other words, is 
its exosomatic condition, that is, its technical condition.
The as such, which thus consists in taking care of pharmaka as 
such, and, in the first place, of the pharmakon of knowledge and 
power that is writing, by the same token consists, from the very 
beginning of the ‘history of being’, in effacing the question, in for-
getting the pharmakon as question, starting from Plato. It consists in 
turning it into the question of being, which, precisely through this 
very fact, becomes the forgetting of being – the forgetting of being 
insofar as it is always already there-being, in the locality of a Lichtung 
opened up by the facticity of what Peter Sloterdijk believes we should 
call ‘anthropotechnics’.
What makes the consideration of the as such of being possible is 
literal hypomnesic tertiary retention. It is also what makes the dif-
ferentiation of noesis into faculties (in particular those of knowing, 
desiring and judging594) and functions possible. In the course of exo-
somatization, these are functionally differentiated, and, in so doing, 
they constitute epochs of noesis and of the de-noetization that is its 
perpetual accompaniment.
At present, today, we must reconsider hypomnesic tertiary reten-
tion as such, from its prehistoric emergence up until its current forms, 
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which constitute thoroughly computational capitalism as Absolute 
Non-Knowledge, that is, as anthropic danger (Gefahr), concretized by 
and as what Heidegger called Gestell. But we must do so in order to 
detect the possibility and the necessity of making (the) new noetic dif-
férance required by this new stage of exosomatization, and in order, 
in so doing, to trans-form the chaotic ‘shift’ into an unexpected, 
unhoped-for [inespérée] neganthropologcal opportunity.
This unhoped-for neganthropological possibility, which is ‘that 
which saves’ without redemption, is that bifurcation which Heidegger 
could not care-fully think (under the name of Ereignis) because 
he saw calculation and meditation as an opposition. In so doing, he 
remained, as the custodian of this opposition, the last great represen-
tative of what he himself called metaphysics, considering it in terms 
of a history of forgetting, but in doing so being led to the discourse 
of Gelassenheit, where, in Meßkirch, his probably ‘visceral’ (that 
is, unthinking) anti-Semitism manifested itself as such, and as his 
unthought as such.
I have elsewhere tried to show that all this amounts to a serpentine 
affair,595 that is, a matter of the status of the pharmakon (of which 
the snake is everywhere the symbol, even among the Inuit596) in the 
history of nihilism, and over the course of monotheism’s (exoso-
matic) trans-formation into absolutely computational capitalism. 
Omnipresent in Greek mythology as in the sacred texts of monothe-
ism and in everything discovered by positive anthropology, the ques-
tion of the snake or the serpent is what escapes everyone, including 
Freud, with the exception of he who, in 1923 in Kreuzlingen, while 
living under the terror of anti-Semitic persecution, delivered ‘A 
Lecture on Serpent Ritual’597 – while Binswanger, treating and caring 
for Warburg, reconsidered and care-fully thought about the place of 
the dream in psychic life, that is, in what we are here calling noesis.
23 Making the (organological and pharmacological) différance
To orient oneself in pansée is possible thanks to the ‘subjective prin-
ciple of differentiation’ inasmuch as the latter is conditioned by ter-
tiary retention, and to panser is to distinguish law from fact, in facts, 
and in making (the) différance by making the performative selection 
that tertiary retention enables. To make this différance is to individu-
ate. And the possibility of individuating is what every law and right 
must guarantee to individuals – whether psychic individuals, who are 
called ‘subjects’, or collective individuals, which constitute ‘peoples’.
Here the exosomatic, organological and pharmacological ques-
tion of politics imposes itself as that which poses to each psychic 
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individual – posited thereby as a citizen, that is, as a regime of psy-
chic individuation guaranteed by a law and right constituting a regime 
of collective individuation – the question of the effectiveness of these 
forms of individuation inasmuch as they make possible public and pri-
vate social organizations through the metastabilization of agreement 
interpretable under conditions spelled out by law. These conditions 
themselves require the establishment of criteria formed by knowl-
edge, and, in particular, forms of knowledge subject to the critique of 
peers – a possibility ruined by generalized proletarianization.
The literal (lettered) codification of law that makes political indi-
viduation possible, between the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, 
requires the cultivation of an ability to read in everyone and by 
everyone – and requires related institutions of education, training, 
certification, publication and so on, all of which continue to evolve 
throughout the course of Western history, while other forms of juridi-
cal collective individuation develop in parallel in other civilizations, 
along with other, more or less comparable institutions, on the basis of 
other forms of written, if not alphabetical, retentions.
In the current state of fact, ‘code’, as digital tertiary retention, as 
that on which Lawrence Lessig reflects, requires none of that. On 
the contrary, it allows all of these things to be bypassed and short-
circuited – and, with them, law and right themselves, that is, noetic 
différance. In so doing, it also allows a fable to be propagated, accord-
ing to which:
1 a spontaneous noetic capacity would be ‘hard-wired’ 
in the brain;
2 this capacity would itself be reducible to calculation.
Institutions of certification, publication, education, training and so on 
constitute what I call retentional systems,598 that is, the apparatus, on 
the one hand, of hypomnesic exosomatic exteriorization, and, on the 
other hand, of the cerebral, psychic and social interiorization of code 
that has been exteriorized in and by these systems. Only in this way 
does code become law, that is, by psychically and socially incorporat-
ing the symbolic, which becomes embodied psycho-somatically but 
also as part of a social cohesion [faire-corps], and which thereby con-
stitutes knowledge: code must become knowledge in order to be a law 
or right, which must in turn be that of a social body. Such a becoming 
is the différance of an automatic indifférance of code (of its repetition 
to the letter of the law, but without spirit, which is to say, without the 
power to neganthropically do work).
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I have just referred to a becoming-knowledge of code, a devenir-
savoir, but the word ‘devenir’ is misleading here – given that to 
become is to become entropically, so to speak (after Carnot, Clausius 
and Boltzmann), and given that, within entropy, Schrödinger dis-
tinguished life – that is, différance in general – as negative entropy, 
or negentropy.
Emerging as negentropy from an entropic ground, différance – as 
the process of the trace and the traced that, in Of Grammatology, 
Derrida presents as life – when it is exosomatized, remains alive, 
remains vital différance. Yet, even so, through exosomatic organo-
geneses it inscribes and configures bifurcations in becoming through 
which localities are established that metastabilize ways of enduring 
other than those of living things, and through which the feelings of 
being and existing come to be established. Such bifurcations emerge 
from becoming [devenir] as futures [avenirs], that is, as differences 
(with an ‘e’) that are not reducible to the laws of becoming, which 
are thus différances of becoming, because they counteract it by differ-
ing and deferring [différant] the ‘law of becoming’ that is entropy – 
ephemeral différances with respect to what henceforth constitutes the 
rule of the ‘arrow of time’, and a new age of melancholy.
What trans-forms entropic inevitability [fatalité] into negentro-
pic opportunity [possibilité] is law and right [droit] – and as such it 
is connected to the being-for-death described by Heidegger in Being 
and Time (which should be reinterpreted in relation to both Freud599 
and Schrödinger600). In such a conception of law, interpretation is a 
transformation – and law turns back to Marx, who began as a law 
student in the school of Friedrich Carl von Savigny.601 It is as this 
power and knowledge of neganthropic transformation that the right 
to philosophy is a duty of philosophy, which must be redefined for the 
Anthropocene-become-disruptive – that is, accomplishing nihilism as 
absence of epoch.
In the Anthropocene, which is also and firstly a question of entropy, 
the history of the supplement that is the reality of différance must be 
reconsidered and concretely expressed in terms of the new perspec-
tive that begins to take shape with Sadi Carnot and passes through 
the cosmology of Hubble and the biophysics of Schrödinger – and 
it must constitute a critique both of cognitivism and neurocentrism. 
Understood with Canguilhem, the history of life is the process of a 
negentropic différance that becomes neganthropic with the emer-
gence of lithic tertiary retention, intensifying its noodiversification 
with hypomnesic tertiary retention, and eventually leading to the 
Anthropocene with the autonomization of the means of calculation 
in the service of negotium, and depending on the function of reason 
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to make the différance capable of reinventing an ‘art of life’ – in 
Whitehead’s sense – with the pharmakon that has emerged from this 
new stage of exosomatization.
The history of the supplement constitutes the history of a code, 
which, as we read in Of Grammatology, is firstly genetic, but which 
with tertiary retention is no longer organic but organological, which 
is also to say, pharmacological: where we must make (a) différance 
that is no longer given, a vital process of artificial selection that is 
the function of reason, posited in other terms by Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen in order to redefine economics as what, with exosomatiza-
tion, replaces biology as that which governs the relationships between 
organs and organizations so as to maintain entropy at low levels.602
Digital tertiary retention and the coding referred to by Lessig lead 
to high performance computing, as a way of treating ‘big data’, and 
to ‘data science’, and this is what allows Chris Anderson to claim 
there is no longer any need for theory. But this so-called ‘correlation-
ist’ treatment of digital data performing at two-thirds of the speed 
of light, between two and four million times quicker than the nerve 
impulses that produce this data, brings with it an overwhelmingly 
entropic becoming in which the data economy, increasingly self-ref-
erential due to the performative effects induced by feedback loops 
and algorithmic recursive functions, tends to become a closed system 
whose effect can only be precipitate the ‘shift’ evoked by the signato-
ries of the article in Nature.
In January 2000, Lessig alerted internauts (those who constitute in 
potential what Mauss called the internation) to the fact that ‘the code 
is not fixed’:
The architecture of cyberspace is not given. […] [T]he code 
can change. Other architectures can be layered onto the basic 
TCP/IP protocols, and these other architectures can make 
behavior on the Net fundamentally regulable. Commerce is 
building these other architectures.603
In June 2015, this architecture has indeed changed, and in the 
very direction anticipated and denounced by Lessig. It can and must 
change in the opposite direction, and become a hermeneutic web, that 
is, a publication space for digital tertiary retention dedicated to the 
formation of a new noetic and political community founded on the 
categorical imperative of reversing the overwhelmingly entropic pro-
cess borne by the current computational system, a system that exclu-
sively serves a capitalism itself becoming purely, simply, exclusively 
and therefore absolutely computational – entropic as such, that is, 
inherently self-destructive.
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Such a reversal consists in particular in reinventing interpretative 
tools: IRI is developing a forerunner of such tools in the form of a 
platform for sharing and annotating lecture notes.
It is not a question of resisting, as Derrida, Lyotard and Deleuze 
all end up saying, but of inventing. The theoretical organology to 
which the study of the history of différance and of the supplements 
that generate noodiversity leads can be constituted only on the basis 
of organological practices that can and must themselves generate new 
exosomatic proposals, that is, new histories of the supplement – and in 
order to make (the) différance through a bifurcation opening up a new 
era of noesis: the Neganthropocene.
Simondon allows an understanding of différance that goes beyond 
Derrida, as allagmatic practice,604 and vice versa: différance is also 
what, driving the processes of vital, psychosocial and techno-logical 
individuation that Simondon tried to think, enables care-ful thinking 
about the future [panser l’avenir] of individuation and disindividua-
tion (of the pharmakon) beyond Simondon’s residual humanism.
Today, the defence of neganthropic law and right against anthropic 
facts – wholly against them, right up against them [tout contre] – has 
the right and the duty to modify those digital tertiary retentions that 
are the codes and platforms that put them to work, in the service of a 
new age of noesis in general, as the exosomatic principle of the dif-
férantiation of law within facts, that is, as artificial selection in the 
service of those neganthropic works needed by the Neganthropocene.
24 The différantial function of reason and its instruments
We should understand and transform the protentional negativity of our 
fellow men and women – to which Florian bears witness – through 
the quasi-causal modification of facts (the retentional industry) into 
right and law (as the sharing of protentions), where the heart of the 
problem (and not just the question) is to give a reasoned account of 
this quasi-causality through which a (de)fault becomes what is nec-
essary – which we must think care-fully with Derrida and Deleuze, 
which is also to say, with Nietzsche and (right up) against [tout con-
tre] Heidegger.
Reason is différantial: it is a regime of différance, and it stems from 
a noetic power that is neganthropological, through which its function 
is constituted. In other words, the necessary default is the organologi-
cal and pharmacological regime of neganthropy as noetic différance.
Having become disruptive in the sense described in Dans la dis-
ruption, this exosomatic fact is what leads to the situation described 
by Anderson: it is the fact of the ‘end of theory’, and it is a passage 
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to the limit of the doubly epokhal redoubling as loss of reason, that 
is, of its function, which is to provide criteria. Law would then be a 
reconstruction of knowledge that starts from what presents itself ini-
tially as its destruction, which, today, is its being put into question by 
Absolute Non-Knowledge and by the information industry – within 
which information is conceived as completely calculable.605
This challenge, this being put into question, always proceeds from 
what Ivar Ekeland describes as an instrumental expansion – that is, an 
organological and pharmacological expansion – that opens possibili-
ties for bifurcations in the system that all knowledge constitutes, cre-
ated through the emergence of observable improbabilities:
We are, today, in a position identical to those who peered 
into the Leeuwenhoek microscope at the end of the eigh-
teenth century. Place a drop of water in a microscope and 
you will see many things of which you hitherto had no idea. 
Use your computer, and you will realize calculations that 
you could never have accomplished with paper and pencil, 
and you too will see that there are many things of which you 
had no idea.606
What Ivar Ekeland describes here does not just concern concep-
tual knowledge: it also affects work-knowledge and life-knowl-
edge, knowledge of how to live and do, which means that it affects 
the affects.
This affection now occurs at the speed that bit-strings circulate in 
fibre optic cables, between two and four million times quicker, as we 
said, than the impulses that course through our nervous system. We 
must, therefore, turn to the neurosciences: by using cerebral imaging, 
Maryanne Wolf has shown that the real issue here is that the cerebral 
organ is disorganized and reorganized as a result of interiorizing, via 
the mediation involved in the practice of hypomnesic tertiary reten-
tions, the circuits of transindividuation that are forms of knowledge 
– and, through them, social solidarities, but also the divisions, dis-
putes and conflicts of interpretation that underlie them (as the super-
saturated potentials of the preindividual funds in which they consist).
This view is diametrically opposed to that of Catherine Malabou:
I consider it incontestable, from now on, that the structures 
and operations of the brain, far from being the glimmerless 
organic support of our light, are the only reason for pro-
cesses of cognition and thought; and that there is absolutely 
no justification for separating mind and brain.607
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Once upon a time, we had Gall’s phrenology, in which ‘spirit is a 
bone’.608 Today we have a soft phrenology where spirit – blithely con-
founded with thought, itself reduced to ‘cognition’ – becomes gelat-
inous, while reason, mentioned in passing, becomes a synonym for 
causality, consisting of this gelatine traversed by electro-chemical 
currents, in which Catherine Malabou sees the proof of her thesis with 
respect to the mind as plasticity. Is it still from such a perspective that 
we must understand the question of the ‘epigenesis of reason’?609
Rather, what is truly urgent is to reread Kant with Freud (swept 
away by Malabou in the name of gelatine) and Freud with différance, 
where différance would no longer be ‘quasi-transcendental’ but quasi-
causal, which is also to say, organological – the schematism being the 
site of this organological condition. It is this that Ekeland’s account 
makes clear.
This in turn requires, not only that Derrida be read with Simondon 
and Deleuze, but that all these French authors be read alongside The 
German Ideology of Marx and Engels.610
25 Sculpture, gardening, culture:  
impromptu remarks on the noetic cerebral organ
As Henri Bergson had the audacity to suggest when, in opposing 
Théodule Ribot, he raised this issue, thinking is not contained within 
the brain.611 We ourselves say, after Bergson – and beyond what he 
himself said612 – that it lies between neganthropological beings such 
that their brains have the characteristic of being cultivated: cultivated 
like gardens, and not simply ‘sculpted’.
This culture is made possible by instruments (tertiary retentions), 
which, by constantly disorganizing and reorganizing noetic cere-
bral organs within a noetic loop that is a spiral or a fractal wherein 
intergenerational and transgenerational circuits of transindividua-
tion form, succeed in fostering neganthropic anamneses that always 
remain yet to come, and therefore invisible (invisible to cerebral imag-
ing and to de-noetized exosomatic beings, just as they are to correla-
tionist algorithms): these are consistences,613 which neither exist nor 
subsist, remaining always to come – in différance.
To think care-fully [panser] is to complete this loop by accom-
plishing the neganthropological fate in which noesis consists: its dif-
férance. Contrary to what Tarde614 suggests, what lies between brains 
as cultivated organs in the service of reason as neganthropic func-
tion is not a void: it is an infinite organological field (in the sense in 
which Deleuze and Guattari use this adjective, ‘infinite’, in What is 
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Philosophy?615 – though they did not themselves clearly see the organ-
ological dimension it contains).
In this field – which we should also understand in Simondon’s 
sense, that is, in the sense of the Theory of Form, and of electromag-
netism – unfinished organic organs are cultivated, which are thereby 
inherently and structurally heteronomous (because non-self-suffi-
cient: the hand of the pianist, the foot of the footballer, the ear of the 
student). They are cultured through operations conducted with the 
noetic instruments emerging from this endless dynamic loop, polar-
ized by anthropic forces and neganthropic counter-forces, which 
consist both in tertiary retentions, whether hypomnesic or otherwise 
(tools, instruments, works, cities, networks and so on), and in the cir-
cuits of transindividuation attached to them. All this constitutes what 
Simondon called the transindividual, and it is transmitted by the 
educational processes of all kinds that are the quotidian lot of what, 
therefore, is called ex-perience.
Noetic cerebral organs, being organo-logical, exo-somatize the 
endosomatic organic organs that they inherit in coming into the 
world: they trans-ductively ‘organologize’ them, so that the endoso-
matic organ becomes the organ of a socially exo-somatized cohesion 
[faire-corps], inscribed on circuits constituted by the symbol and the 
fetish as well as the object, tool, instrument, machine, code and insti-
tution. Passing through these circuits, they are inscribed into the his-
tory of knowledge – where knowledge is always a knowledge taking 
care of the pharmakon that is always the exosomatic reality, failing 
which it un-does [dé-fait] this cohesion [faire-corps], a disintegration 
that haunts all philosophy and beyond (from Socrates to Durkheim, 
via Hobbes and Spinoza).
In creating social cohesion [faire-corps social], the exosomatic 
body, individuating itself by knowing, produces bifurcations in 
knowledge that dis-organize it in order to re-organize it anew. It does 
so by participating, deliberately or otherwise, in the generation of 
new tertiary retentional organizations, and, through that, in giving 
rise to new collective protentions. This quasi-circularity, considered 
more closely, is a constant looping back, the spirals of which, con-
stituting moments of intermittence, that is, oscillations, form a frac-
tal spiral because they are encased, along with other spirals, within a 
larger spiral that is also their différance, in a sense that passes through 
Simondon and beyond Derrida, itself encasing more local spirals: 
intermittences are also relations of scale between orders of magni-
tude, that is, between localities of scale.
The noetic brain is not just organic: it is organological, which means 
infinitely in différance. But it is because this is so that, inversely, it is 
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continuously being proletarianized and finitized, in ways that are ever 
more noticeable to those who, as mortals, live in this strange way: this 
technical form of life (that Canguilhem described as its own patho-
logy, that is, as its own health – as its normativity) consists primarily 
in mortifying itself, always and forever. But, in so doing, it leaves 
traces that will be reactivated inasmuch as they constitute a negan-
thropological potential.
This is what Nietzsche never managed to think with the notion of 
‘will to power’, even though it amounts to this very question.
What is called panser, therefore, sets out like a fall. Yet this fall 
raises – an elevation that is always also a falling back, a relapse.
J’attends en m’abîmant que mon ennui s’élève. (I await, ruin-
ing myself, the raising of my ennui.)616
I write this as a student [élève] of Derrida: he raised me, as does any 
philosopher, so another might come. A philosopher is one who raises 
[éleveur, breeder]. Such ‘raising’, however, is not what Peter Sloterdijk 
ironically imagines can be found in Plato’s Republic – thereby dis-
solving all these questions and problems (which all pass through the 
question of politeia) in his customary caustic cleverness.
Derrida raised me, and I entered his thinking through the gener-
ous thought of another éleveur, Gérard Granel. These confidences are 
addressed to Catherine Malabou, to whom – taking up an old, long-
interrupted dialogue of the deaf,617 which I am unilaterally resuming, 
beyond the contingency of the individual and collective contemporary 
miseries typical of de-noetization – I now say: the brain is the organ 
of the disorganization that results from its always untimely expres-
sion, projected away from it, through which what is called panser 
always escapes from those who still try to think care-fully within the 
experience of the already that presents itself in fact (and in its effects) 
only as the not-yet (thinking here both of Heidegger and Proust – and 
thus of Proust and the Squid618).
Between these alwayses, alreadies, stills and not yets is woven 
the exigency, at once intragenerational, intergenerational and trans-
generational, of faith, without which there can be no alētheia, or 
dikē, or noesis.
Let us now find support for these questions by reading ‘Pensée et 
technique’, an article by Rudolf Boehm published in 1960619 – that is, 
before Heidegger published his texts on the Kehre – after which we 
will attempt a kind of conclusion.
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26 The history of the future:  
technics, ontological difference and knowledge
In What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology, I recalled that:
What is called ‘man’ is apprehended by Heidegger, at the 
beginning of Being and Time, as Dasein. And to this being-
there [Heidegger] accords [the] privilege […] of posing 
questions.620
It is indeed written in Being and Time that ‘this being which we our-
selves in each case are, and which has in its being and among other 
things the possibility of posing questions, will be designated with the 
name Dasein’.621 The quotation from On Pharmacology continues:
Leaving Heideggerian thought to one side, I propose that the 
question of the question is that of who, in posing questions, 
creates long circuits and through that adopts that which con-
stantly places into question, namely, the pharmakon.622
The circuit of adoption always generates a new pharmakon (which 
could be a neologism or a molecule or an instrument), which in 
turn always ‘wants’ to be adopted, and which itself always launches 
another putting into question. Such is the basis of what Simondon 
called ‘de-phasing’ [déphasage], shifting phase.623
When I was writing On Pharmacology, I had not yet read Boehm’s 
‘Pensée et technique’. Reading this article from 1960 brings new 
elements to the reading of Heidegger, in particular as concerns the 
meaning of tekhnē – and feeds into my own perspective as argued via 
the question of the doubly epokhal redoubling, which is the system 
of ‘escapement’ (in the horological sense of the word, but also in the 
sense of the forgetting of being) that keeps the measured and excessive 
beat [bat la mesure et la démesure] of what it is no longer sufficient to 
call the ‘history of being’: it is a matter of the history of the future.624
Each time there occurs – as an echo of a stage of the doubly epokhal 
redoubling – a challenge, a putting-in-question, what is most diffi-
cult and most urgent is to describe this questioning, that is, to discern 
in what way it is unheard-of and unprecedented, which means, radi-
cally improbable because incomparable and therefore incalculable, 
and, in this sense, impossible, which makes this today a today as never 
before. To make this impossible into a possibility, Möglichkeit, in the 
sense this is used in ‘Letter on Humanism’,625 is what is at stake in 
Entschlossenheit,626 as well as with quasi-causality, and it falls within 
a logic and a history of that supplement which is the trace of différance.
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Such a description is the formulation of the order and disorder of 
questions engendered by the being put in question(s) – a question is 
never the bearer of just one question – resulting from what Heidegger 
called ‘setting to work’ (in Werk setzen), which is also to say, putting 
to work, working, if not machining [usinage].627
The question of the order of questions, which forms the founda-
tion of the method that emerges from Discourse on Method, is also 
the issue in what Heidegger called ontological difference. It is with 
this question that we must begin, even if it is in an après-coup. Such a 
question of order cannot remain unaffected by the disorder that, since 
Clausius, constitutes the direction of the universe in a way that seems 
to stifle in advance any horizon of promise, and which is or becomes628 
through this fact the first question, and, in a way, the limit between 
the order and disorder of these questions. We will see, however, that 
a question of order and disorder629 is present in An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, and is so as violence, Gewalt.
Différance is precisely this question of the deferral and differ-
entiation of disorder by order, and as the violence of a power. This 
différance must today be understood and made as such: ‘today’, in 
our time, which is to say in that moment when disruption gives rise, 
in what we must understand as the Entropocene, to a disorder that 
attempts to impose a new order, but an order that remains indifférant 
because it is founded on extreme proletarianization. It is this ques-
tion that we must turn into a problem, as Deleuze says, which means 
that we must think care-fully about it by questioning the concept of 
différance (its knowledge) and the power of différance on the basis of 
the economy and dis-economy (the pharmacology) of anthropy and 
neganthropy: such is the program of a neganthropology.
A question, in the sense of being what constitutes the historial priv-
ilege of Dasein (that is, the exosomatic privilege – a privilege that is 
therefore a problem and not just a question), is never ordinary. It is 
always extra-ordinary (in Being and Time this is the each-time singu-
lar question – in any epoch of the ‘history of being’ – of ontological 
difference). And this is what is said, by antithesis, in the last strophe 
of the chorus song in Antigone. What is extra-ordinary is the ‘onto-
logical difference’ that arises out of the ordinary, that is, from what 
Being and Time calls the ontic.
But the question that falls to us, that falls due for us, and to which 
Florian bears witness, is not just an extra-ordinary question, not 
just ontological in the Heideggerian sense: it is the question of the 
Ereignis, which in his later writings Heidegger related to Gestell, as 
that which puts in question the very possibility of putting in question, 
and as the ‘co-propriation’ of the human and technics-become-Gestell. 
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The questions of Gestell and Bestand appear in 1949, no doubt as the 
turn par excellence.
In 1962, Heidegger pronounced his final word on ‘what has been 
called “Being” up to now’,630 and on that which ‘there is’, on the ‘it 
gives’ (es gibt).
For us, in the twenty-first century, the ‘task of thinking’ is to 
undertake a return to the question of tekhnē, which in 1960 Boehm 
showed to be the first, last and constant issue of thinking throughout 
Heidegger’s work, where, precisely, knowing is a work, that is, the 
crafting and fashioning of a difference (with an ‘e’) we must make, 
which Heidegger called ontological and which with Derrida became 
the différance of the trace.
In the order, disorder and chaos of a putting-in-question that clearly 
upsets everything [nous bouleverse] as never before, the first question 
that imposes itself upon us as we are gathered here in, behind, before 
or after what we call philosophy, is not a putting in question of the 
‘right to philosophy’. The first question that imposes itself upon us 
today is the putting in question of the right to knowledge, and, by the 
same token, not the duty of knowledge but the duty to knowledge: the 
duty that befalls all of us to guarantee the right and the duty to access 
knowledge and to access it ourselves – and thus, the duty to demand to 
be able to know, organologically, pharmacologically and in the inter-
nation that would thereby be constituted.
In ‘Pensée et technique’, Boehm analyses and compares two texts: 
on the one hand, ‘On the Essence of Ground’, in which Heidegger 
establishes that transcendence constitutes the horizon of facticity as 
the ‘being-in’ of Dasein, and, on the other hand, An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, in which it seems that this transcendence is fundamen-
tally constituted by the technicity of Dasein. Tekhnē, here, is a syn-
onym of knowledge, and so, on this subject, Heidegger modifies his 
interpretation of Plato. Boehm writes:
If our claim about the close relationship between the idea 
of ‘transcendence’ (in ‘On the Essence of Ground’) and 
tekhnē (in the Introduction) is true, then it follows that one 
and the same idea is referred, in Heidegger, initially to Plato, 
whereas, in the later instance, Platonic-Aristotelian philoso-
phy is on the contrary characterized by the loss of this idea 
and of the knowledge of originary tekhnē.631
In An Introduction to Metaphysics, this relationship between tekhnē 
and being – which is then also called dikē, and is so insofar as being is 
power, Walten – takes the form of a conflict between being and Dasein 
as a technician who knows only by working, operating, and where 
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tekhnē seems indeed to constitute a putting-in-question of being by a 
privileged being itself put in question, while being reveals itself to be 
dikē (which, we read in Protagoras, is brought to mortals by Hermes):
That the being of man is tekhnē means that he is violent. 
That man is violent means that his being is tekhnē. What, 
then, is the meaning of this word?632
The violent is the δεινον, that which is dreadful, δεινοτατον. Boehm 
here quotes An Introduction to Metaphysics on a decisive point:
Tekhnē means neither art nor skill, and it means nothing 
like technology in the modern sense. We translate tekhnē 
as ‘knowing’. But this requires explication. Knowing here 
does not mean the result of mere observations about some-
thing present at hand that was formerly unfamiliar. Such 
items of information are always just accessory, even if 
they are indispensable to knowing. Knowing, in the genu-
ine sense of tekhnē, means initially and constantly look-
ing out beyond [Hinaussehen] everything subsistent. This 
transcendence…633
And Boehm specifies that ‘instead of Transcendenz, Heidegger here 
uses Hinaussein’, in the sense that an object is also called transcen-
dent that is ‘outside myself’ (Gilbert Kahn translates Hinaussein by 
‘être-au-dela’).634
This transcendence sets to work in a preliminary way, and 
in different ways and on different paths and in different 
domains, that which alone gives to what subsists its relative 
law, its possible determination and thus its limit. To know 
is to know how to put being to work in the form of beings.635
In the absence of epoch, as the fulfilment of nihilism now known as 
the Anthropocene, and after this violence, it seems that this setting to 
work, as transcendence in the sense of Hinaussein, is the process of 
exosomatization qua artificial selection by noetic dreams that ‘real-
ize’ what Heidegger called the ontological difference, but which after 
Derrida we should call différance. This différance, however, must be 
understood as a question of entropy, and of the deferral that différan-
tiates it and spaces it (a question that Derrida did not take up), and 
it must be specified as noetic (and preceded by vital différance), and 
hence as always engendering pharmaka, which is also to say night-
mares: it ‘is’ that which there is qua Gestell.
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Hence the Greeks called art and artworks tekhnē in a privi-
leged sense, because art is what most immediately brings 
being – that is, the appearing that stands there in itself – into 
being (in the work).636
Being, here, is dikē: dikē ex-presses being in its conflict with tekhnē, 
a conflict where, however, being appears via the beings that tekhnē 
constitutes.
This deinon is, according to Heidegger, twofold: the uncanny 
is, on the one hand, that violence (Gewalttätigkeit) which 
profoundly characterizes the very existence of the human 
being and which properly speaking constitutes its essence; 
and, on the other hand, the still more powerful overwhelm-
ingness (das Überwältigende) of being, which, at the same 
time, provokes and breaks the violent ‘reaction’ against it 
and that is the being of man.637
The genesis of being and of its difference, so to speak, is this con-
flict between two powers and two violences. In this conflict, being 
presents itself to the privileged being that is Dasein as dikē:
The reign of this super-eminence of being and its disturb-
ing uncanniness is expressed, according to Heidegger, in the 
Greek word dikē; that in which the violence that pervades 
the existence of man consists can be understood by reflect-
ing on the original meaning of the word tekhnē.638
Here, Boehm again quotes Heidegger:
Thus, deinon as the overwhelming [that is, the powerful] 
(dikē) and deinon as the violence-doing (tekhnē) confront 
each other. […] Tekhnē breaks out against dikē, which, for 
its part, as fittingness (Fug), has all tekhnē at its disposal.639
Hence:
It [this confrontation] is only insofar as the uncanniest, 
human being, happens – insofar as humanity essentially 
unfolds as history.640
What is at stake in this conflict – which Heidegger described as the 
history of being, and which we are calling noetic différance insofar 
as it is neganthropic within the violence of that exosomatization by 
which ‘human being, insofar as it exists’, is dreadful and violent, in 
the confrontation with all being, and thus with itself – is the doubly 
epokhal redoubling inasmuch as noesis can reconstitute a peaceful 
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possibility for dikē that can only ever be temporary, and within which 
conflicts simmer. These conflicts, when they generate knowledge, can 
be both polemic and pacific: this is what the ancient Greeks knew as 
the experience of logos – and it is what we learn from Heraclitus.641
27 Knowledge, capital and the Anthropocene: capital as noetic 
indifférance and the violence of power today
Knowledge (of being) is tekhnē: it is tekhnē that puts us in question 
– making us journey towards knowledge, which it, nevertheless, has 
always already put into question anew.
For if tekhnē is knowledge, it is also and always what obliter-
ates knowledge, as well as the right to know, and hence the duty to 
know. And this is so because, as Marx and Engels showed in 1845–
46,642 tekhnē as knowledge is also the power to exercise domination 
through an exteriorization without return, that is, without re-interi-
orization – and therefore without noetic différance: in a noetic indif-
férance that is also a fiduciary, that is, calculable, différance, which is 
called capital.643
Such is the paradox of knowledge that remains only exterior-
ized knowledge, and which thereby becomes proletarianizable. It is 
Socrates who in the Phaedrus first investigates this machinic fate of 
knowledge, and it is in this light that we should reread the Grundrisse. 
Tekhnē is what opens this question but also what makes it inaccessible 
and closes it off. And it is in these terms that Boehm concludes his 
own analysis:
Just as constantly as with the question of the meaning of 
being, Heidegger seems preoccupied by a problem that, 
although it shows itself in many different guises, in varying 
contexts and from changing perspectives, remains funda-
mentally the same: the problem that results from a techni-
cal condition within which thinking seems inevitably con-
strained whenever it intends to undertake a setting-to-work 
of its truth.644
Truth, alētheia, is set into work [mise en oeuvre], is Werk, that is, work, 
machining, fabrication [travail, usinage et fabrication].
In the language adopted in Automatic Society and Dans la disruption 
in order to pave the way for the continuation of Technics and Time, 
this ‘truth’ is that of exosomatization – which is also to say, what 
Hegel had already described as exteriorization,645 which constitutes 
the Wirklichkeit of the phenomenology of Spirit, and the production 
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of exosomatic organs as it is described by Marx and Engels in The 
German Ideology.
Exosomatization is tekhnē inasmuch as through it being is given 
only while withdrawing – as pharmakon.
Indeed, any tekhnē or technics to which thinking must nev-
ertheless appeal in order to evoke the meaning of being 
seems that it must inevitably provoke a conflict between 
this original meaning of being and, precisely, the attempt to 
think it. Does being itself, therefore, originarily refuse the 
evocation of its meaning?646
It is on the basis of such questions that we should read Identity and 
Difference,647 ‘The Turn’648 and ‘Time and Being’.649 Failing which, 
the provocation (das Herausfordern) that is Gestell remains incompre-
hensible, and falls into the disastrous interpretation of Heidegger by 
the French little Heideggerians.
Or would the technical provocation of being itself, accord-
ing to the very meaning of being, be both the only mode 
possible and the only authentic mode of such an evocation, 
and in such a way that thinking would succeed in bursting 
apart the meaning of being by the very fact of the failure of 
its work?650
To burst apart [éclater] the meaning of being, to make it fail, there-
fore, would or could be ‘the only authentic mode of […] an evocation’ 
of being! For once, we are indeed entitled to use an exclamation mark 
– here, as never before, on this register that gives so much to think 
about care-fully [donner à panser].
The failure is the default, that is, hubris, and inasmuch as it is neces-
sary, even though it always re-commits [refait] the default, and does 
so as violence, Gewalt, which is also authority, that is, power.651 It 
is this failure that becomes power precisely as that which is neces-
sary, that is, what the Greeks called anankē, necessity as well as fate, 
Geschick. And this is what dikē means – which calls for aidōs, but 
about the latter Heidegger has here not one word to say.
But if this is so, should philosophy then forget being and 
simply concentrate its efforts on reaching the greatest per-
fection of its technique? Or, finally, would there still remain 
a possibility for thinking to discard its links to a technical 
condition?652
On this final question Heidegger would stumble until the end. As for 
the possibility that philosophy might ‘simply concentrate its efforts on 
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reaching the greatest perfection of its technique’, this is the disastrous 
point to which we have arrived precisely in and since the denial and 
the disavowal of the technicity of panser.
Philosophy does not refer, here, only to what we call ‘philosophy’: it 
refers to the knowledge emerging from the history of being in totality, 
that is, in the first place, mathematics and physics, and then to every-
thing that emerges in the twentieth century as cybernetics, which, in 
this sense, is also a kind of philosophy. We know that, for Heidegger, 
Wiener, along with Heisenberg, was a subject of his attention. But 
what Heidegger pays no attention to is that which constitutes – for 
care-ful thinking about the there (Da) within which hubris exercises 
the power and violence of dikē, which is not simply law (nomos) – a 
crucial new element, namely, negentropic locality, brought to light by 
Schrödinger in 1943.
To pay attention to this there that opens up a world ‘poor in world’, 
and to pay attention to the conditions for enriching this impoverished 
world that is also the violent possibility of a destruction of these worlds 
– such is our task, beyond Schrödinger as beyond Heidegger and 
Derrida, and this requires care-ful thinking about exosomatization.
The ‘greatest perfection’ of technics is what is attained here [là] 
where Gestell is imposed as ‘the Being of what is today all over the 
earth’, as Heidegger wrote at the beginning of ‘Time and Being’.653 
And it is Gestell that thereby establishes ‘the relation of man to what 
has been called “Being” up to now’.654 These are the questions that 
open up with the conclusion of Rudolf Boehm’s article.
28 The uncared-for
Let us ourselves (reader and author) recapitulate, and let us draw 
whatever conclusion is possible at present.
The duty of philosophy in the Anthropocene, where Florian can no 
longer have waking dreams, is to turn to the natural sciences as well 
as the human and social sciences, and also to the sciences and tech-
nologies of the digital, and to break with what has formed a disabling 
limit of ‘deconstruction’, namely: the absence of any dialogue with 
science and mathematics. We must go beyond this situation, which 
was established in the early 1970s. This requires a profound reinter-
pretation of différance and its traceological supplementarity.
This also means that here, philosophy does not come claiming 
an established right: it proposes a field characterized by a spectrum 
of obligations that affect all academic claims within the sphere of 
rationality – and this obviously amounts to another interpretation of 
rationality – that is, an interpretation of reason as the organ and the 
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function capable of dreaming, forming and setting-to-work ‘rational’ 
motives (that is, motor affects).
Here, reason is not dis-affected calculation, which in the twenty-
first century becomes algorithmic, but rather a matter of the her-
meneutic investment of traces, and of differentiating from the new 
anti-political economy in and through a neganthropological différance 
whose operation must effect bifurcations – after the default.
To make (the) différance can only be to articulate the logic of the 
supplement with the history of the supplement – and vice versa, which 
means, to experience [expérimenter] the logic of the supplement and 
to make it into an Epimethean affair in this sense, which cannot con-
tain itself to logos inasmuch as ‘logocentrism’ has always involved 
a failure to see that language is a case of exosomatization. To experi-
ence the history of the supplement through the logic of the supple-
ment and vice versa is to experiment with it by putting it to the test, 
to undergo the ordeal of the violence of tekhnē in order to realize the 
necessary pacification. It is, in other words, to uphold the law [faire 
droit au droit], to face up to our fatum – but what fatum? The fatum of 
generalized degradation of a kind that Lévi-Strauss could never have 
envisaged, thought or cared for, or supported.
The duty of philosophy is to make this différance – which performa-
tively gives itself the law through this very fact. It is, in other words, to 
bring this performativity, which so fascinated Derrida,655 to the point 
of its fully noetic consideration, so that it can again become suggestive 
for care-ful thinking of theories of bifurcation. A performative utter-
ance constitutes an event occurring within a context and requiring 
a signature: it is, in this way, a bifurcation – and, precisely, a noetic 
bifurcation.
Philosophy must assume this task today, and it can do so only 
organologically: the conditions of possibility and impossibility of per-
formance understood in this sense are those of ‘code’, in Lessig’s sense. 
This obviously raises the question of writing in Derrida’s sense, and 
of this very strange history of supplementarity in which code – which 
Derrida more or less imprudently related to the ‘genetic program’ 
(and on this point Atlan had grounds for disagreement: genetic code 
as it was thought in the epoch of Of Grammatology is today no lon-
ger conceived as a ‘program’) – has today become a function, serving 
not reason but, precisely, the understanding, and an automatic under-
standing, which is exactly what Chris Anderson describes, and as the 
proletarianization of reason itself (but Anderson sees nothing of this). 
But such an automatic understanding has, through this very fact, lost 
(its) reason.
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Theories of positive and negative entropy, of dissipative struc-
tures, of chaos, order and disorder,656 but also information theory, 
cybernetics and their degraded extensions into cognitivism and even 
their integration by Gilbert Simondon into his (allagmatic) concept of 
information, are incapable of being mobilized for what we are here 
calling panser in the Anthropocene – care-ful thinking towards the 
Neganthropocene. All these forms of thinking, deriving from the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, remain fundamentally locked 
within a failure to consider tekhnē – a neglect through which the indif-
férance of tekhnē is able to come fully into play, as the unthought and 
the uncared-for, the impansé.
The 2015 and 2016 pharmakon.fr seminars and summer academies 
were devoted to showing that organology requires new ways of theo-
rizing entropy and negentropy – as anthropy and neganthropy – where 
the pharmakon is what always produces both entropy and negentropy 
in ways that are not just those of the living. This is what cybernetics, 
information theory and cognitivism all ignore, as does Simondon.
Only on this condition will it be possible and fruitful to engage 
a new critique of political economy (passing through Georgescu-
Roegen), at a moment when automation is consigning global capi-
talism to a structural insolvency that is itself equally global. Only a 
macro-economics founded on a systemic culture of neganthropy could 
bring about a new ‘shift’, giving rise to a new epoch of epokhality 
itself: an epokhē being what as such comes about thanks to a negan-
thropic bifurcation.
This is the significance of the questions of Ereignis and Gestell in 
‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’657 and ‘Time and 
Being’. These lectures were not given until after Boehm had pub-
lished ‘Pensée et technique’658 – and they should be read on the basis 
of Boehm’s analysis, which breaks with Heideggerian doxa on many 
planes, including those by which Heidegger himself understood his 
own work, being himself intermittent, that is, falling prey [déché-
ant], through those backwards steps [reculs] that are symptoms of his 
politico-spiritual errancy (the question of Geist imposing itself pre-
cisely here).659
Contrary to this doxa, tekhnē, as Heidegger discusses it in An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, constitutes a quite singular regime of dif-
férance to which even Derrida ultimately remained indifférant – indif-
ferent to its as such and to everything that in Heidegger stems from 
it. To think care-fully about this age of différance, which is therefore 
necessarily also an age of indifférance, is what Florian expects of us, 
without knowing it, precisely because he cannot know without us, 
who in turn cannot know without he who suffers the consequences 
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of this indifférance. He does not have within himself the resources to 
fight it, because noetic différance cannot be constituted without trans-
mission, without a heritage, which is always the more or less dampened 
violence of a test of strength with and in the intergenerational and the 
transgenerational.
Indifférance is precisely what short-circuits this test, this com-
bat (polemos), which is the scene spoken of by Heidegger in An 
Introduction to Metaphysics and interpreted by Boehm, a scene 
in which the name of necessity is dikē – ‘justice beyond law’, as 
Derrida said.
29 Machination
What is at stake in the Grundrisse is the machinic fate of knowledge – 
and, in this regard, we must return to the passage in An Introduction 
to Metaphysics where Heidegger elaborates the meaning of tekhnē 
as knowledge.
Boehm does not quote from the beginning of this passage, where it 
is a question of machination – to mēkhanoen660 – which constitutes the 
field of violence, deinon, and of the violent, deinotaton:
Violence, the violent, within which the action of the vio-
lence-doer moves, is the whole circuit of the machination, to 
mēkhanoen, which is entrusted to him.661
Entrusted to him, that is, to ‘the action of the violence-doer’, that is, to 
us, ‘the being that we ourselves are’, and such that we are, there where 
we are: on the earth of the twenty-first century, an earth encircled by 
the geostationary satellites of the Entropocene.
We are not taking the word ‘machination’ in a pejorative 
sense. We are thinking, through it, something essential that 
announces itself to us in the Greek word tekhnē.662
This thesis, which introduces Heidegger’s whole discourse with 
respect to what establishes tekhnē as knowledge, illuminates the ques-
tion of the interpretation of the verse of Pindar that Valéry made the 
epigraph of Cimetière marin – within which we must try to live:
Μή, φίλα ψυχά, βίον ἀθάνατονσπεῦδε,
τὰν δ᾽ ἔμπρακτον ἄντλει μαχανάν.663
It is starting from these questions, reopened by Boehm, concerning 
what, in Heidegger, ties tekhnē to dikē, and such as we have intro-
duced them into the interpretation of Gestell and Ereignis, that we 
must understand with Alain Frontier the impossibility of translating 
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μαχανάν – a question of idiom, that is, of idiocy, that is, of locality, 
which is the question of the Da, and which haunts Dans la disruption 
through and through: it is the question that sends us mad.
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Notes 305 
indirectly, and Derrida lacks the question of organogenetic dif-
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Misery series introduced the themes of organology and pharmacol-
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Derrida’s commentary on it, nevertheless adds to the reading of the 
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closer to Gilles Deleuze, and, in some respects, Michel Foucault. 
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448 In an extended sense of the concept of the technogeographical mi-
lieu presented in Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical 
Objects – where it is a matter of physical geography, whereas here 
we are referring to human geography. See Stiegler, Automatic 
Society, Volume 1, §22.
449 See Simondon, On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, and 
my commentaries in Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, Stiegler, The 
Re-Enchantment of the World: The Value of Spirit Against Industrial 
Populism (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), and Stiegler, 
Automatic Society, Volume 1.
450 See Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, Negotiations 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 177–82, and 
Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1, §14.
451 This thesis is advanced in Bernard Stiegler, For a New Critique of 
Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
452 On denial, see Stiegler, Dans la disruption, §§12, 34, 50, 72 and 
101, and ch. 15.
453 On this shift, see Anthony D. Barnosky et al., ‘Approaching a State 
Shift in Earth’s Biosphere’, Nature 486 (7 June 2012), pp. 52–8, and 
my commentary in Stiegler, Dans la disruption, esp. §20.
454 On this point, see Stiegler, La Société automatique 2, ch. 2.
455 This obstacle blocking the horizon is what Florian, my silent inter-
locutor in Dans la disruption, calls ‘the end’.
456 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2010).
457 See Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology.
458 The operations of Dasein, that is, of its retentions and protentions, 
are the stakes of what Simondon called the allagmatic.
459 This question of violence, of hubris and of justice should obviously 
be articulated with the thought of Walter Benjamin.
460 See especially Martin Heidegger, ‘The Turn’, Bremen and Freiburg 
Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012).
Notes 310 
461 I develop this point in Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living, ch. 
1. On what, with respect to this putting in question(s), encloses 
Heidegger’s position and the ‘fourfold’ within ‘metaphysics’, and 
which encloses at the same time those whom, particularly in France, 
we call ‘Heideggerians’, see Stiegler, Dans la disruption, §126, and 
Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
462 Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1, ch. 5.
463 Stiegler, La Société automatique 2 has the specific goal of showing 
that this new age of ideology (in the sense of The German Ideology) 
coincides with a new age (in the way we refer to the age of gold or 
bronze or fire) of exosomatization, which the transhumanists under-
stand as requiring no criteria other than that of the market, that is, of 
calculation, in order to non-allagmatically effect the choices generat-
ed by the artificial selection through which, for the last three million 
years, technical life has exosomatically pursued the organogenesis 
of the living.
464 Bernard Stiegler, Acting Out (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2009), pp. 1–2.
465 This is first enunciated by Valéry (in 1919 and again in 1939), then 
by Freud (1929) and eventually by Husserl (1934).
466 Rudolf Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique. Notes préliminaires pour 
une question touchant la problématique heideggérienne’, Revue 
Internationale de Philosophie 14 (1960), pp. 194–220.
467 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970), p. 10.
468 Adolf Hitler, text of the decree, dated 2 August 1934, request-
ing the 1934 plebiscite, quoted in Ralph Jessen and Hedwig 
Richter (eds), Voting for Hitler and Stalin: Elections Under 20th 
Century Dictatorships (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 
2011), p. 240.
469 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1968).
470 See Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography 
(London: Flamingo, 1984), p. 77.
471 It is the same, consequently, for Derrida, who is either treated as a 
god who must be repeated to the letter, which is beyond ridiculous 
for this thinker of the letter, or ignored – and ignored because he 
would supposedly be ‘Heideggerian’.
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472 See Edmund Husserl, ‘The Origin of Geometry’, in Jacques Derrida, 
Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1978).
473 Here we should engage a dialogue with Patrick Boucheron and his 
great ‘inaugural lecture’ at the Collège de France on 17 December 
2015. This will be outlined in Stiegler, La Société automatique 2. 
See Patrick Boucheron, Ce que peut l’histoire (Paris: Fayard, 2016), 
or see the video of the lecture, ‘What History Can Do?’, with si-
multaneous English interpretation, available here: <http://www.
college-de-france.fr/site/en-patrick-boucheron/inaugural-lecture-
2015-12-17-18h00.htm>.
474 Stiegler, Dans la disruption, §116.
475 Translator’s note: See Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: The 
Last Interview (Houndmills, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 25–26: ‘I am referred to more and more often 
as a survivor – the last, the final representative of a “generation”, that 
is, roughly speaking, the sixties generation. Without being strictly 
speaking true, this provokes in me not only objections but feelings 
of a somewhat melancholic revolt. In addition, since certain health 
problems have become, as we were saying, so urgent, the question of 
survival [la survie] or of reprieve [le sursis], a question that has al-
ways haunted me, literally every instant of my life, in a concrete and 
unrelenting fashion, has come to have a different resonance today. I 
have always been interested in this theme of survival, the meaning 
of which is not to be added on to living and dying. It is originary: life 
is living on, life is survival [la vie est survie]. To survive in the usual 
sense of the term means to continue to live, but also to live after 
death. When it comes to translating such a notion, Benjamin empha-
sizes the distinction between überleben, on the one hand, surviving 
death, like a book that survives the death of the author, or a child the 
death of his or her parents, and, on the other hand, fortleben, living 
on, continuing to live. All the concepts that have helped me in my 
work, and notably that of the trace or of the spectral, were related to 
this “surviving” as a structural and rigorously originary dimension’.
476 And more precisely, if I believe a conversation that I had with 
Warren Sack, in Provençal. As for old French and old German (‘Old 
High German’), they bear within them the whole question and prob-
lem of the there and of its no-longer-being-there in the absence of 
epoch. In the next volumes of Technics and Time, and in particular 
in the final volume, I will go into these questions of not-being-there 
as such, that is, as questions of locality. We will see that locality is 
what Heidegger cannot think care-fully [panser] because, like most 
of the philosophers of the twentieth century, and with the exception 
of Bergson, he ignored the issue of entropy and the issue of localities 
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that form negentropically – even though the there of Dasein, insofar 
as it always presents itself as being not (yet) there, is neganthropo-
logical. That there which is not yet, and which, in this there, is not 
thought yet (see What is Called Thinking?, a text in which Heidegger 
thinks thinking firstly as memory), is exosomatic. This means that 
it is not a simple locality such as the Umwelt of the animal. It is an 
ēthos, which is also to say, the khōra of a taking place constrained 
by dikē and aidōs as the criteria of artificial selection for which phu-
sis provides to mortals no given or donation other than their very 
facticity within the default such as it can, and in that must, become 
that which is necessary, anankē. These questions, which will be thor-
oughly disentangled [débroussaillées] in La Société automatique 2, 
will set out the path that will be opened up in the final three volumes 
of Technics and Time, as the breakthrough from the Anthropocene to 
the Neganthropocene.
477 Alain Rey (ed.), Dictionnaire historique de la langue française (Paris: 
Le Robert, 2012).
478 These questions of assimilation and selection will be entered into 
more deeply, with Nietzsche and with the analyses of Barbara 
Stiegler (in Nietzsche et la biologie [Paris: PUF, 2001] and Dionysos 
et la critique de la chair [Paris: PUF, 2005]), in Bernard Stiegler, La 
Société automatique 2, ch. 3.
479 Rey, Dictionnaire historique de la langue française.
480 Plato, Meno, discussed in Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, ch. 5, esp. 
pp. 97–98. Translator’s note: And see Bernard Stiegler, ‘Persephone, 
Oedipus, Epimetheus’, Tekhnema 3 (1996), pp. 88–91.
481 Rey, Dictionnaire historique de la langue française.
482 See Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2000), and Boehm’s analyses in 
‘Pensée et technique’.
483 Bernard Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).
484 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Différance’, Margins of Philosophy (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
485 André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1993), p. 97. Translator’s 
note: And see Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, pp. 154ff.
486 Translator’s note: Technique et langage is the first volume of La 
geste et la parole.
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487 Translator’s note: La mémoire et les rythmes is the second volume of 
La geste et la parole. Both volumes were combined in the English 
translation.
488 André Leroi-Gourhan, Milieu et techniques (Paris: Albin Michel, 
1945), and see Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, pp. 43–44 and 53–56.
489 See Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological (New 
York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 198, and Stiegler, What Makes Life 
Worth Living, p. 29.
490 Stiegler, States of Shock, ch. 5 attempts to show that we can inter-
pret the Hegelian speculative proposition and what it misses starting 
from these return shocks. This in turn relates to why the project of 
Catherine Malabou, too, misses the essential, leading her to privilege 
the brain, just as Gall (according to Hegel) privileged the skull bone.
491 Of course, animal life can have exosomatic dimensions that are ac-
commodations to the milieu. But we refer to exosomatization only 
when endosomatic organogenesis becomes dependent on exosomatic 
organogenesis, which, conversely, becomes independent of the bio-
logical conditions of endosomatic organogenesis.
492 Examples include Merlin Donald, Kim Sterelny and Michael 
Tomasello. Gerald Moore, thanks to whom I have discovered these 
works, is conducting a systematic and thorough investigation of arti-
ficial selection, starting from these new perspectives.
493 Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, pp. 401–8.
494 We will see this by reading Heidegger with Boehm. But we should 
add here that the measure cannot be reduced to dikē in the tragic 
Greeks, and that it is also called aidōs, which, strangely enough, 
Heidegger never refers to in his project of thinking tekhnē.
495 Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, p. 107, translation modified.
496 Marc Azéma, La Préhistoire du cinéma. Origines paleolithiques 
de la narration graphique et du cinématographe… (Paris: Errance, 
2011). And see also Marc Azéma and Florent Rivére, ‘Animation 
in Palaeolithic Art: A Pre-Echo of Cinema’, Antiquity 86 
(2012), pp. 316–24.
497 Georges Bataille, Prehistoric Painting: Lascaux, or The Birth of Art 
(Geneva: Skira, 1955).
498 On this point, see Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
499 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects (Minneapolis and 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).
500 See Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1.
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501 Translator’s note: See, for example, Michel Deguy, A Man of Little 
Faith (Albany: State University of New York, 2014), p. 36: ‘What is 
threatening today also threatens poetry. I often call it “the cultural”. 
How can we resist this Threat, if not by renewing our attachment 
– to the world of the earth, to the literature of our languages, to the 
tradition of poetry?’
502 Translator’s note: For Heidegger’s analysis of deinon and to deinota-
ton, see Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, esp. pp. 159–61, 
where Heidegger understands the latter in Sophocles’s Antigone as 
referring to human being as both ‘the uncanniest’ and ‘the most vio-
lent’, but where it must be kept in mind that the entire of this lecture 
course is an attempt to pursue this understanding as an ‘essence’ 
rather than as a particular ‘property’ of the human being. This 
analysis is taken up again in 1942, in Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s 
Hymn ‘The Ister’ (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), esp. pp. 61–74. But unlike in 1935, in 1942 Heidegger 
also pays particular attention to the figure of Antigone herself as the 
supreme deinon (see pp. 102–5).
503 In Stiegler, Dans la disruption, I have tried to show that this passes 
through the opposition that is set up between calculation and medita-
tion in Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1966).
504 Bataille, Prehistoric Painting, p. 12: ‘Directly we enter the Lascaux 
Cave, we are gripped by a strong feeling […] of presence – of clear 
and burning presence – which works of art from no matter what pe-
riod have always excited in us’.
505 See Stiegler, La Société automatique 2. What is missing in Jean-
François Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), in his conjoined reading of 
Kant and Wittgenstein, is just such an account of the role of exoso-
matization in the noetic faculties.
506 See Azéma, La Préhistoire du cinéma, p. 21.
507 These questions should be considered in close relation to those 
raised by Aby Warburg, Ludwig Binswanger and the young Michel 
Foucault. See Stiegler, Dans la disruption.
508 Translator’s note: See, for example, the letter from Adorno to 
Benjamin dated 18 March 1936, in Ernst Bloch, Georg Lukács, 
Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno, Aesthetics 
and Politics (London and New York: Verso, 1977), pp. 120–26.
509 Bataille, Prehistoric Painting, p. 119, translation modified: ‘The 
Lascaux “Man in the Well” is one of the most significant of the earli-
est known figurations of the human being. […] But the stiff, childlike 
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manner is unsettling, all the more so because of the bison’s realistic 
execution – the bison is in every sense alive. The bison is wounded 
and the man is lifeless: although simply leaning backward, the man 
is stretched out, legs flung wide, hands open. Underneath the man is 
a traced bird, less awkward but no less childishly drawn; this bird 
without feet is perched, like a weathercock, atop a kind of rod.
‘This scene has been responsible for varying and hardly reconcil-
able hypotheses. […] I wish at once to stress one undeniable point: 
the difference in the presentations of the man and the beast. The 
bison itself falls within a kind of figuration of the real that could 
be called intellectual realism […], the bison seems naturalistic in 
comparison with the man [who seems] awkward […] and similar to 
children’s simplifications. Many children would do a drawing like 
this one of the man; not one would attain the vigour and suggestive 
force of the bison picture. […] Hence the paradoxical opposition of 
the representations of man and animal as it appears to us, from the 
outset, at Lascaux.
‘On the whole, the human figures of the Reindeer Age conform 
to this profound separation, as if, through some systematic spirit, an 
effort was made to preserve man from the naturalism which, when 
it was a question of representing animals, achieved astonishing 
perfection’.
510 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1, p. 155, translation modified.
511 An ontology that is based on the exclusion of Weltgeschichtlichkeit 
(§§76–83 of Being and Time) from the ‘fundamental’, a 
Weltgeschichtlichkeit that can be constituted only factically, acciden-
tally, making of Geschick just one such accidental necessity.
512 And of the idiocy that it contains, as does any idiom, which, as we 
will see in L’idiotie, when it becomes the sixth [or seventh] volume 
of Technics and Time, is the condition of the there, Da: of locality 
inasmuch as it is irreducible.
513 On the absence of epoch, see Stiegler, Dans la disruption.
514 This text is a kind of connecting together of what, between 2000 
and 2016, has led to a range of works in which concepts have been 
developed that were generally absent from Technics and Time, 
1–3. The question of nihilism appears especially in Disbelief and 
Discredit, and is then developed systematically in the two volumes 
of Automatic Society, where it becomes a key issue.
515 On this dis-integration, see Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1.
516 Translator’s note: The reference here is to Heidegger, Being and 
Time, §7, p. 35 (German pagination), the point at which Heidegger is 
first attempting to characterize the way that phenomena show them-
selves in such a way as to require a phenomenology: ‘What is it that 
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phenomenology is to “let be seen”? What is it that is to be called 
“phenomenon” in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very es-
sence becomes the necessary theme when we indicate something 
explicitly? Manifestly it is something that does not show itself ini-
tially and for the most part, something that is concealed [verborgen] 
in contrast to what initially and for the most part does show itself. 
But, at the same time, it is something that essentially belongs to what 
initially and for the most part shows itself, indeed in such a way that 
it constitutes its meaning and ground’.
517 See Bernard Stiegler, Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected 
Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Polity, 
2013), ‘Introduction’.
518 See Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living, p. 77.
519 In the sense of Stiegler, Taking Care of Youth and the Generations.
520 Translator’s note: See, for example, Maurice Blanchot, The Space of 
Literature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 229, and 
Blanchot, The One Who Was Standing Apart from Me (Barrytown: 
Station Hill Press, 1993), p. 24.
521 Translator’s note: ‘Ursprüngliche Zeit’ is often translated into 
English as ‘primordial time’. On this ursprüngliche Zeit see, for ex-
ample, Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 329 (German pagination).
522 On the question of the dream, see also Stiegler, Automatic Society, 
Volume 1, ch. 3.
523 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: “What is 
Enlightenment?”’, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 54.
524 See Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living, pp. 27–29.
525 See ibid., pp. 14–15.
526 It may well be observed that it is not only history, but ‘-ology’ in 
general that is thus suspended. But I believe that organology and 
pharmacology are the effective and historical reality of this suspen-
sion – and that the objection against ‘-ology’ is what makes it pos-
sible to ‘hide behind one’s little finger’ [‘se cacher derrière son petit 
doigt’, avoid facing responsibility], and this is undoubtedly where 
digital studies must begin: by positing that the fingers and more gen-
erally the digits can always be used to hide.
527 Sylvain Auroux, La Révolution technologique de la grammati-
sation. Introduction à l’histoire des sciences du langage (Liège: 
Mardaga, 1994).
528 Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3, pp. 214–15.
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529 Translator’s note: See Joseph Beuys, quoted in Bernard Stiegler, 
Symbolic Misery, Volume 2, p. 64. ‘Man can only express himself 
through forms imprinted in matter. Which is certainly also al-
ready the case with the tongue’. Cf., Joseph Beuys, What is Art?: 
Conversation with Joseph Beuys (Forest Row: Clairview, 2004), p. 
78, where the translation misses not only the reference to the tongue 
but the reference to imprinting as well.
530 This is what I have tried to show in the courses of pharmakon.fr.
531 Aby Warburg, ‘A Lecture on Serpent Ritual’, Journal of the Warburg 
Institute 2 (1939), pp. 277–92.
532 I argued in Bernard Stiegler, Pharmacologie du Front national 
(Paris: Flammarion, 2013) that it is this putting into reverse that 
Marx and Engels analysed in The German Ideology.
533 That is, having no hope of ever being equal to any god – and hence 
not forgetting that the fire of Zeus becomes, in the fabricating 
hands and numerating digits of mortals, a pharmakon, a ‘dangerous 
supplement’.
534 By way of Deleuze, as I have explained in particular in States of 
Shock, but also through the hermeneia of Barbara Stiegler. This will 
be the issue in Stiegler, La Société automatique 2, ch. 2.
535 This was explained in the final chapter of Stiegler, The Decadence 
of Industrial Democracies. It was also the subject of my final discus-
sion with Derrida, in Rio de Janeiro, in closing a symposium dedi-
cated to him.
536 In Stiegler, ‘How I Became a Philosopher’, Acting Out, and in the 
courses of pharmakon.fr, especially during the first two years, that 
is, 2010–11 and 2011–12. This will be the main issue in Symboles et 
diaboles, the fourth [or fifth] volume of Technics and Time.
537 The surface of the water, which, once having fallen back into it, 
seems to it to be the surface of the air (the surface of the air as we 
sometimes see it when, in a swimming pool, while wearing a diving 
mask, we swim underwater like fish and peer up at what is above us: 
we see the surface of the air – as if this inversion restored something 
to the location).
538 This dialogue will be reread in detail in Symboles et diaboles.
539 We will read these works of Bergson in L’idiotie, the sixth [or sev-
enth] volume of Technics and Time.
540 On the occasion of a symposium held at the University of Kent at the 
initiative of the Noötechnics group. See ch. 1 in this volume.
541 See Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1.
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542 Chris Anderson, ‘The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the 
Scientific Method Obsolete’, Wired (23 June 2008), available at: 
<http://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/>. I comment on this 
text in Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1.
543 Florian, in L’Impansable (coll.), L’Effondrement du temps: Tome 1, 
Pénétration (Paris: Le Grand Souffle Editions, 2006), p. 7. I interpret 
this testimony in Stiegler, Dans la disruption.
544 It was in 2014 at the University of Kent that I argued for the need for 
this ‘entropology’ so as to elaborate a new age of knowledge based 
on a neganthropology – during which one of the organizers of the 
conference, Benoît Dillet, reminded me that Claude Lévi-Strauss 
concluded the final chapter of Tristes Tropiques by claiming that an-
thropology might more accurately be described as an ‘entropology’. 
See ch. 1 in this volume.
545 What follows is obviously only a start, to which La Société automa-
tique 2 will add further clarifications, and for which the final three 
volumes of Technics and Time will be the continuation – Inshallah.
546 With the exception of some paragraphs towards the end, the fol-
lowing text, as I have already indicated, was largely presented at 
Princeton University in the autumn of 2015.
547 I keep this word in Greek because it contains a dimension that is 
otherwise lost in classical hermeneutics: hermeneia above all means 
‘ex-pression’, and this is the sense that is conveyed when Aristotle 
writes Peri hermeneias.
548 Derrida, Of Grammatology, pp. 4–5, translation modified, my italics.
549 Jonathan Crary, 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (London 
and New York: Verso, 2013).
550 Jacques Derrida, Who’s Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), and Jacques Derrida, 
Eyes of the University: Right to Philosophy 2 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004).
551 Pope Francis, Laudato Si’ (dated 24 May 2015; published 18 June 
2015), available at: <http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/
encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-lau-
dato-si.html>.
552 Charles Melman, L’homme sans gravité (Paris: Denoël, 2002).
553 Grandeur et décadence d’un petit commerce de cinéma (Jean-Luc 
Godard, 1986). Psychoanalysis, pansée par excellence, was for 
decades, especially through Freud, Klein, Winnicott and Lacan, a 
perpetual, conceptual construction site, producing, on the basis of 
its clinical practice, the most daring analyses and syntheses. Since 
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the loss of Lacan, and with rare exceptions (such as Paul-Laurent 
Assoun), it has become mostly the exploitation of its legacy in the 
form of a small business that seems, in the eyes of many – wrongly – 
to be as obsolete as haberdashery.
554 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 5.
555 Derrida concluded his introductory remarks on my thesis, which he 
supervised, in front of a jury chaired by Jean-Luc Marion, by asking 
me the question, ‘What is it you’re afraid of?’ In the course of the 
weeks and months that followed, I could not help but think that, in 
this way, Derrida was both downplaying the gravity of the situation 
I was attempting to describe as the uncontrolled extension of reten-
tional technology, and making a show of being someone ‘who is not 
afraid’. The question I was raising, however, had nothing to do with 
fear [peur] in a way connected to cowardice, but to do with worry 
[crainte], in a way that requires courage.
556 Anthony D. Barnosky et al., ‘Approaching a State Shift in Earth’s 
Biosphere’, Nature 486 (7 June 2012), pp. 52–8. The article was sum-
marized by its authors as follows: ‘Localized ecological systems are 
known to shift abruptly and irreversibly from one state to another 
when they are forced across critical thresholds. Here we review evi-
dence that the global ecosystem as a whole can react in the same 
way and is approaching a planetary-scale critical transition as a re-
sult of human influence. The plausibility of a planetary-scale “tip-
ping point” highlights the need to improve biological forecasting by 
detecting early warning signs of critical transitions on global as well 
as local scales, and by detecting feedbacks that promote such transi-
tions. It is also necessary to address root causes of how humans are 
forcing biological changes’.
557 Nietzsche, who was not unaware of the question of entropy, never-
theless could not quite take on board what, with Schrödinger, would 
have strengthened his position with respect to nihilism and with re-
spect to the task of philosophers after overcoming their ‘original sin’ 
– which is ‘their lack of historical sense’.
558 This is explained in Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1 and 
Stiegler, Dans la disruption, and will be explained in greater detail 
in Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
559 These questions receive more detailed examination in Stiegler, La 
Société automatique 2.
560 On ‘anthropy’, which is not just entropy, but its pharmacological and 
organological effection, see Stiegler, La Société automatique 2, ch. 3.
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561 See François Châtelet, Jacques Derrida et al., Le Rapport bleu: Les 
sources historiques et théoriques du Collège international de philoso-
phie (Paris: PUF, 1998).
562 Bernard Stiegler, States of Shock, p. 187.
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid.
565 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, 2nd edn (Boston: Beacon, 2002).
566 Stiegler, States of Shock, p. 196.
567 Which led him to give the lecture in Berkeley – which in my view 
was a reversal of his own teaching, as I explain in States of Shock – 
that would be published as L’université sans condition.
568 Derrida, ‘The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy before Linguistics’, 
Margins of Philosophy.
569 Emile Benveniste, ‘Categories of Thought and Language’, Problems 
in General Linguistics (Coral Gables: University of Miami 
Press, 1971).
570 On this point, see Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
571 Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects.
572 The average speed of nerve impulses is fifty metres per second, but 
they can reach speeds of one hundred and twenty metres per second.
573 Lawrence Lessig, ‘Code is Law’, Harvard Magazine (Jan.–Feb. 
2000), available at: <http://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/
code-is-law-html>.
574 I have raised this subject in commenting on Yann Moulier Boutang’s 
L’Abeille et l’Économiste (Paris: Carnets Nord, 2010), in Stiegler, 
Automatic Society, Volume 1, pp. 211–12 and 229–30.
575 This question is lacking in the analyses of the relationships between 
law and technics by the great French jurist Alain Supiot.
576 See Peter Galison, Einstein’s Clocks and Poincaré’s Maps: Empires 
of Time (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).
577 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television: 
Filmed Interviews (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
578 Jacques Derrida, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Phenomenology 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 167. 
And see Stiegler, Technics and Time, 2, pp. 237–38. Translator’s note: 
And see also Bernard Stiegler, ‘Derrida and Technology: Fidelity at 
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the Limits of Deconstruction and the Prosthesis of Faith’, in Tom 
Cohen (ed.), Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 240–41.
579 Plato, Protagoras. I translate aidōs by ‘vergogne’, and I have ex-
plained this in relation to our ‘today’ in Bernard Stiegler, Constituer 
l’Europe 1. Dans un monde sans vergogne (Paris: Galilée, 2005).
580 This is precisely what the mediology proposed by Régis Debray 
abandons – because it does not supply the means, posing itself as an 
alternative to philosophy, in relation to which it sometimes seems 
contaminated by resentment.
581 This will be developed in Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
582 Alain Supiot, Homo Juridicus: On the Anthropological Function of 
the Law (New York and London: Verso, 2007).
583 In the sense I have developed in Stiegler, The Decadence of Industrial 
Democracies.
584 See Immanuel Kant, ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, 
Political Writings, and my commentary in Stiegler, Technics and 
Time, 3, p. 200.
585 Galison, Einstein’s Clocks and Poincaré’s Maps.
586 See: <recherchecontributive.org>.
587 See Stiegler, Pharmacologie du Front national, p. 181. This is what 
surviving Althusserians, cultivating their post-noetic boutiques, are 
incapable of understanding and therefore of thinking – which makes 
them incapable of thinking care-fully [panser], that is, of opening 
new political perspectives in a situation that nevertheless makes this 
necessity both obvious and absolute.
588 See Husserl, ‘The Origin of Geometry’, pp. 170–74.
589 But we must here totally reconsider the question of biopolitics and 
biopower – which is one of the subjects of Stiegler, La Société au-
tomatique 2, ch. 2.
590 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 1 (German pagination).
591 Ibid., §17.
592 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1982), pp. 261–64.
593 See Stiegler, Dans la disruption.
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594 The subject of Stiegler, La Société automatique 2 is a new theory 
of the faculties founded on a history of the noetic functions that 
compose them.
595 See Stiegler, Dans la disruption.
596 See Emile Petitot, Vocabulaire Français-Esquimau: Dialecte des 
Tchiglit des Bouches du Mackenzie et de l’Anderson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. xxxiii.
597 Warburg, ‘A Lecture on Serpent Ritual’.
598 See Stiegler, Technics and Time, 3.
599 This will be analysed via Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle in La 
guerre des esprits, the fifth [or sixth] volume of Technics and Time.
600 See Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
601 See Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1, pp. 142–45 and 157–60.
602 See Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic 
Process, and my commentary in Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
603 Lessig, ‘Code is Law’.
604 See Anaïs Nony’s contribution to the 2016 pharmakon.fr 
summer academy.
605 See Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
606 Ivar Ekeland, ‘Hasard, chaos et mathématiques’, in Réda Benkirane 
(ed.), La Complexité, vertiges et promesses: 18 histoires de sciences 
(Paris: Pommier, 2006), p. 266.
607 Catherine Malabou, The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain 
Damage (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), p. xiii.
608 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), §343.
609 Translator’s note: See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 
(London: Macmillan, 1929), p. 174, and see also Catherine 
Malabou, Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2016).
610 This is what I have tried to document more precisely in my last 
three books.
611 Translator’s note: See Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New 
York: Zone Books, 1991), pp. 126–31.
612 I will return to this in detail in L’idiotie, the sixth [or seventh] vol-
ume of Technics and Time.
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613 Consistence is a key concept developed in the Disbelief and Discredit 
series, and especially in the first volume.
614 Gabriel Tarde, The Laws of Imitation (New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1903).
615 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994).
616 Stéphane Mallarmé, Collected Poems and Other Verse (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 16–17.
617 I am thinking especially of a reading and an interpretation of the 
preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit that we conducted together 
one winter on the island of Ushant, and which we recorded with a 
camera that I had just purchased – it must have been in 1984.
618 Maryanne Wolf, Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the 
Reading Brain (New York: Harper, 2007).
619 Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique. Notes préliminaires pour une question 
touchant la problématique heideggérienne’.
620 Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living, p. 105, my italics added.
621 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 7 (German pagination), transla-
tion modified.
622 Stiegler, What Makes Life Worth Living, p. 105.
623 Clearly, a pharmakon does not ‘want’ anything. Nevertheless, it 
seems to want to be adopted: it seems to be animated. This is true of 
the fetish as well as of any tertiary retention insofar as it is ‘invested 
with spirit’. Such an investment is not reducible to the fetishized 
attributes of the commodity. It is possible only because the struc-
ture with which spirit is composed is that of revenance, that is, of 
haunting, which forms the horizons of Weltgeschichtlichkeit through 
which are arranged the always, the already, the still and the not yet 
that weave and are woven in primary and secondary psychic and col-
lective retentions and protentions.
624 Translator’s note: On the author’s combined horological and philo-
sophical use of ‘escapement’ in relation to the indeterminate and in-
calculable ‘instant of my death’ as the dynamic of the individuation 
of my singularity, see Stiegler, The Lost Spirit of Capitalism, p. 63.
625 On the meaning of this term in Heidegger’s ‘Letter on Humanism’, 
see my commentary in Stiegler, Dans la disruption, §133.
626 Heidegger, Being and Time, §§60–62.
627 Werk also means fabrication, manufacturing.
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628 This is the moment to stress how in Martin Heidegger, The Essence 
of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2002), a lecture course given in 1931, he insisted 
that these questions of individuation be posed as a question of the 
becoming of Dasein, and, through that, of being inasmuch as it is 
only as history.
629 That this is also a question of disorders of magnitude is discussed in 
Stiegler, Automatic Society, Volume 1, §62.
630 Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 
1972), p. 2.
631 Rudolf Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, p. 204.
632 Ibid.
633 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 169–70, translation modi-
fied. Boehm quotes the French translation by Gilbert Kahn.
634 Translator’s note: Gregory Fried translates Hinaussein into English 
as ‘Being-out-beyond’, and hence very much in conformity with 
Kahn’s ‘être-au-dela’. The earlier translation by Ralph Manheim 
uses ‘transcendence’. Here we have altered Fried’s translation, 
bringing it slightly closer to Kahn’s French, in order to make clearer 
the steps of Boehm’s and Stiegler’s arguments.
635 Ibid., pp. 169–70, translation modified.
636 Ibid., p. 170, translation modified.
637 Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, p. 199.
638 Ibid.
639 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 171, translation modi-
fied, quoted in Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, pp. 199–200.
640 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 171, translation modi-
fied, quoted in Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, p. 217, my italics. 
Translator’s note: Note that this was translated rather differently into 
French as ‘survient ce qu’il y a de plus inquiétant : l’être de l’homme, 
pour autant que l’homme existe, en tant qu’histoire’.
641 I will return to these questions in the subsequent volumes of Technics 
and Time, and to the difference of justice and law that they contain, 
passing through Nietzsche and the will to power on the basis of anal-
yses undertaken in La Société automatique 2. Here, we must again 
quote Jacques Derrida, this time in ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical 
Foundation of Authority”’, Acts of Religion (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 234: ‘Heidegger will try to show that, for 
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Heraclitus, for example, Dikē, (justice, right, trial, penalty or pun-
ishment, vengeance, and so forth) – is eris (conflict, Streit, discord, 
pólemos or Kampf); that is, it is adikia, injustice, as well’.
642 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: 
Progress Press, 1976).
643 Fiduciary différance is what makes belief calculable, through which 
it is transformed into trust – in the market: into credit without credo. 
This introduction of calculability into the heart of the protentions in 
which credo, credit, trust, confidence and so on all consist, is what, 
in Disbelief and Discredit, follows from the problems discussed at 
the end of Technics and Time, 3. This is one of the threads that ties 
together all the books that have appeared since 2003. But what re-
mains essential is panser in the Anthropocene – care-ful thinking 
towards the Neganthropocene.
644 Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, p. 217, my italics.
645 See Stiegler, States of Shock, ch. 5.
646 Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, p. 217.
647 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1969).
648 Heidegger, ‘The Turn’, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures.
649 Heidegger, ‘Time and Being’, On Time and Being.
650 Ibid., my italics.
651 Derrida, ‘Force of Law’, p. 234: ‘Gewalt also signifies, for Germans, 
legitimate power, authority, public force. Gesetzgebende Gewalt is 
legislative power, geistliche Gewalt the spiritual power of the church, 
Staatsgewalt the authority or power of the state. Gewalt, then, is both 
violence and legitimate power, justified authority’.
652 Boehm, ‘Pensée et technique’, p. 217.
653 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 2.
654 Ibid.
655 Translator’s note: For example, in Jacques Derrida, ‘Declarations 
of Independence’, Negotations: Interventions and Interviews, 1971–
2001 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
656 These last terms are highly contested, especially by René Thom and 
his disciples.
657 Heidegger, ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’, 
On Time and Being. Also included in altered translation in 
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Heidegger, Basic Writings, revised and expanded edition (London: 
Routledge, 1993).
658 Translator’s note: The lecture ‘Time and Being’ was given in 
January 1962 at the University of Freiburg and ‘The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’ was given in April 1964 in 
Paris. The four lectures now published in English as ‘Insight Into 
That Which Is’, and which were the origin of Heidegger’s account of 
Gestell, and the basis of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (a 
lecture given in November 1953 in Munich and published in 1954), 
were first given in 1949, but the crucial fourth of these lectures, 
‘The Turn’ (also translated as ‘The Turning’), was not published in 
German until 1962.
659 I will return to this in Stiegler, La Société automatique 2.
660 Translator’s note: This phrase from the so-called ‘ode to man’ 
is from line 365 of the Loeb edition of Antigone. See Sophocles, 
Antigone, The Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 
1994), pp. 36–37.
661 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 169, transla-
tion modified.
662 Ibid., translation modified.
663 Pindar, ‘Pythian 3’, 61–2: ‘O my soul, aspire not to immortal life, 
/ But draw strongly from the sources of mekhanē’. In French: 
‘Ô mon âme, cesse d’aspirer à la vie immortelle, / mais puise 
énergiquement aux sources de la mékhanè›. This translation was 
inspired by the commentary of Alain Frontier on the translation of 
Aimé Puech, available at: <http://www.sitaudis.fr/Incitations/lettre-
a-un-ami.php>.
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